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READINGS IN rrECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
Selections from the Publications 
of the Program of Policy Studies 
in Science and Technology 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1966 The George Washington University made a deliberate 
institutional decision to inquire into the means by which the know-
ledge and analytical resources of a major university in the Nation's 
Capital might be usefully related to the on-goin~ public policy 
process while simultaneously strengthening the research and instruc-
tional programs of the university. A generous institutional grant 
from NASA enabled the University to establish the Program of Policy 
Studies in Science and Technology which was to be applied to the 
development of "a university policy analysis capability." 
The Program of Policy Studies is an interdisciplinary, Univer-
sity-wide policy analysis group. The Program has a core staff of 
full-time professional researchers representing a wide range of dis-
ciplines. The Program draws on the resources of the University 
faculty, gnaduate and professional students and research facilities. 
The Program's special strength is the capability to assemble and 
manage interdisciplinary analysis groups. Continuing relationships 
are maintained with the governmental agencies, professional associa-
tions, and other private sector representatives in the Washington 
area. 
The Program has taken an active interest in all areas of Science, 
Technology, and Public Policy. Members of the staff have had an 
early, intense, and continuing int.erest in the development of Tech-
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nology Assessment concepts and methodologies. This aspect of policy 
studies is especially appropriate since Technology Assessment involves 
an interdisciplinary analytical process designed to provide decision 
makers with information on the total social implications of proposed 
programs and projects. 
The Proll:.ram produced approximately 40 publications relating to 
Technology Assessment during the period of the NASA award. These 
studies explore the historical, theoretical, methodological, and 
institutional aspects of assessment. Many of these publications 
represent early efforts to probe the concept and methodologies of 
the assessment function. They have served, along with the contrib-
utions of many other institutions and scholars, to acquaint a gener-
ation of technology assessment practitioners--both graduate students 
and policy makers--with the process of technology assessment. 
This volume has two purposes. The first is to republish, in 
whole or in part, PPS technology assessment publications still in 
demand but now out of print. The second is to publish in one volume 
some of the PrograIIl I s more significant assessment studies. With 
these objectives in mind, the papers selected for this volume are 
organized to reflect the Program1s research in the following areas: 
development of the concept of technology assessment; institutionali-
zation of technology assessment; the interface between law and tech-
no logy assessment; and assessment case studies. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
Technology assessment is not one clearly defined analytical 
technique. Quite the contrary. It embodies several essential proc-
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esses: problem definition, data gathering, analysis of alternatives, 
and policy implementation. However, the assessment procedure will 
vary with the task-objective given or posited, including such var-
iables as the nature of tile technological project configuration to 
be assessed with respect to defined social environments. 
The Program's publications on the developnlent of the concept of 
technology assessment reflect a variety of conceptual facets. 
Kranzberg's paper, Historical Aspects of Technology Assessment! 
indicates that current concepts of technology assessment and effo~ts 
to institutionalize the assessment functi0n clearly have antecedents 
in the events and decisionmaking sequences of the past. The excerpts 
from Coates's larger study, Technology and Public Policy: The Proc-
ess of Technology Assessment in the ]'ederal Government j summarize 
the basis of early legislative concern for establishing a legisla-
tive technology assessment component to aid in public decision-
making. 
The Technology Assessment task must confront the interacting 
variables--conditions and trends--of an evolving social process. 
Contextual factors are obviously of great relevance to the defini-
tion of the relevant problem situation. These topics and others 
are discussed in Mayo's paper, The Contextual Approach to Technology 
Assessment: Implications for 'One-Factor F~X' Solutions to Complex 
Social Problems. It is an obvious fact that we have attempted to 
solve, alleviate, or somehow cope with intricate social problems by 
totally inadequate "single ft ctor'l means whether the latter be legal, 
economic, or technological. The contextual approach undertakes to 
demonstrate that technology assessment assis~s in the identification 
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of the full range of implications of taking a particular action and, 
in addition, facilitates the consideration of alternative means by 
which the total affected social problem context might be changed by 
available project options. 
The paper by Black, Technology Assessment: What Should It Be? 
provides a special perspective on the technology assessment function. 
It stresses the necessity of uncovering unsuspected relationships 
in proposed actions, and treats the feasibility of using decision 
theoretical models to cope with problems of uncertainty in the fu-
ture-oriented analyses characteristic of assessments. Mayo's paper 
on Social Impact Evaluation sets forth an anticipatory assessment 
construct which emphasizes the importance of concepts and standards 
of lIsocial justice" or schemes of social value weight and distribu-
tion in performance of the assessment task. 
The Program's publications have also r·3flected another aspect 
of conceptual development, i.e., refinement of the methodology of 
technology assessment. Jones's paper, Generating Social Impact 
Scenarios: A Key Step in Making Technology Assessment Studies, ·sum-
marizes a methodology developed by the Mitre Corporation for the 
Office of Science and Technology. This paper was presented in a 
seminar series the Program conducted on technology assessment. The 
conceptual and methodological importance of doing retrospective 
technology assessments is summarized in the research proposal: 
Retrospective Technology Assessment: Submarine Telegra~. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
The Program's papers and reports on the institutionalization of 
technology assessment represent several different perspectives and 
levels of analysis. They include examination of the institutional-
ization of technology assessment in the legislative and executive 
branches of the Federal government and in State government. The 
important issue of public participation has also been addressed. 
Drawing upon teaching, governmental and policy analysis exper-
ience, Mayo prepared a detailed analysis for the Congress of the 
relationships between an institutionalized assessment function and 
legislative information gathering and decisionmaking needs. This 
is reprinted as: Some Legal, Jurisdictional, and Operational Impli-
cations of a Congressional Technology Assessment :omponent. 
Mayo's paper on Some Implications of the Technology Assessment 
Function for the Effective Public Decisionmaking Process undertakes 
to analyze ways in which the institutionalization of the assessment 
function can affect the following phases of the public decision pro-
'. 
cess: problem perception, problem definition, data assembly, inven-
tion of alternatives, evaluation cd options, authorization, imple-
mentation, operation, appraisal, and modification. 
Presented next are excerpts from one of the Program's studies 
on the implementation of technology assessment, or the use of tech-
nology assessment information in decisionmaking. This study was pre-
pared by Kasper, Logsdon and Mottur and titled: I~plementing Techno-
logy Assessments: Final Report of the Technology Assessment Imple-
mentation Project. 
Reprinted in its entirety is Coates's Sl;!mmary Report: Technology 
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and Public Policy: The Prucess of Technology Assessment in the Fed-
eral Government. This review covers the following topics: 1) who is 
doing technology assessment, 2) organization of ,technology assess-
ments, 3) disciplines and techniques used in tecbnology assessment, 
4) analysis of a sample of technology assessment studies, 5) gaps 
and overlaps in federal technology assessment, 6) prerequisites for 
further improvement of governmental technology ,assessment. 
As part of its four-part program to develop priorities for 
technology assessment research both for its own support program and 
for the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the National 
Science Foundation awarded a grant to the Program to prepare a 
statement on technology assessment priorities in the Executive branch. 
Excerll GS from the Program's report include: "Candidat'~s and Priori ties 
for Technology Assessments: A survey of Federal Executive Agency 
Professionals." 
Executive and legislative staff in State governments have ex-
pressed keen interest in usi,ng technology assessment to improve 
decisionmaking. In 1974 the Program staff participated in a con-
ference on this topic. Excerpts are taken from the report: The 
Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment. 
Coates has followed closely the origin and evolution of the 
congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Her first evaluation 
of the Office's performance is reprinted as: ~merging Trends in 
Technology Assessment. 
A considerable body of research has been devoted to examining 
the role of the public in technology assessment. Two foci are ap-
parent. One relates to using citizen's opinions, attitudes, and 
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reactions to technology as data for the conduct of the assessment 
process--that is, to use this information to estimate the social 
, 
impacts of technology. Another research focus examines the effort 
to enhance the power base of the public in implementaing the results 
of a technology assessment. The Program's research has addressed 
both of these topics. Selections come from: Mottur's paper on 
Technology Assessment and Citizen Action, and Coates's paper on 
Technology Assessment--New Demands for Information. 
The selection from the Program of Policy Studies Evaluation uf 
a Technology Assessment Performed by Oak Ridge ::-rational Labora"tory 
on the Modular Integrated Utilitl-System Technology (MIUS) is in-
cluded for the purpose of indicating a further development in the 
institutionalization 11 )cess. This evaluation of an a~~essment is 
indication of the need to establish professional standards for 
judging the adequacy with which assessments are performed and for 
analyzing the sufficiency of the definition of task-objectives that 
are given to or posited by assessment entities. 
IV. INTERFACE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE LAW 
The first paper in this section undertakes to provide a basic 
framework f,or the consideration of the purposes and techniques of 
scientific method and adversarial system. Similarities and dfffer-
ences in these two techniques of inquiry are considered. The role 
of scientific method on the one hand and adversarial system on the 
other, with reference to their relevance in the performance of as-
sessments, is the primary concern of the paper by Mayo, Scientific 
Method, Adversarial System, and Technology Assessment. 
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Jones' paper, "Advocacy and Technology Assessment,1I presents a 
highly structured and unusually rigorous treatment of adversarial sy
s-
tem ass applied to technology assessment. The role of adversarial sy
s-
tem in technology assessments, particularly in connection with the 
discussion of criteria of adequa::y of assessments, should be a contin
-
uing reference source for those involved in the assessment function. 
The monograph by Green on Law's lPterface with Expanding Tech-
nology presents the author's views on the interaction of technology 
assessments with the process of politj.cal decisionmaking. Green 
suggests a number of reasons why those engaged. in the assessment 
function should not be overly optimistic of the impacts of asseS8-
ment outcomes on political decisionmaking. 
v. CASE STUDIES 
Students of technology assessment have recognized that the pur-
pose or task-objective of assessments may vary greatly, depending 
either upon the analyst's interest (if he has the privilege of 8el-
ecting the topic) or upon the requirements of the sponsoring agency 
if the assessment is undertaken through contractual or grant arrange
-
ments. 
Many papers and studies which do not conform to a strict notion 
of an assessment methodology may, nevertheless, indicate phases of 
thought development about the assessment task or assist in the under
-
standing of the basic purpose of the assessment function, i.e., to 
clarify policy options or alternative project configurations. 
One of the earliest assessments undertaken by the Program 
was directed to Early Experiences with the Hazards of Medical Use 
of X-Rays: 1896-1906 by Marx. This is an interesting early attempt 
i 
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to "feel our way" in asses,sment methodology as well as to look at 
the perceptions which existed at the time of the introduction of a 
significant new technology. The extract selected concerns operation 
of the technology assessment process in early experiences with the 
hazards of medical use of X-Rays. 
The paper by Wollan, Controlling the Potential Hazards of Gov-
ernment~Sponsored Technology is an early attempt to examine the ab-
ility of governmental agencies to adequately assess technological 
programs or projects to which they are committed. Wollan reviews 
the hazards of government-sponsored activities, including weather 
modification, supersonic transport noise, and the value conflicts 
involved in the flouridation controversy. 
The paper by Mayo, Consideration of Environmental Noise Effects 
in Transportation Planning by Governmental Entities reviews the ev-
aluation of environmental concerns with respect to major transport-
ation systems: the inter-state highway system and commercial air 
transportati6n. The paper sets forth in relatively brief form the 
type of pl~nning that was done for interstate highway system and 
suggests the shift in social value emphasis that has become apparent 
during the approximately 20 years since the interstate system was 
authorized. While the focus of the paper is primarily on transport-
ation noise, it reflects the growing significance of a variety of 
new concerns about the quality of the social environment in the 
1960's and early 1970's. 
A paper of considerable current interest is that of Genetic 
Technology: Promises and Problems by Frankel which is directed to 
the evaluation of the emerging technologies of genetic medicine. 
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The paper focuses upon the growing acquisition of new diagnostic 
capabilities, their consequent impact on screening and counseling 
for genetic disease, and the policy issues stemming from these cap-
abilities. 
The growing concern with energy is reflected in the assess-
ment by Coates in a report on Community Level Impacts of Expanded 
Underground Coal Mining. This paper perhaps is more representative 
than any of the others in Part V of the concepts and analytical 
techniques now associated with technology assessment. The paper 
identifies and eVBluates the potential secondary consequences of 
rapid community growth in deep mining localities and the ability of 
affected communities to absorb and manage such growth. 
The Abstract from a report An Integrated Strategy for Aircraft/ 
Airport Noise Abatement: A Legal-Institutional Analysis of §7 of 
the Noise Control Act of 1972 and Proposals Based Thereon is included 
for the reason that it represents an assessment task-objective which 
is not always differentiated from the more common approach of pro-
posing a technological project configuration and asking what likely 
social benefits and costs will result. Rather ,than being presented 
with a specific aircraft/airport noise plan for assessment, it was 
the task of the Program staff to construct and assess alternative 
abatement configurations. This abstract of a rather substantial re-
port on aircraft/airport noise examines the development of the air-
craft noise control structure since the Griggs case of 1962 which 
crystallized legal doctrine by placing the responsibility upon the 
airport operator rather than the carriers or the Federal Government, 
i.e., the public. This legal "one-factor fix" simply was not an ade-
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quate solution to a growing social problem. However, ten years 
elapsed before the Noise Control Act of 1972 undertook to estab-
lish the legal-institutional framework within which an adequate air-
craft/airport noise abatement program might be initiated with con-
cern for full recognition of all the beneficial and detrimental 
consequences of air transportation and appropriate distribution of 
benefits and costs. 
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HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
Technology assessment as a limited art is nothing new. Simple assess-
ment is close to the purpose of any innovation t even if only a mere guess 
that it will work to some good. It goes back to prehistory. We can 
imagine some forebear of homo sapiens picking up a stone to kill small 
game or to beat a neighbor--or his wife--over the head. He had glimpsed 
the purpose in advance. He immediately confirmed the efficacy of the 
weapon, no doubt with grunts of delight. 
Every new tool, machine, process, technique, design, or product is 
judged in the light of its efficiency in me~ting some need. Technology 
assessment still tries to answer questions about efficiency, cost, and 
function related to purpose. These questions run to how to make work 
easier or life more pleasant, how to make money, how to kill or destroy 
more effectively, and in ge~eral haw to achieve specific goals the 
innovators seek. For most ~f his~ry, technology assessment has been 
narrow and immediate, but~ithin ~bese limits perhaps effective. More 
remote and broader effects were ~nored. 
The pyramids, for all we know even today, preserved and sustained 
the pharaohs' ka',s, or spirits, in the afterlife. From the standpoint of 
the pharaohs--and they were the only people whose assessments counted 
then--the pyramids were a worthy allocation of resources, admirably 
fulfilling the spec~al requirements for the afterlife of the god-kings. 
From the standpoint of the millions of workers whose labor built these 
great monuments and of the inhabitants of Egypt as a whole, the pyramids 
were an unmitigated disaster. Still, the pyramids satisfied first-order 
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assessment in the light of Egyptian learning and social structure, which 
placed the pharaoh at the top of the pyramid, figuratively speading. 
Throughout history most oth.er first-order requirements have been 
economic or military in nature, conceived in the narrowest possible 
fashion. But second-order effects--effects on the entire economy, 
social effects beyond the economic, the socia-economic aftermaths of 
war affecting both victor and vanquished--these were rarely, if ever, 
considered. Second-order and more remote effects occurr.ed, of course, 
but their prediction was diffuse and unlikely to be convincing. In 
that connection I recall a cartoon which appeared many years ago in the 
late Collier's magazine. A caveman emerging from his cave with a bow-
and-arrow remarked to his companion, "Th-is new little invention of mine 
will make war so horrible that men will never make war anymore." 
Only when random invention began giving way to systematic innovation 
could technology assessment look much beyond first-order effects. Yet 
failure to assess the far-reaching effects of technology did not, as I 
have noted, keep them from occur~ing. Vast improvements in man's living 
. conditions, his conquest of the environment, and the uplifting of social 
and educational standards were wrought by technological advances in 
agriculture, construction, transport, and communications--even though 
for the most part innovations in those fields were made by men who 
considered only limited first-order effects. 
By now we have awakened to t~e fact that technology has social 
and human effects which we historians can clearly detect by our 20-20 
hindaight. Today we claim--or some of us claim--that these effects are 
calculable in advance. The historical developments which have brought 
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about this change I shall discuss under the headings of (1) the broadening 
through the centuries of the social context for, technological change&11.d 
assessment, (2) the growing need since the Industrial Revolution for 
assessment, (3) the recent deepening awareness of the impacts of tech-
nology, (4) the development of social and communal responsibility for 
technology, and (5) the current growth in the assessment capability. 
Broadening of the Social Context for Technological Change and Assessment 
The example of the pyramids showed how technology assessment once 
was concerned with but a single individual, the god-king. In classical 
antiquity, and indeed through much of history, the range of assessment 
extended only to the benefits for a small, elite group. This limited 
the impetus for technical innovation. The Hellenistic scientists, for 
example, knew about the power of falling water, the force of air pressure, 
and the energy of expanding steam. They were familiar with the pr,inciples 
of force pumps, water wheels, windmills, rotary grinders, and even the 
reaction steam turbine. But instead of using this knowledge and these 
mechanical appliances to perform work, they made toys. 
Hero of Alexandria, who lived in the first century A.D., described 
78 machines in his treatise of Pneumatics. There were siphons for pro-
ducing the illusion of turning water into wine. One contrivance lit 
fires in hollow altars; the expansion of the air exerted pressure through 
concealed pipes forcing libations of liquids onto the flame. Another 
air-expansion device within the altar opened the doors of the temple and 
later, as the fire died, closed them automatically. Hero is even said to 
have devised the first auto~~tic vending machine. It sold holy water, an 
automatic vending market which has so far eluded the Mafia in our country. 
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Hero and the other Hellenistic scientists failed to apply scientific 
knowledge and discoveries LO control the environment by reason of social, 
not intellectual, deficiencies. They considered only the welfare of a 
small number of individuals rather than the ~ntire population. The 
majority of the. people were workers, the lowest elements of society and~ 
in most cases, slaves. There was little need to improve technical devices 
to save cheap slave labor. 
Medieval society, still elitist in nature and contemptuous of 
manual labor, dropped the institution of slavery, and despite the 
popular myth to the contrary, the rising classes of artisans and merchants 
were receptive to technological change. The guilds of canny craftsmen 
were quite aware that ;.,f they failed to adopt an innovation in production, 
other artisans would, and markets in the next city might be lost. 
When the spinning wheel first appeared in Europe toward the end 
of the 13th century, it must have caused unemployment. Yet the first 
mention of the spinning wh~el in a guild regulation of about 1280 merely 
prohibited the use of wheel-spu~ thread in the warp (as distinct from the 
weft), presumably because it was not yet as strong as that produced by 
hand. The object, then, seems to have been to protect the quality of the 
cloth, not to rule out technical improvements. 
On close inspection, we find very little guild opposition to 
industrial changes before the 16th century. When opposition appeared, 
it was because the pace of techno~ogica1 change was quickening, and a 
new industrial system was beginning to appear. The guild structure itself 
was slipping, fighting in vain for its very existence. As a flourishing 
part of medieval society, the guilds were stTong enough to accept 
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technological change; only when the structure lost touch with the new 
economic order did the attempt to block change begin. 
The medieval guild cannot rightly be compared with the modern labor 
union. Certainly, however, their liILlted view of technology assessment 
in the face of new modes of production, once their very being was threatened, 
seems fairly analogous. Featherbedding practices and building codes 
represent indirect forms of technology assessment considering only the 
welfare of the small segment of the population actually engaged in running 
trains or building houses, not the welfare of those using them, and 
certainly not the entire community. 
Despite the later guild opposition, the onset of industrialization 
turned out to be irresistible. Yet, if there was anything that could be 
called technology assessment, it was limited,to first-order economic 
effects, namely, the profit of individual businessmen. Their sponsorship 
of technological innovation on behalf of their own self-interest was 
largely unchallenged ?ecause of the concomitant development of new con-
cepts of private property based on natural rights and, somewhat .later, 
on the doctrines of laissez-faire. 
When opposition to industrialization began to appear at the beginning 
of the 19th century, it was confined to small, special-interest groups 
whose selfish concerns seem almost trivial today. In England some members 
of the country gentry objected to the spoliation of the countryside. They 
had in mind their own hunting rights hedged by railroads puffing their 
way across the landscape. They also resented the rise to economic, and 
eventually to political, power of the self-made men representing the 
burgeoning industries. 
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The Luddite protest, more dramatic, has been interpreted by many as 
the first indication of worker opposition to the onset of industrializa-
tion. We know now that the Luddites destroyed their machines, not so 
much because they opposed the mechanization of their work, but as a means 
of venting their anger and frustration at the practices of their employers. 
Yet the Luddites have become symbolic of opposition to machines. Certainly 
their protest was a harbinger of things to come insofar as technology 
assessment is concerned. For the first time, there was a real challenge 
to the notion that only the profits of the factory owner were to be con-
sidered in adjudging the worth of technological change. 
Although the factory legislation of the early 19th century was 
largely ineffectual and did little to stop the gross exploitation of 
workers, it marked an extension of the concept of technology assessment 
to include the workers, their health, and their economic welfare. This 
legislation also brought a new factor into technology assessment--the 
government. Prevailing laissez-faire doctrines aside, the government 
intervened to mitigate some of t~e worst social consequences of unfettered 
industrialization. It was a sign of things to come. 
The man chiefly responsible for broadening the social context of 
technology assessment was Karl Marx. He made plain one great truth: 
Technology has social and cultural ramifications far beyond the first-
order effects to which attention had hitherto been directed. This view 
took the centr.al position in the ~ll-embracing Marxian theory of history-
a theory which, however unfortunate in politics, has deeply influenced 
the study of society. 
What is more, Marx avoided the confv..sion between technology itself 
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and the social system which it had so profoundly affected. Marx's 
stric'i:ures were not against technological change. He called for greater 
progress in technology and sought to stimulate technical advance. Indeed, 
he devoted many pages of praise to the industrial bourgeoisie in a work 
dedicated to its overthrow, called Das Kapital. His effort concentrated 
not on mitigating the effects of technology out on rearranging, by 
revolution, a socio-economic system which would enable the benefits of 
technology to be spread among the masses rather than confined to the 
profit of a few. 
Aside from a few English gentry and some spokesmen for the Romantic 
movement during the mid-19th century, not many worried about the inroads 
of industrialization on the natural landscape. In America the concern 
about the physical environment was largely based not on aesthetic con-
siJerations, but on the question of rational exploitation of natural 
resources. John Wesley Powell, who becam.e director of the U.S, Geological 
Survey in the last quarter of the 19th century, conducted an irrigation 
survey to identify, locate, and conserve the fast-disappearing water 
resources of the arid western lands. Powell's attempts at scientific 
conservation were at best only partially successful. John MUir,t!'1ho 
sought to preserve forest lands from sale to commercial interests,also 
met with only partial success. Yet environmental considerations were 
introduced to technology assessment, a factor which was to become of great 
importance only by the mid-20th century. It was an extension that would 
bring technology assessment in time to consider the protection. of posterity 
itself, just as the societafcontext of technological change had already 
become broadened to include all segments of society. 
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The Growing Need for Technology Assessment 
.. 
The Industrial Revolution was a tremendous enlargement in the scale 
of techno log} Not surprisingly, the new dimensions produced enlarged 
impacts of society and humanity. For one thing, there were simply more 
people around. For another, all the extra people were more intimately 
affected by technology due mainly to crowding and the increasing economic 
interdependence of mankind. Through most human history, the vast majority 
of mankind had lived in rural areas, and their major occupation had been 
concerned with agriculture. The Industrial Revoltltion changed all that. 
Production, once centered in the hearth and home, now was carried on in 
factories located in cities. The self-sufficiency of farming life gave 
way to the close-linked interdependence of individuals in the modern 
metropolis. Now other groups in society besides the elite, the artisans, 
the merchants, and the capitalists clamored for some of the benefits of 
advancing technology. The factory workers' first-order assessment of 
their own benefit frequently clashed with those of their employers. And 
beyond them all was society as ~ whole, whose interests might suffer even 
if workers and employers could compromise on their mutual benefit. 
The need for technology assessment was also heightened by the 
acceleration of social change, which was itself a corollary of speedier 
technological change. Anthropologj.-sts tell us that among the most deep-
seated of cultural habits are courtship patterns. After remaining static 
for centuries, courtship pattern~ have been revolutionized several times 
within our own century. Henry Ford's automobile not only brought the 
farmer to the city; it also changed the wooing spot from the front parlor 
to the rumble seat. Just where the locale d'amour is now, I am much too 
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professorially dignified to find out, though I occasionally stumble over 
people billing and cooing their way to the bachelor's d~gree in the bushes 
of an urban campus. Despite this throwback to the primitive setting, I 
am always sure--without necessarily looking--that the festivities are 
being conducted tN'ith due regard for second-order assessment of the bio·· 
logical technologies. My own thoughts about the abundant resources of 
human love, however, are turning increasingly toward conservation. 
The United States, too, is rapidly advancing into middle age. Natural 
resources, like love, once seemed so abundant that little thought had to 
be given to conservation. As we grew up, advances of scientific tech-
no10gy in new materials and substitutes tended to avoid questions of 
exhaustion, but we cannot continue to ignore them. Conservation has now 
become at least a requirement of second-order technological assessment. 
As one writer has put it, "We have not run out of fresh water in this 
country; we have simply run out of streams to pollute." 
Not only the scale but the cumulative nature of our technical 
applications is endangering us. The emissions of a few thousand auto-
mobiles posed no great threat to the salubrity of the air. Millions of 
automobiles do pose a serious threat. And DDT provides another example. 
Thirty years ago, DDT was hailed as a miraculous insect killer. 
During World War II, it kept our soldiery free of the lice and vermin 
infestations which had produced more casualties in World War I than 
actual combat. In large-scale public health programs throughout the 
world following World War II, DDT succeeded in wiping out one of mankind's 
greatest scourges, the malarial-carrying insects. Similarly, when 
sprayed on crops, it enormously increased agricultural productivity. It 
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is not surprisin,g that the developer of DDT was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for Medicine. Yet today DDT is regarded as a potential threat to mankind. 
Through a process of biological magnification in the food chain, slight 
traces of DDT build up as poisonous doses in fish and birds, and eventually 
in man himself. In this way a one-time boon to man has become at best a 
mixed blessing. The magnitude, accumulation, and human impact of 
technological change, together with technologically produced social change, 
have made pressing the need for technological assessment in all human, 
environmental, and social aspects. 
" The Deepening Perception of the Impact of Technology 
The awareness that technology can sometimes have harmful effects is 
not new. In classical antiquity, Xenophon expressed a prevailing social 
attitude when he said in Book IV of the Oeconomicus, "What are called 
the mechanical arts carry a social stigma and are rightly dishonored in 
our cities. For these arts damage the bodies of those who work at them 
or who act as overseers by compelling them to a sedentary life and to an 
indoor life, and in some cases t'o spend the whole day by the fire. This 
physical degeneration results also in deterioration of the soul." 
Similarly, John Ruskin in the 19th century looked back to an older, 
medieval England, "ye merrie olde Englande" of cakes and ale and morris-
dancing on the green. Unfortunately, ye merrie olde Englande was not 
"merrie" for the vast majority of its inhabitants who lived in fear, 
poverty, superstition, and filth.' Jacques Barzun of Columbia University is 
a contemporary example of the aristocratic, nostalgic, romantic discovery 
of the horrors of technology. His book, Science: The Glorious Enter-
tainment, is a compendium of connnon complaints about modern 1ivj.ng: useless 
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machinery~ ugly architecture~ tasteless bread, planned obsolescence, 
offensive advertising, zip codes, automatic telephone dialing, and the 
like. The destruction of rural life, the mass exploitation of the poor, 
cancerous growth of cities, and the uglification of the world through noise, 
fear, and fi1th--these Barzun and his fellow IIbleeding-heart humanists" 
laid at the door of technology and science. 
What strikes me about these criticisms is not that they are based 
on a perceptive assessment of the social implications of technology but 
rather upon a false view of an idyllic past. In these days of urban 
spr.aw1 and the ravenous bul:dozer, it is not surprising thai many men 
look back with fondness to small-town life and nostalgically believe 
that in many ways the past, which they ~sua11y identify as anytime before 
1914, was much superior to the present. I am not at all certain that 
American small-town life was really idyllic, and I invoke Sherwood 
Anderson, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, John O'Hara, the Lynds, and 
Tennessee Williams as my witnesses. If the small-town IIgood old daysll were 
really so good, how are we to account for the fact that so many Americans 
fled the small town? Perhaps the pronvincial, parochial, censorial, 
gossipy, uncultivated world of Peyton Place does not correspond so much 
to human desires as the challenge and excitement of the big city with 
all its traffic snarls, television serials, and perpetual crises. The 
fact is that the migratory trend is from the countryside to the city, not 
the other way. A decade from now more than 90% of all Americans, it is 
estimated, will be living in urban areas. 
Not all the broad-scale attacks upon contemporary technological 
society arise from romantic longings for a non-existent past. The modern 
j ] 
1 
J 
1 
r T 
r 
' .• : 4. 
~'z( 
i .' " L .............. L .. 
I 
I 
12 
novel, the contemporary drama. and today's poetry have as an insistent 
theme that man has become the victim of a dehumanizing technology. This 
literature of anti-technology employs the metaphors of Frankenstein's 
monster, robots from R.U.R., and the regimented citizens of Brave New 
World and 1984. The "bleeding-heart humanists" who misquote thest~ works 
seem confident that their technological target material cannot read the 
books. What the original books and plays said is not that technology is 
at fault, but its human abuse. What's worse is the view of man put 
forth by the non-critics of these works; they claim that man is by nature 
so abusive, so evil an animal that he cannot be trusted with technology. 
Well, that is some kind of assessment. 
More serious critics base their assessments on better philosophical 
and literary grounds. Though willing to admit that technology has "raised 
the ceiling of human achievement," Lewis Mumford claims that modern 
technology--he calls it "technics"--has become authoritarian and is 
"transferring the attributes of life to the mac.hine and the mechanical 
collective." Jacques Ellul has a similar apocalyptic view, feeling that 
technology has become the end of human life. Fusing ideas borrowed from 
both Freud and Marx, Herbert Marcuse attacks industrial civilization on 
the grounds that it has made man "one-dimensional." Even admitting that 
more men may be happier today than ever before, their happiness, he claims, 
is "a state of anaesthesia." Though technology has done away with 
scarcities, it forces men, says Marcuse, to "exhausting, stupefying, 
inhuman slavery," alienating the workers from each other, from their 
products, and from work itself. Mass society provides bread, circuses, 
and technology. Material plenty yields no spiritual gratification and 
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leads to social oppression. Marcuse holds these principles to be se1f-
evident in both capitalist and communist societies. They characterize 
industrial civilization no matter what the sociopolitical arrangements 
may be. 
Marcuse offers little in the way of solutions. All efforts at 
reform are impotent, he claims. Free speech and electoral activity 
are superficial devices for adjusting people to the status quo. Revolu-
tion is all but impossible. Marcuse can only offer strident opposition 
to the society either by withdrawal or by confrontation which will shock 
society ~nto changing. Here is technology assessment of the most sweeping 
character. 
While such wholesale indictments may stimulate nihilistic revo1u-
tionary movements, they really tell us very little about what can be done 
to guide and direct technological innovation along socially beneficial 
lines. Twentieth-century man will never willingly divorce himself from 
technology nor even consent to a moratorium on further advances. The 
sentiments uttered by Marcuse and his youthful adherents might ultimately 
succeed in bringing about major transformations in the softer supporting 
systems--legal, educational, governmental, economic, and the like. They 
are ineffectual as to technology because of their intellectual murkiness 
about changes in the dynamics of technology itself. Still, they render two v 
cheers, heavily, for some kind of technology assessment. Mumford, Ellul, 
and Marcuse deserve "A" for choice of topic, and "D" for effort. They 
have nevertheless raised a right question: Do technological innovations 
really help all mankind or are they only for the benefit of a few? The 
people who really made the public understand this question were, of course, 
neither philosophers nor historians. 
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Rachel Carson; in he:;.: book, Silent Spring, first attracted wide 
attention to the harmful effect of pesticides that persist and accumulate 
in the environment. Her picture of a silent spring where the birds no 
longer sing in a desp,oiled natv,ral environment made her book into a 
bestseller. It instigated Congressional investigations and scientific 
studies, and awakened the public. Ralph Nader's book, Unsafe at Any Speed, 
attracted attention to the problems of automobile safety by showing how 
Detroit, in its efforts to attract sales through high styling and attempts 
to economize for competitive reasons, frequently gave second place to 
safety considerations. His work, too, brought about Congressional investi-
gat ions and awakened the public to dangers inherent in a technology where 
motivations for private profit ignored public welfare. 
Both books resulted in legislative action, indirectly and directly. 
Federal legislation for the installation of safety devices in automobiles 
and an increasing amount of state legislation on DDT bear witness to the 
effectiveness of these popular writers, the one a first-class scientist, 
the other a well-educated lawyer, in bringing about meaningful technology 
assessment. Thanks to Carson and Nd.der more perhaps than anybody else, 
awareness of the need for technology assessment has been deepened in 
the United States. 
Development of Social and Communal Responsibility 
About a century ago society began to recognize that rampant individu-
alisrn armed with natural rights doctrine concerned with interests in 
property did not necessarily result in the social welfare of all. The 
reason that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" was unseen was because it 
simply wasn_'t there. The sum of individual self-interests did not result 
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in the wealth of nations. If society were to insure security and justice 
for all its members, it was evident that the government must become a 
very visible hand in guiding, controlling, and limiting individual rights 
in the interests of the community at large. This was particularly the 
case when, through the enlargement of the franchise and the growing democrati-
zation of society in both Europe and America during the 19th century, larger 
numbers of the populat::~/.m could make their voices heard in government and 
could demand public attention to their needs. Viewed in this light, tech-
nology assessment is simply another step in governmental intervention for 
the common good. Let us look back at some precedents of government 
direction of technology in America. 
In 1824, casualties from boiler explosions on steamboats, particularly 
an explosion on the Aetna in Ne'i York Harbor, 'Which killed 13 and caused 
many injuries, made Congress take notice. A resolution 'Was introduced in 
the House of Representatives in May 1824 calling for an inquiry into the 
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expediency of enacting legislation bar~ing the issuance of a certificate 
of navigation to any boat operating at high steam pressures. This bill 
did not pass, but the continuance of such explosions during the next few 
years created a powerful public demand that something be done. 
Since nobody knew the exact reason for the boiler explosions, the 
first order of business was to investigate the cause. In 1830, finally, 
the government made its first research grant of a technological nature, 
employing the Franklin Institute of. Philadelphia to investigate the cause 
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of boiler explosions. Not until 1836 did the Institute present its full 
report and make detailed recommendations for regulatory legislation. It 
was to take another two years before a law was passed, and that so watered 
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down that the suggested inspection criteria and standards for steamboat 
engineers were eliminated. Boiler explo~ions thereupon continued with 
increasing losses of life. In 1852, at last, a law with teeth in it was 
passed, with a regulatory agency to enforce it. 1 
i. Other problems involving technology were taken up in the same piece- ! 
meal fashion: first canal building, then railroad building, and, when 
manned flight was young, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
was established. These were followed by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Office of Desalination in the Department of the Interior, and investi-
gating committees on automobile safety, insecticides, and the like. All 
these agencies were involved in technological goals and purposes, but 
they confined themselves for the most part to specific problems. Broader I 
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assessment has come very slowly. 
An attempt to institutionalize and regularize the giving of scientific 
advice to the government, the prelude to technology assessment~ occurred 
quite early. The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863, and 
on the infrequent occasions when it was asked for advice, the advisory 
approach was used primarily for individual proj ects or problems. Bu't 
what about the problems arising from the combined impact of many different 
systems? And what about social systems in relation to science and technology 
: . 
. \ Powell's attempt to achieve a rational scientific basis for a conser-
vation program in the western lands was, indeed, a broad-scale approach to 
the combined impact of several different technoJ.ogical systems and many 
special interests. However, perhaps the most systematic attempt of the 
government to confront the consequences of scientific and technological 
developments was to be found during the New Deal in the Temporary National 
r 
. ~. -~-
\ 
l 
17 
Economic Committee (!NEC). The !NEC hearings, begun in December 1938 
and lasting 18 months, were triggered by the economic recession of 1937, 
and they resulted in the most thorough investigation of technology anj 
its implications in our history. The committee sat for 775 hours of 
testimony, listened to 55 witnesses, and published its hearings; its 
exhibits, reports, and transcripts fill two good-sized shelves. The 
problem under closest scrunity was of course technological unemployment. 
Nevertheless, the research potential of industry and the effects of the 
patent system in encouraging technological advance were considered on 
issues of corporate monopoly, which was at the whipping post. Repre-
sentatives of special interest groups-largely labor and management-made 
their cases. Few witnesses represented the public interest. Little 
consideration was given to second-order effects of technological advance, 
although much was implicit in the economic analyses presented to the com-
mittee. The President's Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic 
Progress in the 1960's made a similar large-scale effort to consider the 
effect of technological change on American society. y~f it, like the !NEC. 
was a -"one-shot deal;" it did not represent a continuing effort in 
technology assessment. 
Parallel with these short-lived efforts to view the larger social 
consequences of technological change was an extension in the concept of 
the public whose welfare the government sought to serve. Pesticides again 
provide the example. The first federal law dealing specifically with 
pesticides was the Federal Insecticide and Fungicide Act of 1910, which 
J 
sought-to protect the pesticide user--the farmer--from being bilked by 
manufacturers who were selling him inferior products. It took almost 
three decades before the protection of the federal government was ey'_ended 
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to the general consumer, the public which ate the food products grown 
with the aid of pesticides; this was the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act which was designed to protect the consumer from harmful chemical 
residues in his food. Rachel Carson gave a new dimension to the concept 
of the consumer of pesticides by showing their effects on wildlife. 
As of now, therefore, several federal agencies are concerned with 
protecting the public in regard to pesticides: the Department of Agriculture 
protects the farming public which uses pesticides in growing crops; HEW 
protects the consuming public which eats food products grown with pesti-
cides; and the Department of Interior is concerned with protection of 
wildlife and, in a sense, with the protection of future generations of 
Americans, by att'.mtpting to preserve the ecological balance for posterity. 
The pesticide story thus manifests the development of governmental 
responsibility for the social impact of technology; it reflects a 
broadening of our national goals from a preoccupation with narrow 
economic elements to the physical health of the consumer and, ultimately, 
the general social welfare of the people and their physical environment. 
Or, looking ·at it in another way, we find that our government of the 
United States must concern itself with the welfare of all the inhabitants 
of our land--birds, bees, animals, and fishes, as well as that peculiar 
animal, man. 
Increasing Assessment Ca2abilities 
Given the historical opportunity, need, concern, and precedents, 
have we developed the know-how for meaningful technology assessment? I 
need not review in any detail the very recent history of man's growing 
ability to collect and manipulate data. Both the hardware and the software 
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are becoming increasingly accurate and sophisticated, enabling uS to 
deal with dynamic variables in complex situations. Along with these 
are fundamental developments in mathematics, statistics, and general 
systems theory. Attendants at an Engineering Foundation Research 
Conference scarcely need to be reminded of the great strides made in 
our ability to store and retrieve information. 
Many scientists and engineers tend to be skeptical of these 
techniques when applied to problems involving human and social factors. 
Though such skepticism may have been warranted only a decade or so ago, 
it can no longer be maintained. It is now possible to produce dynamic 
models of systems involving complex human and social variables, and our 
skill is growing. Systems and operations researchers are increasingly 
competent to provide probabilistic data regarding the impact of scientific 
and technological decisions on social trends and changes. Though the 
information may not be so "hard" as that obtained in the physical 
sciences, it represents a giant leap forward--to use a now famous phrase--
in man's ability to quantify social 'behavior and to develop social indica-
tors. It is precisely in this area of second-and-higher-order effects 
that our assessment capabilities have progressed. 
Yet our growing knowledge and expertise in the behavioral sciences 
would be of little value in technology assessment if not accompanied by 
the growth in our scientific and technological capabilities. These give 
us technological alternatives which alone can make technological assess-
ment reasonable and meaningful. 
Let me explain. In societies where the level of science and technology 
is low, they mus't make use of any and every technological advance which 
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they can afford in order to subsist, even if tha applications have harmful 
side-effects. For example, while Sweden and the United States can afford 
to ban DDT, countries like India cannot afford to do so.. It would not 
be economically feasible for India to change to an insecticide less per-
sis tent than DDT which would require spraying every few weeks instead of 
twice a year. Yet India must have the insecticidal benefits from DDT 
despite its harmful effects. Its use there has cut down the incidence of 
malaria from 100 million cases a year to only 15,000 cases, and the death 
rate from 750,000 to 1,500 a year. In more advanced industrial countries 
with higher standards of health, malaria presents no such problems. 
Furthermore, our higher technological level enables us to use 
tec~ological alternatives at a slightly higher cost, let us say. The 
search goes on for other methods of pest control--chemical, mechanical, and 
biological--and it is quite likely to be successful. Only nations possessing 
this kind of potential can offer technological alternatives allowing 
response to unfavorable technology aSsessments. 
What I am really saying is that one major result of the technological 
revolut:ion of our time i.9 to increase man's choices and options. Our 
high level of scientific knowledge and technological performance gives 
" 
us the ability to pick and choose among different ways of acc{\'mplishing our 
social goals. This possibility of choice makes technology assessment both 
meaningful and possible. 
Conclusion 
One of the clich~s of our time is the well-known statement that 
"there is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come." This is 
powerful rhetoric but bad history. Anybody can name several ideas whose 
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time is long past but which exhibited little power. Notable among these 
are the concepts of world peace and human brotherhood. They have been 
around for some 2000 years, accepted in theory but never in practice. 
Technology assessment strikes me as an idea whose time has come, but 
I think it also has the power. It, too, is a matter of the human heart, 
but it also has some powerful hardware and interests behind it. 
In this brief review of the historical aspects of technology assess-
ment, I have endeavored to outline the development of the factors 
suggesting that the time has come for technology assessment. Techno-
logical changes now have a broader and accelerating social impact. The 
need exists; the awareness of the need exists; precedents for its applica-
tion are manifold; and we are developing the. capabilities to apply it 
effectively. 
What really counts--and the examples of world peace and human 
brotherhood plague us on the point--is our willingness to apply it in 
practice. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
B. Technology and Public Policy: 
The Process of Technology 
Assessment in the Federal 
Government 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
Introduction 
The accelerating rate of technological change and development 
in the twentieth ctmtury has raised serious questions concerning 
the ability of democratic systems to control and direct techno-
logical development in ways compatible,with both the protection 
of present and future public interest and the survival of 
individual freedom. In highly industrialized societies scientific 
invention, technological innovations, and public policy alterna-
tives are inextricably intermeshed. Consequently much of politi-
cal theory in the twentieth century has focused on the problem 
of democratic decisionmaking. Political philosophers have asked: 
will the highly complex decisions which determine the quality of 
men's lives, the conditions of their labor, and the shape of 
their physical environment, necessarily be made by an elite class 
of specialists and technocrats? Will such decisions be made 
within an anonymous and non-responsible corporate structure? 
Can we escape this fate only at the cost of a highly controlled, 
totalitarian State? Or will the technocratic elite, the corporate 
structure, and the governing process inexorably me:r:ge, while the 
mass of men, unable to participate meaningfully in decision-
making, lapse into apathy or aliena·tion? 
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Professor Stafford Beer, Professor of Cybernetics at Great 
Britains' Manchester University, testifying before a congressional 
committee in 1970, said: 
II ••• (Technology now seems to be leading humanity by 
the nose. We appear to have no sense of priorities 
where our problems are concerned; we do what is 
technologically easy -- and we do it regardless of 
cost.·" 
Professor Beer was concerned with the apparent failure of 
democratic societies to develop systems of management and control 
which are adequate to the complexities of their internal and 
external environments. The alternative which he offered was to 
"design a stable society," recognizing that this will involve 
"the deployment of a politica.l science to new ends" by treating 
our "complexity-control capability .•• as offering a nervous system 
for the body politic. II 
The belief that, as Beer phrased it, "technology is leading 
humanity by the nose," is now widespread. A pessimistic atti-
tude toward technological development is not new (such was an 
important part of English Conservatism and of the Romantic 
Movement in the eighteenth century, for example). But such 
pessimism has become widespread only in the middle of the twen-
tieth century. J. B. Bury, in his seminal work on The Idea of 
Progress, shows how the burgeoning of technology was the key to 
IStafford Beer, "Managing Modern Complexity," in U.S., Congress, 
House, Eleventh Meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology 
with the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House 
of Representatives, The Management of Information and Knowledge, 
January 27,28, and 29,1970, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970. 
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the intellectual revolution by which human history was reformu-
lated as the march of Progress: 
liThe spectacular results of the advance of science and 
mechanical technique brought home to the mind of the 
average man the conception of an indefinite increase 
of man's power over nature as his brain penetrated her 
secrets. The evident material progress which has con-
tinued incessantly ever since has been a mainstay of 2 
the general belief in progress which is prevalent today." 
It was not until modern technology had permeated the lives of 
common men and instigated sweeping social changes that history 
could be viewed as an open-ended process of change through which 
improvement of the quality of life for the masses was a possible 
if not an inevitable condition: 
"It was not until commerce, invention, and natural 
science emancipated humanity from thralldom to the 
cycle and to the Christian epic that it became possible 
to think of an immense future for mortal mankind, of 
the conquest of the material world in human interest, 
of providing the conditions for a good life on this 
planet without reference to any possible hereafter ••• 
(O)f all the ideas pertinent to the concept of progress, 
to the interpretation of what has gone on during the 
past two hundred years and is going on in the world, 
none is more relevap.t than technology • .,3 
But the same transformation of ordinary life by technology 
which helped to produce and gain acceptance for the idea of 
progress, eventually brought pessimism about further technolog-
ical development. Melvin Kranzberg, an historian of science and 
technology, has identified broad historical trends which prepared 
2 J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1932; repUblished by Dover Press, 1955), p. 324. 
3Charles A. Beard, in an Introduction to Bury's work cited 
above, pp. xi and xxi. 
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the way for a more critical attitude toward technology.4 He 
traces the steady broadening of the social context of science 
and technological change from the early stages when science was 
monopolized by the priesthood of Egypt and used to preserve its 
nw~ power, and the era of classical Greece, when Science was 
viewed as a field of intellectual inquiry with little incentive 
to develop practical applications. Enlargement of the scale of 
technological application occurred explosively during the indus-
trial revolution and has accelerated throughout the twentieth 
century. Accumulation of detrimental impacts, such as pollution, 
from the overwhelmingly large-scale utilization of technologies 
became only in recent decades so obvious as to generate wide 
public awareness of such consequences. In the last thirty years 
there has also been an increasing assumption of societal respon-
sibility for technology as public institutions became subsidizers 
of technological innovation. 
Throughout most of history the impetus for technological 
innovation was the expectation of direct benefits for the user 
and for relatively small segments of society, usually the econ-
omically dominant class (as Marx said, the owners of the dominant 
mode of production). Social costs, in terms of loss of common 
lands, spoilage of local environments, or adverse conditions of 
labor were transferred to classes which were excluded from 
4Melvin Kranzberg, Historical Aspects of Technology Assessment, 
'The GE!Orge Washington University Program of policy Studies in 
Science and Technology, Occasional Paper No.4 (Washington, D.C.: 
The George Washington University, August 1969). 
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political power (whether Egyptian slaves, medieval serfs,. or 
cottage factory workers); such costs need not be considered and 
could almost be said to have been invisible. The plentiful supply 
of natural resources and manual labor and -- after the rise of 
liberalism in the eighteenth century -- the concept of limited 
government, allowed technology to develop relatively free of 
consideration of larger social consequences. 
After the onset of the industrial revolution, bringing with 
it increases in population, concentration of people into work 
centers, and increasing economic interdependence, the acceler-
ation of social change attendant on technological development 
could no longer be ignored. Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and 
Karl Marx provide the landmarks in recognition of the effects 
of technology on society. Kranzberg notes of Marx: 
"Re made plain one great truth: Technology has social 
and cultural ramifications far beyond the first-order 
effects to which attention had hitherto been directed ••• 
What is more, Marx avoided the confusion between tech-
nology itself and the social system which it had so 
profoundly affec·ted. Marx's strictures were not against 
technological change ••• Ris effort concentrated not on 
mitigating the effects of technology but on rearranging, 
by revolution, a socio-economic system which would 
enable the benefits of technology to be spread among 
the m3sses rather than confined to the _profi t of .tpe 
few. " 
In the last two decades the social costs, rather than the 
benefits, of technological development have increasingly been 
the center of attention in the united States. The possibility 
of world-wide overpopulation, the threat of exhaustion of natural 
5 b' I ~d., p. 7. 
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resources, the cumulative effects of overwhelmingly large appli-
cations of technology on the environment, and chemical hazards to 
human safety and health have generated acute concern. The deci-
sions which produced these effects were largely marketplace 
decisions, in spite of the steady increase in governmental inter-
vention in the economy since the 1900's. Indeed, federal, state, 
and local governments are among the heaviest users of technology 
and have become increasingly the subsidizers and promoters of 
technological innovation. 
During the New Deal era in the United States and while totali-
tarian governments in Europe, Asia, and South America occupied 
the center of political consciousness, political theorists directed 
most of their attention to the threat of all-powerful governments. 
More recently political thinkers are again pointing to the seeming 
inability of democratic societies to provide what Stafford Beer 
called "stable metasystems," for the control of self-directed, 
change-resisting social institutions which are powerfully organized 
to maintain their internal stability and survival. In the 
industrial society such social institutions -- industries and the 
specialized interest groups and professions associated with them --
will through the dynamics of insuring their institutional survival 
make decisions which a limited government (designed for a less 
complex society of the past) may lack the power or the initiative 
to make in the public interest. Beer warned a somewhat puzzled 
congressional committee: 
j 
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liThe central thesis of cybernetics might be expressed 
thus: that there are natural laws governing the 
behavior of large interactive systems -- in the flesh, 
in the metal, in the social and economic fabric. These 
laws have to do with self-regulation and self-organiza-
tion .•. (T)his behavior is governed by the dynamic struc-
ture of the system ••• Outcomes are latent in the dynamic 
structure of the s*gtems we have or may adopt: they will 
inexorably emerge. 
Victor Ferkiss, in Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality, 
also pointed out that the most serious danger to democratic 
decisionmaking today is not hypercontrol but chaos: 
"The danger is not that industrialism has destroyed 
the intermediate group in modern democratic society 
but that the group is so strong that the individual, 
instead of finding freedom in the interstices created 
by group competition, may be crushed between the contending 
parties, or that instead of a dominant total government 
riding roughshod over an inert society, public purposes 
will be lost sight of in the feudalistic struggle of 
competing special interests. ,,7 
Ferkiss, like Stafford Beer, sees this problem in cybernetic 
terms as a failure of control and communication under an overload 
of ~onflicting demands on the body politic due to the complexity 
of technological society: 
6 
" ••• (T)he lines of power and control are more and more 
intermeshed ... The total social organism has a central 
nervous system, but so overwhelming are the desires 
and signals from its c.onstituent parts, so involuntary 
most of its actions ••. that it is impossible to speak 
of it as being directed consistently by a single con-
scious will ... The sheer volume of activity leads to 
communications problems that make centralized direction 
difficult. Indeed, here as elsewhere in technological 
civilization, the paradox is that not unifo~mity but 
anarchy may present the greatest dan.:;er •.• " 
Beer, ~. cit. 
7Victor Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality 
(New York: George Braziller, 1969), p. 155. 
8Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
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John Kenneth Galbraith, warning that social goals are being 
subordinated to the ends of technological growth and economic 
expansion, argues for greater us(~ of governmental power. 9 Henry 
S. Kariel makes a similar argument that limited government in 
the classical liberal sense is no longer adequate: 
"When industry is allowed to follow its own logic, 
when technological expansion and economic growth 
become exclusive objectives to which others are 
sacrificed, and when politics is kept from inter-
fering with the inner imperatives and self-evident 
'success' of industrial development, men are apt to 
find themselves deprived of effective freedom even 
while they are provii5d with its indispensable 
material conditions. 
"Post-industrial" society, Daniel Bell has noted, is charac-
terized py the pre-eminence of the professional and technical 
class" and "the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the 
source of innovation and policy formulation."ll Other writers 
have pointed out the danger that ordinary citizens and their 
elected officials will tend because of the increasing complex-
ity of public policy issues to defer to an elite whose prestige 
and influence rest on information and expertise. Robert E. Lane
 
foresees "a shrinking of the political domain,,,12 and Jean 
Meynaud although rejecting the thesis that a "power elite," is 
9 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1967). 
10 Henry S. Kariel, The Promise of Politics (Englewood CliffS, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). 
IlDaniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," 
i.n Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert E. 
Moore, eds.,. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 157. 
12Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a 
Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review 31 (October 
1966), pp. 649ff. 
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now in control, demons"trated how political power may shift toward 
technocrats, who have a dangerous tendency to form closed groups 
and who exhibit a strong bias toward the interests of managers 
and professionals. 13 
Galbraith I "li1ho like Ferkiss and I<ariel has called for greater 
exercise of public power to counter the economic power of in-
dustries and the competing demands of specialized il'lterests, has 
also said that 
n(I)ncreasingly, it will be recognized that the 
mature corporation, as it develops, becomes part 
of the administrative complex associated with the 
State. In r~me the line between the two will 
disappear. n 
The fear that government itself, responding to the necessity 
of exerting control over increasingly powerful forces of econ-
omics and technology, may centralize and consolidate power to 
an extent that destroys individual freedom, goes back to the 
traditions of liberal thought since the industrial revolution. 
Writers like Robert Boguslaw, Robert O. MacBride, Donald N. 
Michael, and Alan Westin contend that this danger takes on new 
dimensions with the possibility of national data banks, in for-
mati on systems, and other electronic devices which enormously 
13 Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 
pp. 293-303. 
14 . h . t 393 Galbra~t , £Eo ~ , p. • 
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Professor Emmanual G. Mesthene (himself rather optimistic about 
the influence of technology on political decisionmaking) formu-
lates the long-standing liberal warning in modern terms: 
"There is ••• the problem of what happens to traditional 
relationships between citizens and government, to SXlch 
prerogatives of the individual as persclhal privacy, 
electoral consent, and access to the independent social 
criticism of the press, and to the ethics of and public 
controls over a new elite of information keepers, when 
economic, military, and social policies become.increas-
ingly technical, long-range, machine-processed, infoIi6 
mation-based, and expert-dominated." (Italics added) 
Recogni tion that modern governments I whe'ther in opposition 
to, or in conjunction with, technocratic elitists and corporate 
interests, may irretrievably erode the sphere of individual 
choice and freedom, leads many writers to argue (unlike Ferkis, 
Kariel and Galbraith) against unnecessary use of governmental 
powers. Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener urge that: 
15 
" ••• {W)e try in general to moderate Faustian impulses 
to overpower the environment, and to try to limit both 
the centralization and the willingness to use accumu-
lating political, economic, and technological power ••• 
so that the inescapable increase in regulation of human 
choices remains in the hands of people who will 
Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians: A Study of System Design 
and Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1965). Robert o. MacBride, The Automated State: Com uter 
S stems as a New Force in SocJ.et PhJ.ladelp J.a: ChJ.lton Book 
Company, 1967. Dona N. MJ.chael, "On Coping with Complexity: 
Planning and Politics," Daedalus 97 (Fall 1968), pp. 1179-1193. 
Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 
For an excellent discussion of these and other writers on the 
topic of computer technology and freedom, see Technology and the 
Polity, Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, 
Research Review No. 4 (Summer, 1969), pp. 31-36. 
16Emanuel G. Mesthene, How Technology will Shape the Future, 
Harvard University Program on Technology and Society Reprint 
No.5, reprinted from Science 161 (12 July 1968), p. 19. 
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respect its disastrous potential and !~11 not 
unnecessarily .:::entralize it further." 
The issues raised by these and many other thinkers may 
perhaps be summarized: To what e~tent is our present form of 
government capable of generating direction and control over 
technological development which can enable us both to achieve 
social goals and protect public interests, and to protect indi-
vidual participation, privacy, and options within a guaranteed 
and suitably broad sphere? 
Technology Assessment 
Beginning about 1966 in the United States the concept of 
Technology Assessment has been discussed as a technique for 
improving societal control over technological development and 
applications within the constitutional framework and institu-
tional structure of the federal government. By technology 
assessment is meant the systematic identification~ analysis I 
and evaluation of the potential secondary consequences (whether 
.. 
beneficial or detrimental) of technology in terms of its impacts 
on social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental 
systems and processes. Technology assessment is intended to 
provide a neutral, factual input into the decisionmaking process. 
17 
Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, "Faustian Powers and 
HumCJ.n Cho'ices: Some Twenty-First century Technological and 
Economic Issues," Next Fift 
Years, William R. Ind~ana 
University Press, 
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Assessment techniques may be integrated into the planning, 
designing, and evaluative process used by government agencies 
in preparing technology-oriented progr~s and projects, and 
may also provide a critical review of such programs and projects 
after their injection into the public policy arena. 
The present study, Technology and Public Policy, is intended 
to provide a descriptive and analytical review of the concept 
of technology assessment and the current status of its applica-
tion in the work of federal executive agencies. 'l'he remainder 
of this chapter will examine the origin of the term technology 
assessment, a brief history of its discussion and development 
since 1966, and some of the factors influencing that development. 
Subsequent chapters will examine the work of federal agencies 
concerned with technological programs and projects and the extent 
to which they are utilizing or can be expected to util;; . ..:'e the 
technique of technology assessment. 
It should be noted that many of those who have written about 
technology assessment suggest that the technique can or should 
be used in private sector decisionmaking. As used in this study, 
however, the term technology assessment is limited to studies 
which are intended to provide input into or to influence public 
sector decisionmaking. 
The word "technology" itself requires some comment. The 
dictionary definition of "technologyjl is "applied science; a 
technical method of achieving a practical purpose; the totality 
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of the means employed to provide objects necessary for human 
.. 18 
sustenance and comfort. II The McGraw~Hill Encyclopedia of 
Science and Technology says that technology is "the systematic 
use of industrial processes, tools, and techniques fo,r the 
accomplishment of specific l)lanned functions." According to 
this encyclopedia, science is organLzed knowledge, engineering 
is planning and design based on organized knowledge and aimed at 
modification of the physical environment, and ~hnology is the 
technique by which such modification is carried through. Some 
thinkers use a much broader definition of technology which 
includes institutional or legal innovations. John Wilkerson, 
the translator of Jacques Ellul's La Tec~nique (translated as 
The Technological Society) describes technique as "the organized 
ensemble of all individual techniques which have been used to 
secure any end whatsoever," and further quotes Lasswell as 
defining technology as "the ensemble of practices by which one 
uses available resources to achieve values.,,19 
However, technology as used in this paper does not include 
processes and techniques which are purely behavioral, legal, or 
institutional (such as psychoanalysis, a guaranteed annual wage, 
or day-ca~e nurseries). The subject of discussion is the assess-
ment of "hard" technologies involving the use of industrial 
18 
Merriam-Webster Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1965. 
19 
Jacques Ellul, T~e Technological Society, translated from 
the French by John Wilkinson (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. vi. 
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processes I tools, and techniques I and gel'leral1y intended to 
modify either the physical envixonment or the human body, 
although the assessment may deal with the full range of secondary 
and higher order consequences. 
Development of the Concept 01 Technology Assessment: 
1966-1970 
On March 7, 1967, Representative Emilio Daddario introduced 
before the Congress a bill proposing the creation of a "Techl1ol-
ogy Assessment Board" to assist 'the Congress in mak-:ng wise 
decisions concerning 'the use of science and technology and to 
provide Congress with an "early warning signal" of the poten'tial 
good and bad consequences of technological programs. Repr€senta-
five Daddario st-..ipulated that this bill was intended "not as a 
piece of perfected. legislation but as a stimulant to dis.cussion;.tt 20 
Daddario, who was then Chairman of 'the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development of the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, defined technology assessment as: 
20 
" ••• a form of policy research which provides a balanced 
appraisal to the policymaker. Ideally, it is a system 
to ask the right questions and obtain correct and timely 
answers. It identifies policy issues, assesses the 
impact of alternative courses of action, and presents 
findings. It is a method of analysis that systemati-
cally appraises the nature, significance, status, and 
merit of a technological program ••. (and) is designed to 
uncover three types of consequences -- desirable, un-
desirable, and uncertain ••. To assess technology one 
has to establish cause and ~ffect relationships from 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
"Technology Assessment," Statement ()f Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the ••• , 
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967. 
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the action or project source to the locale of 
consequences. •. The- function of technology assess-
ment is to identify •.. both short-term and long 
range (impacts)."2l 
In the sense in which Mr. Daddario here used it, the term 
"technology assessment" had apparently been used for the first 
time in a report of his Subcommittee a few months earlier, 
october 17, 1966. 22 This report was concerned with undesirable 
consequences of technology, \'7hich the sUbcommi.ttee noted were 
appearing with alarming frequency: technological unemployment, 
toxic pesticides, pollution, automobile effluents, forest 
depletion, exhaustion of resources I disposal of radioact.i ve 
wastes, invasions of personal liberty by computerized i"nforma-
tion systems and electronic surveillance, and the effeots of 
carbon dioxide on climate. The subl:!ommittee said that., in the 
past, 
" ••• man could afford to look upon the innovations of 
technology with some complacency. For the innovations 
came slowly, they were put to use in a relatively slow 
and modest fashion, and their side effects developed 
at a sufficiently relaxed pace to permit man to adjust 
21 . Ib~d., pp. 12-13. 
22 
According to Franklin P. Huddle of. the Science Policy Research 
Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress, in ;" paper entitled "Government Technology Assessment: 
the Role ~'.£ the Social Sciences," presented at a Round Table Dis-
cussion of the American Political Science Association, October 2, 
1970. The author is indebted to Dr. Huddle for the use of this 
paper in preparing the present historical discussion. The term 
technology assessment is frequently used by engineers and other 
technologists to mean evaluation of the performance of a system, 
i.e., assessment of intentional, first order consequences only. 
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to them -- or to alter his course if the threat were 
great enough. ,,23 
Under the leadership of Mr. Daddario the members of the Sub-
committee had been inquiring into reports of "ecological 
disasters" which were appearing in newspapers across the country 
and in books such as Rachel Carson's silent Spring. 24 According 
t8 researchers at the Congressional Research Service (then the 
Legislative Reference Service) who assisted the subcommittee in 
these deliberations, the members had been particularly impressed 
by a suggestion of Col. Charles Lindbergh, an ardent conservation-
ist, that some method was needed to anticipate such detrimental 
impacts at an early stage of technological developments. The 
term technology assessment was chose:n, some observers remember, 
in order to assure that any fut.ure legislation dealing with such 
activity would be referred to the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development. 
When Mr. Daddario introduced his proposal to establish a 
Technology Assessment Board, he told the Congress in an accom-
panying statement, 
"Technical information needed by po1icymakers is 
frequently not available, or not in the right form. 
A po1icymaker cannot judge the merits or consequences 
of a technological program within a strictly technical 
context. He has to consider social, economic, and 
legal implications of any course of action." 
23 - . . d . U.S. Congress, House, Cornm1ttee on SC1ence an Astronaut1cs, 
"Inquiries, Legislation, Policy Studies Re Science and Technology: 
Review and Forecast," Second Progress Report of the Subcommittee 
on Science, Research, and Development, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 
1966, p. 25. 
24 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). 
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The problem for Congress in dealing with technological 
innovation is therefore one of providing itself with in for-
mation about scientific and technological possibilities and 
options, in a form intelligible to and useful for nonspecialists
 
decisionmakers. The Daddario Subcommittee decided to explore 
the idea of technology assessment further through the holding 
of seminars and public hearings, and by commissioning several 
studies of the subject, by the National Academies of Sciences 
and Engineering and by the Legislative Reference Service. 
In the fall of 1967 the Subcommittee invited a number of 
specialists in policy sciences to a seminar on Technology Asses
s-
ment. President Bowen of the University of Iowa, the former 
chairman of the National Commission on Automation, Technology, 
and Economic Progress, called attention to another aspect of 
the social direction of technology, the need to establish 
consensual goals and priorities for the immediate and long-range
 
future of the nation. He therefore proposed both the estab1ish-
ment of a technology assessment "council" to serve the federal 
government, and the establishment of a "commission on national 
25 
goals." 
The Library of Congress Study. The study which the Subcom-
mittee had requested from the Legislative Reference Service was 
submitted in the spring of 1969. Technical Information for 
25 " d t' U.S. Congress, House, Comm~ttee on Sc~ence an Astronau ~cs, 
"Technology Assessment Seminar," Proceedings before the Sub-
committee on Science, Research, and Development, September 21 an
d 
22, 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967 (revised August 1968), 
pp. 5-6. 
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Congress, by Dr. Frank P. Huddle, examined fourteen cases in 
which the Congress had acted on issues concerned with technology, 
such as the Salk Vaccine, the nuclear test ban treaty, the Mohole 
research program, and water policy formulation. 26 
In each of these cases Dr. Huddle examined conflict between 
scientific and political decisionmaking, differences between 
scientific and political information, and differences between 
scientific and political behavior. He concluded that the 
technical aspects of political issues should receive priority 
attention and that "it is impnrtant that the scientific question 
or issue be carefully framed so that the answer to it provides 
a useful and significant piece of evidence for guidance in the 
consideration of the broader political issue." When the techni-
cal questions are not firmly resolved, Dr. Huddle noted, "the 
political resolution of the broader issue tended to be defec-
27 
ti ve. " 
Perhaps the greatest difficul'ty which Huddle noted in supplying 
Congress with scientific information was that "the lay members 
of Congress found it impossiblE~ to acc!ept the proposition that 
science is probabilistic," and were apt to accept "invalid 
hypotheses" (sic) and to make "improper use Clf outstanding 
personalities. " Huddle therl.:fore suggested ·the need for 
26 
U.S. Congress, House, Committel': on Science and Astronautics, 
Technical Information for Congress, Report to the Subcommittee 
on Science, Research, and Development, prepared by the Science 
Policy Research Division, Legisla'tive Reference Service, Library 
of Congress. House Document No. 91-137, 91st Congress, 1st 
Session, April 25, 1969. 
27 " 
Ibid., p. 506. 
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information input from a wide range of disciplines, including 
in every assessment involving lithe interaction of man and 
machine II -- the social sciences; and he stressed that technology 
assessment must be an iterative process: 
liThe more time that can be given to this new process, 
to the progressive sequences of interactions of new 
fact and analysis, the mQre mature and sound will be 
the ultimate decision. 1I2 !3 
At the same time, delay in decisionmaking can allow irreversible 
detrimental impacts to occur. Therefore, Huddle concluded, it 
is important that the process of technology assessment "should 
begin to occur as far upstream as possible,1I and he urged that 
IIby institutionalizing and systematizing (the assessment process) 
the quality and efficiency of the process' can be improved. II 
The National Academy of Sciences Study. A second report on 
technology assessment was submitted to the Committee on Science 
and Astronauti.cs by the National Academy of Sciences in July, 
1969. 29 This report was prepared by a Panel of the Committee 
on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP) chaired by Professor Harvey 
Brooks of Harvard University. The report described the existing 
process of governmental assessment and decision as "critically 
deficient" in several regards: 
Technologies are assessed on the basis of economic 
benefit to the user rather than on the basis of 
general social benefits, 
28 " Huddle, Government Technoloqy Assessment,"p. 15. 
29Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, Report of 
the National Academy of Sciences to the Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, July 1969),~ 
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"External" costs of technological applications, 
e.g., pollution, are ignored, 
In the process of resource allocation, there is a 
lack of criteria that recognize "the full spectrum 
of human need," 
The burden of proof "has tended to fallon those who 
challenge the wisdom of an on-going technological 
trend," 
Waiting until deleterious effects become evident 
"entails too high a risk that vested interests --
among both producers and consumers -- will by then 
become so entrenched as to make it politically very 
difficult or economically very costly to suppress or 
modify an offendi~8" technology or to develop an 
alternative one." 
The CQSPUP panel outlined conceptual, institutional, and 
methodological constraints on improvement of the assessment 
process, but it recommended the establishment of new mechanisms 
within the federal government whose functions would be the 
sponsoring and funding of basic research on technical problems 
and of technology assessments, the continuing review of assess-
ments made by other government institutions, and the dissemina-
tion of information about technology assessments. The report 
suggested that a technology assessment center be located within 
an expanded Office of Science and Technology in the Executive 
Office of the President, working in close conjunction with a 
technology assessment division to be located in the National 
science Foundation. A separate assessment component, the Panel 
said, was needed to serve the Congress and provide it with an 
independent source of assessment informat.ion. 
30. 34 Ib1d., pp. -35. 
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The COSPUP report also included a first attempt at structuring 
a methodology for technology assessment. Recognizing that there 
was "no unique way to break down so vast a subject," the panel 
conceptualized the task in three interrelated subject areas: 
the focal points from which assessment should begin, assessment 
modes and mechanisms, and patterns of response and action. 
The focal points for assessments, the panel suggested, might 
be the technology, the environment, or the individual. Technology 
was here defined as "a system of interrelated innovations, some 
technical and some social, which comprise some sort of coherent 
nexus pertaining to systematic manipulation of the environment," 
e.g., automobile transportation or cable television. 
Beginning with this focal point an assessment must consider 
both economic, social, and legal arrangements which would 
facilitate introduction and use of a technology, and arrangements 
which could constrain or regulate its use. The assessment must 
then examine: 
the rate of advancement in development of the technology, 
possibilities for technology transfer to related areas, 
probable growth in the scale of application, 
availability of intermediaries or buffers between 
technology and user (in the case of drugs, the doctor; 
in the case of construction, building codes) , 
degree of departure from existing, accepted technologies, 
economic concentration of producers, 
centralization of decision making with regard to the 
technology and susceptibility to collective control, 
1 
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the competitive environment, 
societal sources of resistance to use of the technology 
(legal, social, religious). 
Another focal point for assessment is the environment, and 
the effects on it of the technology, whether these effects are 
aesthetic, changes in ecosystems, or biomedical in nature. 
However, the panel said that: " ••• pending further attention to 
definitional and other basic matters, the contemporary interest 
in environmental issues will make its major contribution to 
technology assessment by providing impetus for action rather than 
b f . h' h .. .. f ,,31 Y urn~s ~ng suc act~on w~th an organ~zat~onal ocus. 
Assessments might also use as their focal point, the individual. 
Here the panel suggested that the assessment should inquire what 
effects technology, or a specific technological application, are 
having on: 
the development and socialization of the child, 
the work experience of the adult, 
access to material goods and social values, 
opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, 
health and safety. 
The COSPUP panel concluded that a combination of all of the 
three focal points was required in an adequate assessment because 
'. 
of the possibility of synergistic effects and the possibility 
that either important second- and third-order consequences would 
be overlooked, or new developments in technology would go un-
noticed. 
31 b' d 132 ~., p. • 
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In discussing assessment modes and mechanisms, the .dnel dis-
tinguished between internalized assessments, that is, assessment 
built into the incentive structure of the decisionmaking process; 
and externalized assessments, that is, assessment conducted by an 
institution deliberately separated from the front-line decision-
maker. The panel strongly preferred internalized assessments, 
on the grounds that they tend to "redefine responsibility without 
• • • 11 32 . separat~ng ~t from author~ty, although the panel recogn~zed 
the need for external assessment also in order to make the system 
function properly: II Ideally , the effort should be to modify goals 
and criteria of success without dictating the means of achieving 
them. " 
The COSPUP panel here failed to explore the problem of insti-
tutional bias in agencies assessing their own projects and 
programs. However, the panel also distinguished between negative 
assessment, usually performed by agencies with regulatory 
responsibilities, and positive assessment, by an agency respon-
sible for evaluating and promoting new technology. This 
terminology was revealing in that it seemed to assume a one-sided 
approach to assessment ;:1alculated to protect the agency's interest, 
and the conclusion reached by the panel was somewhat counter to 
its announced preference for internalized assessment: liThe 
solution the panel has urged is a second-order assessment activ-
ity performed by an agency with neither promotional tasks nor 
risk-preventing responsibilities, an entity ancillary to the 
33 
activities of all agencies with one or the other kind of bias." 
32 
Ibid. , p. 139. 
33 
ILiu. , p. 140. 
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Finally, the COSPUP panel considered possible patterns of 
response to technology assessments -- changes or modifications 
in introduction, support, or use of technology through: resource 
allocation decisions, modifying private initiatives by inter-
nalization of costs or enforcement of standards or regulations, 
or the altering of incentives through creation of new legal 
rights or other social innovations. The panel suggested that 
assessments should be structured so as to be appropriate for the 
ends in view and the needs of specific decisionmaking entities. 
"If society persists in its present course," the COSPUP 
pane.l warned, "the future holds great peril, whether from the 
uncontrolled effects of technology itself or from an unreasoned 
political reaction against all technological innovation. "34 
The National Academy of Engineering Study. A third report was 
also submitted to the Daddario Subcommittee in the summer of 
1969 by the National Academy of Engineering. A Study of Tech-
nology Assessment was prepared by the Committee on Public 
Engineering Policy (COPEP) chaired by Chauncey Starr, Dean of 
35 the School of the University of California at Los Angeles. 
This study went somewhat beyond the National Academy of Sciences 
effort in that COPEP performed three "experiments in technology 
34 
Ibid., p. 118. 
35A Study of Technology Assessment, Report of the Committee on 
Public Engineering Policy, National Academy of Engineering, to 
the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
July 1969). 
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assessment," preliminary examinations of the technology assess-
ment task in the fields of Teaching Aids (instructional television 
and computer-assisted instruction), Subsonic Aircraft Noise, 
and Multiphasic Health Screening. 
In conducting these experimental assessments, COPEP used a 
seven-step analytical approach, as follows: 
1. Identify and refine the subject to be assessed. 
2. Deliniate the scope of the assessment and develop 
a data base. 
3. Identify alternative strategies to solve the selected 
problems with the technology under assessment. 
4. Identify parties affected by the selected problems 
and the technology. 
5. Identify the impacts on the affected parties. 
6. Valuate or measure the impacts. 
7. Compare the pros and cons of alternative strategies. 
In commenting on their chosen approach, the COPEP group noted 
that Representative Daddario had suggested that assessment should 
seek to establish cause-effect relationships between a technology 
. . . 36 .. 
and l.ts l.mpacts on soc1.ety. COPEP found that a purely causal 
methodology" had certain limitations. There were in fact, two 
classes of technology assessment, said COPEP, problem-initiated 
assessments and technology-initiated assessments. The first, 
exemplified by the subsonic aircraft noise problem, deals with 
a large number of variables but is focused on a we 1.1.-defined 
36 
u.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
1ITechnology Assessment," Statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 90th Congress, 
1st Session, July 3, 1967. 
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goal, namely solution of the problem. Here identification 
of cause-effect chains, such as is done using the systems 
analysis method of engineering, is feasible because lithe future 
course of events is a converging one, where many causal chains 
converge on one or at most toward a few end-points. The process 
begins at the large end of a funnel, and the optimum solution 
to a given problem is at the small end." In technology-
initiated assessments (such as those dealing with instructional 
aids or multiphasic health s·creening), however, 
"The assessment process begins with the new technology 
at the small end and emerges as a complex pattern of 
consequences at the large end. As cause-effecL chains 
diverge, predictability of events diminishes •• Thus 
the farther that predictions ~7etend to see, the greater 
their degree of uncertainty." 
Therefore the COPEP study groups tended to convert the technol-
ogy-initiated experimental assessments into problem-initiated 
assessments by focusing on a few potential areas of social 
concern or of social opportunity which might be significantly 
affected by the subject technology. However, the report noted 
that this choice was influenced by the constraints of time and 
effort in making these experimental studies, and warned "The 
uncertainty in this approach is that in making the selection of 
problems to be addressed, important social and political impacts 
could be overlooked." 
In carrying out steps 5 and 6 of their experimental metho-
dology, (identification, evaluation, and measuring of impacts 
37 
A Study of Technology Assessment, p. 16. 
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f n 
on affected parties), the COPEP study groups worked out a simple 
scheme for comparison of the judgments of the assessors. Each 
assessor rated each potential impact (for example, increased 
cost of instruction with the use of television) for each affected 
party (instit1.~tions of higher education, students, faculty, 
industry). Impacts were rated as to their nature (favorable, 
unfavorable, unknown), their probability of occurrence (likely, 
unlikely), and their susceptibility to federal action (control-
lable, uncontrollable, unknown). The limitations of this 
coarse-grained rating scheme were recognized; but, said the 
committee: 
" ••. attempts to apply several (more complex rating 
schemes) led to the realization that the effort and 
judgment required to implement them resulted in 
distinctions that could neither be better supported 
nor whose combined effects could be assessed more\ 
critically. 1138 , \ 
This difficulty points to a critical need which is co~istentlY 
recognized in technology assessment studies subsequent to the 
COPEP report: the lack of an acceptable and accepted system of 
social indicators for measurement and comparison of potenti'al 
impacts which have been identified through technology assessment. 
On the basis of its three experiments, the committee reacheq 
fourteen conclusions. 39 These are paraphrased below. 
1. Technology assessments are feasible, and will be useful to 
Congress "when prepared by properly constituted, independent, 
ad hoc task forces with adequate staff support and time." 
38 .. d 43 ;(b~ ., p. . 
39 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
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2. They should be free from political influence or bias. 
~'-----"- "---r-~-
Selection of a preferred course of action is the prerogative 
of the legislator; the assessment group should limit itself to 
outlining alternative strategies for action. 
3. Assessors should be chosen for their expertise and not as 
representatives of affected parties or interests. 
4. Assessors must necessarily be chosen from public and 
private organizations with knowledge about the subject, but 
organizational biases of the experts will tend to cancel out and 
be neutralized. 
5. There should be extensive participation by behavioral and 
political scientists; experience shows that engineers, economists, 
and social scientists can work together harmoniously. 
6. To be of most use, the assessment should take about one 
year and be the sole activity of the research group. 
7. Congress would be best served by a small management group 
which would arrange for technology assessments by diverse research 
organizations. No one entity can provide adequate in-house 
expertise for all assessments. 
8. Cause-effect analysis should be supplemented by "the 
intuitive judgments of knowledgable individuals." 
9. Assessments can begin through consideration of either a 
technolo~, or a social problem. The procedures for these two 
kinds of asse~sment will differ somewhat; Congress has a greater 
r 
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need for the first, while more fully tested methodologies exist 
for the second. 
10. Technology-initiated assessment requires a choice between 
"diffuse searches seeking some early-warning signal" and "con-
version to a problem-oriented study" that chooses the most 
significant (potentially detrimental) impacts for analysis. The 
latter choice involves the danger of overlooking hitherto un-
recognized impacts. 
11. Long-term forecasts (more than five years) are valuable 
for planning and "setting the stage" for consideration of unfore-
seen events, but are likely to be unreliable. 
12. Criteria for establishing the priority of topics for 
assessment include the breadth and depth of expected social 
impact, the visibility of the problems to legislators and to the 
public, and the current and expected rates of development of the 
technologies. 
13. Appraisal of impacts must include the derivation and " .. 1 
of measures of social value pertinent to the quality of life, in 
addition to conventional economic and technical risk-benefit 
criteria. 
14. Technology assessment can provide the public support 
necessary for national programs designed to secure the benefits 
and avoid the problems of technological advances. 
Unlike the COSPEP report earlier described, which indicated 
a preference for internalized assessments (those integrated into 
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institutional decisionmaking processes), the COPEP report thus 
concentrated on the need for externalized assessment, "by 
properly constituted, independent, ad hoc task forces" of 
neutral experts. The COPEP study, unlike the earlier efforts, 
made a clear distinction between problem-initiated and tech-
nology-initiated assessments. By clearly preferring the former 
(because of the existence of familiar and well-developed 
techniques of analysis for such subjects), and by advocating the 
conversiol~ of technology-focused assessments into problem-
oriented studies~ COPEP tended to downplay exploratory, antici-
patory assessment at an:early stage of technological innovation, 
when problems have not become obvious and potential consequences 
have not yet been recognized. This thrust undercuts the 
greatest value of technology assessment as other advocates, 
including Mr. Daddario, have conceived it. By focusing on 
technology-related problems to the almost total neglect of 
potential benefits, this report stressed the negative aspects 
of technology assessment and may have fed the anxieties of 
critics who were, in 1969, already beginning to talk of technol-
ogy assessment as "technology arrestment." These fears became 
evident at a meeting which provided the next significant forum 
for discussion of technology assessment. 
1969 and 1970: Discussions and Hearings. Under the aegis of 
the Engineering Foundation, a non-profit professional association, 
about one hundred persons met in August 1969 for a discussion of the 
-
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three reports which had been generated on technology assessment. 
Participants included the COSPUP and COPEP members, representa-
tives from the Legislative Reference Service and congressional 
committee staffs, and engineers and academicians. During the 
diRcussions, as one participant, Dr. Franklin Huddle, described 
the discussion, it became clear that 
n ••• there was a trend toward the polarization of 
views into --
n{a) Those favoring a formal governmental process .•• , 
those concerned with the cooling of technology, 
and those concerned with ecological/environ-
mental insults caused by technology, 
versus 
"(b) Those determined that the creativity of tech-
nology should not be restrained by the strait-
jacket of assessment and regulation; those 
attaching high value to the economic importance 
of continued exploitation of technology; and 
those inclined to discount as exaggerated the 
allegation of environmental degradation resulting 
from technological 'progress'."40 
Those who take the extreme position that technology assessment 
may be "a straitjacket" dampening technological innovation and 
starving scientific research by suppressing public support, 
cannot be assumed to be callous to societal problems. As one 
such sceptic wroti;!, in a paper entitled "Technology Assessment 
or Technology Harassment?": 
"Considering the attacks to which science and technology 
are now being subjected, the danger is ••• that harassment 
by an overemotional political process may prevent (new 
40Huddle,nGOVernment Technology Assessment," p. 26. 
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technology) from coming to fruition. Such a risk 
may be run, however, to assure that the new technology 
will meet !i:s legi'timate purpose of serving the public 
interest. " 
This author, Dr. Leon Green, Executive Secretary of the 
Defense Research Board, pointed out in speaking of pollution: 
"What generally goes unrecognized ••• is that the culprit 
is not technology per s~ but persistence in the appli-
cation of obsolescent l1f not archaic) technology for 
economic reasons, and failure to apply new or existing 
technology for the processing of waste products. What 
is needed is not less but more and better technology, 
thoughtfully applied." 
In November and December 1969, the Daddario subcommittee held 
hearings on the subject of technology assessment. 42 The Comptrol-
ler-General of the United States and the heads of the National 
Science Foundation, the Library of Congress, a National Labor-
atory, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Office of Science 
and Technology, described for the subcommittee the readiness and 
capability of their organizations to provide Congress with 
technology assessments. Other executive agencies, such. as the 
Department of Commerce and the Food and Drug Administration, 
provided testimony about the technology assessment activities 
of their agencies. In addition, there was testimony from repre-
sentatives of a number of academic institutions, especially those 
41 Leon Green, Jr., "Technology Assessment or Technology Harass-
ment," unpublished paper presented at a Seminar of the Program 
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington 
University, March 26, 1970. 
42 H 'tt ' d ' u.S. Congress, ouse, Comm~ ee on Sc~ence an Astronaut~cs, 
Technology Assessment, before the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development, 9lst Congress, 1st Session, Nov. 18, 
24i Dec. 2, 3, 4, 8, and 12, 1969. 
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with programs in the policy sciences, which indicated that the 
idea of technology assessment had been picked up and explored 
and was rapidly becoming a new and recognized area for academic 
endeavor. These groups included the Program of Policy Studies 
in Science and Technology at The George Washington University, 
the Program in Science and Public Policy at Purdue University, 
the Program of Technology and Society at Harvard University 
(now defunct), and others. 
The activities of the Daddario subcommittee had sparked wide 
interest and the concept of technology assessment was being 
explored, during 1967-1970, through a flood of articles in 
science and engineering publications, professimc~l journals, and 
the general media. An annotated bibliography O¥i te0hnology 
assessment, prepared by the LibraLY of Congress for the sub-
committee in mid-1970, listed 154 articles, documents, and books 
h ub · 43 on t e s ]ect. 
Thus, when the Daddario subcommittee reconvened hearings in 
the spring of 1970, the idea of technology assessment had 
44 
generated wide interest. Public hearings were held in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, and Webster Groves, Missouri (at Webster 
43 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
Technology Assessment, an Annotated Bibliography and Inventory 
of Congressional Organization for Science and Technology, pre-
pared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development. 
9lst Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 1970. 
44 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
Technology Assessment - 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Science, Research, and Development on H.R. 17056, 9lst 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970. 
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College) in March to hear representatives of public interest and 
citizen action groups, and experts on technological impacts and 
critical environmental problems. In May and June the hearings 
continued in Washington to hear discussions of how a technology 
assessment mechanism to serve Congress might best be structured. 
The Daddario Bill proposed the establishment of a Technology 
Assessment Board to promulgate assessment policy, and an Office 
of Technology Assessment to serve Congress by initiating assess-
ments, using both the Congressional Research Service and the 
National Science Foundation to carry out research projects 
requested by the Board, the Director of the Office, or the chair-
man of any congressional committee. This bill, H.R. 18469, was 
introduced by Representative Daddario on July 15, 1970, and 
subsequently reported out by the House Science and Astronautics 
Committee. A counterpart bill, S. 4085, was introduced in the 
Senate at the same time. Another bill (S. 4044) had been 
introduced by Senator Magnuson a few days earlier, which would 
establish an "Independent Technology Assessment and Environmental 
Data Collection Commission" to serve all branches of the govern-
ment. The Commission, as proposed, would have much the same 
functions described in Representative Daddario's bill with 
particular emphasis on providing an "early warning-" of detrimental 
environmental impacts of new technology. This bill \Vas referred 
to the Commerce Committee of the Senate. No further action was 
taken on these bills by the 9lst Congress. 
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However the Daddario bill reappeared during the 92nd Congress 
as H.R. 10243, sponsored by Representative Davis and others. 
(Mr. Davis had assumed the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on 
Science, Research, and Development after Mr. Daddario retired 
from Congress in 1970 to run for another office.) The bill 
received the unanimous approval of the Committee on Science and 
Astronautics and was passed by the House of Representatives on 
February 8, 1972, by a vote of 256 - 118, and sent to the 
Senate. The bill would establish an Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) to serve the Congress; OTA would not itself 
perform technology assessments but would initiate and direct 
assessments through contracts wi·th nonprofit, academic, industrial, 
or ad hoc research groups. Its independence from the Executive 
Branch was stressed; as one of its sponsors told the Congress, 
"Let us face it ••• we in the Congress are constantly 
outmanned and outgunned by the expertise of the execu-
tive agencies. We desperately need a stronger source 
of professional advice and information, more immediately 
and entirely responsible to use and responsive to the 
demands of our own committees in order to more nearly 
match those resources in the executive agencies."45 
The original bill called for OTA to be made up of a Technology 
Assessment Board consisting of two Members of the House, two 
Senators, the Comptroller-General, the Director of the Congres-
sional Research Service, the Directoy,: of OTA, and four public 
45 
U.S. Congress, House, Remarks of Mr. Moshur supporting a 
bill to Establish the Office of Technology Assessment, Congres-
sional Record, February 8, 1972, H. 867. 
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members appointed by the President. But in the ir; terest of 
further independence from the Executive Branch, the bill was 
amended on the floor so that the Board would consist of five 
Members of the House and five Senators, with the chairmanship 
alternating between these two groups. The Director is to initiate 
assessments only at the direction of the Board or of congressional 
committees. 
A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch 
Should the Technology Assessment Bill be accepted substantively 
by the Senate, the Congress will have established a mechanism 
which will provide Congress with technology assessments indepen-
dent of the assessment process in the Executive Branch. Congress 
had already passed, at the end of 1969, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, discussed in a subsequent section of this 
chapter, which was designed to improve the planning and evaluation 
of technological projects and programs by executive agencies. 
The Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development had taken 
one further step in this direction by commissioning a fourth 
study of technology assessment by the National Academy of Public 
Administration. This study was concerned with technology assess-
46 
ment in the Executive Branch. This study, which appeared in 
July, 1970, concluded that "Technology assessment in the Execu-
tive Branch now suffers from two major drawbacks: (1) the 
46 . . h A Technology Assessment System for the Execut~ve Branc . 
Report of the National Academy of Public Administration to the 
Committee on Science and Astronautics; u.S. House of Representa-
tives (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, ~uly, 1970). 
r 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
C. Contextual Approach to 
/ Technology Assessment: 
Implications for "One-
Factor Fix" Solutions to 
Complex Social Problems 
Louis H. MAYO 
April 1971, pp. 8-26i 38-87 
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participants, institutions, and social interests significantly affected 
by the proposed application. Further, each such participant will employ 
an alternative-oriented decisional mode18 to conduct its analysis of the 
more promising strategies or courses of action to pursue in order to 
achieve the desired assessment outcome. 
The System of Technology Assessment comes into operation with respect 
to a given application when prompted by an Initiating Event such as a sug-
gestion, recommendation, or proposal from any participant, public or private, 
in the System. Or the event may be a crisis or disaster arising from a 
technological source or within a social problem context for which a techno-
logical means is sought for its solution or alleviation. Frequently, a 
mission-oriented agency will be the initiating entity which sets the System 
in motion, the proposal growing out of its normal planning or R&D activities. 
Assuming the usual progression of a promising R&D proposal, the stages will 
include: Initiation, Assessment/Planning, Decision/Approval by the Executive 
Branch and the Congress, Implementation, Operations, Continuing Appraisal, 
and Feed-back. In some instances this Process of Program Implementation 
is monitored and regulated by an independent administrative/regulatory 
agency. But continuing monitoring and informal assessments will be made by 
various entities in the overall System of Technology Assessment/Application. 
In assessment decisional situations involving the establishment of a statutory 
8 
See Louis H. Mayo and Ernest M. Jones, "Legal-Policy Decision Process: 
Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function," 33 Geo. Wash. L. R. 318, 
350 (1964). 
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scheme and an implementing agency, the evolution might be characterized by 
the phases of the Legal/Policy Decision Process of Intelligence, Recommenda-
tion, Prescription, Invocation, Application, Appraisal, and Modification/ 
Termination. 9 
It is apparent in locating the evaluative function in the context 
of the on-going Effective Public Decision Process that evaluation pervades 
the entire process. Assessments are performed for a variety of purposes. IO 
The evaluation function, including technology assessment, is perfonned by 
a great diversity of public, private and public/private sector entities 
with differing authority, objectives, resources, capabilities, experience, 
and influence on the decisional process -- evaluation being primarily an 
intelligence or enlightenment input of relevant data and analyses. Assess-
ment is carried on by participants having perspectives ranging from the 
most exclusive and partisan to the most inclusive and public interest-
oriented. The participants interact in formal and informal forums and in 
authoritative decisional arenas. The assessment outcomes of a diversity 
of assessment entities must eventually be evaluated by the ultimate 
9 
Harold D. Lasswell, and My'res S. McDougal, "Jurisprudence in Po1icy-
oriented Perspect:ive, II 19 Fla. L. R. 486, 505 (1967). 
10 
For example, assessments may be directed to an evaluation of the 
total social impacts of a specific technological application, or to certain 
specified effects if the application is considered as a source of social 
harm or as a means of alleviating an adverse social condition. But the 
assessment objective might also be to assess alternative technological 
configurations or alternative applications which will conform to a stip-
ulated future social environment, or to make a comparative assessment of 
alternative technological applications designed for the same social purpose, 
or to make a comparative assessment of alternative technological applications 
designed for different or competing social objectives. For illustrations 
of various assessments and their particular purposes, see Vary T. Coates, 
Examples of Technology Assessments For the Federal Government, Staff Discussion 
Paper 206, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology of The George 
Wash~ngton University, January 1970. 
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authoritative decision makers, such as the agencies of the Executive and 
the Office of Management and Budget j as well as by the legislative com-
mittees and sub-committees of the Congress. It would seem essential to 
the overall adequacy of the technology assessment function that thoughtful, 
calculated, and understandable national policies be established which wiIl 
provide the criteria for evaluation of the social impacts of proposed 
technological applications. Otherwise. assessment outcomes, with respect 
to particular programs or projects, cannot be evaluated for adequacy and 
usefulness by the responsible decision makers. Further, this overall task 
of assessment outcome evaluation would seem to require some mutuality of 
accommodation among expressed national policies in the major social-
11 functional areas. 
But the establishment of meaningful national policies which can give 
guidance to assessing entities is no easy task. Of course, the assessor 
always has the option of measuring effects brought about by the interven-
tion of a technological application in terms of alternative schemes of 
social interests or of alternative national policy objectives. This approach 
is useful in setting out policy alternatives where no established policy 
exists; concomitantly, it may simply stimulate greater divisiveness by 
supplying analytical support for more sophisticated advocacy. 
11 
See, for example, John W. Gardtler, "The Undelivered Message 
of John Gardner," The Wash. Post, May 16, 1970, p. A 12. col. 3. 
We can't understand our current frustration if woe look only at 
specific substantive goals in education, housing, employment, 
and the like. What is not working is the process and the 
mechanisms which should serve us in achieving all of our goals. 
1 
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Daniel P. Moynihan has asserted that we are moving from a focus on 
independent programs which Ilrelate to a single part of the system" 
12 to policy which "seeks to respond to the system in its entirety." 
He expects this movement to be a definitive trend in the 1970's.13 
In short, we are giving increasing attention to total social problem 
contexts or social systems as contrasted with programs directed toward 
particular parts of such systems which are not coordinated by an overall 
policy. "(A) policy approach to government • . . (seeks) to encompass 
the largest possible range of phenomena and concerns. ,,14 Moynihan cites 
the 1956 Interstate and Defense Highway System as the "largest public 
works program in history,,15 and states that the eventual judgment will 
be that it has "had more influence on the shape and development of 
American cities, the distribution of population within metropolitan 
areas, and across the nation as a whole, the location of industry and 
various kinds of employment opportunities (and in all these, immense 
influence on race relations and the welfare of black Americans) than 
any initiative of the middle third of the 20th Century. ,,16 But he also 
concludes that "the politics of getting the Interstate B.ighway Program 
enacted, decreed, or at least indicated, the narrowest possible defini-
tion of its purposes and impact. ,,17 However one might assess this 
judgment, it is correct that President Eisenhower's Message to Congress 
12 
Daniel P. Moynihan, liThe Concept of Public Policy in the 1970's," 
Speech given at Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1970, p. 5. 
13 14 U 
Idem at 7. Idem at 11. Idem at 15. 
16 17 
Ibid. Idem at 17. 
r 
LI __ _ 
r 
1 
1 
! 
- 12 -
----" -----.. -'" .. ---~-r-" 
I 
f 
on the National Highway Program of February 22, 1955, attached the Report 
of the Presidential Advisory Committee on A Ten Year National Highway 
Program which focused its attention on the "Nation's highway system, 
other modes of transportation being explicitly excluded."18 But within 
the social sub-system thus posited, both the Advisory Committee and the 
Report of the House Committee on Public !'lorks displayed an intention to 
include all significant social interactions and effects of the proposed 
"Nati:-,nal highway system." As the author of this paper has observed 
elsewhere: 
The Congressional Committee Report shows that an extremely 
wide range of engineering, financial, and social factors 
was considered. From our present perspective, however, we 
would note that some factors were given no attention what-
ever. The Advisory Committee and the Congress seemed to be 
much more concerned ,-lith the efficient implementation of the 
highway program rather than with cumulati",e and qualitative 
social impacts, particularly those which might be detrimental. 
No consideration was given to increasing envir.onmental pollu-
tion which ~yould result from the growing traffic volume: air 
pollution from exhausts, engine noise, resulting aesthetic 
debasement, or the derivative health hazards from the fore-
going sources. Nor was a great deal of attention given to 
the relationship between the increased number and size of 
motor freight carriers and the possible increased hazards to 
private auto drivers and passengers. 19 
The above quoted passage should be considered as illustrative of the 
prevailing public concerns (or the lack thereof) of the middle 1950's, 
and not as a criticism of the Presidential Advisory Committee and 
Congressional evaluators. But Moynihan comments with reference to the 
planning and implementation of the Interstate Highway System by the 
Bureau of Public Roads: 
18 19 
Mayo supra note 1, at 18. Idem at 19. 
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As bureaucrats, their instinct was faultless. Had anyone 
realized what they were in fact doing, the sheer magnitude 
of the interests they were affecting, it is nig'u impossible 
to imagine that they would have won acceptance. Indeed a 
bare fifteen years after the Interstate program commenced, 
it is near impossible to get a major highway program approved 
in most large American cities. But it is too late: most 
systems have been built. In the process -- such at least 
would be my views -- quite appalling mistakes were made, but 
they were mistakes having to do with i~sues nominally alto-
gether unrelated to the highway program itself, and so no 
one was responsible for them ...• 20 
Surely it is possible to hope for something more. Government 
must seek out its hidden policies, raising them to a level of 
consciousness and acceptance -- or rejection -- and acknowledge-
ment of the extraordinary range of contradictions that are typ-
ically encountered •... Surely also it is possible to hope for a 
career civil service that is not only encouraged, but 2Iquired 
to see their activities in the largest possible scope. 
Despite the foregoing suggestions of lack of policy guidance in 
terms of formulations which encompass broad social problem contexts or 
inclusive social systems, we do have many commendable policy statements 
directed to '~ritical social problem contexts in our statutory schemes, 
as for example: Employment Act of 1946, Housing Act of 1949 and sub-
sequent reiterations, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, etc. So the deficiency may not be entirely due to a lack 
20 
Hoynihan supra note 12, at 17. 
21 
Idem at 18. 
This discussion of the re-assessment of the Interstate Hig11way 
Program suggests the question of the extent to which the new National Rail 
Passenger Corporation, which commences management of intercity rail passen-
ger service as of May 1, 1971, has been evaluated for "total social impacts" 
with resper.t to its operations. See DOT Release of Jan. 28, 1971, #2071. 
See also, Tom Wicker, "Rescuing the Iron Horse," N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, 
p. 15E, col. 4. 
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of well fonnulated policy. It is also a matter of detennj.nation to carry 
out stated policy including the willingness to allocate sufficient resources 
for the development of adequate planning and assessing capabilities as well 
as to implementation/enforcement functions. 22 
Ail intense concern has now emerged for a reorientation of social goals 
expressed by fonnulations such as "the qualitative society," a "livable 
23 
environment," and "balanced social growth." There is definitely a trend, 
22 
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., "The Rhetoric and the Reality," The 
Wash. Post, June 4, 1970, p. A 16, col. 3. 
Certain indicators raise serious doubts as to the extent of the 
public's interest in environmental pollution abatement when actually 
confronted ~vith the cost. See Sylvia Porter, "You Will Pay For 
Pollution Controls," in the Wash. Star, Sept. 23, 1970, p. F 6, col. 3. 
In an editorial, "Missing the Message on Billboards," The Wash. Post, 
Sept. 22, 1970, p. A 20, col. 1, makes the following comment: 
One of the funnier games that politicians occasionally play is to 
pass a law one day and then help break it the next. Except that 
not everyone finds it funny. In 1965, Congress enaeted the Highway 
Beautification Act which said, among other things, that all bill-
boards were to come down by July 1, 1970, from rural sections of the 
interstate and primary highway systems. This meant some 800,000 signs 
bordering 235,000 miles of roadway. Now, five years and two months 
later, the billboards are still up. What's worse, a fair chance 
exists that they may stay up. 
23 
See Institutions for the Effective Management of the Environment, 
a Report of the Environmental Studies Group to the Environmental Studies 
Board of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of 
Engineering, Part I, January 1970, 
See also A Strategy for a Livable Environment, a Report to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, by the Task Force on 
Environmental Health and Related Problems, June 1967, and the Report 
of the National Goals Research Staff, Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity 
with Quality, Washington, D. C.: The White Hous/a, July 4, 1970. On the 
urgent need for "balanced and purposeful growth" see George H. B;:-own, 
Director of the Bureau of the Census, "Looking to 1985 - and the Dangers 
of an Affluent Majority," Washington Post, Dec. 29, 1970, p. A 14, col. 3. 
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of which technology assessment is but one aspect, to adopt a more "balanced" 
orientation toward social advance. 24 This involves the development of 
indicators of social change and the means of measuring and evaluating such 
change. This orientation toward the introduction of "reater rationality 
into the process of applying resources to social goals obviously involves 
an increasing degree of selectivity among social goals, deliberateness in 
choice of means, and criteria for making such determinations. 25 
24 
A major shift in social value priorities has been urged, that is 
from a concept of "The machine-conditioned utopia • • • based on power, 
property, productivity, profit, and pUblicity" to one of "an organic world-
picture in the center of which stands man himself." See discussion of 
Lewis Mumford's book, The Pentagon of Power (1970) in Business Week, 
November 14, 1970, p. 6. 
"For the first time in the nation's history, environmental questions 
are figuring importantly in the campaigning in many states in this fall's 
elections." N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, p. 1, col. 6. 
25 
The strong movement toward the reappraisal of priority social va.lues 
is reflected in the following statement concerning Robert S. McNamara, Presi-
dent of the World Bank, Wash. Star, Sept. 21, 1970, A 13, col. 1: 
The former U. S. Secretary of Defense hit hard at milita~~ expendi-
tures when he told. finance ministers and central bank governors 
from 116 nations, "That 20 times more should be spent on military 
power than on constructive progress appears to me to be the mark of 
an ultimate and, I sometimes fear, incurable folly." 
He said it was "inconceivable" to him that Americans accept a situation 
in which they form 6% of the world's population but consume 40% of its 
resources and "contribute less than their fair share to the development 
of the emerging nations." 
McNamara also said population planning is imperative because the world's 
present population of 3.5 billion would not become stationary until 2120 
at which time it would be at 15 billion. 
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We are moving from a situation of relative randomness to one of social 
selectivity in technological devslopment. 26 Neither unalloyed technological 
development nor unrestrained economic growth is any longer assumed an unmixed 
27 blessing. Both have been strongly related to and held responsible for a 
26 
"A Nation Seeks its Goals," The Futurist, Vol. IV, No.4, August 1970, 
p. 116. 
"This Nation's relationship to technology may be approaching a 
reorientation as drastic as the apparently impending change of 
relationship of man to his environment. For the first time, 
there seems to be a serious commitment to a deliberate and 
cautious approach to the introduction and use of technology." 
(Quote from Report of National Goals Research Staff). 
The purpose of evaluating the impact of technology is both to 
enable society to refrain from introducing technology that might do more 
harm than good and to enable technology to be introduced in such a way 
that institutional change may be made with greater deliberation. 
27 
See Edwin L. Dale, "The Economics of Pollution," N. Y. Times Magazine, 
Apr. 18, 1970, p. 1, and J. Alan Wagar, "Growth Versus the Quality of Life,'f 
Science, June 5, 1970, p. 1179. 
See also, Benjamin C. Marble, "Who Needs the SST?" (Review of Technopo1is: 
Social Control of the Uses of Science, by Nigel Calder, New York: Simon & 
Schuster), Book World Section, The Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1970, p. 8. 
Calder's witty and well-organized study of the relatively orderly 
Technopolis we live in now is written to show the consequences of 
an uncont~o11ed, world-wide, slavish adoption of the philosophy 
that more is better. This is a philosophy that assumes the virtues 
of genetic prefiguration, the superiority of predominately white, 
W0stern peoples, and all the solutions professed during the past 
twenty years by the sales-oriented builders of rockets, weaponry 
and gross national product. Calder knows that something else is 
needed, and while he doesn't pretend to have all the answers, he 
asks a lot of the right questions in Technopolis. 
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policy of unlimited consumption and, hence, as direct contributors to 
the deterioration of both the social and natural environments. 28 This 
emerging public attitude that technological resources along with others 
should be employed to maximize social gains and minimize social costs is 
reflected in policy declarations such as that of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. This Act states in part that we take action 
"to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony •.• " 
Such concepts as "social indicators," "social systems analysis," and 
"technology assessment," represent the analytical dimension of this quest 
for a new value orientation. 
28 
Hans H. Landsberg, -'Villains Obscure Some Real Keys to Pollution," 
The Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1970, p. B 3, col. 1. 
For it is high per capita consumption based on high per capita 
income, combined with a sophisticated and powerful technology, that 
accounts for the major facets of environmental pollution in the 
United States today. Behind technology and income, size and growth 
of population run a poor third. 
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II - Contextual Approach to Technology Assessment 
What is the critical change in our conceptual approach and supporting 
analytical techniques that is implied in the previous discussion? Basically, 
it is the need for an inclusive, comprehensive concept of the evaluative 
function in the planning and development of new programs and projects, 
technological or otherwise, in the support of national policy goa1s. 29 
29 
See Mayo; supra note 1, at 5. 
Consider also the following statement: 
People have long knOWll that technology can have undesirable 
second-order consequences, the Goals Staff says. ~bat seems 
to be new is: 
1. Technology is becoming both more voluminous and more 
complicated. 
2. The complexity of much new technology makes it more 
difficult to anticipate how it will do its primary job. 
3. As our understanding of biological, ecological, economic, 
and social processes improves, we are struck with the com-
plexity of the consequences which technology can produce. 
4. We have a growing determination and belief in our capacity 
to evaluate the second-order consequences of all our actions, 
including the use of technology, and to include their costs 
in our policy making process. 
IIA Nation Seeks Its Goals," The Futurist, August "-1970 , p. 116. 
Another variation is presented in the statement of Charles J. Zwick, 
President of Southeast Bancorporation, Miami, Florida, in Economic Analysis 
and the Efficiency of Government, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy 
in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. Part 1: 
Aug. 12; Sept. 16 and 19, 1969, p. 165: 
Simply stated, congressional interest and capacity are absolutely 
essential to major advances in the executive branch of Government, 
because of this interaction between congressional interest and the 
focus of the senior officials in the executive branch. 
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As we have seen, this involves the recognition that numerous participants 
having different objectives, resources, and capabilities interact in various 
forums and decisional arenas and that these interactions can lead' to lost 
opportunities as well as serious social detriments if left unexplored. Such 
interactions among participants, institutions, and social values may be 
conceived of as a social system. A system, however, is often perceived as 
a relatively stable pattern of interactions which can be identified and 
displayed, schematically or otherwise, by cybernetic feed-back loops. Perhaps 
it is more useful in the present state of the art to think of a "total social 
impact" or "contextual" approach to technology assessment rather than in 
terms of inclusive, comprehensive and highly sophisticated "systems" with 
29 (continued) 
A second major area for improving analysis capability of the 
Government is additional work on the distributional impact of programs. 
In brief, how does the program affect various regions and client groups? 
Most analyses have ignored these issues. (Italics added.) 
Economists, in particular, like to emphasize the efficiency aspect 
of a program, ignoring the distributional impact of program changes. 
If I learned anything in my three and a half years in Washington it was 
that Members of Congress are very much concerned with dis~ributional 
impact. How does it affect their constituents in particl.lar, and more 
generally, given their basic political orientation, what groups are 
favored and what groups are disadvantaged by a special course of action? 
The distributional impact of policy changes should be a standard 
requirement for an analysis effort. In the excellent volume th~ committee 
produced earlier this session, Professor ;ames T. Bonnen of the Michigan 
State University discusses this problem and points out that it is almost 
impossible to find data on distributional impacts of Federal programs. 
But until analyses provide information on this issue, they will contjftue 
to be politely receive.d and then set aside as not completely relevant to 
the serious business of congressional decisionmaking. J 
1 
I 
I 
, 
r 
I 
i 
I· . 
• __ ~L. 
f 
1 
- 20 -
all feedback loops meticulously incorporated in the analytical model. 
On the other hand we need not close our eyes to the fact that we are 
dealing with social systems. The social impacts of an application on 
participants, institutions, processes, and social interests, and the 
accompanying interactions may not only induce modifications in the pro-
blem context delineated for examination with respect to the design, 
operations, regulation, and use of the posited application, but also 
affect related social problem contexts. Changes induced in other social 
systems may ultimately feed back into and affect the primary social 
problem context. 
Attitudes toward and conceptG of the evaluative function will 
certainly differ. 30 But in any event, the contextual approach of 
30 
No doubt the controversy will continue for sometime over the 
advantages and limitations of decisions based on the intuition of exper-
ience on the one hand the rational/c1)ntextual approach on the other. 
Kenneth Boulding has stated that: 
The g~'eat danger of rationality is of course suboptimization, that 
is, finding and choosing the best position or part of the system 
which is not the best for the whole. Too many people, indeed, and 
especially too many experts, devote their lives to finding the best 
way of doing something that should not be done at all. Decision 
mak;.ng loy instinct, gossip, visceral feeling, and political savvy 
rna:}' stand pretty low on the scale of total rationality, but it 
may have the virtue of being able to take in very large systems in 
a crude and vague way, whereas the rationalized processes can only 
take subsystems in their more exact fashion, and being .rational about 
subsystems may be worse than being not very rational about the system 
as a whole. I would not argue, of course, that rationality about 
the system as a whole is impossible. On the other hand, the economist 
has a certain mind-set in favor of his own skills, and it is easy 
for him to leave out essential variables with which he is not 
familiar. Here, indeed, a little learning may be a dangerous thing, 
or even a little rationality. 
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attempting to trace through systematically, insofar as practicable, 
the full social implications of a technological application as it 
affects participants, institutions, resources, and social interests, 
seems a definite advance over narrowly defined and exclusive "systems:! 
which have characterized most assessment efforts in the past.
31 
30 (continued) 
Kenneth E. Bou1ding, "The Economics of Knowledge and the 
Knowledge of EconomiCS," Paper given at the American Economic Associa-
tion, Dec. 29, 1965, p. 14-15. 
Consider the following statement by Daniel P. Moynihan: 
I refer to what Jay Forrester has termed the "counter-
intuitive" nature of social problems. We learn to think, 
Forrester aSSY~~5 us, in simple loop systems. Social problems 
arise out of complex systems. The two are not alike, so it is 
asserted by men who ought to know. There are fundamentally 
different properties, such that a good common sense judgment 
about the one will lead with fair predictability to illusions 
about the other. Thus Forrester: "With a high degree of 
confidence we can say that the intuitive solution to the problems 
of complex social systems will be wrong most of the time." 
Moynihan, supra note 12, at 20. 
31 
See in this connection Garrett Hardin, "To Trouble A Star: 
The Cost of Intervention in Nature," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Jan. 1970, p. 20: 
Economics employs partial analysis to reach its decisions. 
This defect is not essential to the subject of economics, but 
it is traditional. Because of the increasing pressure of 
population and because of our greater knowledge of the conse-
quences of our actions, economics is being rapidly altered 
away from its classical mold in the direction of ecology. 
The public interest in every proposal will in the future weigh 
more and more heavily in reaching decisions on the expenditure 
of public moneys. Cost-benefit analyses must be carried out 
within an intellectual framework that comes closer to incorpor-
ating the total system. 
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Policy statements in statutory schemes and executive orders usually 
set forth broad social objectives. Such policies are in tunt supported 
by one or a variety of programs and projects directly and indirectly 
through programs designed primarily to serve related social policies. 
Policy guidance with respect to national social goals therefore provides 
the measurement standards which would be employed (at least as one scheme 
of social values) in a total social impact assessment of a particular 
program or project. As is evident, however, from the previous exposition 
of the Effective Public Decision Process and the System of Technological 
Assessment/Application, a comprehensive framework for technology assess-' 
ment of a major intervention into the social pro.cess will involve a 
sequence of analytical operations of which a national social policy 
or policies will provide only one of multiple inputs. 
Recognition of the need for a reinforced technology assessment 
function and its regularized application is only the first phase of what 
must be a continuing process. The really criti-cal point is the adequacy 
with which assessments are performed. The notion of adequacy can be 
understood only with an appreciation of the full scope of operations 
involved in the assessment process. 
Assessment tasks can be. expected to differ considerably depending 
upon many factors, such as the study parameters set by the sponsoring 
agency or by the initiating assessment entity, by the nature of the 
particular application, and by the resources of the assessing entity. 
Hence, 'We can anticipate a viuicty of assessment methodologies. If we 
assume for present purposes that a major new technDlogical application 
r 
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or alternative applications (such as transportation modes for linking 
large metropolitan areas) are proposed for introduction into a future 
social environment, then it would appear that the following types of 
organizational/analytical operations are essential: 
Preparatory Phase: 
Tentative specification of the time sequence of tasks to be 
performed in order to achieve the objective of the assessment. 
Provisional organization of the assessment group staff into 
Social Impact Task Units related to social sub-processes 
(institutional-value contexts) as contrasted with conven-
tional academic disciplines or professional identifications. 
For example: 
~ Effective Public Decision Process (National and 
International) 
Economic Institutions and Processes 
• Knowledge and Skill Institutions and Processes 
Urban and Regional Developmental Processes 
Social Behavioral Patterns: Standards of Conduct, 
Interpersonal Relations, etc. 
Processes for Exercising Volitional Options in the 
Social Environment: Well-being: Access to goods, 
services, etc. 
Processes Affecting the Quality of the Natural Environment 
Instruction of the assembled staff in the overall methodology of the 
study and techniques for evaluating social impacts. 
Execution Phase: 
Establishment of baseline data on the existing Social Environment. 
Establishment of baseline data on the R&D status of the relevant 
technology or technologies. 
Projection of future social environments within the prescribed 
time frame: extrapolations, deliberate interventions, and 
contingencies. 
Imposition of the proposed technologi.cal application (or alter-
native applications) on the projected future social environments. 
1 
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Identification of the significant effects or changes which will 
necessarily, probably, or possibly occur during the initiation, 
implementation and operational stages of the application (or 
applications). 
Selection of those effects to be fully analy~ed and evaluated 
to determine the social impacts of the application. 
Identification of the participants, institutions, processes, and 
social interests affected by the changes brought about by the 
introduct:t,on of the application into the prOjected future social 
envi.ronments. 
Social impact analysis of such effects in terms of their probability, 
magnitude, duration and social desirability or undesirability with 
respect to the affected participants, ins~itutions, processes, and 
social values. 
Measurement of the social impacts in such manner (as aggregates or 
particularized) as to render them usable inputs into a rational 
decision process. 
Presentation of the assessment outcome in terms of 1) an overall 
social cost/benefit ratio; or in terms of 2) critical policy 
issues which take into account the significant changes flowing 
from the technological intervention and the social impacts 
resulting therefrom; or by 3) the alignment of basic findings 
with R&D requirements and with further social impact assessment 
needs. 
The foregoing operations seem logical and straightforward, but one must 
be aware of the uncertainties and difficulties involved in certain of the 
operations, particularly the evaluation of social impacts. Various projec-
tions must be made. Not only must technological development forecasts 
be made, but assumptions are required with respect to the conditions of 
operation 9 managerial skills to be applied, and the reaction to such 
operations by those who will be affected. Models of the manner in which 
participants (individuals and organizations) will behave or be expected 
.1 
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to behave must be posited. Serious deficiencies now exist in our 
capability for "future-oriented" thinking. 32 
Further, the degree of social impact will depend upon the extent 
of use, or what is assumed to be the extent of use, of th~ subject 
technology. We have often in the past probably seriously underestimated 
33 the scale of application (private automobiles, television, etc.). 
The scale of use varies with such factors as the perceived utility, the 
affluence of the society, and the number of people or entities in the 
"market." The aggregate use of technologies by an American citizen is 
many times greater than that of the average Indian citizen. Hence, the 
32 
On the need to develop new professional skills to diagnose complex 
social systems in modern, dynamic society, see Edgar H. Schein, "The Role 
Innovator and His Education," Technology Review, October/November 1970, 
p. 34. See also, Erich Jantsch, "Planning and Designing fer the Future," 
Futures, September 1969, p. 440. 
33 
The automobile had a 
discussion of the evolution 
ety by Samuel Eliot Morison 
The Great Change 1907-1939: 
relatively slow start. See the interesting 
and impact of the automobile on American soci-
in The Oxford History of the American People, 
"1. The Auto and the Ad Man," 419 (1965). 
To introduce a touch of humor into our predictive capability, or 
better, fallibility, we might reach back even further and consider a quote 
fro!.l Scientific American for July 1899 which appears in Reason Awake: Sci-
ence for Man by Rene Dubos (1970), p. 95. 
The improvement in city conditions by the general 
adoption of the motor car can hardly be overestim-
ated. Streets clean, dustless, and odorless, with 
light rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly and noise-
lessly over their smooth expanse, would eliminate 
a greater part of the nervousness, distraction, and 
strain of modern metropolitan life. 
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potential for both technological abuse as well as technological benefit 
is far greater in America than in India. 34 From the foregoing discussion 
it is apparent that there are limitations on what' can be expected from 
Technology Assessment. But this much can at least be said: Technology 
Assessment can alert all affected participants to the probable social 
impacts of a given application under ~pecified cond:!.tions. 35 Thi.6 in 
itself is an advance tOl4ard more rational social behavior. 
34 
See W. H. Davis~ New Republ~c~ Jan. 10, 1970, p. 13; also 
Frank S. Hopkins, "America and the World: The Future," (Address 
delivered at the 2nd Annual Institute of Sociology at Muskingum 
College, New Concord, Ohio, March 8, 1970), in an attachment to 
the World Future Society Bulletin, Vol. III~ No.9, Sept. 1970, p. 3. 
35 
See generally Lederberg, Joshua, "TA Can Help Prevent Some 
Historic Mistakes," WaShington Pust. January 24, 1971, p. B 2, col. 1. 
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IV - Social probiems and the "Technologic?:l Fix" 
,;, 
The previous sectioLl has alluded to a variety of questions which 
would be posed and examined in a comprehensive assessment of the prob-
able future implications of an adequate technology assessment function. 
This section will be limited to a discussion of special aspects of the 
potential implications of assessment outcomes for social action programs. 
Specifically, what nd_ght be the implications for the selection of means 
of coping with social problems and how will such means (in particular 
technological applications) be related to or integrated with prescrip-
tions concerning control over the mode of introduction, manner of 
operation, and restrictions on the use of resulting ~roducts or services? 
This formulation entompasses two topics·which have usually been treated 
separately: 1) the impact of a reinforced assessment function on techno-
logical innovation and 2) the concept of "technological fix." 
One of the principal arguments that has been made against an enhanced 
technology assessment function is that it will have an inhibiting impact 
on technological deve10pment. 49 While it certainly may, in given instances, 
49 
The National Goals Staff cautioned that: 
Technology assessment must not become "technology arrestment • • 
Fortunately, parallel to the technology assessment movement, there 
is an emerging "technology transfer" movement dedicated to finding 
a fuller range of uses for existing and new technology. 
itA Nation Seeks Its Goals," The Futurist, Aug. 1970, p. 116. 
" 
See also, Leon Green, Technology Assessment or Te9£nology Harassment?: 
The Attacks on Science and Technology. Paperpresentea'at Professional 
Seminar Series on the Processes of Technology Assessment, The George 
Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, 
#8, Mar. 26, 1970. 
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"l, 
have limiting implications as to how or when or where a technology is 
to be applied and to the level bf operations, one of the main contentions 
49 (continued) " 
II 
The following views of Edward E; David, the President's science 
adVisor, are relevant to this matter: 
LOSING, OUR NERVE TO EXPERIMENT? 
Edward E. David, Jr.~the President's science adViser, believes 
this country is losing its technological nerve. 
David told a science writers seminar last week that the Amer!can 
public is becoming increasingly alienated from rational ways of thought. 
"There are many evidences that society does not believe that technology 
can be controlled in a rational way," he said. "Because of that, 
society is losing its courage to experiment. This trend leads to 
disaster for it divorces our decision-makers fr~m reality." 
David said that "we must not place limitations on biological 
experiments" despite warnings from s1.l,Cn eminent scientists as 
James D. Watson, Harvard Nobelist, that genetic engineering may lead 
to test-tube babies and a host of ethical and social problems. David 
also reiterated his opinion that we should build two prototype super-
sonic transports (SST's) to determine whether the technical and 
environmental problems can be overcome so that it becomes feasible 
to build a fleet of SST's. Finally, he cited the negative reaction 
given by the National Academy of Sciences to suggestions by Nobelist 
William Shockley that research should be performed in an effort to 
identify characteristics peculiar to different races. 
"Make no mistake," he said, "a limitation on experimentation in 
whatever cause is the beginning of a wider suppression. When we fail 
to experiment, we fail. In failing, we bring the best part of 
American society as we know it today to a halt. 
"Already we see timidity in new ti~d~:r1:akt.Lg&;-," David continued. 
~~e require overanalysis before we are wil1iug to ~ind out what are 
the real possibilities. If these trends progress, our society will 
become dull, stodgy, and altogether stagnant." --Po M. B. 
Science, 'March 5, 1971, p. 875. 
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made herein is that technology assessment may have far more serious 
implications for general social behavior, individual and organizational. 
It is not just the technological/industrial sector which may experience 
limitations on the promotion of an ever-expanding market through popula-
tion growth.and the stimulation of demand through advertising, lobbying 
activities, and political manipulations. 50 Almost all segments of society 
will in some measure be affected, beneficially and adversely, in this 
effort to apply science and technology like other resources in the rational 
pursuance of priority social needs. In many areas, R&D for technological 
progress should be expedited, not slowed. 51 We certainly need some 
alternative to the conventional internal combustion engine and a quieter 
aircraft jet engine. We need better means of public transportation, 
better means of waste disposal, better housing and sanitary facilities 
50 
Robert Gomer, "The Tyranny of Progress," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, February 1968, p. 4, 7.,-
For the technological revolution, negative feedbacks have so far 
been feeble or lacking, in large measure, of course, because the 
gains have been enormous and visible; the ill effects have been 
slower to make themselves felt, and have been obscured or justified 
by the gains. On the other hand there are strong positive feedbacks 
which tend to spur uncontrolled, unplanned expansion. Chief of these 
is economic pressure -- pressure for doing things most cheaply regard-
less of ultimate cos~ to the society, and pressure for stimulating 
population growth in order to increase consumer markets. 
51 
We have hardly begun to make effective use of cybernetic concepts, 
automatic data processing, and simulation techniques. See the various 
suggestions in: John S. Saloma, "System Politics: The Presidency and 
Congress in the Future" !echno10gy Review, December 1968, pp. 23-33; and 
E. S. Savas, "Cybernetics in City Hall" 'Science, May 29, 1970, p. 1066. --
J 
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for much of our population. But perhaps we do not need to drive a private 
auto as much; or live as close to airports; or dispose of so much trash; 
or continue uncoordinated zoning practices; or abide archaic institutional 
positions which stand in the way of introducing needed socio-technical 
innovations; or expand the population without limit. 52 
52 
The number of cars, trucks and buses registered in this count~ 
is increasing twice as fast as the human population, according to 
figures released by the Department of Transportation. 
"Vehicles Outpacing Human Population," N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1970, 
p. 85 J col. 1. 
One observer views the matter in the following p~rspective: 
In summary, the new religeocology to date promises more soporific 
than salvation precisely at that time when salvation may be rapidly 
escaping attainment. This situation will continue so long as 
politicians and other leaders see the ecology crusade as merely 
a way in which basic problems and schisms can be forgotten and as 
long as citizens insist upon life as usual with a minimum of disrup-
tion and inconvenience. However, as the recognition of the real 
nature of these problems develops in many· groups and the ecology 
crusade begins to seek radical solutions, we can anticipate a 
heightened politicization of the issues and an increased conflict 
with vested interests and privileges. Americ'ans should not be afraid 
of this possibility, since that is the direction in which true salva-
tion may lie. 
For example: 
Ecological Problem 
Automobile Pollution 
Religeocology Answer 
Clean up the exhaust o;li 
the car; support pri-
vate enterprise in 
this attempt. 
Lowrie, Ritchie P., liThe New Religeocology: 
Salvation or Soporific?", Social Policy, July/ 
August 1970, pp. 46, 48. 
Radical Questions 
Shouldn't we consider 
abandoning the auto-
mobile as a meaningful 
mode of mass transpor-
tation? Even if we clean 
up exhausts, what about 
traffic congestion, noise. 
aCCidents, and the dis-
posal of abandoned cars? 
" f 
L._ t 
···--·-~"""""""'--1-···~ 
- 42 -
Presumably the great benefit of technology is that it provides an 
increasingly effective and flexible means of satisfying human needs and 
aspirations; it provides -- or should provide -- for an ever improving 
social environment, not merely a greater selection of technological options. 
Technology assessment is advanced as a means by which we can better employ 
technology for expanding social options such as access to goods, services, 
and the enjoyment of social-cultural amenities. 53 But some observers 
53 
In this connection consider the following comment on the views of 
Buckminster Fuller in the Wash. Evening Star, Oct. 23, 1970, p. B 1, col. 3: 
Basic to the game is Fuller's idea that mankind.still functions 
badly -- on the Malthusian concept of scarcity of resources. This 
concept, he believes, is the phycho1ogical underpinning for nation-
states and the cause of such things as "pollution." Such local 
political units and problems will disappear, he predicts, when men 
become aware of the availability of natural and man-made resources 
on a worldwide basis. 
TECHNOLOGY TO ACT 
;.1 
Most importantly, perhaps, Fuller obviously believes man now 
possesses the technology to act, once he is provided with inform-
ation on the scale that the computer has made possible. 
The results of the World Game, he says, will be to enable "all 
humanity to enjoy the whole planet Earth uithout any individual 
profiting at the expense of another and without interference with 
one another." 
Of course, action programs following from certain persuasive assess-
ment outcomes could in fact reduce certain kinds of social options 
(in terms of individual choice), i.e., imposition of birth control 
regulations or restraints on land use. 
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suggest that since we· have let technological innovation, application, and 
I) 
II 
use, expand without heeding the full social consequences, it is already 
too late to introduce a strengthened assessment function. 54 Of course, 
it is not too late for this effort, but it may very well be too late for 
us reasonably to expect a continuing enlargement of social options during 
the short term. 55 Assessment outcomes over the past few years have clearly 
54 
See Moynihan supra note 12, at 18; and consider the review of 
The City by John V. Lindsay (New York City: Norton Press, 1970) in which 
Harold Lavine states: 
Yet, as every New Yorker can attest, the city is becoming more and 
more unlivable -- even for the upper middle cla~s. Crime in the 
streets is steadily increasing; the streets themselves are becoming 
dirtier and noisier; and traffic, more and more tangled; the schools 
are continuing to deteriorate, and heroin addiction among the young 
has grown alarmingly in middle-class neighborhoods. More important 
still, the feeling of helplessness and of alienation is spreading. 
"Book Revie\v Section," Saturday Review, Apr.. 11, 1970, p. 25. 
55 
For a stimulating discussion of possible impendf.ng crises over 
the next few decades see John Platt, "What We Must Do," Science, Nov. 28, 
1969, p. 1115. 
As far as the long term is concerned, Frank S. Hopkins comments in 
"America and the World, The Future," (Address delivered at the 2nd Annual 
Institute of Sociology at Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio, Mar. 8, 
1970), in an attachment to the Bulletin of the World Future Society, 
Vol. III, No. 9, Sept.~ 1970: 
I am more optimistic about 2001 than I am about 1984, since it seems 
to me that we have more options open for the more distant date and 
more lead-time in which to set in motion necessary social reforms 
which will be vital to our destiny. p. 6. 
Hopkins is less optimistic about the near future: 
But when I think about 1984, I find myself beset with many gloomy 
thoughts. It seems to me that it is going to take the leaders and 
policy-makers of the world, prodded on by all tho~ghtful people, 
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demonstrated that severe curbs must be imposed on the application and use 
of certain technologies if we are not to greatly diminish certain desirable 
I 
social conditions, such as a non-polluted environment which we have enjoyed 
in the past. This does not necessarily inhibit technological innovation as 
a continuing process. It may mean that the directiorl: of future R&D will be 
subject to certain guidelines or constraints. And it could mean that the 
operators-managers and the users-consumers will find certain traditional 
areas of autonomous, volitional behavior severely constricted. 
Technological applications surely contribute to the enjoyment of life, 
i.e., recreation, mobility, health services, etc. But it is also apparent 
that modern medical technology has helped sustain a growing populati~n.56 
55 (continued) 
most, if not all, of the next 14 years to change their attitudes 
toward the future. Mankind must learn to think in completely 
different terms from the ideologies of the past if our civilization 
is to survive. In the next 14 years we must change many of our 
traditional value systems and execute many basic social and political 
refo1~s. This will not happen automatically. We are going to have 
to endure many grave crises before we make up our American and global 
lninds as to the nature of our problems and challenges and the kinds 
of policies we are going to have to pursue. In short, things are 
going to have to get worse before they get better, and 1984 may well 
be just about the low point, the true nadir, of the history of Western 
civilization. (p. 9) 
56 
Egypt, like developing countries a~ound the world, is undergoing 
a runaway population growth as a result of the impact of improved health 
care, medicines, vaccines, disinfectants and insecticides in reducing 
centuries-long high death rates. 
Raymond R. Anderson, "Egypt Turns on Her Internal Enemy: The Birth 
Rate," N. Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1970, p. 4, col. 1. 
J 
" 
r-
1 
> 
{ 
~J 
'J 
-r 
\ 
- 45 -
Our increasing population, while demanding the products and services 
provided by modern technology, in turn produces much of the environ-
mental pollution incidental to the use of such technologies. Thi~ con-
sumer pollution is supplemented by the wastes and pollutants of the 
industries essential to produce the desired consumer products and serv-
ices. Hence, we are confronted with an ascending spiral of technology, 
population, and po11ution. 57 Might advancing technology itself provide 
the means by which we can extricate ourselves from a seemingly hopeless 
situation? Waste water can be recycled, purified and reused. An e1ec-
tric-powered auto could replace the gasoline combustion engine and sub-
stantia1ly abate air pollution. But while we may be able to clean up 
waste water by purely technological means without causing serious immed-
iate or long-term side-effects, it is not so clear that an efficient 
and economical electric car could replace the internal combustion engine 
within a brief time span without serious dislocations in the economy. 
The existing institutional structure, including manufacturers, component 
suppliers, dealers, fuel and repair servicing organizations, and related 
activities of lending institutions, insurance companies, and consumer 
groups can hardly be phased out or drastically restructured over a few 
years without serious social costs. 
The technology assessment function will ultimately not be judged 
from the standpoint of the degree of control imposed on technological 
innovation but by the measure of its contribution to the advancement 
57 
S. Fred Singer, "Calculating the Best Population for U.S.," The, 
Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1970, p. D4, col. 1. 
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of major national goals. The latter, broader standard of performance 
of the assessment function clearly encompasses some degree of guidance 
or control over society's ~~e of technology. A regularized assessment 
function would not likely introduce a serious inhibiting f~ctor on 
research activity or even on applied research to the developmei!lt stage. 
But the assessment function would probably lead to much cl~ser scrutiny 
of the likely effects which would be produced by new technologies as 
they are moved into the implementation and operational stages. Conceiv-
ably such appraisals could feed 'back into the R&D process and diminish 
the aggregate level of R&D resources. On the other hand, the assessment 
function may have no effect on the level of research and development 
activity but rather on the type of R&D undertaken. Much more study and 
experience will be needed before such questions can be satisfactorily 
answered. But as heretofore stressed, the impact of the assessment 
function on the process of technological innovation cannot be viewed 
apart from the social contexts in which the application operates or is 
to be introduced. These contexts inyolve people, their functions, 
desires, and associations. Technology assessment must apply models of 
how all affected participants will behave in response to the introduction 
of an application into a future social environment through the initiation, 
implementation, and operational stages of the new application. Significant 
participants will be circumscribed in their own sub-context of other 
intel~3.cting partic:tpants with given functions, objectives, resources and 
constraints, and available forun.~ <it.d decisional arenas in which claims 
are asserted for preferred outcomes. Radiating effects are of all kinds, 
certainly not restricted to s imp J,.!'t. direat cause-effect relationships. 
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The basic lesson which will most likely be driven home by a vigorous 
technology assessment function is that the correction of a social dis-
location, or the achievement of a new, significant social objective, 
will involve an intr:l.cate context of interrelated participants, iilstitu-
tions, processes, and social interests. We know this, supposedly, but 
we do not always talk as if we do and we seldom act in accord with this 
obvious proposition. For example, we still tend to talk in terms of a 
"fix," technological or otherwise, as if there are unlimited potentialities 
for one-factor solutions to complex social problems. But as noted, assess-
ment outcomes will most likely be translated into social action programs 
which will have far-ranging implications, including deprivations, on 
numerous entities, popUlation segments, and institutional frameworks 
not solely on the technological system. There may be situations in which 
the solution or the alleviation of a serious social problem will revolve 
around a technological innovation or can b~ provided by a legal inter-
vention, or by economic manipulations. But most solutions will require 
an articulated combination of means. s8 
58 
De Jouvenel seems to agree: 
He warns "against a mindless extension of forecasting practices 
from narrow technical problems where they may be applied, almost auto-
matically, to more complex social and political realms where there must 
be a premium on wi.sdom and sophisticated insight." 
"Only through profound insight into the political process and 
the transformation of ideas can we progress to sound estimates of 
social change on a large scale. Thus planning is not for technocrats 
but for humanists deeply respectful of the human condition and its 
social manifestations." 
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The crucial import of the co:ntextual approach to technology aelsessment 
is that the one-factor "fix" for social problem abatement:or solution should 
be approached with some degree of caution. But this is not to dismiss the 
notion of the "technological fix." Indeed, if a single means appears to 
provide an approximate solution to an existing problem or the achievement 
of a social objective, then the accompanying economy of effort and sharpness 
58 (continued) 
Philip C. Ritterbush, reviewing The Art of Conjecture by Bertrand 
de Jouvenel, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1967, p. 34. 
Those who have undertaken to analyze complex social problem areas 
recognize the need for the contextual approach: 
Resolution of the Florida jetport question with least environmental 
cost the study group found required consideration of population 
growth and location, protection of water supplies, proper allocation 
of resources for agriculture, sound development of public transpor-
tation, insurance of attractive living conditions, and "protection 
of ••• unique national resources." The diversity of considerations 
necessarily involves a multiplicity of agencies whose decisions 
contribute to an environmental effect; this is the governmental lesson 
drawn from the case study and addressed in the report. 
"An Unusual Study pQints to Institutional Complexities in Environmental 
Management," News Report of the National Academy of Sciences and the National 
Academy of Engineering, February 1970, Vol. XX, No.2, p. 8. 
A total social impact approach has apparently now been taken with 
respect to the siting of electric generating plants. See the Report on 
Electric Power and the Environment (1910) sponsored by the Office of Science 
and Technology. This Report is discussed in "Land Use: Congress Tak::: .. g 
Up Conflict over Power Plants," Science, Nov. 13, 1970, p. 718. It is also 
evident that weather modification and control will involve far more than 
a "technological fix." See references to the international organizational 
aspects of this matter in "The U. N.' s Coming Role: Internationalizing 
Technology," The Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1970, p. B 6, col. 3. 
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of purpose may offer substantial advantages over a more elaborate "socio-
political" process solution. The unique advantage in the "pure" techno-
logical fix is that it solves or minimizes a problem by changing the 
environment rather than human behavior. As noted previously, however, 
the import of the contextual approach is that some measure of control 
over hum.an and organizational behavior must usually be applied along 
with other means in dealing with difficult social situations. 59 
59 
Even a specific means (fix) for problem solution or program 
impleruentation may need to be implemented through coordination of a 
variety of jurisdictions or agencies having both public sector and 
private sector characteristics or components. Murray L. Weidenbaum in 
"Toward a Modern Pub lic Sec tor," The Conference Board Record, 
September 1970~ Vol. VII, No.9, p. 17, 21 states: 
The Post Office Department and the Railway Express Agency both 
deliver pat'ce1s; again, one is public and the other private. 
The mixed economy that is now developing is different. It is 
characterized by mixed organizations, each of which possesses 
characteristics of both public institutions and private organiza-
tions. The most obvious examples are the large defense contractors 
and the not-for-profit research laboratories that do most of their 
business with the Federal Government. 
The modern public sector that is developing is hardly something 
aloof and entirely separate from the private sector; rather, in its 
usual pragmatic fashion, the Unit8d States is fashioning policy tools. 
not for the sake of their intrinsic beauty, but to achieve a growing 
variety 6f difficult and far-reaching national objectives. 
It would appear likely that in coming years increasing proportions 
of Federal funds will be disbursed via state and local governments, 
inter-governmental agencies, government-oriented corporations, quasi-
private institutions, and perhaps even newer organizations possessing 
beth public and private characteristics. The typical Federal Agency 
inneed will probably be a policy formulator and overseer of programs 
dealing with operations which have been decentralized in a variety of 
ways and over a wide span of the American economy. This will provide 
a very considerable strength and resiliency to American institutions 
during a period of substantial stress and change. 
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Further, the notion of a "fix," te,chno1ngica1, legal, economic, medical, etc., 
smacks too much of the narrowly focused social. process models of the conven-
tional academic disciplines and professions. 60 These models tend to be 
partial, distorted, and artifid.al, and are far more suitable to the display 
of specialized esoteric professional skills than to adequate social problem 
analysis. In this connection Kenneth E. Bou1ding has stated: 
60 
At the basis of the whole general systems enterpr:i.se is a 
faith, if we might call it that, that the empirical world 
is one, and that the division into different disciplines 
is more a property of the subculture of science than it is 
The normal connotation of a "fix" seems inconsistent with the 
observable dynamics of the ongoing social process. Donald A. Schon 
asserts that: 
The practical,;; ilsequence of the 10s8 of the stable state is that 
we must see any programmatic solution to a problem as 8. learning 
system capable of shifting over time; no solution can be effective 
if it carries with :J.t an organizational, institutional or program-
matic definition perti.nent only to the state of affairs at the 
time the program was invented. 
The principal problem of design is the design of learning systems, 
or systems able to t'ransform their own behavior over time. 
Schon, Donald A., "Implementing Programs of Social and Technological 
Change," Technology Re'\I'ie~, F.ebruary 1971, p. 48, 49. 
Schou rejects "once-and-for-all" solutions to social problems and 
the mythology that there is a "one-to-one correspondence between the 
problem and its solution". Idem at 49. He seems to favor an approa?h 
described as "an incremental system which consists of a set of shorf::" 
range solutions, tied to a monitoring of people's behavior in relation 
to those solutions ••• " Idem at 51. 
Apparent.1y lawyers and "politicians" can be just as addicted to the 
"quick·~fix" approach as technologists. See quote in "Environment Unit 
Shifting Emphasis: City Control Board to Put Politics Before Science," 
N. Y. Times" Sept .• 27, 1970, p. 64, col. 1. 
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a reflection of any properties of the empirical world. One 
may perhaps back down a little from that grand statement and 
suggest that there are different systems levels, at least in 
regard to degree of complexity, within the empirical world, 
so that the division of disciplines by 9ystems levels would 
not be wholly arbitrary. One might perhaps distinguish four 
or five systems levels c,f the empirical world -- the physical, 
the biological, tre~psychological, the social, and if we are 
very ambitious, we~might add the transcendental. Within each 
of these levels the traditional bgyndaries between the discip-
lines are rapidly becoming fuzzy. " 
Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems and Interdisciplinary Studies," 
p. 2-3, in Richard F. Ericson, (ed.), Toward Increasing the Social Relevance 
of the Contemporary University (Scheduled for 1971 publication). One of a 
series of essays deriving from the 1968-69 Interdisciplinary Systems and 
Cybernetics Project, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, 
The George Washingt~~ University. 
The influence on economic thinking :f.s postulated by one observer as 
follows: 
Economics, as it has been practiced by most economists since the 
time of Adam Smith, has had as its purlieu the customary arrange-
ments of systems. The systems in question have been the subsystems 
of individual business enterprises. Those who paid the piper called 
the tune. With some exceptions, economists have assumed that 
"whatever is, is right," to quote William Graham Sumner, who was 
quoting Alexander Pope. Ecology, neither so fortunate nor so unfort-
unate as to have patron~, has taken a larger view. The ecologist 
studies all imputs and outputs, ~egardless of who pays for them or 
who benefits by them. In the past, the ecological eye has been 
focused only on nonhuman economic situations. The focus is now 
changing as ecology engulfs economics. 
Logic dictates this engulfment, but logic alone does not determine 
history. Power relationships also must be favorable. I think the 
power relationships now favor a change. In the past, economics was 
to a large extent the handmaiden of business. The vast majority of 
economists were either employed directly by businesses, or had jobs 
in university departments of .economics that were unusually sensitive 
to business interests. In recent decades, the steady increase in 
the number of economists employed by governmental and quasi-govern-
mental agencie~ points toward the day when the tunes played by 
economists will be different. A different sector of society is 
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How then should we evaluate the potential of the "technological fix" as a 
resource-means for achieving "balanced" social development? The term "fix" 
with respect to social problem management suggests a complete or essentially 
complete solution by meane of a one-factor operation, i.e., auto self-
starter to remove the effort and dangers of cranking, telegraph to avoid 
delay in long-range communications, incinerator to remove solid wastes 
(though it produces air pollution), development of the fusion process to 
provide an unlimited, economical supply of electrical energy, development 
of a "quiet engine" to remove or substantially abate jet engine noise, etc. 62 
i) 
61 (continued) 
paying the piper. Whether this means that economists will enjoy 
greater intellectual independence is not clear and may well be 
doubted. However, the shift in the balance of power should favor the 
development of a broadly ecological view among economists and that 
will be a social gain.· '(ltal;i,cs added) 
Garrett Hardin, "To Trouble a Star: The Cost of Intervention in Nature," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1970, p. 18. 
62 
In his article, "Political Arenas, Life Styles, and the Impact of 
Technologies on Policymaking," Policy Sciences: An International Journal, 
No.3, Fall 1970, p. 275, 277, Dean Schooler states: 
Physical technologies, stemming from and produced by the physical, 
medical, biological, and engineering s~iences, involve an operating 
system comprised of material, nonbehavioral components. These 
technologies are external to individuals and groups and at most 
merely require those individuals or groups to passively use them 
or allow their use. Specific physical technologies, many already 
built into public poliCies or hailed as "quick technological fixes" 
to social problems, include the "pill," air conditioners, automobiles, 
weapons, drugs, street lights., teaching machines, gene controls, 
antismoking pills, new fuels and food sources, personality control 
drugs, smog control deVices, rainmaking procedures, desalination 
techniques, mace, and seat belts or air bags for automobiles. 
Behavioral technologies involve not mechanical or chemical techniques 
but rather types of human relationships and behavior (9). Behavior, 
personality, social relationships, or individuals and groups' store 
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But technology is only one means (resource) for solving, abating, or 
controlling social problems, including those of which one or a combination 
of technological applications may be the major cause. So why stress the 
potential of the "technological fix" as contrasted with a "legal fix" or 
"economic fii"? On,e might object that laws, being officially enforced 
standards of behavior, are not as conclusive as a technological fix might 
(/ 
be, the very purpose of the latter being to avoid the necessity for contro1-
ling or modifying human behavior. One must concede that the imposition of 
a 50 m.p.h. speed limit is not as effective in keeping all motorists within 
i' 
such libi~; as would be a uniform engine design limiting maximum speeds \: .. / 
to 50 m.p.h. But a "legal fix" can often be an extremely effective means 
of bringing about desired corrective action. Federal licensing of radio 
stations was used to eliminate the electronic interference among stations 
in the early days of radio breadcasting. 63 But the contemporary problem of 
air pollution with the primary source identified as the automobile internal 
combustion engine presents a~ instructive illustration of the significance 
of context and process and the need for application of a combination of 
means through time to gain control over a technological abuse. 64 Legal 
62 (continued) 
of values comprise the operating system of the technology and must 
change with new technologies. Such teohnologies emerge from the 
poli tical, social, psychological, and econ,:>mic sciences. They 
involve organization, decision-making patterns, and values. 
63 ~ 
See Network Broadcasting (1958) Cha: 3, Report to the Corumittee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Jan. 27, 1958, U.S. House of Representatives, 
85th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 27, 1958. 
64 
The range of legal, fiscal, and technological means which are needed 
in order to substantially reduce air pollution from automobile exhausts are 
suggested, though not extensively treated, in the following two articles 
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standards have now set a technological (R&D) target date for drastic 
reduction in exhaust pollution by 1975. 65 A tax on leaded gasoline has 
been advanced as a means of inducing gasoline producers to shift to other 
means of increasing octane rating. 66 While little has been done or pro-
posed to d~~e by way of restricting the use of private automobiles~ the 
public is ~~ing conditioned to this possibi1ity.67 It might be inferred 
from this action that technological innovations do not l: just happen; they 
often need to be planned as part of the strategy for a 'combined attack 
64 (continued) 
from the Bulletin of 
Russett, "Licensing: 
"How To Buy A Cleaner 
65 
the Atomic Scientists, November 1970: Bruce M. 
For Cars and Babies," p. 15; Murray L. Weidenbaum, 
Environment," p. 19. 
Sec Amendments to the Clean Air Act, December 31, 1970, Public 
Law 91-604, 9lst Congress. 
66 
See "Welcome Tax on Smog," The Wash. Post, Editorial, Sept. 12, 
1970, p. A 18, col. 1; see also William Steff, "Gas Tax 'Essential' to 
Smog Fight," Wash. Daily News, Sept. 18, 1970, p. 14, col. 1. 
The Administration's proposed tax o~ lead added to gasoline 
about 2.3 cents a gallon -- is a crucial test of the American 
people's will to curb air pollution, Treasury Under-secretary 
Charles E. Walker maintains. 
The tax, he told a news conference yesterday, is a "first essential 
step to cleaning up the atmosphere." 
The Treasury and OST experts agteed the critical point about the 
tax was that it offered lithe only way" the auto industry could 
meet new air pollution standards for its 1975 models. 
67 
The possibility that legal action will be required to limit the 
use of automobiles in the largest cities by 1975 has been suggested by 
Dr. John T. Middleton, Director of the Air pollution Control Office of 
the Environmental Protection Agency. See Washington Star, January 30, 
1971, p. A 1, col. 4. 
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on a social objective and as a part of a socio-political process through 
time. Similarly, there is no "technological fix" at the present time for 
jet aircraft noise. Such a technological solution appears to be many 
years off. 68 But a combination of techniques articulated in an overall 
approach to the problem could do much to alleviate this environmental 
intrusion. These means would include: accelerated R&D on alternative 
"quiet engine" technologies, design of new airports based on noise con-
tour~ with zoning adjuated to acceptable noise levels for various activi-
)1 
ties, and modified flight patterns and runway locations for existing 
airports. 69 
What can then be said, even on a tentative basi~. of the promise 
and utility of the notion of the "technological fix." Surely there is 
much to be said for the resolution of social problems by means which do 
not require severe restraints on human behavior or which avoid possibili-
ties for mis-management or irresponsible use. What then are the 
68 
See "The SSTs May Not Be as Noisy 3S They Sound." The Wash. Post r.;(~""" 
Nov. 15, 1970, p. B 6, col. 3. This article by Claire Sterling raises f 
implicitly the interesting question of the most appropriate time and 
"state-of-the-art" for the introduction of a technological application 
in order for it to meet with official and public approval. 
69 
It is ci~ar that the one-factor "legal-political fix" threatened 
by New York City Mayor Lindsay will not suffice to resolve the total 
Supersonic Transport controversy. See David S. Broder irtThe Wash. Post, 
Oct. 6, 1970, p. A 21, col. 6, "N. Y. Resists SST Squeeze," quoting 
Mayor Lindsay: ','As Mayor of the City of New York, I am prepated to do 
all in my power to prevent any SST from landing at New York's airports 
until it is proven safe both to our environment and to th~ health of our 
citizens." Some of the great variety of variables involved in the siting 
of airports are noted in "Boston Debates Airport Growth," N. Y. Times, 
Nov. 15, 1970, p. 84, col. 6. 
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characteristics of problem contexts which are susceptible to technological 
remedies? The concept of the "technological fix" and its application to 
social problem areas has been discussed with a high degree of understanding 
of its potential and limitations by Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Dr. Weinberg states: "I do not wish to 
overstress the role of the physical sciences in this new, social-prob1em-
oriented world. The technological fix is certainly not a PCiT;1acea.,,70 
But he goes 011 to say that "If one accepts the technological fix as one 
means of alleviating social problems, then surely our reorientation 
towa~d social problems ought not to diminish our interest in certain 
technplogies and their supporting sciences.,,7l Several examples of 
existing or prospective technological fixes are discussed by Dr. Weinberg 
as illustrated by the following extract: 
70 
Today's social problems -- like population, poverty, pollution, 
and peace -- possess important technological components. How 
can we look at world population without at the same time examin-
ing the development of the remarkable new high-yielding strains 
of corn, wheat, and rice? How can one consider ways of stabiliz-
ing the world order, of achieving peace, without in~luding 
possible developments in spy satellites and ABM's?7 
I have gone further and· urged that in more cases than our 
traditional social thinkers are prepared to concede there 
may be "technological fixes" that could circumvent a seem-
ingly impossible social problem, or at least to so alter its 
dimensions as to allow new social approaches. Let me illustrate 
with one "technological fix" -- the Gangetic plain project of 
Perry Stout of the University of California at Davis (8). 
I, 
Alvin M. 
p. 141, 144. 
Weinberg, "In Defense of Science," Science, 4ran. 9,1970, 
:\ 
71 72 
.!PM. Idem at 143 • 
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As all of us know, feeding the growing masses of India had, 73 
up until 3 years ago, be~n considered to be totally impossible. 
The missing element in Stout's plan is energy, energy to 
pump water and energy to manufacture nitrogenous fertilizer. 74 
Here is a technological fix: a technologica.lly based scheme, 
involving new discoveries in agricultural science and in 
nuclear energy, that could buy significant time in the face of 
an urgent social problem. This is not to say that this techno-
logical fix gets at the "heart" of India's social problem which 
is over-population. On the other hand, i.t seems to me to be a 
much more humane and practical approach than the one advocated 
by some social planners: to force India to control its popula-
tion even if this means incredible famine. We technologists 
are not infallible, and Stout's scheme may not work; but neither 
are the social planners, such as the Paddocks, who only a few 
years ago were willyag to write India off. 75 
One can easily think of\many other "technological fixes" -- such 
as large tankers as a me.ans of defusing the political sensitivity 
of the Suez Canal, or tf.te intrauterine device as a means of reduc-
ing the social motivation required to achieve birth control. In 
every instance the fix achieves remedies rather than rooting out 
causes; and on this account this line of thought has been attacked 
as being insufficient or inhumane. Yet social problems are never 
really solved permanently -- one only exchanges one social problem 
for another, hopefully less pressing, social problem. Any 
resol1.1,tion of a social problem basically 7guys time: I see nothing 
wrong!!with using technology to buy time. 
If then, through technological means we should apply our efforts toward 
"reforming the environment and stop trying to reform people,,77 what are the 
identifying characteristics of suitable social problem contexts for a tech-
nological fix? One method of approaching this task is to examine the 
73 
Ibid. 
75--
Ibid. 77--
74 
Ibid. 
76--
Idem at 143-144. 
Harold Taylor, "Inside Buckminster Fuller's Universe," Saturday 
Review, May 2, 1970, pp. 56, 57. 
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interplay between two variables: technological innovation and the political 
process. Thus, Sayre and Smith in Government, Technology and Social Problems 
state: 
It would advance our understanding if we could begin to 
identify a spectrum of social problems ranging from those 
that are ready for a technological "quick fix" (Le., 
politically amenable and within the state-of-the art techni-
cally) all the way to those problems that 'Se intransigent 
in both political and technological terms. 
They employ as a "first approximation" of such a spectrum a two-dimensional 
matrix for identifying social problem areas which are politically ready or 
unready and technologically ready or unready.79 
The authors provide many useful insights into the conditions which 
tend to make a technological innovation (primarily a" "quick fix") acceptable 
to the political process. Among the factors noted are the readiness and 
attractiveness of the technology itself, the stimulation of "crisis" events, 
the manner )Jin which the "problem" is perceived and formulated, the effect of 
/,1 
pre-conditioning of the political decision makers through "education," the 
nature of the social interests involved and the extent to which such interests 
are supported by institutionalized processes, the focus and character of the 
decisional process involved, the role of "leadership," and the "timinglf of 
the introduction of the proposal into the decisional arena. 
78 
Wallace S. Sayre and Bruce L. R. Smith,Government Technology 
and Social Problems, Columbia University: The Institute for the Study 
of Science in Human Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1969, p. 12. 
79 
Ibid. 
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There are many dimensions to the task of identifying the contextual 
?-,,"J'~'''' 
conditions which may be favorable or unfavorable to the approval qf< a 
technological fix as a social problem solution. Where a problem is the 
result of a single cause" the desired solution is clear, a consensus 
exists on the need for a solution, and an apparently effective technolog-
ical means is available, conditions would seem highly favorable for such 
a solution. 80 Perhaps the introduction of polio vaccine is a classic 
illustrationuf a fix applied to such a situation although there was 
considerable controversy over the mode of distribution. 8l Ordinarily 
,the situation is not so simple. Social problems will not be perceived 
\'. 
'\ 
\ 
an~ defined b~r all potentially affected participants ,in the same manner. \, /! 
'\ 
.~ 
,...-----80.,\ \\ . 
These)1 co\hditions would be generally applicable to any typ,:~ of 
one-factor ;7'fix!!.' whether technological, economic, or legal. Requ\iring 
exact chan&,e fo~, bus fares (or provision for scrip only as chang~) 
to relieve buS! drivers of the need to carry cash has proven to be a 
relatively effective "economic fix" for the problem of bus holdups. 
And with respect to the potential danger of cancer .the· '''Delaney Amendment" 
undertakes to provide a "legal fix" by prohibiting'thsa miLrketing of all 
cancer-producing food additives (cyclamates, for example), the provision 
stating that no food additive shall be deemed safe if it induces cancer, 
when ingested, in any animal. 
On the latter point see, Alan Kaplan and Robert H. Becker, The 
Process of Technology Assessment in the Food and Drug Administratlon. 
Paper presented at Professional Seminar Series on the Processes of 
Technology Assessment, The George Washington University: Program of 
Policy Studies in Science & Technology, #7, Mar. 5, 1970. 
81 . 
See "Chapter Twelve - Congressional Response to the Salk Vaccine 
for Immunization against Poliomyelitis," in Technical Information for 
Congress, Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 25, 1969, p. 309, by the 
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress: Science Policy 
Research Division. 
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Depending upon the problem definition, the resultant context of affected 
participants, institutions, processes, and social interests will shift. 
Even where there may exist a broad consensus on a general goal, there 
may be sharp differences in the precise objective to be achieved, as for 
example, with air pollution control standards. 82 
Dean Schooler in his article on "Political Arenas, Life Styles, and 
the Impact of Technologies on Policy Making" analyzes the likely accept-
ability of tecnnological solutions (physical and behavioral) to social 
problems in terms of how affected individuals or groups perceive the 
"impacts" of the application, Le., whether such impacts will be 
redistributive, regulative, self-regulative, or distributive. 83 
Thus, l-d. policy building upon or employing a particular 
technology may readjust wealth, status, or power among 
major groups; require or prohibit certain activities; 
allocate desired values to individuals or groups; or 
enhance or allow individuals or gr()ups to shape their 
life styles or public policies affecting them. 84 
Schooler suggests th~t physical technologies are normally seen as distri-
butive and generally beneficial since they are "means of solving social 
85 
problems without a co~itment of time or personality." On the other 
hand, behavioral technologies evoke the "specter of redistribution or 
reg~lr.ition" and are "likely to engender conflict and opposition, ,,86 
82 
David Bird, "Two Court Casf.!s on Pollution Illustrate Sharp 
Differences Over How Clean the Aj.r Should Be" N. Y. Times, Mar. 29, 
p. 57, col. 2. 
83 
See note 62 supra, at 277. 
84 85 86 
Ibid. ,Idem at 278. Idem at 279. 
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especially when behavioral technologies involve "structural" changes 
including the "basic rules" which determine the outcome of policy making. 
Technologies affecting such structure would include hiring 
practices, reapportionment\) cooperative ownership schemes, 
systems analysis, social indicators and social reports, 
cost-effectiveness technique~, and other tools Qr processes 
of decision making. ' 
These conflicts over structural issues (metapolicymaking) 
are much more sensitive than conflicts over substantive 
issues (policymaking) 
Like reapportionment, efforts in the "policy sciences" may 
be perceived as threatening established procedures for 
policymaking and reallocating the distribution of power and 
respect within a policymaking system. 87 
'il 
However, our concern here is not so much with the acceptabilfty of 
a given means of solving a social problem, whether such means be a physical 
or behavioral technological application, as it is with the notion that a 
one-factor fix of whatever nature can supply a satisfactory solution to an 
existing social dislocation or provide the means of achieving a basic 
community goal. ProfJessor Schooler does not elaborate on this specific 
question. While he does not dismiss the value of the "technological fix" 
as a means of dealing with human problems,88 he strongly supports an 
87 
Idem at "Z-8'O. 
8S--
J Schooler states at 283, no;;e62 supra: r;::- ~ 
II 
Physically technology' can be used creatively to solve social ~ifoblems. 
Amitai Etzioni has argued for physical technology as a "sho?:t:cut" to 
social change (24). He, contends that the "ideal" solution~ to human 
problems require prohibitive sums of money or commitments. Furthermore, 
no evidence has been ~ited to show that "quick technological fixes" are 
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analytical concept which seems quite similar to the contextual approach 
89 
treated herein. 
Problem perception and definition which circumscribe the social 
problem context (or system) to be examined, have infinite variations. 1 
Presumably the birth control "pill" should provide the technological fix 
for population control -- assuming its safety and efficacy. But it is 
not such a "fix" (at least not at this point in time) for some fairly 
obvious reasons. Deficiencies of purported technological fixes can 
usually be disclosed by asking a series of questions setting forth the 
social context: What technological means, designed for what specific 
purpose, to be utilized and managed by what particip~nts, affecting what 
institutions, practices and social values in what manner and to what extent, 
88 (continued) 
failures. Perhaps, says Etzioni, street lights and policemen. on 
buses do indeed reduce total crime rather than shift it to dark 
streets and subways. 
One might at least ask, however, that some explication be given to the 
concept of social problem conceptualization before being expected to 
systematically discuss the assertion that "no evidence has been cited 
to show that 'quick technological fixes' are failures." 
89 
Schooler states at 283, note 62 supra: 
Increasingly, the most useful policy-oriented research will emerge 
from a multidisciplinary base. If the physical technologists have 
a contribution to the solution of social problems, then sociology, 
psychology, politica1 science, and economics must join them in a 
cooperative effort. Properly designed physical technologies will 
require evaluation of people's response to the technology, diagnosis 
of people's present behavior without the technology, and accurate 
statements detailing exact1y what variables the technology must 
affect. Solutions must be multidisciplinary in the.ir construction. 
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is proposed? Certainly all participants will not view the problem in the 
same perspective. From some institutional viewpoints, no population 
problem exists. Some participants may view population increase as a 
problem but one that little or nothing can be done about whether the 
difficulty arises from lack of availability of the means for economic 
reasons or otherwise, or for reason of institutional constraints, or by 
virtue of personal value preferences. Effective population control will 
involve a combination of means, some short term, others long term. The 
selection of means will be one of proportion among means, not one of 
1 · f 90 exc us~veness 0 means. Put another way, the more enmeshed the problem 
in the social process (the greater the number of influential community 
groups with a diversity of perspectives on the matter) the less likely 
that a one-factor "fix" will provide an adequate solution. It has 
taken much more than a simple legal declaration rejecting the "separate but 
91 
equal" doctrine to make significant headway in achieving racial equality. 
90 
William P. Bundy, "The Tortuous Road to Population Control," 
The Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1970, p. B2, col. 1. 
91 
James T. Wooten, "Confusion But Still Progress in South's Schools," 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1970, p. 10 E, col. 1: 
Thus, the struggle, the bewilderment and the confusion continue. It 
is .a matter of figures, yes; but more, it has now become a battle of 
strategems, and caught in the conflict are the children and the public 
education systems of the South. 
Nearly a century ago, George Washington Cable, a white southerner 
of progressive persuasions, wrote that man ~-rou1d walk on the moon 
before America solves her racial problems •. That one-half of his 
prediction should now be fact is no reason to believe that the 
remaining portion soon shall be. 
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Another aspect of the technological fix to which useful attention 
might be given relates to the decision process leading from the prescriptive 
phase\ ;f formal approval to the application phase of actual use. Put other-
--' 
wise, what are the characteristics of the formal-authoritative decisional 
process which are involved in the approval or rejection of the technological 
fix as a means for social problem solution? Does the approval to use the 
91 (continued) 
Of more interest with respect to the defic.iences of a hard and 
fast "legal fix" to complex social problems is the reported question 
of Justice Black of the Supreme Court in a recent "school desegregation 
busing" case: 
At what point would busing to achieve exact racial balance 
be required? 
More questions were asked about that than were answered in three 
days of Supreme Court hearings last week. No ingenious solutions 
to the dilennna of de facto segregation were offered; indeed no one 
seemed anxious to fully examine the subject. There was perplexity 
in Justice Black's question to a civil rights lawyer, "How can you 
rearrange the whole country?" Discrimination because of race should 
be corrected, he said, but "it disturbs me to try and challenge the 
whole living arrangements and way of life of people allover the 
nation. You're challenging the place people live." 
Wash. Evening St~, Oct. 19, 19'70, p. A 9, col. 1. 
Similarly, the "legal fix" represented by the "Newspaper Preservation 
Act" is only one of multiple factors which may contribute to diversifica-
tion of news and opinion in the nation (planned effect). 
Declaration of Policy: Sec. 2 of the Newspaper Preservation Act, 
Public Law 91-353, 84 Stat. 466, July 24, 1970: 
"In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press 
editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all 
parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the public 
policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers 
in any city, community, or metropolitan area where a joint operating 
arrangement has been heretofore entered into because of economic 
distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act." 
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teichnological means encompass fonnally or practically the follcw-on 
decision to actually apply this means? Or can the decision-approval 
phase be clearly distinguished from the application phase in that an 
entirely different group of decision makers is involved? These types 
of questions not only relate to th~~ application of the technological fix 
but extend to the ~..l2!aisal phase in that;, they suggest evaluations of 
the effectiveness of the approved means. 
The decisional process patterns relevant to the initial evaluation, 
promotion~ decision-approval, and ap'plication, of a technological fix to 
a social problem will vary widely. Reference to the System of Techno1og-
ical Assessment/Application will sustain this observation. One need 
think merely of the combinations of social problem areas, technologies, 
participants, assessment forum;,;, and decisional arenas to appreciate 
the variety of contexts which may be involved. For example, if the 
objective is to recapture national prestige by establishing technological 
superio~ity as with the Apollo program; if the focus of decision is with 
a small group of decision makers at the highest level of authority; if 
the decision of approval is inclusive of the application; and if the 
technology is a~;ai~able and other resource support can be assumed, then 
92 implementation/fof the technological fix can be moved along rapidly. 
J' 
92 
John M. Logsdon, The Apl:}_'lo Deciaion and Its Lessons for Policy-
Makers, The George Washington University: Program of Policy Studies 
in Science and Technology , Occasional Paper No.7, January 1970. 
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A second and much broader contextual pattern applies to public 
service projects such as the construction and operation of ne"t-7 highways, 
subways, airports, and power plants. Normally, the required procedures 
provide for a sequence of decisions by a multiplicity of public and 
private sector participant~ including hearings for those segments of 
the public which will be beneficially or adversely affected by these 
projects. lienee, the decision, for example, to issue or reject the 
application for a construction permit for the construction of a nuclear 
power plant may involve a contentious and drawn-out struggle amon~ 
competing interest groups. But once the final decision of appro'iTa1 is 
made, the construction and operation of the plant is assumed as is the 
consumption of the energy produced. 93 
A third general category of decisional contexts are those ~n which 
the decision approving use is distinct from the decision or decisions 
to actually apply the technological means. The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration has approved the use of the "pill" but actual application is 
finally determined by individual or family decisions and the aggregate 
of such decisions is the measure of the application -- or effectiveness. 
93 
As the demand for more electrical energy increases and the 
accompanying concern for environmental quality intensifies, controversy 
can be expected to continue even beyond the construction permit stages 
especially with respect to nuclear power plants. See "~ary1and A-Plant: 
Boon or a Menace?" with refe.rence to the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant. 
The Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1970, p. 1, col. 1. See further comments 
in Washington Evening Star; Editorial, January 1, 1971, p. A 4, col. 1, 
"Calvert Cliffs Decision," and the New York Times, January 24, 1971, 
p. 42, col. 2, "Maryland Atom Plant Gets aPermlt." 
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Here, individual human beings are involved in volitional choices. The 
one-factor fix cannot be assumed with the same finaH\ty as in the first 
two decisional patterns above if the objective of the use of the "pill" 
is considered to be overall population control. Highly charged social 
interest conflicts emerge in this context which question our value 
priorities, especially the current demands for a "quality environment." 
Are we really more concerned with the goal of an optimum social environ-
ment than with the "natural" or "constitutional right ll of tl)€ .,husband 
and wife to determine family size, even with the prospect of eventual 
\ \ intolerable human congestion~ If the latter situation does evolve, 
then the issue will be whether to impose authoritative controls over 
family size (to modify or control human behavior). In this instance 
legal sanctions ,.;rould be essential to the application of the technolog-
ical means. Required use of seat belts is also an example of the legal 
imposition of a technological means to reduce automobile fatalities and 
94 injuries. The continuing flouridation controversy represents a some-
what more complicated context involving the decision of approval and the 
decision ,to apply dichotomy since, like the "pill," it raises issues of 
community imposed control versus individual volition. 95 It is a context 
94 
Similarly, the new requirements for installation of "air bags" 
for crash protection involve both legal and technological means of 
implementation. See Washington Post, March 6, 1971, p. 1, col. 4. 
95 
See Michael Wol1an, "Technology Assessment and the Law," (Section 
on Fluoridation), 36 Geo. Wash. L. R., 1105,1125 (1968). 
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which will present continuing difficulties since alternative technological 
means may be available for achieving the same objective, one applicable on 
the community or governmental level and the other available for individual, 
volitional application. In other types of public/private sector decisional 
contexts, a consensus fix may be demanded. 96 
96 \: 
See Aaron Latham, "Hot Tenants Protest Lack of Air Cooling," 
The Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1970, p. C 1, col. 1. 
The protesters, most of them more than 60 years old, marched 
yesterday with the aid of canes, crutches and braces. Like more 
youthful demonstrators might, they carried signs, but they walked 
slowly because their doctors had warned them not to over-exert. 
The marchers, numbering about 50, were protesting the lack of air 
conditioning in Claridge Towers, 1221 M St., N. W., a public housing 
high-rise apartment building for the elderly that was considered a 
national model when it opened three years ago. 
Monteria Ivey, the acting director of the National Capital Housing 
Authority, Washington's public housing agency, attended the demon-
stration and told the elderly marchers that he hoped their building 
would be air-cooled by next summer. 
He said that regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development once forbade air conditioning in public housing but 
that HUD recently changed its mind: in the future, the elderly 
will be allowed cooling. Public housing families, however, must 
continue to live with the heat. 
Ivey said that the elderly need air conditioning more than families. 
The marchers yesterday agreed. 
"The ambulance' comes much more often in the summer," Roberto Wallace 
said. 
The Claridge, opened with great fanfare in 1967, was the nation's 
first "turnkeyll housing project, meaning that NCHA agreed to buy 
it immediately on completion from a private contractor. The 
IO-story building has 343 units. 
'·r--------~~· .. -
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If a technological fix is left to individual volition for application 
can it be appropriately termed a IIfix?1I This type of arrangement will 
coften lead to great disparities in application. If individuals view the 
llfixll as depriving them of a more cherished social value than that perceived 
to be gained by the technological means, then it is not likely to be applied. 97 
But the thrust of the above comments has been that the extent to which a given 
means will provide an effective solutio~ to a social end can be evaluated only 
with respect to the specific social contex,t and effective public decision 
process involved. 
96 (continued) 
Sometimes the IIpublic" insists on the development and application 
of a "technological fix." See for example, The Washington Post, Editorial, 
Sept. 24, 1970, A 10, col. 1, concerning the Senate vote of 73 to 0 for a 
bill requiring a 90% reduction in automobile produced pollution by 1975. 
97 
The requirement for a warning on cigarette packages that smoking 
may be injurious to one's health is certainly a questionable fix for the 
stJ>stantial reduction of cancer resulting from cigarette smoking. 
1/ The approval of methadone as a means of alleviating heroin addiction 
/~y no means assures that this method will result in an appreciable net 
//social gain. 
':// 
For conflicting views on the methadone "fix," see the Washington 
Daily News, March 6, 1971, p. 5, wherein a study group of the Washington, 
D. C. methadone programs stated that lIit is providing therapy on a scale 
unmatched elsewhere in the countryll while a prosecutor of a nearby 
Virginia County remarked that methadone is a greater threat than heroin. 
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V -<s~me Implications of the Contextual Approach for 
'Social Proble~ Perception, Definition, and 
-l 
1 Evaluation-of Alternative Solutiens 
The diJJcusS.ien thus far strengly suggests that an effective technelegy 
assessment~unc:i~'~OUld impre.s significant changes on the effective public 
decisien pr~cess/lj"y identifying the full range ef participants, institutions, 
precesses, and social interests affected in substantial technological under-
takings. But in this paper we have been concerned primarily with the impli-
cations of technelogy assessment fer eur attitude toward the applicability 
of ene-factor fixes .as satisfactery means of dealing with existing social 
preblems or fer achieving desired social goals. 
98 
'J;he Sayre and Smith analysis focuses primarily en the "pelitical" 
precess threugh which a technelogical "quick fix" must be "filtered" befere 
it can be applied to a social preblem context. Their cencern is with the 
cenditiens which tend to. be faverable or unfavorable to. the acceptability of 
a technelogical means. Of course, the task of adapting an available tech-
nelegy to a relevant secial preblem area is a matter ef critical importance. 
Hewever, the "implementatien feasibility" element is only ene aspect of 
an adequate technology aser<i.ssment function. Simply because a technological 
means seems apprepriate, the technelegy is available, and the political 
climate is amenable, is not conclusive as to. the desirability ef the 
application. 99 In fact, innumerable technelegical projects implemented 
98 
Sayre and Smith, supra nete 78. 
99 
Perhaps the SST is a gQPd illustratien ef a situation wherein 
technical feasibility and initial, previsienal pelitical approval clearly de 
net satisfy the criterien ef censidering all prespectively affected interests. 
As the Washing ten Evening Star has stated editerially, "the first censidera-
tien had to. be the total impact on the natien and the werid." Dec. 4, 1970, 
p. A 18, col. 1. See also "The SST: What' ~ the Hurry?": Washington Post, 
Editorial, Dec. 3, 1970, p. A 18, ce1. 1. . 
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in the past with only these considerations in mind have either resulted in 
unsatisfactory treatment of social problems, increased social conflict, or 
introduced new detrimental elements into the environment. Technology a~sess-
ment involves much more than an examination of the political feasibility of 
approving a technological fix. An adequate assessment can not only identify 
all of the significant effects which might flow from the introduction of 
the proposed technolqgical fix, but can also clarify other available options 
for dealing with the particu1at' problem and the 1:.ocia1 benefits and costs 
which can be anticipated from the application of each such alternative. 
Technology assessment contributes to the decision as to whether a techno1o-
gical fix or some other means should be adopted in terms of serving the 
totality of social needs or demands, as contrasted with an appraisal of 
whether the technological fix £!£ be moved through the political process. 
The probability of implementation of a particular means or alternative 
means is but one aspect of the technology assessment function. 
The foregoing comments concerning the relationship of the contextual 
approach to technology assessment have served to discourage the application 
of simplistic remedies to complex situations of social stress and conflict 
grounded in multiple causes. However, it is neither asserted nor implied 
that one-factor fixes have no utility in particular situations. But this 
is precisely the point which needs further examination and elabo~ation, 
namely, the identification of adequate means for dealing with tfsocia1 
problems. II This in turn requires a conceptual inquiry into how problems 
should be defined for assessment, planning, and program implementation 
purposes, as well as an examination of ,the manner in which problems are 
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in fact defined in most situations today. The means of dealing with a 
"problem" are, of course, a function of the way in which the problem is 
defined. But problem conceptualization is a huge and complicated subject, 
the scope of which can merely be suggested in this discussion. 100 
As a practical matter the operational initiative for the considera-
tions herein discussed commences with 1) a perceived problem, and 2) one 
or more provisional means of solving the problem. Our attention has been 
given to the general notion of one-factor fixes as appropriate means of 
dealing with complex social problems. The "technological fb." is often 
an attractive means for getting at the primary planned effect sought,lOl 
whether it be the alleviation of an adverse social impact or the attain-
ment of a desired social objective. As has been suggested, difficulties 
arise with changes which may be imposed upon various participants (and 
associated value-institutional processes) which are not identified and 
taken into account when the assessment focus is limited to the primary 
100 
See Mayo, Louis H., The Problem-Oriented Approach to Legal-Policy-
Institutional Innovation (Internal Reference Document of the Program of 
Policy Studies, The Geo~ge Washington University, November 1970). 
101 
The "skyscraper" may be considered a "fix" which satisfies the 
need (planned effect) for huge groupings of offices required of vast 
business enterprises and also a means of avoiding inordinate land costs, 
but the implications for such functions as efficiently moving urban 
populations, assuring a continuing supply of power, and providing for 
adequate fire protection are substantiaL Further ,<_?sychological 
adaptation is a problem for those who do not feel comfortable when the 
towers sway in a strong wind. See J. A. Engels, "Skyscrapers: No Refuge 
in Superlatives," Wae.lhington Post, November 21, 1970, p. E 1, col. 1. 
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objective as the only significant effect. Further, technological feasibility 
and even political, economic, and social acceptability (if the latter is 
limited to the desire to attain the prime objective) do not necessarily 
assure an inclusive public interest solution. 
An adequate technology assessment methodology will assure that those 
professionals (or the entity) performing the assessment relate the 
requisite analytical tasks to the realities of the Effective Public 
Decision Process. This perception forces the assessing entity to recognize, 
among other things, that the various participants in some manner affected 
by the proposed application will propose alternative coursee of actions in 
each of the phases of the policy formulation/program implementation continuum. 
Put otherwise, an adequate .assessment methodology will assure that all of the 
Effects or Changes which will necessarily, probably, or possibly eventuate 
(based upon explicit assumptions and models) will be identified from the 
comprehensive examination of the interactions of participants, policies, 
institutions, and processes. The significance of this observation is that 
when the assessing entity undertakes to apply the methodology advanced in 
Part II, supra, it must consider the actions and responses which will occur, 
or probably, or possibly occur (based upon such parameters as the technolog-
ical configuration being assessed, the future social environment posited, 
the goals sought to be implemented, and models of indiVidual or institutional 
behavior assumed, etc.) during each phase of the Policy Formulation/Program 
Implementation Process. This process can be represented by an approach to 
I 
.~ 
1 j 
I 
1 
I 
I L , .~i 
t 
( 
- 74 -
effect identification by reference to the Initiation, Implementation, 
and Operational stages or through the following phases if governmental 
action is substantially involved: 
PerceEtion of the "problem" 
Formulation/definition of the problem and the 
problem context 
Assembly of relevant information 
Consideration of alternative means, i.e., 
statutory scheme, organizational arrange-
ment, social action program, etc. 
Evaluation and recommendation/promotion of 
selected outcome 
Formal prescription of new law or authorization 
of new program 
Application of ne~ statutory scheme in appropriate 
decisional contexts or the implementation of the 
prescribed social action program 
Appraisal of the effects of the application 
of the statutory scheme or of the operation 
of the social action program 
Modification or termination of the statutory 
scheme or the social action program based 
on r.ontinuing monitoring and appraisal 
These functions, variously phrased, tend to be Gufficient to cover the 
sequence of phases involved in any governmental decisional context. The 
decisional phases in technological projects initiated and developed 
102 primarily in the private sector will differ somewhat. 
102 
The private sector would be concerned with basic research, 
development, production, distribution, and market response decisions 
among others. 
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The assessment phase must include a provisional judgment and assumptions 
with respect to all of the succeeding phases. A given technological means 
might be considered a "fix" to the extent that it maximizes social benefits 
and minimizes social costs associated with the total Policy Formulat~Lon/ 
Program Implementation process. It would seem that facilitating actions of 
some sort will normally be reqUired in each phase. In short, few fixes --
legal, economic, or technological -- are self-exec:utinA' 
The essential point here stressed is that effects or changes in 
various value-institutional processes with respect to certain participants 
occur or may occur at any or all phases of the Policy Formulation/Program 
Implementation Process. A thorough c·ontextual assessment must take into 
account such effects. Limiting an assessment merely to the operat:i.onal 
phase may result in ignoring some of the most significant changes which 
will occur in the establishment of a new program or technological project. 
For example, should a proposal be made to construct a center-city STO:port 
to meet urgent demands for more efficient and flexible inter-urban short-
haul transportation~ it is clear that serious community decisions would 
be required relating to resource allocations among various goals and that 
vigorous public controversy might likely result. Assuming approval of 
such a project, the displacement and relocation of businesses and residences 
would be ~nly one of several substantial effects during the implementation 
phase. Such effects as improved mobility or increased aircraft noise would 
not appear until the operational phase. Instances abound of new techn,ological 
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projects which require positive action or generate critical reactions 
in the initiating and implementation phases. 103 Such actions ~I{d reactions 
are effects which convert into beneficial or detrime~tal social impacts. 
103 
It should be evident that the designation of stages of the 
overall developmental and application process as Initiation, Implementation, 
and Operational is not meant to imply that such stages are separate and 
distinct or even fully incorporate all of the decision/action operations 
involved. Sometimes the stages may be essentially distinguishable, but 
in perhaps most major projects a variety of developmental sub-processes 
link and overlap these stages. For example, considerable basic research 
may necessarily precede the overt Initiation stage. See Washington Post, 
March 9, 1971, p. A 4, col. l, re test of the "R-Machine" in the e:l':peri-
mental phase of developing nuclear fusion as an energy soul:ce. Pre .... 
Initiation activity may ·also raise serious controversies which can lead 
to significant decisions with respect to a large pattern of scientific 
research and technological applications. See Victor Cohn in the Washington 
Post, January 29, 1971, p. A 1, col. 1, with respect to g(metic engineering 
("test tube babies"). Further, implementation may be taking place at the 
same time the authoritative Initiation/Approval decision is being debated 
or made. Ruge investments were made by various oil companies in the North 
Slope Pool of Alaska long before the current controversy over the formal 
decision to approve or disapprove the Alaska Oil Pipeline. Se,e "Alaska 
and Oil: Tough Questions," in the New York Times, February 28, 1971, 
p. 55, col. 2. While the "national data bank" issue continues to be argued, 
personal data is being rapidly computerized. See "When We Get All The Data 
In One Place," New York Times, February 28, 1971, p. E 4, col. 3. Never-
theless, the ide;tification of stages or phases of the overall policy 
formulation and program implementation process normally provides clarity 
and precision to analysis. 
It should also be recognized that a decision can be made to reverse 
an Initiation/Approval determination well into the Implementation stage 
of a proj.ect. See "~lorida: Nixon Halts Canal Projec.t, Cites Environment," 
Science, January 29, 1971, p.357. This project also demonstl.'ates the fact 
that major effects take place in the Initiat~on stage (investment in rights 
of way and the construction of barge terminals and other canal facilities) 
and that Implementation effects include both increased job opportunities 
and destruction -- to some degree -- of the natural environment. 
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Hence, even if the means of satisfying a social demand is primarily 
technological and can be plausibly called a "fix," in most if not all 
cases the inevitable, probable, or possible effects will involve support-
ing initiatives in the various value-institutional process areas in order 
to increase the benefits or minimize the costs or perhaps even to enable 
the technological means to be applied at all,.104 An adequate technology 
assessment methodology will disclose such effects and the nature of the 
active or passive impact which will result. Furthermore, testing out a 
proposed one-factor fix by applying the contextual assessment methodology 
may disclose, for example, that: 
The fix selected affects a much wider social sub-system 
(context of interacting part:i'.cipants and value-institutional 
processes) than the context initially subsumed under the 
problem as perceived. 
104 
The fix is not sufficient in itself to solve the problem or 
advance the social goal -- that it must be supplemented by 
facilitating techniques at one or more of the phases of the 
Policy Formulation and Program Implementation Process. 
The assessed implications of the fix suggest problem context 
redefinition. The assessment outcome may show that the fix 
can be effectively applied to a more narrowly focused social 
As noted, a "fix" may be c.onsidered as a means of solving an 
existing social problem or of achieving a social goal. But it soon 
becomes obvious upon examination that if weather modification is selected 
as a means of increasing the water supply in a given river basin, there are 
numerous legal, jurisdictic;al, organizational, and financial arrangements 
which are essential to the operational efficacy of this means for the simple 
reason that there are innumerable effects or changes which will result from 
or which are acivisable to take in order to maximize the benefits. 
Similarly, the so-called "housing problem," with which Project Break-
through of the Department of Housing and Urban Development is now concerned, 
can by no means be solved with the most advanced housing/construction 
technologies alone. Difficulties here are rooted in traditional legal 
doctrine, real estate transaction practices, mortgage and investment 
institutional procedures, housing codes, union practices, industry decisions 
related to the size of aggregated markets, and so forth. 
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objective or that the .fix, in combination with other techniques, 
has the potential for effectively achieving the solution to a 
broader social problem context than that initially posited. 
The fix is applicable only to a short-term solution and other 
means must be employed for a complete solution or for continuing 
control of the problem. The analysis may further suggest altern-
ative strategies for securing the objective sought as by the 
application of various techniques, appropriately introduced 
into the policy formulation and program implementation process 
and coordinated through time. 
105 
A fix (whether technological, economic, legal, etc.) is not a 
satisfactory solution for the problem context posited and that 
nothing short of a drastic modification of individual or organ-
izational behaVior (not provided by a simple fix) will suffice 
to achieve the desired social objective. Of course, several 
significant questions are raised by this implication. Should 
it be aSO'Jmed, for example, that a technological short-cut which 
avoids the need for change in human attitudes and social behav-
ioral patterns is always to be preferred?105 Many observers 
In "Man the Magician: Watch Us," The Wash. Post Book Ttlorld, 
Aug. 16, 1970, p. 4, Edward Edelson states: 
Technology has failed us because we let it run wild. Instead of 
following human logiC, we have followed technological logiC. If 
something could be done, we have douB it without considering the 
human consequences. We need a basic change of attitude. The 
engineers must start thinking about the human uses of technology 
giving the greatest benefit to the greatest number, not creating 
the biggest machine for its ovm sake. 
The rest of us need an equally basic chang~ of attitude, toward 
the objects of everyday life. Here is one example of what must 
be done: 
In the past few years, most middle-class Americans have become 
accustomed to air conditioning, at home and at work, now even 
in automohi1es. Air conditioning is an avid consumer of electric 
power, and all power pollutes, either by adding to air pollution 
or by disrupting a wild area or hy adding too much heat to water. 
The people who protest today about pollution do so in air conditioned 
comfort. They shave with electric razors and use electric can openers. 
They buy eight-cylinder cars and insist on power steering. With every 
gesture, they make more pollution necessary. Th~n they sign petitions 
to make the problem go away. 
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think, to the contrary, that drastic shifts in social attitudes 
and behavj.or is the really crucial issue .106 
105 (continued) 
It is useless to double our consumption of electric power every ten 
years and demand less pollution. The only real solution is to use 
. ::Less of everything -- really, everything. And that, of course, is 
an economic disaster. 
See also on the same theme, "Environment: The Human Element, II 
Review and Outlook Column, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1970, 
p. 12, col. 1. 
All sorts of environmental problems could be solved i~ people were 
more friendly to the idea of paying a bit more to incorporate the 
cost of protecting the environment into manufacturing processes. In 
other words, as we have pOinted out in these columns before, solutions 
to the problem of the environment so serious to the cities may lie 
most basically in effecting changes in individual values and tastes. 
That is no easy job, even when serious discomforts and inconvenience 
grow to critical levels for the whole society. For the moment it 
seems to present policymakers with a bleak choice. They can let 
the drift to crisis go until the day when catastrophe creates popular 
demand for change, perhaps at the price of lost life and massive un-
happiness. Or they can try to force the change to avert catastrophe 
by moving aga:i.nst the will of the people ,which in a democracy, after 
all, must be considered valuable, too. 
Perhaps there is some happier third choice which would yet come clear 
(popular respc.lnse to gradual limits) on auto use in New York City, 
for example, has been encouraging. But we doubt if new technologies 
or their management will play much role in finding better solutions, 
however well they are managed. For it is the human problem that is 
the heart of the matter, and the real cause for worry when mUltiple 
crises strike a city. 
106 
See The New York Times, September 20, 1970, p. 13, col. 1, "Maxims 
Are. Cut Down by English Economis t (Prof. Edward J. M:ishan)": 
"Everything I say goes against people's democratic instincts, 'why 
shouldn't we choose what we want?' they say. What people want, 
ho"Tever, is not wisdom but immediate gratification. Thiey have been 
taught by the system to be myopic, and when they have power they 
corrupt themselves. vJhat they need is not power out strength of 
character and morality. In this they are not well serv.~d by the 
Establishment. II 
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Assuming that some degree of flexibility exists in the consideration of 
the social objective sought and in the means (resources) to be applied, then 
106 (continued) 
Victor Cohn in "Scientists I View of the Future," in The Washington Post, 
January 4, 1970, p. A 3, col. 6, comments: 
Science then is undergoing a change -- for morality. Will the public? 
The specific question, maintained many speakers, is: Will the public 
pay the bill for survival? Or lvill it make other, "less moral," choices? 
Scientists who said popl\lation must level off also said this will 
require much sacrifice by wealthy nations and families to bring 
health, social security and higher living standards to poorer 
nations and families. Only then, it was stated, will the insecure 
stop producing huge families as their only social security. 
"We the prosperous," it was widely agreed, will have to give up big 
cars, big defense budgets and big man-in-space programs to pay the 
required economic and social bills. 
But Americans, predicted S. Fred Singer, physicist and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, will refuse to pay even the 
environmental clean-up bills, when they realize how big they Thust 
be. Already, noted Dr. Philip Lee, Americans are refusing to pay 
the bills "for quality education and adequate health care" of the 
25 million people added by the baby boom of 1947-57. 
On the population/birth control problem, Colman McCarthy writes in 
"Ecology and the Bias for Living," The Wash. Pc.st, January 15, 1970, 
p. A 17, col. 3: 
As arrogant as the industrial and commercial polluters are, they are 
still only serving a public which demands more cars, planes, textiles, 
chemicals and comforts for more "civilized" living. In the end, it 
is man who pollutes. Thus, the pollution problem runs parallel to 
the population problem: the more people, the more pollution. The 
day is past when theologians can stand back and argue against. birth 
control on grounds of morality. An over-polluted overr-opulatic!l. .. 
must not only argue for birth control, but must perhaps seek to 
legally enforce it -- on grounds of survival. 
Unless massive birth control is practiced immediately, no amount 
of public money or private worry can keep the earth from becoming 
what Buckminister Fuller called, "the planet Po1luto." In a grim 
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the foregoing observations tend to emphasize the provisional nature of the 
policy analysis (technology assessment) function. There will probably be 
a continuing interaction and adjustment between alternative concepte of 
the relevant social context (participants, values and institutions affected) 
and the alternative configuration ofr9sources (means and techniques) to be 
employed. This determination of the "bestir or of a "satisfactory" arrange-
ment may, of course, differ as between the assessing entity's outcome and 
that of the ultimate political decision-makers when the program is finally 
approved. 
Therefore, from the foregoing discussion one might reasonably conclude 
that with respect to almost any social problem of consequence for which a 
provisional means has been selected, such means should not be adopted for 
the simplistic reason that it coincides with one's intuitive judgment as 
to the suitability or applicability of one-factor fixes generally. 
106 (continued) 
way, the backlash of nature may well inflict, in the absence of 
birth control, universal pollution as a form of death-control. 
On the significance of the population problem see Claire Sterling, 
"India: The Nightmare Demographers Warn us About," The Washington Post, 
Sept. 2, 1970, p. A 22, col. 3, indicating that the population of India 
has doubled in the past 30 years and may double again in the next 20: 
This is the n~ghtmare demographers have been warning us about, the 
sudden, terrifying leap in population that comes of staving off 
death without restraining birth, the inexorable statistic that could 
make life very nearly unbearable on our planet in our lifetime . • • 
For some time now, and especially since 1966, the Indian Government 
has been trying to control human birth on a scale, and in a style, 
that has never been tried before. The difficulties are so tremendous 
that some observers have already written off the campaign as lost. 
They are mistaken, I think, if only because a campaign like this can-
not be decisively won or lost. Every baby that might have been born 
and isn't puts India that much ahead -- a fraction of a hundred-
millionth, perhaps, not much but more than nothing. 
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Unfortunately, there often exists an irresistible urge to reduce 
problems to the narrowest possible context and to consider the 
simplest types of alternative solutions. Such thought processes 
tend to focus upon only a single or limited pattern of anticipated 
consequences which are of paramount interest to the particular 
participant. Emphasis on specific consequences further leads to the 
selection of means related directly to such consequences. Instances 
of this type of thinking are frequently exhibi~ed in the public 
107 decision process. 
The value of the contextual approach to assessment set forth in 
Part II, supra, is that such an assessment of even the most limited 
type of means or fix proposed for a social problem solution can dis-
close not only the deficiencies :l.n such means for the social problem 
as initially posited but the configuration of means appropriate to 
its solution or the need to redefine the social context which can 
107 
In the Congressional debate over the proposal to continue 
work on the development of two prototype SST's (estimated overall 
cost of $1.3 billion) the Washington Daily ~ews reported on' 
December 1, 1970, p. 9, col. 1, that the Citizens' League against 
the Sonic Boom argued that the SST would have a "significant impact" 
on marine life in the Atlantic while 
The principal argument advanced by proponents of the SST 
is that the Anglo-French Concorde and the Russian TU 144 
have already flown at supersonic speed, and thus the ques-
tion boils down to whether the U. S. airlines will be able 
to buy a U. S.-built SST or will be compelled to buy one 
manufactured abroad. 
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most appropriately be treated at the particular time with the resources 
108 
available. In short, the contextual approach provides a systematic 
and reliable method for determining all of the effects and interactions 
associated with the application of specified means to achieve particular 
goals within the relevant social problem context. 
An adequate technology assessment function should make a significant 
contribution to the task of clarifying alternative courses of action, 
most of which, with respect to complex social problems, will combine a 
mix of technological, economic, political, legal, and social behavioral 
means. An adequate assessment can greatly assist in the determination of 
the social benefits and costs which will flow from the adoption of each 
alternative. Assessment outcomes which do provide such clarification 
should exert considerable influence in authoritative decisional arenas 
where decisions are ultimately made for the allocation of resources, the 
distribution of benefits and costs, and the prescription of legal rights 
and duties. This evaluation of the ultimate impact of the assessment 
108 
In this connection see the Report of the National Academy of 
Sciences/National Academy of Engineering, Jamaica Bay and Kennedy 
Airport: A Multidisciplinary Environmental Study (February 17, 1971) 
which "considered as many significant factors of urban life as it 
could" and explicitly rejected the simplistic and misleading definition 
of the problem of whether to expand the airport by further fill of the 
bay as one of "Birds versus Planes" or "Jobs versus Pollution." See 
NAS/NAE News Report for February 1971, which includes a comment on the 
Jamaica Bay Report. 
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function on the national policy process assumes, of course, effective 
implementation of the assessment function. 109 Prospects for effective 
109 
This is clearly a questionable assumption as the following comment 
from Dan Greenberg, New Scientist, Sept. 10, 1970, p. 552, suggests: 
DuBridge's successor, Edward E. David Jr., arrives with sound 
professional credentials, but the record is blank on whether he 
possesses the guerilla instincts so indispensable for operating 
from a narrow power base in Washington. The big agencies, with 
their massive spending power and allies in Congress, can bulldoze 
the route to their objectives. The White House science office, 
on the other hand, must rely on a whispered comment to the Bureau 
of the Budget, a discreet exploitation of a presidential prefer-
ence or interest, a judicious bit of testimony harmonizing with 
what a congressional chairman thought anyway. 
The above statement, however, seems to make an assumption concerning 
the role of the OST which has not yet been resolved, i.e., which entity 
in the Executive Branch will have the ultimate technology assessment 
responsibility: the Office of Science and Technology, The Council on 
Environmental Quality, the Domestic Council, the Office of Management 
and Budget, etc. In this connection see the recommendations of the 
Report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy, Science and 
Technology: Tools for Progress, April 1970 which suggests the OST and 
the Report of the National Academy of Public Administratio~ Technology 
Assessment System for the Executive Branch, to the Committee on 
Science and Astronautics, U. S. House of Representatives, July 1970, 
which recommends the Council on Environmental Quality. 
Hugh Folk questions whether "additional information will impJ:'ove 
policy making in technology and science." He doubts the validity of the 
underlying premises of technology assessment: "that the government wants 
to make good technological policy, has the power to make good policy, 
and would recognize a good policy if one were proposed. The premises 
are at least questionable, if we interpret 'good' as meaning in the interest 
of the survival, prosperity, and liberty of the mass of the population. Many 
powerful politicians • • . have no concern for the national interest at all, 
but serve the parochial interests that permit their political survival." 
"I can only conclude that neither the Administration nor the Congress 
want a rational system of policy assessment. Politicians are elected at 
vast expense because they serve powerful interests not all of which are 
compatible with the public interest." 
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110 implementation are briefly considered elsewhere by the author. So long 
Ii 
as assessments are performed on an ad hoc and incidental basis, there is 
little reason to expect that they will contribute a substantial added 
increment of rational control over the direction and rate of social change. 
An adequate assessment must be recognized as a crucial element in the planning 
phase of the proposed introduction of any new application into the social 
111 process. Implementation will then require the necessary resources of 
analytical skills, information networks, and the coordinating mechanisms 
which can produce a systematic integration of inputs from a variety of 
112 
assessing entities. The assessment function can then provide effective 
109 (continued) 
" .•• they (politicians) understand that sound policy assessment 
might limit their freedom of action and their ability to serve their 
masters in good conscience and political safety." 
Hugh Folk, The Role of Technology Assessment in Public Policy (Paper 
presented at MAS Annual M.eeting, Boston, M.ass., Dec. 29, 1969), pp. 1-3. 
110 
See statement by the Program Director in the 1969-70 Annual Report, 
The George Washington University: Program of Policy Studies in Science 
and Technology. 
11J .. 
Walter Sullivan, science reporter for the New York Times, wrote 
recently: 
"In essenco the United States has reached the stage where no one 
element of civilization can be developed on a large scale without 
critically affecting other elements." Unless techniques of "techno-
10gici:l1 assessment" are brought into play, he says, "the Great Machine 
of our civilization will increasingly work at cross purposes." 
"Environment: The Human Element," ReV:ltM and Outlook Column, 
The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1970, p. 12, coL l. 
112 
See generally, Gabor Strasser, Developing a "Technology Assessment" 
Capability: New Analysis and Planning Methods with a Scope Much Broader. 
than Technology, Executive Office of the President: Office of Science aud 
Technology, May 1970. 
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guidance for developing deliberately selected conditions of future 
social environments. J.13 
It is apparent that "ideal solutions," in terms of treating the most 
.... 
relevant problem contexts, are not always feasible for reason of political, 
budgetary, institutional, technological, or other constraints, including 
analytical/planning deficiencies. One-factor fixes are frequently the 
only recourse for dealing with crisis situations. Further, the complexity 
of the socio-po1itica1 process, including the vast uncertai:nties involved 
in long-range projections, is a compelling reason in the judgment of many 
decision-makers for adopting cautions, short-term, partial measures rather 
than comprehensive arrangements for coping with major social problems 
through time. In many social problem areas we simply do not know enough 
to assess the situation and develop appropriate means for adequately 
dealing with the matter as an overall problem. Even so, such means as 
are selected for application should be fully assessed for planned and 
derivative effects. Only in this manner can such means be appraised for 
actual net contribution, if any, to the solution of the problem posed. 
It is submitted that the contextual approach to technology assessment 
(which recognizes the dynamic processes of society such as the Effective 
Public Decision Process and the Prdcess of Policy Formulation/Program 
Implementation with respect to given undertakings) will prove more 
113 
Louis H. Mayo, "Conunents on H. R. 17046," Technology Assessment -..,. 
1970: Hearings before the Subconunittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment of the, Conunittee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Congress, 2d. Sess., 
May 20, 21, 26, 27; June 2-3, 1970, p. 210. 
'"I 
y 
i,r 
1 
I 
1 
r 
I 
, 
r 
I 
- 87 -
productive in the attainment of inclusive public interest goals than 
precipitous grasping at short-cut, one-factor fixes. While no social 
benefits are without costs, an adequate technology assessment function 
can greatly assist the ef.forts toward policy formulation and program 
implementation by clarifying optional means or combinations of means 
which maximize social benefits and minimize social deprivations. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
D. Technology Assessment: 
What Should It Be? 
Guy BLACK 
June 1971, pp. 33-41 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Technology Assessmemt in Anal~ical Context 
It is clear that technology assessment--even a preliminary tech-
nology assessment-~means balancing the desirable against the undesirable. 
The Council of Economic Advisers to the President says "while it might 
be tempting to say that no one should be allowed to do any polluting, 
such a ban would require the cessation of virtually all economic 
activity. ,,14 It is characteristic of much of the concern over second-
order effects that many proponents look only at adverse consequences of 
programs without balancing these against the desirable results. Clearly, 
this balance must be struck in every administrative dec~!rlon, and to do 
this requires integrating not only information on second-order conse-
quences, but also the desirable consequences which are the primary 
purpose of the program. 
Technology assessment cannot reqsonably be considered to be the 
whole analytical scope of program analysis. There is, therefore, a 
need to integrate the results of technology assessment with other 
program analyses. The essential consideration is that the results of 
technology assessment be supplied in a form that ?ermits integration 
with other information. 
There is a need for consistency of definitions and classification 
schemes. It is the usual practice in cost-benefit analysis to discount 
future costs and returns. Official guidelines prescribe the discounting 
rates. Cross-the-board consistency in program analysis depends on 
- 33 -
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uniformity ·of the rates so that if technology assessments use discounting, 
it should USe the rates currently in use for related program analyses. 
In aerospace-type systems anaJysis, establishing the c.ompatibility of 
analyses is one of the functions of systems engineering--a coordinating 
role. 
Some part of the notorious difficulty of successful interdiscipl~nary 
research results froln tp'.e incompatibility of data outputs from various 
disciplines, as they tare normally produced. Only in a few instances 
and for some disciplines have successful bridges been built. For 
example, certain elements of the behavioral sciences are now fairly 
well integrated into the work of some economists, though others resist 
the integration bitterly. In a classic article, Hollis Chenery showed 
how the results of an engineering analysis, expressed in the format 
traditional to engineers, could be transformed into the format useful 
to economists,15 Dorothy Rice has, in a well-known study, tran~f?rmed 
\ 
life expectancy data into a form useful in economics and cost benefit 
I . 16 ana YSl.S. Tec.hnology assessment must be interdisciplinary, and the 
integratability of analysis is crucial. Interdisciplinariness in 
research does not mean merely a willingness to listen and respect each 
other. The results of analyses tend to be data, and an interdisciplinary 
analysis must meld--and not merely report on alternate pages--results 
from a number of disciplines. 
Can Technology Assessment Produce Results? 
For technology assessment to be worthwhile, the decisions and follow-
on actions of governments and other organizations must somehow be different 
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than they would have he,en otherwise. It is instructive to examine the 
impact of planning studies, which are markedly akin to technology assess-
ment--indeed, it is possible to consider that technology assessment 
~\Qunts to a broadening of the focus of planning. 
The frequency with which plan~ing studies have been ignored by 
decision makers is notorious, Although the quality and content of the 
studies is sometimes at fault, it would appear that the most common 
difficulties lie in the relationship between the planning body and the 
decision makers. Planners often fail to include plans for implementa-
tion. Indeed, planners who perceive their role as technicians severely 
limit their willingness to deal with and make explicit recommendations 
for implementation. 
These same considerations are bound to affect the degree to which 
technology assessments affect public decision processes, although it is 
presently difficult to see the technology assessment specialist as a 
policy-neutral technician. While some--and perhaps considerable--lack 
of consideration and utilization of technology assessment must be 
expected, every effort should be made to minimize it, if only to increase 
through utilization the efficiency of the analytical effort of technology 
assessment. Efficient use of analytical resources is certainly a worthy 
objective; everyone would agree that it can be enhanced by the efficient 
organization and implementation of studies, but unless final reports are 
to be the end products, applying the criteria of report quality to a 
planning sffort is a suboptimization; a more meaningful criteria is 
obtained by comparing benefits to society that flow from decisions with 
- 35 
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the study and without it. In th~qp terms, a mediocre study by profes-
sional criteria may actually be superior to glittering gems of analysis, 
undecipherable to nonprofessionals. 
As to the means by which technology assessment can be efficient 
in these terms, there is room for considerable speculation. I would 
.:tdvance a few propositions: 
• technology assessment will have more impact when the analysis 
is competent. 
• it will have more impact when it conforms to the values and 
philosophies of decision makers. 
• it will have more impact if its results are communicated to 
decision makers before they become committed to specific programs. 
• it will be more acceptable when it is relevant to the high-
priority decisions which are the immediate responsibility of the 
decision makers. 
• it will have more impact if it does not threaten the power 
or prestige of the decision makers. 
• it will have more impact if it presents alternatives rather 
than calling for or demanding one rigid course of action. 
The last point is particularly debatable, since it runs counter to a 
highly popular strategy--namely the presentation of a single program 
as the only possible course of action, around which all available sup-
port can be marshalled; presenting alternatives may dissipate support 
for any action at all, and indeed is a c:',)mmon tactic of opponents 
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of any action. But the function of teclmology assessment is not advocacv , 
but to give decision makers a~arger and better hand from which they can 
select their trump cards. 
Implementation in the public sector as a political process .is often 
left out of planning. The implementers, as elected officials, are 
oriented toward widely varied emphases, systems of values, and reflect 
different balances of community interests. In a typical public deci-
sion-making body a large number of points of view are involved, and the 
resulting decisons are typically a compromise. There is, therefore, 
rarely a single cohesive set of value judgments, preferences and 
community interests which can serve as a starting point for the planning 
process. 
Technology assessment is an exercise in value judgment as well as 
in the dev.elopment of hard factual information. Second-order consequences 
may be the hard information part, although the fact that a program will 
ruuse opposition because it runs counter to the value judgments of some 
part of the community is hardly irrelevant i.n the planning of mission-
oriented agencies. 
It is on this point that the mission-oriented governmental agency 
is confronted with one of the dilemmas of the American political process. 
There is still considerable adherence to the doctrine that value judg-
ments arE' '.nc prerogative of Congress and that the bureaucracy implements 
programs consistent with those judgments. Agencies hesitate to estab-
lish identifiable, wholly effective capabilities for selecting and 
implementing their own value judgments. 
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If analysis had nothing to contribute to the formulation and imp1e-
mentation of value judgment, this would not be serious--but it has. 
Persons in agencies concerned with value judgments rarely have much 
analytical support for this part of their. function. The process is an 
under-wraps activity of top administrators and political appointees whose 
status gives them a special basis for the exercise of value judgments. 
Perhaps their most available forums are coequals from other agencies, 
although performance may be seriously handicapped by interagency rivalries. 
The points made above suggest that no single technology assess-
ment is likely to be satisfactory to the entire structure of decision 
makers. Public decision making is structured; within the executive 
branch there is a hierarchy of task and mission-oriented agencies which 
differ in their prescribed area of activity. Offices lower in the 
hierarchy generally have restr:i.,cted areas of operation and mission. 
The principal thrust of their effort must inevitably be on carrying 
forward the program which is their principal assigned responsibility. 
Performance will be judged in those terms. 
In short, technology assessment directed to mission-oriented agencies 
must be restricted to the scope of agency interest ana responsibility; 
otherwise it loses relevance to that agency. But, from a public point 
of view, assessment in these terms is too narrow. A management-oriented 
approach to analysis means also limiting the depth of analysis to the 
point where reasonable bases for management decisions have been provided. 
Analysis on this basis often lacks completeness and elegance. Some 
part of these faults can be remedied through technology assessments 
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produced for elements of government with mUlti-agency points of view. 
At the apex, within the executive branch, and the client for truly 
broad technology assessments, is the President and the exe\cutive 
office. 
Taken as an entity, the Congress might be considered to be the 
client for broadly oriented technology assessment, and the general 
public for even broader efforts. But to view the Congress and the 
public as entities is surely an err.or. The principal work of the 
Congress is in committees, and the client in Congress for technology 
assessments is not primarily the Congress as a whole, but various 
committees. As their functional ,areas are limited so are the scope 
of the technology assessments which will appear to them to be rele-
vant. There are, to be sure, Congressional committees which habitually 
take broad points of view and for whom broadly oriented technology 
assessments vlill appear to be relevant. Much the same problem would 
appear to exist with respect to the public. Nonetheless, given our 
political processes, the public audience for technology assessment 
cannot be neglected if technology assessment is to fulfill its promise; 
and the means by which the public can be reached are as yet unresolved. 
The relationship between the programs and actions of governmental 
agencies and the milieu in which government acts will ultimately hav~ 
much to do with the contribution made by technology assessment. Rela·· 
tionships between the character of government programs and second-order 
effects are often subtle. For example, prohibition of liquor, narcotics j 
, 
or cigarettes tend to create black markets, to support a criminal 
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element which in turn corrupts others. These effects are, quite appro-
priately considered second-order effects of any kind of prohibition. 
An additional determinant is the degree to which the social needs 
to which programs and sought-for first order effects are satisfied. So 
long as the need is desperate and pressing, it will be difficult to con-
vince many that second-order effects need to be taken seriously. 
In Summary 
In summary, it is a mere platitude to note th.lt society is ever 
changing its techniques, and that the effect of the changes are far-
I 
reaching. Hhat is new is the effort to predict the whole structure of 
change, to evaluate it, and to ident.lfy the best of the appnrently-
available alternatives. It is perhaps too early to· say that there is 
new emphasis on implementing the results of such assessments of tech-
nology, though clearly there is a new determination to preserve what 
is best in our environment. 
As yet, this determination has been poorly focused, short on analy-
tical support, and uncertain as to hmv to make the tradeoffs among 
desirable alternatives. In the emphasis on evaluating the consequences 
of scientific research the proponents of technology assessment mny very 
well have made a sound strategic decision, but the impact of change [rom 
other causes is often equally important and so inextricably hound ljp 
with science that it is not really useful to restrict ted1l1ology llssess-
ment to the products of science. 
Potentially one of the more serious shortcomings of technology 
assessment may be an unawareness of important second-order relation'lhips. 
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It would seem that a far-reaching preliminary search for possible 
relationships should proceed analysis in depth. Following this, the 
main thrust of analysis must be problem oriented, must avoid being 
discipline-bound, and must be comparable in structure to systems analysis. 
System models, the framework of such analyses, typically are simplifi-
cations achieved by explicitly setting aside second-order effects, and 
because these are the heart of technology assessment, a different model-
ling approach is called for. 
Technology assessment must not attempt impossible precision. The 
structure of the future consequences is largely stochastic, meaning 
that an array of possible outcomes, appended by probability estimates, 
should be the sought-for result. Forecasts and predictions developed 
in this way lend themselves readily to the methods of decision theory 
which may well become a basic element of technology assessment. 
The means by which technology assessment can be integrated into 
decision making are still unresolved,' and crucial. Let us hope that 
there will be no repetition of the experience of planning, in which the 
results of analysis have so often been ignored. 
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I. CONTROL OVER SOCIAL CHANGE 
THROUGH ANTICIP~TORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT 
It seems a plausible assumption that man has always, to 
a greater or lesser degree, undertaken to grasp and maintain 
some control over his environment through anticipatory assess-
ments of proposed actions. Two basic questions are involved: 
1) What changes in the social environment will be brought 
about by the contemplated action which would not otherwise 
occur? and 2) What will be the social significance of such 
changes? 
While the effort to impose some measure of control over 
the direction and rate of social change has a long history, 
the prospective evaluative function has come to unusual promi-
nence in the past decade in large measure as a result of the 
perception of incompatibility between uncritical expansion of 
industrial-consumption practices and the ne'i'l urgency for access 
to and enjoyment of a much broader spectrum of social values. 
The resulting need for more careful allocation and applica-
tion of available resources to pressing, and competing, social 
needs is evident. This being so, we are understandably becom-
ing more concerned with the inability of influential decision-
making entities to identify and evaluate the full range of 
consequences which will or may flow from new public or publici 
private initiatives - technological or otherwise. 
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Anticipatory Project Assessment, whether expressed .~.c:;\ 
policy analysis, social impact evaluation, or technology 
assessment, can be characterized as the capacity to perform, 
and the disposition to take into account in relevant decisional 
arenas, the following operations: 
c Identification of the significant effects (necessary 
or inevitable, probable, or possible) which will 
result from the introduction of a specified project 
configuration into alternative projected future social 
environments during the planning, implementation and 
operational stages. 
Evaluation of such Effects in terms of Social Impacts 
on affected participants and social value-institutional 
processes in accord with spec.:iJied concepts/standards 
of Social Justice, i.e., schemes of social value weight 
and distribution. 
Presumably, from the perspective of the accountable, public 
sector decision maker, this evaluative function will contribute 
an appreciable increment of control over the direction and rate 
of social change by: 1) facilitating judgments as to when or 
when not to take particular innovative actions; 2) providing 
insights into the advisability of taking major, all-out efforts 
as contrasted with incremental response to changing conditions; 
and by 3) suggesting the more preferable project configurations 
(alternative means) to apply to the achievement of objectives 
consistent with intended (or acceptable) concepts of Social 
Justice. 
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II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE 
ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT FUNCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA 1969) 
provides a useful framework for evaluating the prospective 
d0velopment of the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function in 
that the conditions and trends previously noted will have con-
siderable effect on its implementation. This Act would seem 
to have substantial utility as an instrument for moderating the 
direction and rate of technological innovation as a component 
of social change. It also has considerable potential for 
advancing the public policy analytical capability of the 
nation. First, however, we should consider the possibility 
that the §l02(2) (C) "environmental impact statementll require-
rnent for all major Federal actions could be a delusion to the 
extent it becomes form rather than substance. But assuming 
that this requirement can be a. tremendously potent instrument 
for anticipatory project assessment, one must look closely at 
the prospects for the development of this potential. Environ-
mental impact statements have been required since January 1, 
1~70, it is to be noted, but without benefit of the organiza-
tional resources and conceptual and analytical skills which 
NEPA explicitly recognizes to be necessary. §l02(2) (A) directs 
agencies to: 
utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which 
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social 
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning 
and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's 
environment; 
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and §l02(2) (B) directs that agencies develop methods, procedures, 
and techniques 
. • . which will insure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
priate consideration in decision-making along with 
economic and technical considerations; .•. 
The establishment of an assessment requirement by NEPA 
has some initial value as a means of focusing attention on 
the assessment function and in creating a "market" for a needed 
capability as well as project evaluation outcomes. However, 
it remains a fair and critical questiop- as to how we can 
reasonably expect adequate anticipatory assessment outcomes 
in form of §I02 (2) (C) st.atements when the resources made 
available for developing the requisite analytical capability 
remain at a precariously low level. Perhaps only ,:::atastrophes, 
persistent court actions ·to implement legislation n~quiring 
impact statements, and angry citizen protests of paJ::-ticular 
projects (with resulting delay and increased costs) will 
eventually stimulate the ne.cessary supJ:1ort for an adequate 
anticipatory project assessment function. 
For present purposes, however, let us assume that resources 
will be made available for APA and examine some of the questions 
Wllich will arise in the analytical operations of an assessment 
function. Attention will be directed to the implications of 
§l02(2) (B) since this subsection refers to the analytical com-
ponent of the assessment process. The injunction that Federal 
agencies develop techniques which will lIinsure that presently 
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unquantified environmental amenities and values ••. be given 
appropriate consideration, n presumably in a rational process 
of decision, obviously obscures and ignores a great deal more 
than it illuminates. For example, §l02(2} (B) refers to 
"environmental amenities and values" which must mean that certain 
"values" should be given explicit recognition and some measurable 
degree of social significance in the public decision process. If 
so, then §l02(2} (B) refers to only the final step in a rather 
intricate methodology of anticipatory assessment. §l02(2} (B) 
suggests no distinction between the effects (changes o:t 
consequences) which might flow from the introduction of a 
technological application into a future social environment, 
the widely varying types of effects, the participants and 
social interests which might be affected by each change, and 
the social impact to be attached to each of these changes 
on participants and value-institutional processes. Further, 
the task of giving some measurable or operational significance 
to affected social interests will vary with the characteristics 
of the Decisional Context. 
Put otherwise, §l02(2) (B) is without discrimination as to 
Decisional Context, stating only that techniques be developed so 
that "presently unquantified environmental amenities and values 
may be given appropriate consideration in decision makin/:J." 
(Italics supplied) The same effect, as for example noise from 
transportation systems I will clearly differ with the decisional 
situation. Noise can be measured or quantified in phys:ical 
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terms on a decibel scale and by various facilitating constructs 
such as NEF and CNEL. Furthex measurable dimensions can be 
given to noise effects by such means as determining the number 
of people residing within a given NEF contour. While this is 
a means of measuring the magnitude of the noise effect it is 
not an evaluation of the social significance of the noise or 
conversely, the degree of social interest in noise abatement. 
The social significance will depend upon a number of factors 
such as competing social interests involved in the particular 
decision context. One might plausibly take the position that 
no social value can be "quantified" in terms of operational 
social significance "lithout relating i·1:. to a specific decisional 
situation. 
Presumably, the underlying rationale of §l02(2) (B) is that 
by giving some measurable dimensions to environmental values 
and amenities an ultimate decision on a proposed "major Federal 
action" can be based on an approximate social benefit/cost 
assessment. Some court cases have con~trued the purpose of 
§l02(2) (C) statements as 'support for such decisions although 
the NEPA is basically a "full disclosure law" rather than a 
decision making mechanism. As was stated by the D.C. Circuit 
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC: 
The sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling 
consideration of any and all types of environmental 
impact of federal action. 
However, in the same opinion the court stated that 
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NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment 
on the part of federal agencies. In each individual 
case, the particular economic and technical benefit~ 
of planned action must be assessed and then weighed 
aga.inst the environmental costs; alternatives !\mst 
be considered which would affect the balanc~ of 
values. 
and in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. ~orpsof Engineers, 
the court asserted that it was the intent of the Congress 
through NEPA to require the agencies of the Federal government 
to object!vely evaluate all of their projects, 
regardless of how much money has already been 
spent thereon and regardless of the degree of 
completion of work. (Emphasis added). 
The language of certain court opinions would indicate 
that the Congressional intent with respect to NEPA was to 
assure a total social impact assessment of particular projects. 
However, it is also clear that the courts consider the politi-
cal branches of government to be the final decision makers. 
The opinions also tend to recognize that elements of "judgment" 
must be left with the ultimate political decision makers. 
As noted in the EDF v. Corps of Engineers, the Court stated 
that: 
The methods of calculating cost-benefit ratios 
are innumerable and in many cases esoteric. The 
Court's judgment as to sound procedures in this 
relgard might well not be in accord with the 
judgment of Congress. 
Sel.::retary of HEW Elliot L. Richardson has stated in this 
connection, we do need to "be able to measure the cost of 
each a.lternative (but) our skills in this area are seriously 
underdeveloped." He continues: 
" .. 
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The hard choices, in the end, are bound to depend on 
some combination of values and instincts - and, indeed, 
it is precisely because the content of choice cannot be 
reduced to a mathematical equation that we need the 
political forum to reach the final, most difficult 
decisions. 
To recognize this, however, reinforces the importance 
of being honest and explicit as possible in articulating 
the non-measurable considerations that transcend the 
limits of objective analysis. 
If we accept the Richardson proposition that we need im-
proved social cost/benefit analysis in order better to clarify 
policy options for decision makers but that there are limits 
to the analytical approach, then certain questions arise. For 
example, what conditions, including analytical disabilities, 
impose such limits? Is it the unavoidable uncertainty associ-
ated with the projection of future social environments? Is it 
a lack of ability to identify the effects (consequences or 
changes) which will result from the introduction of,a proposed 
project into a future social environment? Is it a lack of 
ability to measure the probability and magnitude of such effects 
if identified? Is it due to·a lack of ability to determine .the 
interaction of effects (does a given effect reinforce or reduce 
other effects in the decisional context)? Is it a lack of 
conceptual ability to determine when effects must be aggregated 
or isolated and fragmented in order to render them "operationaln 
for purposes of evaluating their social impacts? Is it a lack 
of consensus on social values or on priority social needs which 
precludes accord in the calculation of the social impacts of 
the effects of the proposed action? 
r 
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The foregoing questions suggest deficiencies in future-
oriented conceptual thinking and in analytical skills but are 
hai:-dly satisfactory operational criteria for determining the 
"limits of analysis" with respect to any given problem assess-
ment. It is likely as indicated throughout this paper that. 
the "limits of analysis" will differ with each specific decisional 
context when measured, for example, by the extent to which 
"demonstrable data" can be effectively applie-d to the identifi-
cat ' .. on of effects of proposed projects and to approximation 
of their probability and magnitude or to the establishment 
of the conditions under which and the parameters within which 
realistic discretion can be exercised (or differing social 
value positions registered) in the establishment of normative 
standards. Or the question might be one of determining what 
effort and expense is justified in acquiring additional 
"demonstrable data" for a specific assessment. Will the incre-
mental contribution such data will make to a rational process 
of decision justify its cost? For instance, will it reduce 
elements of uncertainty? When data and analysis can no longer 
contribute to the reduction of uncertainty as to effect 
identification and ~easurement or to the social impact evalua-
tion of such effects or otherwise to the clarification of 
optional choices, then the assessing entity must resort to 
other less objective techniques and procedures, including 
various forms of adversarial system. 
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RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE CONCEPTS 
FOR SOCIAL IMPACT EVALUATION OF EFFECTS 
Why must the assessor be concerned with notions of social 
justice? The sufficient reason is that whether effects of a 
given action (and their distribution) are considered social 
benefits or social costs and to what extent will depend upon, 
in varying degree, the social value perspective (notion(s) 
of social justice) of the participant evaluating the action 
outcome. By expressing, simplistically, the social impact of 
an identified effect as the product of the probability of the 
occurrence of the effect (resulting change, consequence), the 
magnitude of the effect (by relevant dimensions of measure-
ment) , and the degree of social desirability (or undesirability) 
of the effect, then it is evident that techniques for giving 
some measurable dimension to social desirability must be 
aFplied in the process of anticipatory project assessment. 
Alternative concepts of social justice reflect different 
preferences as to social value weight and distribution. Hence, 
the degree of social desirability attached to the social value 
(or values) associated with a given effect will differ with 
the social justice concepts invoked by affected participants. 
It is recognized that the social value orientations of most 
participants may be only partially explicit and by no means 
constitute a comprehensive rationale of political system. 
Other aspects of the relationship of social justice concepts 
to anticipatory project assessment should be recognized in 
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addition to the fact that participants will make divergent 
evaluations of the effects of actions and projects reflecting 
their differing social value perspectives. In our pluralistic 
society there are numerous generally accepted notions of 
social justice including those prescribed in the Constitutional 
structure and otherwise formally sanctioned. The relevance 
or applicability of such concepts will vary somewhat with the 
institutional arena (courts, legislature, regulatory agency, 
executive, etc.) and the precise decisional context (including 
the arena, the issue or proposed action, the participants, 
the social values involved, and the alternatives open to the 
decisional entity). Further, what constitutes compliance 
with a specified social justice concept (which may have general 
relevance in various decisional arenas) will also vary with the 
precise context. 
In a public decision process with a strong adversarial 
component various participants will advance different concepts 
or standards of social justice, often expressed narrowly and 
explicitly in terms of specific social interests which support 
a.preferred decisional outcome. Further, anticipatory project 
assessments made by the diverse participants in the public 
decision process with respect to a given project may range from 
the most exclusive (and narrowly focused, often for purely 
partisan purposes) to the most inclusive (undertaken from an 
impartial perspective and designed to include consideration of 
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all affected participants and value-institutional processes). 
The essential point is that inclusive total social impact 
assessments of given projects inevitably require explicit-
ness in selecting and identifying the social justice concept 
or standard (or combination thereof) by which the social 
costs and benefits of the assessment outcome are to be me~sured -
if the assessment is to include social impact evaluation in 
addition to mere effect identification. It would not seem 
inaccurate to state that this aspect of assessment methodology 
has received scant systematic attention to date. 
This is not presumed to be a simple task as the frustrations 
of the National Academy of Enginearing's Committee on Tele-
communications amply illustrate in the Committee's effort to 
define the public interest with respect to electromagnetic-
spectrum management. The Report states in part: 
The ideal system, as defined for this search, would be 
a systematic procedure that could be applied to deter-
mine and assess the social and economic values associ-
ated with the spectrum management decisions. The 
answers obtained by such a system should be independent 
of those carrying out the procedures. The decisions 
indicated should be in the public interest and should 
contribute to the g,eneral welfare. Our search found 
no such system. It was concluded that some type of 
formula employing numerical values represented the 
only hope, but the st.udy led to the conclusion that such 
an ideal system does not exist nor can it be formulated. 
The most basic reason for the failure of a formula 
approach is mathematicaL A function cannot be simul-
taneously maximized for several dependent variables. 
The greatest good for the greatest number of people, 
or the greatest value for the least cost, simply does 
not exist. 
This statement of exasperation is understandable under the 
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circumstances but does little to further the development of 
an adequate policy evaluative function. The committee did 
consider that its work was "to a degree. a subcategory 
of technology assessment" and found its experience "well 
expressed" by the following paragraph of the National Academy 
of Sciences Report on Technology: Processes of Assessment 
and Choice: 
As in any problem calling for evaluation of a proposed 
resource allocation or distribution, the assessment of 
a contemplated technological development raises vexing 
issues of welfare economics, political theory, and 
ethics. Economists, philosophers, and lawyers have 
debated these matters among themselves and with one 
another for generations. Surely it would be unrealistic 
to suppose that this report could somehow resolve them. 
Nevertheless, this analytical challenge cannot be escapeL. It 
is crucial to the Anticipatory Project Assessment Function. 
The Purpose of anticipatory assessment is to clarify policy 
and project options in terms of their social implications in 
order that intelligent choices can be made by responsible 
political decision makers. 
Yet, it is apparent that while such fundamental concepts 
of social justice as promotion of the "general welfare" .or 
"equal protection of the laws" or "fairness" or provision for 
"maximization of individual autonomy consistent \vith similar 
exercise by all" may be prescribed as the guiding social pur-
pose of particular actions or projects, such standards are not 
usually operationally adequate means of measuring and evaluating 
the actual outcomes of such projects. The translation of the 
r 
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more general social justice concepts into explicit social 
value or social interest schemes will often facilitate the 
assessment task. Social interest schemes can be useful in 
suggesting possible consequences of a given action and hence, 
can contribute to effects identification. Such schemes can 
also be designed so as to reflect the social value emphasis of 
alternative concepts of social justice and thereby provide a 
means of evaluating the social impacts of the consequences of 
an action. 
Nevertheless, should there be any lingering doubts con-
cerning the relevance of social justice concepts to the task 
of total social impact assessment, reference can be made to 
selected existing problem areas and emerging policy decisions 
having clear social justice implications. Any situation in-
volving the allocation of scarce resources raises social 
justice questions as, for example, selection of criteria for 
regulating access to the currently inadequate supply of arti-
ficial kidney (dialysis) machines, and, more generally, the 
selection of criteria for allocating "scarce medical care." 
Apportionment of costs for a given public need raises similar 
questions. A great variety of situations involving the 
"safety" factor, frequently placed in a II r isk/benefit" frame-
work/, directly involve questions of what participants should 
be protected to what extent and at what cost to whom? The 
social justice implications of safety measures have been 
explicitly treated by the National Transportation Safety 
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Board. The numerous inquiries now being rai3ed with respect 
to medical ethics and the patient in extremis, as well as 
inquiries into the implications of genetic engineering, 
require evaluations which are either explicitly or implicitly 
based upon some notions (if not systematic schemes) of 
social justice, and consequently, of what are social bene-
fits, what are social costs, and how they should be distri-
buted. Both the relevance and complexities of social jus-
tice considerations are vividly projected by the current 
efforts to find rational modes of establishing the "value 
of human life" for application in public policy planning 
decisions. 
Every proposed action or project clearly has social 
justice implications, since by whatever concept of social 
justice applied, there will be benefits, there will be costs, 
ru1d such benefits and costs will be distributed among various 
groups in society. Those who bear the costs of a· given 
action are frequently not the direct or primary beneficiaries. 
It is also of the utmost importance to note that alternative 
means of achieving a specified objective may have quite differ-
ent consequences for affected participants or even involve 
radically different groups of participants. The total social 
impact would thus vary with the means used to reach the 
specified objective. This being so, notions of social justice 
may strongly influence the alternative means selected. 
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Perhaps in most situations of anticipatory project assess-
ment some guidance will be given the assessment entity as to 
the social justice concept (project objectives or criteria) to 
be applied to social impact evaluation. For example, statutory 
authority of Federal agencies will provide Statements of Policy 
as to what is sought to be achieved by projects performed 
pursuant to such authority. Frequently these policy directives 
are broad, ambiguous, and may encompass conflicting - if not 
downright contradictory - policy objectives. However, regu-
lations of agencies and the decisions in the various arenas 
of legal process may provide a fairly satisfactory scheme of 
social objectives which can be employed by the assessing entity 
as social impact evaluative criteria. More specifically, 
Agency guidelines for the submission of Environmental Impact 
Statements pursuant to NEPA 1969 §l02(2) (C) and Agency Requests 
for Proposals are sources of evaluative criteria. 
Occasionally, inclusiv~, impartial assessment entities may 
be requested - or undertake on their own initiative - to 
make an anticipatory assessment of a proposed or potential 
project without guidance or limitations on criteria to be 
employed for social impact evaluation. It is then up to the 
assessing entity to develop or select and posit criteria. 
Such criteria would most likely reflect the "controlling" 
norms of the Constitutional framework, cultural traditions, 
and social practices, though the assessing entity may not 
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feel obliged to adhere strictly to these constraints. Hhat 
is required is that the social justice concept employed be 
made explicit. 
The notion of social justice has been introduced to 
demonstrate the relevance of social value perspective to the 
analytical operations of anticipatory project assessment, 
that is, that the evaluation of effects for social signifi-
cance depends upon the social justice concept adopted for the 
assessment. While the public decision process in operation 
is frequently little more than a contest between contending 
parties asserting narrow, strictly partisan interests, it is 
certainly obligatory upon our authoritative decisional entities 
(courts, legislatures, regulatory agencies, administrators, etc.) 
to apply recognized and acceptable notions of social justice. 
In any event, this analysis, unless otherwise noted, will pro-
ceed from the perspective of such authoritative entities, 
presumably undertaking to arrive at acceptable public interest 
outcomes. Further, the assessment function will be viewed 
from the perspective of an inclusive-oriented entity, com-
mitted to providing the authoritative decisional entities 
with outcomes which will assist such entities to arrive at 
determinations consistent with specified social justice 
concepts. Hence, assessment entities, from this perspec-
tive, are obligated to produce outcomes in accord with ex-
plicit concepts of social justice (whether posited by the 
entity or otherwise prescribed). Through this approach, 
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assessment outcomes have meaning for all affected partici-
pants. The outcome would not be represented as the pre-
ferred course of action by the assessing entity. Its function 
in the public decision process is to establish an analytical 
standard by which other alternatives can be evaluated by 
affected participants in the relevant decisional context. 
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I I • DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
F. Generating Social Impact 
Scenarios: A Key Step in 
Making Technology Assessment 
Studies 
Martin V. JONES 
April 1972 , pp. 1-18 
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INTRODUCTION 
The assessment study is a form of planning research that seeks 
to anticipate the secondary social impacts that might arise from: 
(1) The application from some new technology. 
(2) Government or private programs to cope with a major social 
problem like poverty, environmental pollutj,on, or public 
safety. 
(3) A concerted national effort to achieve a ~\1idely supported 
specifi~ goal like landing a man on the moon or finding a 
cure for cancer. ~~ 
From the point of view of methodology, I see nothing to gain from 
distinguishing among the three types of studies identified above. The 
process of tracing secondary reactions is pretty much the same whether 
the initiating force is the application of a new technology (e.g., 
two-way Cable TV, genetics engineering, or a revolution in food pro-
duction methods) or an innovative social program (a major change in 
taxation, a national health insurance program, or a "landmark" 
Supreme Court decision relative to civil rights). 
A key task in any assessment study is the generation of social 
impact scenarios that seek to trace in some structured fashion the 
interactions among various social forces. However, before an analyst 
is ready to generate such scenarios, he must first address three pre-
paratory tasks that are common to all assessment studies, and, in 
fact, to most paper-and-pencil public policy research. These pre-
paratory tasks are: 
* A recent MITRE paper speculates about both the potentialities and 
complexities that might be associated with an intensive effor.t to 
dramatically increase longevity in the United States. See: Social 
Priorities - The Dilemma of Quality Versus Quantity (Martin V. Jones 
- MITRE MTP-364), December 1971. 
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(1) IDENTIFY RELEVANT QUESTIONS. The analyst's first task is 
to identify and make explicit a whole host of heterogeneous 
essentially unstructured questi.ons that must be answered 
relative to the natUL'e 'of the technology or problem being 
assessed, and to exogenou~ forces that are related to the 
technology or problem. 
(2) SYSTEMATICALLY STRUCTURE QUESTIONS. The second task is to 
arrange those questions systematically so that they can be 
a basis for hypothesizing cause-effect, problem-solution, 
action-consequence relationships. 
(3) COLLECT DATA. The analyst's ability to draw inferences, 
however, depends upon his ability to develop answers to 
the specific questions that he has identified and structured 
in the first and second steps. This means that he must 
collect data that will guide his intuitive judgements in 
deriving these answers. 
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the notion of 
assessment studies is not new. For years, disciplinary research has 
produced assessment studies. Economists have made assessments of the 
impacts of new legislation (e.g., tax measures) on the national income 
level, market researchers have assessed the impacts of new products 
on a company's sales, sociologists have assessed the impact of a 
proposed Change in the parole system on the crime rate, educators 
have assessed the impacts of a major curriculum innovation on student 
achievement, etc. 
Similarly, interdisciplinary analyses in recent years have 
"assessed" the comparative merits and shortcomings of alternative 
courses of action for solving or alleviating specific problems. In 
the category of this interdisciplinary research there has been opera-
tions research, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
systems analysis, management science, computer simulation, the Program 
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Evaluation and Review Technique, the Program-Planning-Budgetj.ng 
system, and the so-called "Policy Sciences." 
However, a major characteristic of most of this disciplinary 
and interdisciplinary research is that it has sought answers to a 
relatively narrow list of questions. Economists have usually con-
fined their efforts to appraising the impact of a particular measure 
on the nation's economic well being, market researchers have primarily 
been concerned with the effect that a new product would have on a parti-
cular company's or industry's sales or profit position, By the same 
token, most interdisciplinary studies have compressed the entire 
decision-making criterion into some simple cost-performance, ratio, 
i.e., the dollar cost per patient serviced in a medical treatment 
center. 
One way of describing the contribution of the technology assess-
ll',ent movement is to refer back to the first of the three analytical 
t~sks listed at the beginning of this paper. Those who have pioneered 
the technology assessment movement have insisted that the analyst 
must vastly increase the scope and the number of questions to which 
he seeks to develop answers. This point has been succinctly stated 
by Professor Mayo: 
* 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the concept of tech-
nology assessment is that it is, and is meant to be, 
consistent with the notion of Total Impact Assessments, 
L e., the identification of all social impacts of a parti-
cular application rather than selected impacts. * 
Louis H. Mayo, Scientific Method, Adversarial System, and Tech-
nology Assessment, November 1970, Program of Policy Studies in 
Science and Technology, George Washington University Monograph 
No.5, p. 3. 
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THE MITRE-OST PROJECT 
I believe that our recent MITRE methodological studies for OST 
made a first step toward addressing in a generic context the first 
two tasks listed above. First, we tried to suggest, as comprehen-
sively and as explicitly as time would allow, how the concept "total 
impact analysis" might be defined. In defining "relevant considera-
tions" we consolidated lists of highly diverse societal characteristics 
in a somewhat different way than, to our knowledge, has therefore been 
done in either disciplinary or interdisciplinary studies. In so doing 
we drew extensively from the published research of others in many 
fields for the component items of our lists. These lists of societal 
characteristics - covering such matters as values and goals, demo-
graphy, environment, economic factors, social elements, and insti-
tutional parameters - provided a beginning master list of areas of 
interest about which the analyst should raise questions when he begins 
the process of making a total impact aSlh:,ssment study. 
In the MITRE-OST study we also tried to contribute in a generic 
way to the second task identified at the beginning of the paper. We 
provided a seven-step procedure which, we believe, can help an 
analyst to integrate the diverse checklists of questions so that he 
can begin to trace in a comprehensive fashion the initial and secondary 
impacts of any major technological application or of society's attempts 
to respond to or redirect that application. Exhibit 1 provides an 
analytical overview of the seven-step procedure and some of the 
supporting checklists., 
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ILLUSTRATIVE SOCIAL-IMPACT SCENARIOS 
During the last year our thinking at MITRE has moved toward 
~ncreasingly explicit social impact scenarios. Most of the scenarios 
in the study for OST were essentially simple and qualitative. For 
instance, Exhibit 2 lists in a relatively straightforward manner a 
pa.rtial series of historical events following the introduction of 
man-made fabrics. Exhibit 3 uses a flow-diagram technique to depict 
some multidimensional impacts that might follow an accelerated auto-
mation in industry. Exhibit 4 in a similar way depicts some conse-
quences that might ensue if mariculture (sea-farming) were successfully 
applied to reduce malnutrition in developing countries. 
In Exhibit 5 we speculate about one set of consequences that 
might follow the introduction of two-way Cable TV in major cities. 
This exhibit elaborates the scenario process by documenting the 
rationale that led us to hypot''hesize the series of events shown. 
that: 
In Exhibit 6 we carry the methodology substantially further in 
(1) we attach four important qualifying and elaborating bits of 
information to each successive event: 
(a) how probable is it that the interaction will, in fact, 
occur? 
(b) in what direction will the interaction occur, i.e., 
will the happening of the earlier event cause the 
later event to increase or decrease? 
(c) what will likely be the magnitude of the interaction 
if it occurs? 
(d) what will be the timing of the interaction? How long 
after the earlier event will the later event occur? 
(2) we show multiple consequences flowing from one prior event 
rather than a single consequence. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
SELECTED IMPACTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF 
MAN-MADE FABRICS ON CITIES 
less use of cotton in clothing manufacture 
decline in sales of U. S. grown cotton 
reduced employment opportunities for unskilled 
blacks in southern cotton fields 
stimulated migration of southern blacks to 
northern cities 
great expansion of welfare costs in northern 
cities 
financial crises in northern cities involving 
huge increases in city obligations without com-
mensurate increases in the tax base and revenues 
steady exodus of northern urban whites to 
suburbs 
increasing political influence of non-
whites in northern cities 
election of black officials in northern cities 
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EXHIBIT 3 
SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES 
OF A RAPID INCREASE IN INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION 
3 
INSTITUTIONAL 
Legislation Pro-
vidi~g Re-Training 
Education, 
Shortened Work 
Week, Lowered Re-
tirement Age, New 
J·o¥, Etc. 
4 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
Sh$ft of Segments 
of Population to 
New Locations 
5 
SOCIAL 
1 and 8 
TECHNOLOGY 
Increased Automa-
tion in Commerce 
and Industry 
7 
VALUES 
Education As 
Leisure-Time 
Pursuit Promoted 
6 
ENVIRONMENT 
Increased Use of 
Land for Recre-
ational Purposes 
2 
ECONOMIC 
Increased Leisure 
Time 
Decreased Employ-
ment Among Factory 
Workers 
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EXHIBIT 4 
IMPACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE REDUCTION OF MALNUTRITION FOLLOWING MARICULTURE 
APPLICATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
I 
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ECONOMIC 
The economic prosperity of the inner-city 
will be enhanced because fewer of the I, ~ 
articulate, relatively affluent families will ~ 
be leaving. This may halt, and even reverse, 
the steady erosion of the tax base that most 
major cities have suffered in the last several 
decades. 
I 
TECHNOLOGY 
Interactive TV is applied increasingly 
to make available to inner-city children 
a quality of education equaling that pro-
vided by suburban school systems. 
~ 
DENOGRAPHY 
Historically, the urge to obtain better 
education for their children has been' 
one of the leading incentives in causing 
many of the more ambitious inner-city 
families (both white and black) to move 
to the suburbs. By providing better 
education to inner-city children, inter-
active TV may slow down or halt the 
population exodus to the suburbs. 
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VALUES 
The U. S. has frequently been labeled the 
"throw-away" society and often citizens 
7 
have seemed to prize n~wness for newness sake 
in their housing, automobiles, and other 
material possessions. This tendency may be 
substantially reduced if thousands of ambi-
tious inner-city families decide to renovate 
and refurnish their existing older homes, 
community facilities, etc. 
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If the more ambitious, articulate families 
decide to stay in the city, they will 
take steps to insure that the urban en-
vironment be cleaned up relative to air 
purity, noise, aesthetic nuisances, etc. 
These same families, if they decide to 
stay in the city, will also insist that 
more aggressive steps be taken to rid 
the inner-city of major social problems 
such as d~ug addiction, crime, etc. 
EXHIBIT 5 ~ 
\ 
/ ONE SET OF CONSEQUENCES OF INTRODUCING TWO-WAY CABLE TV IN LARGE CITIES 
INSTITUTIONS 
Najor overhauls in the structure of 
local government may be brought about 
if aggressive efforts are made to clean 
up both the prysical and social environ-
ments of the inner-City while at the 
same time making the total urban poli-
tical process more responsive to an arti-
culate citizenery. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
, 
SOME REPERCUSSIONS THAT MIGHT FOLLOW 
FROM RAISING THE MANDATORY CIVIL 
SERVICE RETIREMENT AGE 
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POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL REFINEMENTS 
There is, as I see it, a distinct advantage to the increasingly 
explicit scenarios as one moves from Exhibit 2 through 6. A scenario, 
like Exhibit 6, is much more informative as to exactly what conditions 
an analyst is, in fact, projecting. Traditionally, a shortcoming of 
many scenarios and projections is their non-explicitness. Because it 
is both explicit and discrete, a scenario, like Exhibit 6, makes it 
possible for other analysts to concur with, or take exception to, 
specific entries in the scenario without having to accept or reject 
the scenario totally. 
Although Exhibit 6 is much more informative than Exhibit 2 or 3, 
Exhibit 6 is also simplified as to the scope of information that 
should ideally be shown in this type scenario. For instance: 
(1) Other factors that would either reinforce or dampen the 
specified sequential relationships should be included in 
the scenario. For instance, in Exhibit 6 disbursements 
from the Civil Service Retirement Fund are likely to be 
influenced by many other factors besides changes in the 
mandatory retirement age - e.g., changes in the number of 
persons reaching 65 years of age, changes in the price 
level, etc .• 
(2) Exhibit 6 shows only 11 interactions. A scenario that 
truly aimed to model the real world might require 50, 100, 
or more interactions. For instance, if the movement of 
the aged to Florida and the Far West were slowed, this 
would lead tc (+) impacts on the economic prosperity and 
the political power of northern states vs. Florida and 
the Far West. Similarly, lower-level impacts might be 
anticipated - the demand for winter clothing would be 
increased an~ that for golf and fishing equipment reduced. 
-
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(3) Exhibit 6 shows only one-way interactions. An indepth 
scenario would aim to include dual or two-way interactions, 
e.g., not only do economic events influence demography, 
but demographic events cause economic impacts. 
(4) Obviously, in any given case, what is required is not a 
single scenario, but a whole series of them. Th~ qualify-
ing coefficients to the events specified in Exhibit 6 are 
all single-valued. However, each of the matters covered 
is characterized by uncertainty. An alternative scenario 
is needed to trace the chain of consequences if a given 
probability of occurrence were to change from, say, 0.9 to 
0.5, or, if, the magnitude of change were to be weak 
instead of strong, or the timing 25-36 months instead of 
1-12 months. 
(5) The qualifying descriptive bits of information attached to 
each sequential event should be expanded beyond the four 
shown in Exhibit 6 - probability of occurrence, direction, 
magnitude, and timing of impacts. Other information that 
might be shown includes: the duration of the impact, the 
diffusion of it across society totally or among IT.embers of 
a specified target group,* and the estimated extent to 
which the impact may be amenable to social control. 
• 
Research in developing more explicit, sophisticated scenarios 
should be accompanied by parametric empirical research that would 
* For instance, the "aged" are not a monolithic group. Some are rich, 
others are poor; some are well, others are sick; some desire to work, 
others do not; some are highly trained, others are unskilled; some 
are married, others are not; some live in cities, others on farms, 
etc. The specific impact that a new technology or social program 
would have would vary greatly according to the socio-economic con-
dition of the aged person involved. 
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help an analyst estimate the probability, direction, magnitude, 
timing, etc. of the various entries in the ~f:f;,',1arios. For instance, 
a major initial concern is whether the period of application of a 
new technology will be quick and short or slow and protracted. 
Exhibit 7 lists some of the factors that can influence the length 
of this application period. Similar parametric lists should be 
developed that would help an analyst to estimate the probability, 
direction, magnitude, and timing of the secondary consequences that 
follow from the initial application of the innovation. 
............. 
Going beyond the qualitative parametric relationships just cited, 
the next step is to quantify the relationships, wherever possible. 
The MITRE reports for OST cited, illustratively, a wide variety of 
such quantitative relationships that have been developed in many 
fields -- economics, demography, environment, publi.~ safety, health, 
etc. (See: Volume 1, pp. 87-92). As one specific example, Exhibit 8 
extracts a small portion of a computer analysis that was conducted for 
the MITRE mariculture pilot assessment study. This analysis projects 
quantitatively the potential impacts on 26 different socio-economic-
environmental conditions of mariculture applications in 67 developing 
countries. 
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DRIGlNAt PAGE IS 
'OF POOR QUALITY 
FACTORS 
People vs. Things 
EXHIBIT 7 
FACTORS THAT WILL INFLUENCE HOW LONG IT WILL 
TAKE TO APPLY A NEW TECHNOLOGY 
EXPLANATION 
r--------
t 
If a new technology initially impacts on the material 
world, such as the transistor did, there will probably 
be less delay in its widespread adoption than if it 
impacts in a major way on people physiologically. 
There almost surely will be a delay if the product is 
one that people would ingest, as a new powerful drug, 
that might have serious adverse side effects. 
Nature of Decision Making Centralized decision making, such as in the milit
ary or 
space programs, is conducive to more rapid application 
than diffused decision making. involving many checks 
National Commitment 
Reward for Innovator 
Capital Required 
Competition 
Instit.utional Climate 
and balances, as is currently the situation in certain 
new health technologies. 
If the new technology would satisfy a "crying need" (a 
cure for cancer) or a national goal (to land a man on 
the moon), there will normally be a tendency to assume 
risks or surmount obstacles that would otherwise block 
or delay an application. 
Since most innovations in our private enterprise 
economy are made by entrepreneurs, ho\oo' the rate of 
application affects entrepreneurial profits is import-
ant. Sometimes, for various reasons, it has been in 
the interest of the innovator (e.g., Corfam, substi-
tute for leather) to prolong the application period. 
In other cases, where imitation has been easy and pro-
duct differentiation difficult (as in the fashion 
field), there has been a tendency to exploit the m.arket 
quickly. 
All other things being equal, the larger the capital 
investment required, the more restricted the number of 
organizations that can participate in the application, 
and hence, the slower the rate of application. The 
increasing capital investment required for the develop-
ment of birth control devices is one of the reasons 
that the period of application of new technology in 
this field may lengthen. 
Closely linked to several prior considerations is the 
extent of competition in both research and production. 
In many industries, smaller companies whose fortunes 
in the industry are rising set the pace for rapid 
application of new technology. In other industries 
where the industry structure is stabili~eq or mori-
bund, innovation is slow. 
Again, similar to several of the above, the extent to 
wh:i.ch vested lnterests c.an conspire to stymie innova-
tion will greatly influence the rate at which innova-
tion is applied. The building industry is, of c.ourse, 
the classic case where contractors, labor unions, and 
local building codes have for all practical purposes 
throttled major innovations. 
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EXHIBIT 8 
SOME ANTICIPATED IMPACTS RESULTING FROM MARl CULTURE APPLICATION IN 67 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* 
IMP ACT AREAS UNITS OF MEASURE 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Mariculture Acreage Millions 16 31 38 42 
Mariculture Production (Total) Millions of Tons 2.0 9.5 17.0 19.0 
Mariculture Production (Exported) Millions of Tons 2.0 9.0 14.0 14.0 
Value: Mariculture Export Billions of Dollars 9.3 42.0 65.3 65.3 
Jobs Created by Mariculture Millions 3.84 7.44 9.12 10.08 
Income from Mariculture (%) % of Nat. Income 0.6 1.9 2.2 1.9 
Annual Protein from Mariculture % of Total Consumed 0 2.0 9.0 13.0 
Malnutrition Abated Millions of Cases 0 75 449 748 
Infant Deaths Prevented Millions of Cases 0 37 224 374 
Training Required }lillions of Hours 96 186 228 252 
Water Pollution Index Index Number** 25.5 31.0 37.6 44.2 
* This is an abridged version of one of twelve different scenarios that were generated in the MITRE 
Mariculture Pilot Study. Each scenario reported on 26 different impact areas as compared to the 
1.2 impact areas shown above. The different scenarios reflected the effects of varying the mari-
culture acreage and the production yield per acre. 
** LotV' number is good; high number is bad. 
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DATA COLLECTION 
In the first and second tasks leading up to the social-impact 
scenarios that we have discussed thus far, we illustrated some of 
the social characteristics that should be related in an assessment 
study. We also identified, again illustratively, some of the para-
meters - like probability of occurrence, direction of change, 
magnitude of change, and timing of occurrence - that should be traced 
for each of the interrelated factors. The third task is to collect 
data that will make it possible to assign the coefficients to these 
parameters in any given case. Should the probability of occurrence 
of one event following another be designated 0.1, 0.5, or 0.9? 
Should the timing be placed in the 0-12 months range, 13-24 months, 
or over three years? 
The MITRE study for OST, primarily because of time limitations, 
did not explore this issue of data collection to the same extent as 
it did the first two tasks, identifying the questions to be addressed 
and structuring these questions systematically for analytical purposes. 
Actually the task of collecting data for a technological assessment 
study is not essentially different than that of any other future-
oriented, pUblic-policy-issue, paper-and-pencil study. Probably the 
major difference, as noted previously, is that in an assessment study 
information would have to be collected on a much wider variety of 
matters -- values, demography, economics, environment, social issues, 
and institutional considerations -- than in a typical disciplinary 
or even interdisciplinary cost/benefit study. For some of these 
matters - like values and institutional considerations - it is also 
more difficult to collect "hard data" than it is in the typical 
economic research or market analysis survey. 
However, rarely, for any of these matters is the choice one of 
data vs. no data at all. It is rather one of data of various shades 
of relevance and validity. It may also be a question of documented 
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data vs. undocumented (llexpert opinion,1I lI authorative source
ll ) data. 
Other things being equal, documented data are preferred to undocu-
mented data because it is normally easier to doublecheck and verify 
documented data. However, often other things are not equal. For 
instance, in dealing with new somewhat unique projects, undocumented 
expert opinion data may sometimes be just as good or better than 
documented data because the so-called undocumented data are more 
current and relevant. For instance, a carefully developed "guessti-
mate" from a well-known gerontologist might provide a sounder 
estimating base relative to the effect on senior citizen productivity 
and morale of raising the compulsory retirement age in the United 
States than would a written report prepared at an earlier date in a 
different country with a somewhat different cultural heritage. In 
recent years new methods have been developed for systematically 
reaching a consensus of expert opinion on a given subject, including 
future forecasts. The best known of these methods is the Delphi 
Technique. 
In searching for data, the assessment analyst should make use 
of all of the analytical techniques that economic, technological, and 
other forecasters have been using for year-so There is no point to 
discuss these techniques in detail here. The MITRE study for OST 
(Volume 1, Chapter XII) has a brief chapter on forecasting, and, of 
course, the literature abounds with long books on the subject. As a 
source of possible interest relative to my own views on forecasting 
methods, I have reproduced in Exhibit 9 a one-page recap of fore-
casting methods that appeared in the referenced chapter. 
In the realm of documented data, the conventional planning factor 
which expresses the quantitative historical relationahip between one 
type of event and another is certainly a useful forecasting tool for 
the assessment analyst in tracing both the timing and magnitude of 
societal interactions. Economists, of course, have a large inventory 
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EXHIBIT 9 
A RECAP OF FORECASTING METHODS 
(Hypothetical Question: What Percentage 
of U.S. Physicians Will Use Computer 
Diagnostic Services by 1985?) 
DEFINITION 
INrunION 
A forecaat baaed on the 
aubjectiva judpent of the 
forecailtar, 
TREND EXTRAPOLATION 
A forecaat based on the 
.aaumption of the continua-
t10n into the future of some 
discerned past trend. 
TREND ~ORRELATION 
A forecast of the future 
atatus of some phenomenon in 
terma of a consiatentrela-
tionahip of tha t phenomenon 
to Bome other phenomenon in 
the past whoae future status 
has already been projected. 
MODELS (STATISTICAL) 
This method 1s a much elab-
orated version of the his-
torical trend correlation 
technique described above. 
It often involves the use of 
dozens, and sometimes of 
hundreds, of estimating 
equations--all integrated 
into a unified forecasting 
method. 
~ 
Thia method predicts the 
future by drawing a plaus-
ible parallel between the 
future and some presumably 
similar prior event. 
ORIGINAl; PAGH'IS 
OF POOR QUALInl 
-
~ORECASTING METHODS 
EXAMPLE 
Expert8 at an extemporaneous workshop seaaion of a 
joint physician, computer-industry symposium predict 
that by 1985 approximately 65% of U. S. physicians 
will employ computer diagnoatic aervices. They cite 
aa evidence the increasing experinlenta tion with the 
use of automated techniques in the medical 
profession~ 
Statistics show tha t over the past 15 Yf.lars the per-
centage of physicians using computer diagnostic 
services increased from 4 to 27%. Continuing that 
trend for the next 15 years indicates that by 1985 
approximately 65% of physicians will employ computer 
diagnostic services. 
Kis~orical data covering the last 10 years show that 
the percentage of physicians with access to computer 
diagnostic consultation is well correlated with 
three other factors; the increaoe in private group 
medical practice, the percentage of the population 
covered by medical insurance, and the percentage of 
doctors graduated from medical schools offering in-
acruction in medical applications of computers. 
Projections on these three factors sre available 
through 1985. Using these projections as a basis, a 
statistical correlation analysis indicates that by 
1985 65% of physicians will have access to computer 
diagnostic consultation. 
An in depth study of physiCians who have already 
adopted computer diagnostic consultation services 
shows that such usage is related in a complex way to 
some 10 different variables such as physician work 
load, degree of medical speCialization, the access 
to and use of other consultative seryiceo, the cost 
of the computer service, etc. Well documented 
studies make it possible to predict the gruwth 
factor through 1985 for these 10 governing variables. 
Using this later study and the cited historical re-
lationship, it is possible to predict that 65% of 
physicians will employ computer diagnostic consul-
tation in 1985. 
In terms of many management and scientific services 
the medical research field has been about 25 yeara 
ahead of the practicing physician, In 1960 approxi-
mately 65% of the nation's medical research f8ci1i-
ties were using computers for data analys1s and 
synthesis tasks similar to those involved in physi-
cian computer diagnostic consultation. On this 
basis it is predicted that by 1985 approximately 
65% of physicians will employ computer diaill08tic 
consultation services. 
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of such relationships that are expressed in IImultiplierll and 
"acceleration" principles. Usually these factors express the quanti-
tative relationships between investment, production, employment, 
income, spending, etc. There are also temporal relationships involv-
ing market and social behavior. For instance, changes in wholesale 
prices usually precede changes in retail prices by several months. 
Demographers, environmentalists, sociologists, medical technicians, 
traffic engineers, and other specialists have similar inventories of 
rule-of-thumb planning relationships. 
The appropriate caveats applying to such relationships are well 
known. All such relationships are developed from historical (hopefully 
analogous) experience. Since we can say for sure that the future will 
seldom be a carbon copy of the past, at best, such historical relation-
ships can be taken only as approximate guides to future relationships. 
Also, in most cases these quantitative relationships only describe 
the past in highly gross terms. In spite of the arithmetic precision 
with which these relationships are often expressed, they usually are 
simple averages that conceal much variation, and sometimes experts 
even disagree as to what the average historical relationships are. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the assessment analyst must use these 
planning factors. If he discards them completely, he is left with 
nothing but unadulterated intuition and heresay, and normally he 
has no sound basis for selecting one unsupported intuitive judgement 
over another. 
In the months ahead, we at MITRE hope to explore further the 
possibilities of new methods of data generation for making assessment 
studies. 
20 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I , 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
G. Proposal to the National 
Science Foundation for a 
Retrospective Technology 
Assessment of Submarine 
Telegraphy 
Vary T. COATES and 
Bernard S. FINN 
November 1974, pp. 1-6; 25-27 
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PROPOSAL 
for 
RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: SUBMARINE TELEGRAPHY 
The Program of Pol'icy Studies (PPS) proposes to conduct a retrospective 
Technology Assessment of Submarine Telegraphy, in response to NSF Program 
Solicitation 74-34. Co-Principal Investigators for the project would be 
Dr. Vary T. Coates, a political scientist and Associate Director and Head of 
the Program's Technology Assessment Group; and Dr. Bernard S. Finn, Curator 
(Electricity) of the Smithsonian's Museum of History ana Technology who is 
conducting a definitive historical study of submarine telegraphy. 
The proposal covers the following topics: 
Sec. I - Introduction 
A. Objectives in Conducting Retrospective Technology Assessments 
B. Criteria for Selecting a Subject Technology 
Sec. II - Rationale for the Study 
A. Submarine Telegraphy as a Subject for Retrospective Assessment 
B. Overview of Proposed Study 
Sec. III Narrative of Development of Submarine Telegraphy 
Sec. IV The Study Plan· 
A. Focus of Proposed Research 
B. Proposed Tasks: Outline and Comr.lents on ~lethodology; 
Logical Sequencing; Time Schedule 
Sec. V - Management Plan and Qualifications of Research Team 
A. Management Plan 
B. Qualification of Research Team 
C. Use of Consul~ants 
Sec. VI. Dissemination and Utilization of Results 
Sec. VII. Proposed Budget (15 mos.) 
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology Assessment is interdisciplinary, problem-oriented research, 
intended to provide a firm scientific/technological information base in 
support of decisionmaking and policy formulation. As a way of analyzing 
complex problems Technology Assessment seeks to combine (a) the quantitative 
methodologies developed in Systems Analysis, Operations Research, and physical 
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sciences and (b) the methods of behavioral analysis developed within the 
social sciences with (c) the analytical tools used in the policy sciences. 
Technology Assessment as a formal, organized activity began in the 
late 1960's. The body of experience in this area is not large, although it 
is now accumulating rapidly, largely as a result of NSF-funded comprehensive 
assessments during the last two to four years. Methodologies have been inno-
vated or adapted from related fields of inquiry to fit the technology or 
problem definition of Assessments as found necessary and appropriate by the 
investigating teams and project sponsors. 
At this stage of development it is appropriate that the state of the 
art of Technology Assessment methodologies should be evaluated and some 
tentative conclusions advanced as to their adequacy, appropriateness, war-
rantability, and effectiveness. This endeavor poses theoretical problems be-
cause Technology Assessment is an anticipatory activity. Most technology-
oriented Assessments have dealt with new and emerging technologies, of which 
the full range of societal impacts has not yet been realized. Testing the 
results and evaluating the findings of recent Technology Assessments there-
fore cannot be done empirically until such period as the predicted conse-
quences do or do not occur as anticipated. 
At that time, some years in the future, another problem will arise: 
an effective Assessment -- that is, one which successfully influenced the 
direction of policy formulation and decisionmaking -- will have provided 
the means for avoiding possible detrimental outcomes which it was able to 
anticipate. Thus it will have changed the future, the Assessment's effective 
anticipation of which is to be evaluated; this is the reverse of the 
classical problem of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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A. Objectives of Retrospective Technology Assessment. 
Retrospective Technology Assessment offers one way to avoid this dilemma. 
Choosing a technological development which began far enough in the past for 
its societ.al impacts to have matured and be widely disseminated, one would 
attempt to identify and measure these impacts and determine the extent to 
which they were predictable during the period of inception of the technology, 
given the state of knowledge and the investigative and analytical tools then 
available. One would also investigate the extent to which analytical tech-
niques available today would have enhanced the potential for anticipating and 
measuring such impacts. 
This statement of objectives obscures a number of pitfalls and fallacies 
which may lie in wait for the unwary investigator and which may be both the-
oretical and practical. There is an assumption that societal impacts which 
later' developed can be regarded as inevitable (aside from their predictability 
or identifiability) -- that is, there is an assumption of a simple cause-
effect r'elationship rather than randomness or the effect of highly involved 
concatenations of converging trends. The concept of retrospective Technology 
Assessment may also conceal an unstated presumption that there are close analo-
gies between the course of past technological developments (and their unplanned 
societal consequences)~ and those likely to occur at present or in the future. 
This is an hypothesis which badly needs empirical investigation, and any con-
tribution to this effort may in fact be the IOOst valuable byproduct .of retro-
spective Assessments. Some Technology Assessment methodology, such as Delphi 
and other consensual techniques, can not be applied retrospectively, although 
some adaptation, such as role praying, might be attempted. 
Technology Assessment has developed under the handicap of a major 
theoretical deficiency, namely, the lilek of an appropriate and useful model 
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of the relationship between technological change and social change. No one 
retrospective assessment is likely to produce a universally acceptable model; 
however, cumulative experience in retrospective assessment may make substantial 
contributions to development of a model. It should be noted in passing that 
much retrospective Technology Assessment is implicit in the literature of the 
history of science and technology, and in a few cases retrospective assessments 
have been attempted on a preliminary and tentative basis; see, for example, an 
early Program of Policy Studies publication, "Early Experiences with the 
Hazards of Medical Use of X-Rays: 1896-1906 -- a Technology Assessment Case 
Study," by Ba rb3 ra S. Marx (1968); and The Ra i 1 road and the Space Program: An 
. Exercise in Historical Analogy, Bruce Mazlich (ed.), MIT Press (19C5). 
Two safeguards against the pitfalls of retrospective Technology Assessment 
are especially important: involvement of trained and experienced historians of 
technology, and careful formulation of the questions to be asked. Tentatively, 
the investigation should ask at a minimum (terms used are deliberately 
anachronistic): 
o What assessments or forecasts of impacts were made at the 
period of the inception of the technology? 
o What formal and informal techniques were used in making 
such forecasts? 
o What unplanned consequences or societal impacts resulted 
from the technology? 
o To what extent were they inevitable given the technology 
and its eventual level of dissemination and use? 
o To what extent were contemporary forecasts (if any) 
correct and inclusive? 
o To what extent did contemporary forecasts (if any) 
prevent or enhance the consequences which were antici-
pated? 
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o To what extent were other' consequences, whi ch were 
not predicted, in fact potentially predictable, 
given the knowledge of the physical universe then 
available? 
o To what extent would they have been predictable given 
the subsequent advances in physical and social sci-
ences and analytical rr~thods? 
o If predictable, could the eventual impacts have been 
altered (either modified, avoided, or enhanced) by 
policy intervention?' 
8. Criteria for Selection of a Subject for Retrospective 
Technology Assessment 
On the basis of this reasoning, PPS has postulated the following minimum 
criteria for selection of a technological development for retrospective assess-
ment: 
(a) The technology selected should be amenable to historical investigation 
and ~escription. 
It should be one which originated in a discrete and definable tech-
nological innovation within the designated time period (roughly, the 
last century). Contemporary records of its inception and the subse-
quent course of its technical development, dissemination, utilization, 
and soci eta 1 impacts mus t exi stand be access i b 1 e to the retrospec-
ti ve assessors. 
(b) The technology should be one which provided a significant new capa-
bility, or an order of magnitude improvement in historical capability. 
(c) The technology should be one which is (in 1974) mature and widely 
utilized. 
(d) The societal consequences should provide a rich and textured field of 
investigation -- that is, it should have produced significant and 
measurable impacts over a range of aspects of society: impacts which 
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can be clearly attributed to the subject technology. 
" 
(e) Thel~e should exist an historical record of "assessment," that is, 
formal or informal predictions from knowledgeable contemporary 
sources as to its potential costs and benefits. 
(f) Preferably the technology should be one which was viewed at its 
inception as provocative or controversial because of its potential 
impacts; and this controversy should have had policy implication. 
SECTION II: RATIONALE FOR A RETROSPECTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF SUBMARINE TELEGRAPHY 
Since the discovery of Columbus nothing has been 
done in any degree comparable to the vast enlarge-
ment which has thus been given to the sphere of 
human activity. 
-- The (London) Times, 6 August 1858 
A. Submarine Telegraphy as Subject of Retrospective Technology Assessment 
Until 1865 the swiftest communication possible between North America 
and Europe was about two weeks (Fi g. 1, p: 6a). Wi th the 1 ayi n9 of the 
first successful transAtlantic cable, this was reduced to a matter of minutes. 
This achievement, barely twenty years after the first electronic 'Iong-distance 
communication, demonstrates that submarine telegraphy provided a significant 
new capability to human activity (though perhaps not,as the Times enthusias-
tically proclaimed, the most vast since the discovery of the New World). Though 
seriously challenged in the 1920's by radio, and more recently by satellite 
communication, submarine telegraphy -- having undergone a major transformation 
of its technology with the laying of the first repeater cable in 1956 -- i'5 
tod~v a highly utilized, mature, but still developing technology. 
*The Lightning set the record -- 13 days, 19 1/2 hours, from Boston to 
Liverpool on her maiden voyage in 1854. 
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appear in the following decade had even greater band-width capabilities. 
The result has been that less than two decades after the laying of the 
first transAtlantic cable with repeaters the old long distance telegraph 
cables have been abandoned. the specialized equipment dispersed and the tech-
niques discarded. 
(e) Potential Contributions of the Study 
Subjectivity must enter as taxonomies of impact dimensions and factors 
are defined and associated to infer impacts; we cannot relive yesterday nor 
recreate nineteenth century man. This is a fundamental limitation to all 
retrospective Technology Assessments. However, all assessment procedures use 
generalized past experience and scientific knowledge in order to sketch the 
anticipated pattern of likely future developments. Therefore, retrospective 
Technology Assessments should sharpen our understanding of past events, the de-
gree of novelty of the present, and the degree of uncer':ai nty inherent in con-
temporary assessments. 
The exploratory retrospective Technology Assessment of submarine telegraphy 
could contribute to important understanding in the following regards: 
o The degree to which intuitive or unsystematic expressions of 
probable benefits and negative impacts in reality anticipated 
the true consequences and avoided worse consequences than 
those which ensued. 
o A measure of the likelihood of anticipating consequences when 
measured by their degree of novelty with respect to dominant 
trends and supposed invariant principles of behavior. Are 
most significant consequences so unique and unprecedented that 
prediction is unlikely; is the increase in complexity of the 
decision process and the companion business world or political 
arena as well as the articulated societal interrelationships 
a major factor in being able to assess and respond to conse-
quences? 
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o An understanding of the mechan'isms by \'~ilich anticipated 
consequences affected Ot' did not affect policy. 
o Whether or not considerations of completeness and thorough 
analysis in establishing the taxonomy of impact dimensions 
and fact0rs, in scanning the interrelationships between 
factors and the self-consistency of implicit scenarios s and 
the affect on related technologies and ventures \'/ould have 
been sufficient by themselves to greatly improve assessment 
performance and hence the consequences of i ntrodud ng the 
technology. 
o The degree, the mechanisms and the timing of the involvement 
of impacted groups into the decision process as related to 
the intensity of detrimental (beneficial) impacts; did 
most groups become aware of the impacts long after the critical 
decision point had been passed? 
o The changing character of the consequences of the technology 
in the successive stages of development; i.e., invention, pro-
motion, and approv'l' • implementation and diffusion; growth and 
dominance; maturit' ::0 homeostasis and subordination to the next 
generation of techlil I ogi es. 
Technology Assessment evolved as an articulation of an ever more 
complex decision process within an ever more complex culture. Do we have 
the right to expect that the historical sources of our experience, learning, 
concepts, values, attitudes s and subjective judgment, no matter how cleverly 
. . 
generalized, will prepare us to anticipate and guide the continued evolution 
of our culture? A deeper understanding of the performance of our forefathers 
and the mechanisms by which they became aware of the societal consequences of 
technology must help us pefceive the trends within the assessment process in 
its policy formulation context. 
Al'! technologies mature. All growth subsides. The limits to growth 
are encountered by all systems. But are the impacts of technology in these 
later stages similar to those of the growth phases? This is a critical but 
largely unexplored issue of Technology Assessment. What policies are there, j 
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what policies should be used and how, at these later stages of development? 
Is the demise of mature technology inevitable or is it the result of neglect 
and ineptitude of the management and regulatory process? 
Marine telegraphy offers a unique opportunity to learn in all of the above 
areas. It covers a broad span of history and is still a viable industry; it 
was a booming growth technology that dominated international communications for 
sixty or more years; it is currently a mature technology which has come to grips 
with the limits of its growth. As a technology its impacts were widespread, yet 
they are sufficiently well defined and contained to yield to this analysis. Fi-
nally we have a rare opportunity to assist and build upon extensive focused his-
torical research already several years in progress. 
SECTION IV - THE STUDY PLAN 
A. Focus of Proposed Res~ 
A brief overview of the study plan appeared in Section II. The focus 
of the proposed research is the production of three elements, defined 
below: 
o An Historical Assessment 
No formal comprehensive Technology Assessment on Submarine 
Telegraphy as an emerging technology was done in 1851,1861, 
1920, or at any other time. Nonetheless, some of the ele-
ments of an assessment appeared both formally (e.g., the 
British Government report of 1861, cited on page 8 above) 
and informally in contemporary writings, newspapers, scientific 
letters, etc. The emphasis will be on informed opinions of re-
sponsible parties (decisionmakers, affected parties, and public 
opinion leaders). 
The individuals and institutions who were the decisionmakers 
relevant to the development of submarine telegraphy will be 
identified. 
Those who were perceived (at the time) as potentially affected 
parties will also be identified. 
The public policy options which were perceived and discussed 
during the period of early development of the technology will 
also be identified. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
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A. Some Legal, Jurisdictional, 
and Operational Implications 
of a Congressional Technology 
Assessment Component 
Louis H. MAYO 
December 1969, pp. 1-54 
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I - Technology Assessment: Context and Needs 
Substantial attention has been given to the needs of Congress 
for more adequate technology assessment support. Alternative notions 
about the specific functions and organizational arrangement to supply 
this support have also been given systematic consideration. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine briefly, through the means of a 
hypothetical assessment structure, certain operational implications of 
a Congressional Assessment Component. 
Many of the controlling or influential conditions are readily 
apparent. Technology assessment is a vast and pervasive function 
engaged in by a multiplicity of participants in both the public and 
private sectors. Assessing entities differ as to objectives, 
resources, capabilities, practices, and outputs. Such entities are 
usually concerned with some special aspect of the overall Policy 
Analysis, Project Planning, Program Implementation, Regulation, or 
Monitoring-Evaluation process. Some assessment entities deal with 
numerous technologies; others deal with only one application of a 
given technology; perhaps most are concerned with a narrow, specialized 
dimension of a given application. Few entities in our assessment 
structure deal with the full spectrum of social impacts of a given 
technological application. Even when the outputs of all existing en-
tities in some way associated with the assessment of a particular 
application are combined, we cannot assume that a total assessment of 
all the significant social impacts have been identified and evaluated. 
In short, our assessment function is highly fra~mented. A deficiency 
exists in our information management capability for assuring adequate 
-1-
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total impact assessments or for providing the continuity of assess-
ment data which. will identify those social impacts which need to be 
given attention in specific assessments. Our present assessment or-
ganization and procedures do not assure that the outputs of the 
multiple assessment entities constituting the assessment system for 
any given technological application will interact in the normal course 
of events (or will be consciously integrated at given intervals) so as to 
effectively combine asser,sment outputs. Assuming that such integration does 
periodically occur, one must still ask whether the outcome constitutes 
a total impact assessment of the given application. It would seem to 
be fairly well agreed that the Congressional Committee Hearing-Forum 
has not always been an adequate mechanism for integrating the relevant 
information into an understandable, cohesive whole. 
A further factor to be noted is that numerous assessments are 
made by entities other than Congress which, for all practical 
purposes, are final. Through statutory authorization various Boards 
and Administrations within the Executive Branch are the loci for such 
assessments as are those regulatory agencies which deal with technologi-
cal problems. In many instances, as with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the Atomic Energy Commission, a highly institutionalized assess-
ment system for relevant applications has been developed. Where such 
regularized assessment systems are performing adequately, there would 
seem to be little need for Congressional concern other than with peri-
odic oversight to assure continued satisfactory performance. In many 
areas of technological development serious deficiencies do exist, however, 
which would seem to require more intensive Congressional attention, at 
1 
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least to the extent of assuring the establishment of assessment pro-
cedures which will provide adequate assessments, total impact or other-
wise, as needed. 
The great variety of assessment demands and assessment 
tasks in conjunction with the diversity of assessment entities 
make it difficult to grasp the scope of the assessment 
function which should be undertaken by a reinforced Legislative assess-
ment component. Put quantitatively, what professional capability and 
supporting resources are required through what period of time to ade-
quately perform a specified assessment task? Numerous variables are 
involved in our assessment practices: 
• The character of the technology to be assessed 
• The particular application to be assessed and the specific 
operational context in which such application is located 
· The objective of the assessment: feasibility, costs, pro-
spective social uses, possible social harms, need for 
further research, need for safety precautions in use, 
need for continuing regulations, etc. 
• Limitations on resources for the assessment (time and pro-
fessional talent) 
• The social indicator/evaluation scheme or schemes to be 
employed in such evaluation 
The possibility of finding precise equivalencies between the given 
assessment task and the time, facilities, and professional manpower 
required is not encouraging. Often resource constraints define the scope 
of the task whatever the ideal magnitude of support might be. Arbitrary 
constraints on time and professional support are imposed out of simple 
necessity to define the scope of the task and to assure. its execution. 
One need only mention the following recent assessments in order to gain 
some notion of the variety of arrangements (including subject matter, 
objectives, and organizational structures) involved in the assessment 
function: 
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A. Executive Branch: 
1. Noise - Sound without Value. Federal Council for Science 
and Technology 'cbomml."ttee on Environmental Quality), Sep-
tember 1968. 
2. Considerations Affecting Steam Power Plant Site Selection. 
Office of Science and Technology (Energy Policy Staff), 1968. 
3. Environmental Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp Jetport. U. S. 
Department of Interior, September, 1969. 
4. Potential Mechanization in the Flue-Cured Tobacco Industry 
with Emphasis on Human Resource Adjustment. Department of 
Agriculture (Economic Research Service), September 1969. 
5. 
6. 
The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Program for Progress. 
Department of Commerce (Commerce Technical Advisory Board, 
Panel on Electrically Powered Vehicles), October, 1967. 
Tomorrow's Transportation: 
Department of Housing and. 
Metropolitan Development, 
tration), 1968. 
New Systems for the Urban Future. 
Urban Development (Office of 
Urban Transportation Adminis-
B. Legislative Branch: 
7. The Search for a Low-Emission Vehicle. U. S. Senate, Com-
mitteem Commerce (Staff Report), 9lst Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, 1969. 
8. Administration of Project Mohole by the National Science 
Foundation. A Report to the Congress by the U. S. Comp-
troller-General, April 23, 1968. 
C. National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 
National Research Council • 
9. Useful Applications of Earth-Oriented Satellites~· Summer 
Study on Space Applications, Division of Engineering, Na-
tional Research Council, NAS-NAE, 1969. 
10. Drug Efficacy Study. A Report to the Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs from the Division of Medical Sciences, National 
Research Council, NAS-NAE, 1969. 
11. Environmental Problems in South Florida. A Preliminary Report 
of the Environmental Study Group to the Environmental Studies 
Board; NAS~NAE, September 16, 1969. 
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Our preliminary probes into the technology assessment pro.cess in 
the Program of Policy Studies at GWU strongly indicate that to this 
point we have hardly made an impression on such conceptual challenges 
as that of defining an Adequate Assessment or on the analytical task 
of relating the adequate assessment of a given application to the level 
of resources required. This is said with full recognition that the 
studies initiateu by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics 
(the Technology Assessment Reports by the National Academy of Sciences 
and the National Academy of Engineering and the Report on Technical 
Information For Congress by the Legislative Reference Service) have 
greatly advanced our thinking on these and other critical assessment 
questions. 
My comments will be directed to the following topics: 1) The 
positing of a hypothetical Technology Assessment Component for legis-
lative support; 2) The posing of a number of questions relating to the 
operational context of this assessment component including the Organi-
zational/Operational Framework, General Operational Problems, Access 
to Relevant Information, and the Utilization of Assessment Data and 
Analyses; and 3) Some selected comments relevant to the questions posed. 
While the content of these remarks are cautionary with respect 
to potential operational difficulties of a legislative assessment sup-
port component, it should be understood that such comments 
do not reflect a negative attitude toward the need for an improved tech-
nology assessment structure. To the contrary, the purpose is to advance 
some questions which are likely to arise with the operations of a new 
assessment component, however general may be the support for its proposed 
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functions. That substantial reasons lend support to the need for a 
better structured technology assessment function seems clear. Th~t some 
observers question whether such an arrangement will make an appreciable 
improvement in the performance of this function is, however, a point not 
to be lightly dismissed. Further, existing entities may be concerned 
over a loss of status or of function as a result of the implementation 
of any new effort to more adequately assess the social benefits and costs 
of advancing technology . 
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II -. ~on6re!isionalTechnolo6Y Assessment 'Component: 
A Hypothetical Structure . 
The intensification of professional attention to the technology 
assessment function over the past few; years would seem to be based on 
three prtmary assumptions: 1) That advancing science and technology should 
be applied in a better informed and more deliberate manner so as to 
\ 
maximize social benefits and minimize social costs; and 2) That the 
technology assessment function can be more adequately performed than 
is now the case with a resulting net gain in the social benefit/cost 
ratio of technological applications; and 3) Th~t the -Congress needs 
an independent technology assessment capability of its own. Hence, we 
need to know wr~ch technology assessment systems are performing adequately 
and why and which technology assessment systems are not working well and 
why. Several deficiencies are apparent to those who have given attention 
to this problem, as for example, the lack of coordination among relevant 
assessment mechanisIlls for particular applications and the inability, for 
this and other reasons, to perform total impact assessments of such appli-
cations. With an understanding of the more serious deficiencies, it is 
feasible to move to the question of what can be done to improve the ade-
quacy of the assessment function. This basic question can be reduced 
" ...... 
£:)iJ' , 
further to inquiries relating to the conceptual, organizational, and 
operational aspects of a new mechanism or arrangement for achieving an 
tmproved assessment function. 
It is evident that the range of organizational alternatives which 
might be employed in order to provide more effective technology assess-
ment data to the Congress is extremely broad. Certain suggestions have 
been made by the recent reports on Technology Assessment of the National 
..... "" 
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Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering and by the 
Legislative R.eference Service of the Library of Congress on Technical 
.. t ( . 
Information For Congress. lt might also be noted that many other sug-
, 'I. < 
gestions have been made by Committees of ,he Congress as well as by 
individuals. Eilene Galloway discusses the topic of Scientific Advice 
for Congress in "An Analysis of Three Proposals" which is included in 
the book Knowledge ~nd Power, edited by Sanford A. Lakoff (1966). All 
such proposals have certain recognizable disadvantages as well as ad-
vantages. All leave considerable areas of uncertainty as to how useful 
such mechanisms would prove to be in actual operation. No doubt, any 
additional alternatives will have similar characteristics. The task, 
however, is to examine as thoroughly as possible beforehand 
the means of maximizing the adequacy of the assessment function while 
minimizing insofar as practicable, the legal, jurisdictional, and other oper-
ational difficulties. 
In recognition of the reluctance to establish new agencies out of 
fear of simply adding further bureaucratic impedance to the govern-
mental assessment circuit some observers no doubt feel that the sensible 
approach is to locate any additional assessment capability in an existing 
organization. Yet, the NAS/NAE Reports on Technology Assessment suggest that 
new mechanisms are needed. The NAB Report states in its Summary of 
Findings: 
Technology assessments on a broad range of subjects are 
feasible and can be expected to be useful to the decision-
making processes of the Congress, when prepared by properly 
constituted, independent,ad hoc task forces with adequate 
staff support and time. (p:-3Y:-
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A management organ~zation, controlled by and answering 
to the Congress, should a~range for the preparation of 
technology assessments for Congress~onal purposes. No 
single, permanent organization can De envisioned that 
could provide adequate ~n~ouse expertise to execute 
assessments' in all of the f:telds that may De required 
by Congress. Therefore:tt would De useful to contract 
for or to administer and organize the assessment task 
forces. (p.4). 
The NAS Report gives attention to several organizational alter-
natives. It was agreed among this panel that there should be important 
assessment components in both the Legislative and Executive Branches. 
With reference to the Congress, one alternative considered was that 
of a Joint Congressional Committee on Technology Assessment supported 
by a highly qualified staff. Another separate alternative was that 
of a Technology Assessment Office serving the Congress as a whole. 
The NAS Report states that: "The panel is not prepared to recommend 
a choice between a Congress-wide unit and a joint committee." 
In view of the fact that possibilities for a new assessment arrange-
ment are a~most unlimited and that subsequent operational character-
is tics would depend to a substantial extent upon the particular arrange-
ment selected, it is felt useful to posit a hypothetical Congressional 
Technology Assessment Component for purposes of this discussion. The 
arrangement here posited is not necessarily offered as the most desirable among 
the various alternatives. It has been selected for two pr:Lmary reasons: 1) The 
basic structure is easily grasped; and 2) the interrelationships which would 
De involved in the operations of such a component raise a rather broad 
range of questions which probably merit consideration preparatory to 
the design of a new mechanism. 
In the barest, skeletal form the Assessment Component posited 
consists of two elements: 
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1. An O~fice o~ Technology Assessment which will perform a 
variety of assessment tasks in support of Congressional 
deciston ma.king 
2. A Joint Select Committee on Technology and Society which 
will focus attention on the general problem of the appli-
cation of technological resources to social needs as well 
as perform consulting, advising and oversight functions 
in connection with the operations of the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment. 
A more detailed exposition of the concept, functions, and organizational 
asp~cts of the Congressional Assessment Component are as follows: 
--, 
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ASSUHPTION: That the Congress is in need of improved 
informational mid analytical support on 
legislative matters involving substantial 
scientific or technological components. 
An assessment arra.ngement with the below noted charac-
teristics is posited for analytical purpos~s, i.e., 
the legal/political implications ~~hicb r;:1Y arise from 
the operations of a Technology AssessuK_-t Component. 
CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS: 
A Congressional entity vlhich can perform the function 
of assembling and analyzing data relevant to an 
overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the pro-
cess of applying technological resources to National 
social goals. 
An assessment service ,·,.hi.ch can' assure the Congress 
and its Committees that the full range of social 
impacts have (or have not) been identified and the 
magnitude, intensity and persistency of such effects 
measured re significant technological appl'i:ca.t ions; 
and provide (if requested and appropriate) evalua-
tions of the social desirability or undesirability 
of such impacts in accord with an explicit scheme 
or schemes of social indicators. 
An assessment service which perform:; primarily an 
"integrationist" function, making !:laximum use of 
the assessment data from various existing technol-
ogy assessment systems so as to provide Total 
Impact Assessment data to the Congress \'lith the 
greatest effectiveness and economy. 
An assessment service ~~hich can evaluate for the 
Congress the adequacy of assessment systems for 
existing or prospective applications, identifying 
deficiencies in existing "regularized!! or "inst-i-
tutionalized" assessment systems and recommending 
means for correcting such deficiencies. (For ex-
ample, the lack of reliable data on certain obvious 
social impacts or the failure to provide a forum 
for all affected segments of the public to advance 
claims or complaints re technological applications). 
An assessment service "lhich can provide the Congress 
with initial assessments on ne,·,. or prospective 
applications if no regul:·rized assessment system 
exists for such task ana'such assessment is not 
forthcoming from other reliable sources. 
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An assessment service 'vhich can advise. relevant 
Committees of the Congress ("lhen requested) inform-
ation on segments of the public which should be 
represented by Hitnesses in the ultimat~ assessment 
forum (Congressional hearing). 
,An assessment service 'vhich can provide for an 
information service by ,",hi ch assessment information 
can be accumulated in an orderly, current, and usable 
fashion. 
ORGANIZATION: (PRESCRIBE BY STATUTE) 
1. Set out declaration of Congressional Policy 
(Concept and Functions as noted above). 
2. Establish an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
to carry out the desired functions. 
3. Provide for a Director of the Office to be 
appointed by the President for an extended term 
(10-15 years). 
4. Provide fDr the Director to obtain from all 
Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government 
pertinent assessment information Dn techgological 
applicatiDns .(primarily non-defense) ,,,hich the OTA 
may frDm time to. time require in the performance 
of its respDnsibilities (with exceptiDns minimized 
and noted). 
5. Provide cDntractual authority for.the OTA with 
respect to Project Research SUPPDrt. 
6. Provide for jDint consultation with the National 
Science Foundation on Institutional Grant Support 
to Unive~sities, National Laboratories, Policy 
Analys is GrDups anci similar Organizations which. 
can provide continuing developmental support in 
specialized areas Df technology assessment. 
7. Provide for a JDint Select Committee on Technology 
and Society 'vhich will perform the .following func-
tions: 
a. Keep fully and currently informed on the 
status and prospects for the application 
of technDlogical resources to national 
social goals. 
b. Provide a fDrum for the evaluation of the 
overall impact of technoJ.ogical applications 
on the full spectrum of social needs. 
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c. Encourage the use of analytical approaches and 
information management techniques in the assess-
ment of technological applications which will 
support an overall system of social accounting. 
d. Consult and advise with the Director of the 
Office of Technology Assessment on the policies, 
objectives, tasks, and assessment practices of 
the Office. 
e. Review periodically the performance of the 
Office of Technology Assessment. 
f. Recommend to the Committees on Government 
Operations the annual budgetary support for 
the Office of Technology Assessment, including 
joint programs with other offices or agencies. 
g. Maintain the closest practicable liaison with 
the Executive Office of the President and 
agencies of the Executive Branch responsible 
for the application of technological resources 
to social needs. 
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One potnt mer~ts attent~on before proceeding to more specific 
questions. While this assessment arrflt),gement is not posited 
as a model to 'De advocated to the exclusion of others Dut,rather as 
an analytical reference, there is one conceptual thrust to this arrange-
ment which justifies brief elaboration and strong 
emphasis. The rationale underlying the Joint Select Committee on Tech-
no1ogy and Society is not that it serve merely as a link between the 
Congress and the Office of Technology Assessment, under.taking Congress-
ional coordinating functions re puBlic issues involving significant 
technological components, p::.ocessing requests from various Connnittees 
direct.ed to the OTA, performing as a consulting and oversight Connnittee 
for the OTA, and providing a mechanism for facilitating the OTA's in-
formation exchanges with other governmental agencies and private sector 
entities. The JSC would have a broader responsibility than technology 
assessment in the sense of identifying the impacts of given applications 
and evaluating the social benefit/cost ratio of such applications. 
This type of analytical task would be the province of OTA. The 
Joint Select Committee would assume the responsibility of keeping fully 
and currently informed on the total national potential for the appli-
cation of technological resources to social needs. Technology assess-
ment is only one aspect, however important, to this more general function. 
The outcome of a total impact assessment of a prospective technological 
application under specified conditions is, of course, essential in de-
termining whether and how such technology is to be applied. ,However. this 
analytical task is, or should be with new technologies, only one sig-
nificant phase in the process of getting the technology applied if 
j 
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it does have real poten~ial for eliminating certain social harms 
or for contributing to various social objectives. Put another way; 
the mere positing of a technology against relevant social needs is 
only a beginning of the process of moving such technology into an op-
erational program. The process of technology application is a social/ 
political action process, not just an analytical task which 
involves the recognition of the interaction of such elements as: 
• Participants in the relevant socio/political context in which 
the application is to be applied 
• The Perspectives and Resources of such Participants 
• Influential Contextual Conditions and Trends 
• Situations of Assessment (Forums) and/or Decision (Arenas) 
• Alternative Strategies employed by Participants 
Alternative Outcomes of Assessment Forums or Decisional Arenas 
• Probable Social Impacts of such Outcomes 
It is nct suggested that the JSC have any direct legislative authority 
with respect to the actual process of getting socially useful, available 
and prospective, technologies applied. It is suggested that it perform 
an informational integrating function and provide a forum whereby an 
approximate accounting can be continuously conducted on the effectiveness 
with which our technological resources are being applied to social goals, for 
example, how our national laboratories, scientific institutes and asso-
ciations, the universities, R&D firms, and so forth, can best con-
tribute their facilities and skills to social objectives. 
A compelling reason for this suggestion is that a positive thrust 
should be given to scientific and technological enterprise which 
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represents one of our great national resources. The assumption of a 
responsibilit~ torev~ew and appraise the effectiveness with which we 
are apply-ing sucht:esources to pressing national social needs would 
fill a neglected polic~ function. Further, it would serve as a counter-
balance to any tendency to become negatively oriented in the technology 
assessment function, i.e., to emphasize detriments to the neglect of 
the social benefits flowing from particular applications • 
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III - Office of Technology Assessment: 
Responsibilities, Powers and Operations 
The followi&lg ,!uestions are focused upon the operations of the 
hypothetical Office ~f Technology Assessment although the relation-
ships necess~ri1y involve the posited Joint Select Committee on 
Technology and Society, other Committees of the Congress, the Legis-
lative Reference Service, the General Accounting Office, the Executive 
Office of the President, various Departments and Agencies in the 
Executive Branch, tha Regulatory Agencies, and private sector entitiGs. 
A. ORGM,IZATIONAL/OPERATIONAL FRAHEtVORK 
1. Assum'Lng the Technology Assessment Component posited, 
should the statutory scheme provide explicitly that the 
final authority for setting the assessment tasks of the 
OTA are to be with the Director of the OTA? Should such 
authority be qualified by requiring consultation with the 
JSC on Technology and Society at stated intervals ~ i.e., 
annually, semi-annually? Since the JSC \Vould be repre-
sentative of the entire Congress, ho\V might the process 
of 'agenda formulation be organized? 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
ORIGINAI1 PAGE TS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
"'hat criteria of priority should be employed in ::;electing 
assessment tasks? 
l~ou1d the acceptance of the foregoing method (A. I.) of 
"setting the agenda" necessarily preclude responses 
to assessment requests from other sources? Indivi-
dual Congressmen? All Congressional Committees hav-
ing jurisdiction over social problems areas or gov-
ernmental activities involving significant scientific 
or technological components? The President (BOB, 
OST, etc.)? Executive Agencies, Programs, or Admin-
istr at ions? 
Should the OTA be directed by statute to maintain a contin-
uing information interaction \Vith the OST/BOB in order to 
coordinate assessment efforts and maximize the productive-
ness of asse~sment activities in both the Executive and 
Legislative Branches? If so, ho\V might this be accomplished? 
~ill 'the OTA be expected to coordinate only with OST/BOB or 
to maintain continuing assessment information arrangements 
"'ith all executive and regulatory agencies as \Vell as pri-
vate sector entities as a means of assuring the optimum 
use of assessment capabilities? 
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6. Should provl.swn be made for IIpublic hearingsll by the OTA? 
Vnder \'1hat circumstances might such hearings be required? 
For what purposes should the OTA otherwise initiate hear-
ings?, Under \vhat conditions might hearings be irii!=iated . 
,lan,.petition" and by \vhat lIinterested partiesll ? If formal 
hearing authority should be provided, under \~hat circum-
stances would \olitnesses be placed under oath? If a \~itness 
'is compelled to testify, \~ould he have the right to counsel? 
Should counsel be privileged to cross-examine witnesses 
giving evidence contrarY,to his client? Would testimony 
or communications from witnesses or correspondents 'olith 
the OTA be privileged? As an alternative to OTA hearings, 
. might the public hearing function be conducted only by 
the Joint Select Committee on Technology and S?ciety? 
7. In order to maintain the II independencell and" integrityll of 
the assessment function, what proscriptions, if any, should 
the Congress place on the Director and Staff of the OTA with 
respect to associations and relationships with other assess-
ment entities or interested participants? 
8. '\ill reports of the OTA have any special legal standing in 
civil or criminal cases against government officials or pri-
vate companies responsible for the application of technolo-
gies \oJhich have resulted in alleged harm to a complainant? 
Will the director or members of the OTA be subject to sub-
poena as witnesses in SJch cases? 
B. GE~~RAL OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS 
1. To what extent might a skeptical attitude toward the social 
utility of a Congressional Assessment Component h'inder the 
operations of OTA? 
2. To what' extent might the critical/cautious attitude arising 
from jurisdictional conflicts or additional administrative 
inconvenience hinuer the operations of OTA? 
3. What lIimageli should the OTA attempt to cultivate? While the 
basic thrust may be to\oJard the establishment of a non-
partisan, non-political entity of recognized capability and 
competence, in Hhat respects must the OTA inevitably assume 
a IIpartisanli stance? Hill it be an lIactiveli or "passivell 
ombudsman? Hhat type of role should it play and what II repu-
tationll should it seek in order to maximize its usefulness 
in the legislative process? 
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4. What would be the likely implications should the 'OTA assess 
not merely technological applications ~~~ (a~suming com-
petent and responsible administration and management) but the 
quality of the management of the application as well? 
5. What general guidelines should be provided, and by whom, for 
the division of responsibility for technology assessment 
among OTA, the Science Policy Research Division of the 
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 
the Gener.al Accounting Office, and particular Committees 
of the Congress, if any, which may wish to provide or con-
tinue with their separate assessment functions? 
6. How might the OTA provide for the accommodation oiad hoc, 
special, "non-programmed" assessment activities? Even 
should the Director of OTA attempt to minimize the ad hoc 
obligations of the Office, how could he respond in a 
practical sense re: 
Permitting OTA staff to appear as witnesses 
be-fore Congressional Committees on specific 
bills? 
Providing special reports on specific bills? 
Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff 
l-iembers to Committees? 
Making temporary assignments of OTA Staff 
Members to Executive Agencies? 
7. -What type or types of Assessment Data Systems should be 
initiated and maintained by the OTA? Will the OTA, in gen-
eral, tend to apply its resources to the task of closing 
deficiencies in existing institutionalized assessment data 
systems Clnd in designing and initiating netv data sy~tems 
for prospective technological applications? 
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C. ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORHATION 
l~ What will be the scope of the responsibility of the OTA 
for technology assessment? tvill it have defined areas 
for inquiry or \vill it be given the broadest type of 
charter for inquiring into every facet of technological 
applications (existing and prospective) on a Total Impact 
Assessment basis - that is, looking at all the social 
interactions of a given application? This is a basic 
,uestion having implications for subsequent questions. 
2. 'Will the 'OTA be provided with formal authority (similar to 
the GAO) \\'hich is essentially co-ext.ensive with its 
responsibilities or might the compulsory authority of the 
OTA be deliberately minimized in order to encourage the 
development of mutually beneficial information exchange 
relationships? In' other \\Ords, ~vill the strategy be to 
persuade, appealing to the net gains from the technology 
assessment function, rather than to compel? 
3. What should be the nature of the authority granted the OTA 
by. Congress so as to fncilitate its access to relevant 
infomation in the Executive Branch? In the Regulatory 
Agencies? 
4. What ,.;ould be the nature of the formal authority conferred 
on the OTA by the Congress so as to facilitate its access 
to essential data in the private sector: competitive 
infor~ation, private/personal information such as hospital 
or nursing hom~ records, etc.? 
S. What would be the position of the OTA if, subsequent to the 
establishment of the OTA, one or more or the Committees 
of the Congress now having oversight responsibilities for 
a given technological area refused to cooperate and dir-
ected the relevant Regulatory Agency and the regulated 
industry entities not to cooperate (re previding relevant 
assessment data) with the OTA? 
6. What if the Secretary of an Executive Department should take 
a sinHar position and the President, \vhile refusing to per-
mit th'eexercise of Executive Privilege in the situation, 
remained indifferent? 
7. Assuming that in some limited circumstances the OTA should 
have the subpoena pO\l1er or should have access to infonna-
tion through the direct subpoena power of Congress, what 
guidelines should be provided which would define such lim-
ited and justifiable circumstances so as to withstand legal 
challenge? 
I 
,~ 
1 
1 
r 
I 
" 
i 
l. . 
..... ~.~.L....._ .. _ 
..,21-
8. Should the OTA have to resort, to BOB "clearance" of its 
information surveys with private sector entities? Should 
the OTA have to resort to information filed ~vith other gov-
ernment agencies rather than make direct demands on private 
industry? 
9. What {,'ill be the procedures and criteria employed for 
"contracting out" special assessment studies or other tasks? 
To what extent might it be required to do such contracting 
out on a competitive basis? Will contracting out (especi-
ally if the OTA should undertake to utilize a large number 
and variety of contractors) tend to aggravate the informa-
tion assess problems with the Executive Agencies and private 
... ....... . ~ 
sector entities (imposing upon such Agencies and entities 
an increasingly greater burden in terms of informational 
r~quirements)? What might-be done with respect to selecting 
topics and contractors to minimize this burden? 
10. What should be the procedure and criteria for selecti.ng organ-
izations or institutions which might qualify for continuing 
"institutional grants" to carryon segments of an overall 
"systems approach" to technology assess,ment7 
11. What role will "experts" or advisory committees have in OTA 
bperations? 
12. How can the OTA handle various types of "conflict of interest" 
problems which might not arise as a legal issue but for 
reason that full and candid information from a uniquely 
qualified individual ~vould place him in a difficult position 
re his relationship with his associated organization or 
institution? Would the OTA activity bring up any ne~., "con-
flict of interest" questions? Hhat would likely be the atti-
tude of the OTA re well informed people who are· acting as 
regular consultants to various mission-oriented Government 
agencies'l 
13. Would any unique problems ,arise re the collection and 
retention of certain types of information under IIfor offi-
cial use onl~' categories? Would problems be different from 
those which arise -with the Census or with the Regulato'ry 
Agencies which do maintain the confidentiality of financial 
statements of the industrial groups regulated? _ 
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D. UTILIZATION 'OF ASSESSHENT DATA A.\'D A,."iALYSES 
1. If the OTA is to be primarily an assessment support activity 
for the Congress, will it nevertheless be assumed to be 
generally accountable to the Public? If some segment or 
participant in the "public" is d iss·atisfied with OTA per-
formance, to whom can the complaint be made? 
2. Which Committees will regularly receive the reports and 
statements of the OTA? Hhich Committ·ees will receive par-
ticular'reports and on l-1hat basis? Hhich entities of the 
Executive Branch? 'What private sector entities? 
3. What ll7ill be the responsibilities of the OTA to inform rele-
vant Committees of the Congress with respect to the Optimum 
Social System (effects and interactions) which should be 
examined when specific bills come before such Committees? 
This matter has special relevance to proposals involving 
continuing technological develop~ents for which many of 
the relevant impacts have already be·.en given at·ten·tion 
in .previous assessments? 
4. Are there any types of assessment reports which will not be 
generally available to the Congress, the Executive Agencies, 
or to any segment Cif the public? \\1ill the OTA direct its 
activities only to "non-security" problems? t-lill some 
reports be limited in distribution if "cl,assified" material 
has been used but the report itself is not classified? 
5. Who will be able to complain to ,,;hom in '''hat forum and under 
what circumstances if the OTA undertakes to disseminate 
assessment data that may be considered by the complainant 
to affect nation~l security or to involve private competi-
tive information (trade secrets, etc.)? 
6. Who will be able to complain to whom in what forum and under 
what circumstances if the petitioner asserts that relevant 
information (not necess.arily his mvn) has not been taken into 
account in an OTA report that has been or' is planned for gen-
eral dissemination or to a Cooraittee of the Congress? 
7. While an OTA would not take any direct action to follow up its 
.assessments '-1here a recommendation is made explicitly or 
impliCitly which is harmful or is allegedly harmful to the 
present or future activities of a private entity, might the 
OTA nevertheless be compelled (pressured) in some instances 
to hold r~buttal hearings for such projects? 
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8. What might be the possibility of instances arLsLng in which 
advance notice of a:1 assessment report (having substantial 
detrimental implications for a private entity or entities) 
would motivate the initiation of a suit for injunction to 
bar the release or publication of such report? Hm., could 
such a suit be instituted? 
9. Various problems of governmental immunity are herein suggested. 
What might be the liability of the OTA Director or Hembers 
of the Staff for people ,.,ho have relied upon the safety of 
an application explicitly found beneficial by the OTA but 
which tUrns out to have serious adverse effects? Is there 
any precedent for personal or governmental liability of an 
analysis/ advisory group such as OTA ,.,hich has brought haim 
upon a private person or corporate person through arbitrary 
or ~r~espo~sible action? 
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IV - Selected Comments: Assessment Performance Criteria 
It is evident that the foregoing questions do not slide into 
precise, discrete slots as might be indicated by the groupings used. 
In a sense they are all interrelated. It is therefore useless to pon-
der long over the proper sequence. Yet it is imperative to be con-
cerned about certain fundamental considerations: Just what assessment 
functions are required to satisfy the legislative needs of the Con-
gress? Assuming a basic organizational structure, how can such Com-
ponent be employed to most effectively perform these functions? If 
one is inclined to feel that resistance to the performance of these 
functions will be serious and persistent then the Component should be 
armed with sufficient formal authority to assure access to relevant 
information. If, on the other hand, one is disposed to believe that 
the effectiveness of the operation depends almost entirely on the 
promise of mutual benefit for the various assessing entities then the 
strategy would be directed toward the cultivation of cooperative, non-
abrasive relationships with coercive tactics reduced to a min.imum. 
In short, the scope of assessment responsibility provided or assumed, 
the formal compulsory authority with which the OTA is provided, and the 
manner of implementing the assessment function are all closely enter-
twined with the "image" of OTA which will evolve. 
The desire to be appreciat·'.d, even admired, may not be wholly 
consistent with the tasks which must be performed. Is it wise, there-
fore, to assume that the success of the Congressional Assessment Com-
ponent will depend largely upon the disposition of the OTA to cultivate 
cooperative attitudes among relevant assessment entities? l1ight a 
, 
. ! 
, 
-25-
"hard line" assumption be just as plausible? Or should the statutory 
scheme provide the broadest assessment respo~sibility with back up 
formal authority in the event certain intractable sit~~tions develop, in 
other words, provide the widest range of options in operational pro-
cedure? Rather than wallow in the "image" question and the general 
operational policy to be pursued, it is probably more profitable to 
think of essentials and examine how certain of the questions posed 
might relate to characteristics such as: 
• Capability of the OTA to perform assessments as comprehensive 
and in as much depth as Congress may 'desire with respect to 
a given technological application ~ se or in the context 
of a given social problem 
• Ability of the OTA to select assessment tasks and arrange, with 
the assistance of the JSC, for the allocation of assessment 
tasks among the LRS, GAO, Executive Agencies, and private 
sector entities so as to most expeditiously and economically 
perform the desired Congressional assessment support role. 
• Provision for access to the essential information sources for 
the assessments desired 
Provision for full representation of affected participants in 
the assessment process 
• Capability of the OTA to manage the intricate informati~nal 
networks which are indispensable for the assembly of that 
data upon which adequate assessments for Congressional pur-
poses can be made 
• Provision for sufficient detachment of the OTA from the political 
decision making process to assure independence of analysis 
• Provision for the linkage from OTA to the political process 
which will provide effectiv! analytical support to decisional 
arenas 
• Provision for continuity of the assessment function 
• Provision for continuing encouragement of the "professionali-
zation" of the assessment function 
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It wO'illd seem advisable to restrict consideration of the questions 
posed in III above to a brief comment on the interrelationship of such 
questions to the following Assessment Performance Criteria: 
Defining and Limiting the Assessment Tasks of the OTA 
Notion of "Independence" of the Assessment Function 
Representation of Affected Participants in the 
Assessment Process 
Discussion of the first criterion relates to such questions as: 
A2 , A3 , A4 , AS • 
B4, B5, B7. 
Cl, C3, CB. 
Discussion of the second criterion relates to such questions as: 
Al, A3, A6. 
B3, B6. 
Cl, C2. 
Discussion of the third criterion relates to such questions as: 
A3. 
C4, C7. 
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a) Defining and Limiting the Asses~ment Tasks of OTA 
What are the critical assessment needs of the 
Congress? An exhaustive answer would take some time. Clearly, 
Congress needs to be in better position to assess the technologically 
oriented proposals of the Executive Department. Congress needs con-
tinuous updating on prospective technological applications and their 
full social impacts. This Subcommittee itself has expressed such 
needs in part, but emphatically, in its Report on "Managing the Environ-
ment" (Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development 
to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics of June 17, 1968) 
wherein it was stated: 
Regardless of improvements in Executive Branch 
Organizations, the Congress needs an independent 
and comprehensive source of information and 
advice ... (p.36) 
Congress (has) a unique responsibility in obtaining 
objective and complete information on technological 
consequences ... {p.2) 
The intent of Congress ... is to avoid arbitrary 
regulation and to establish a fact-based, rational 
decision-making process which integrates all the 
needs of society ... (p. 6) 
The best means of gaining long-term rational management 
is to generate an informational base and provide a 
policy to all operational programs which will cause 
individual decision makers to act in harmony with the 
entire system ... (p. 29) 
and finally: 
The Congress should proceed to develop 
capability for assessing the impact of 
the environment. (p. 8) 
an indepemlent 
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It is apparent that the Congress needs Special Purpose Assessments 
of various technological applications related to environmental man-
agement and similar support for other social problem areas as well; 
it also needs Total Impact Assessmenmwhich examine the full social 
consequences of given technological applications. These two assess-
ment approaches' are interrelated. But whatever technologies are 
selected for total impact assessments and whatever social problem 
areas are selected for the investigation of technological applications 
as the cause or cure of such problems, there are other types of assess-
ment activities which must be given attention. The JSC and the OTA 
would need a firm grasp on the existing technology assessment struc-
ture, the major social p~oblem areas, technological resources which 
are available for the advancement of social goals, technologies which 
are contributing to social problems, technologies which are available 
for abating or controlling social problems, and ways in which the assess-
ment function can most adequately be performed. If the OTA wished to 
be comprehensive and s:ystematic about this preliminary appraisal, it 
might proceed with some approximation to the following: 
1) Systematic grouping of major technologies. 
2) Systematic organization of social goals, needs 
or problem areas. 
3) Matching technologies to relevant or potentially 
relevant social needs So as to facilitate the 
identification of existing and prospective tech-
nological applications. 
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4) Examination of the existing Technology Assessment 
Structure in order to determine: 
a. Which of the existing (or potential) 
technological applications has a regular-
ized (and adequate) technology assessment 
system? 
b. Which of the existing (or potential) 
technological applications do not have 
an adequate technology assessment system? 
(Not capable of producing a total impact 
assessment or an optimum social sub-system 
for assessment with, respect to a particular 
problem or issue) 
c. Which technological applications have a 
potentially adequate technology assessment 
system with the need being only to make 
adjustments in assessing entities or in 
the assessment process to bring them up to 
an adequate level of performance? 
d. Which technological applications represent 
both the level of effort and the character-
istics of uniqueness which requires special 
treatment/assessment either by the new OTA 
structure or by special ad hoc assessment 
groups, boards, or commissions? 
From this analysis the JSC/OTA will be in position to determine more 
accurately the level of effort required, the type of support needed, 
and the more promising internal and external organizational arrange-
ments which should be developed, 
This initial appraisal would provide an assessment information 
base which would show all of the, assessing entities constituting the 
assessment system for major technological applications and for major 
social problem areas with appropriate cross-referencing. Since we cannot 
foresee all the possibilities under which social conditions will interact 
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with particular technological applications, it would seem all 
the more essential to develop this comprehensive assessment information 
system so as to provide maximum sensitivity for detecting both 
opportunities for the application of technological resources to social 
needs and early warning signals of impending detrimental impacts. 
Having taken this approach, we are immediately beset with a further 
critical question: How can the JSC/OTA Component be utilized so as best 
to achieve Congressional aims with the most economical and proficient 
use of resources? One point upon which all tend to agree is that a 
new assessment component should reinforce and refine the assessment 
function rather than attempt to duplicate existing activities. But how 
can this notion be reduced to organizational and operational terms·? While 
the OTA might be given the broadest assessment responsibility and com-
mensurate formal authority to assure the execution of assessment functions, 
it should restrict its tasks to those which need to he performed 
but which are not now being performed. It should also develop procedures 
for assuring that all existing technology assessment systems are operating 
in an adequate manner. 
A few illustrations should suffice to demonstrate how the assessment 
burdens of OTA can be limited to the essentials. Certain points have 
already been suggested. With respect to existing applications where a 
regularized assessment system now exists with the capability of performing 
adequately, the OTA would have no more than a monitoring and information 
integration function to assure that suitable assessment data is provided 
the Congress. The OTA should constantly strive to develop coordination 
within those highly fragmented assessment systems which provide no focal 
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point for the integration of the total span of social impacts so as 
to regularize the system for performing adequate assessments. In 
short, the OTA should encourage, by whatever means are available, 
performance of assessment tasks by other entities actually or poten-
tially capable of doing so. The OTA should take a strong anticipa-
tory orientation toward technology and obtain, through study contracts 
or grants, comprehensive assessments of such technologies, especially 
in cases where developing partisan interests may subsequently preclude 
access to relevant data or deliberately distort the issues involved. 
The OTA should also develop a scheme of priorities of assessment 
tasks which will assist in assuring that the more significant or criti-
cal matters are given attention. Both the NAS and NAE Reports on 
Technology Assessment attempt to provide some guidance in this connec-
tion. It is also evident from the previous discussion that assessment 
tasks should be located primarily in those entities best equipped to 
perform them. The development of such operational policies by the OTA 
should make its assessment responsibility more manageable. 
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Certain implications follow the foregoing approach. Consider, 
for example, that the Legislative Reference Service performs a partic-
ularly useful job for the Congress. More specifically, the Science 
Policy Research Division proJuced an excellent study on Technical Informa
-
tion for Congress. The list of technology assessment projects now in 
progress, as outlined by Mr. Jayson in these hearings on November 24, 
1969, is certainly impressive. It is also to be noted that the research 
staff assists the Committees of Congress in identifying witnesses, pre-
paring reports, and serving as consultants to the Committees. As was 
indicated by Mr. Jayson, however, the management and monitoring of a 
technology assessment function as he envisages the emerging need IIHill 
require a substantial commitment of funds" in order to support a vastly 
enlarged assessment capability. In sum it would seem that an Office of 
Technology Assessment would be required with new responsibilities whethe
r 
attached to the Legislative Reference Service or not. In any event, 
the type of service now provided by the Science Policy Research Division 
is essential. Since this capability already exists there wO:lld be no 
need for an OTA to duplicate it. Further, as noted subsequently, the 
established practice of the Legislative Reference Service (SPRD) in 
responding to the requests of any Committee of the Congress may not be 
a procedure the OTA might deem advisable to follow. Yet, the "on cHll" 
procedure certainly appears to be a most useful one and will undoubtedly 
be continued by the Legislative Reference Service. 
Implicit in the Report on Technical Information ~or Congress is the 
cautionary theme that technology assessment not be 7iewed as a simplistic
 
process. There are endless ramifications. One which ::;hol.ld be of concer
n 
is the necessity for and extent to which management conRicierations of 
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technological projects will or should be encompassed in the concept of 
assessment. The management of a technological application can make a 
vast difference in the resulting social benefits and costs of a project. 
An article in the Washington Evening Star of November 25, 1969, p.12, 
col. 1, illustrates this point. In connection with an investigation by 
the National Transportation Safety Board on "the carriage of large 
quantities of hazardous materials through populated areas (where) 
supposedly effective safety controls do not work," the. Board is quoted: 
Many of the failures of safety controls are 
attributable to ineffective planning, design, 
and management of safety controls involving 
government and private industry. 
Management considerations also suggest the activities of the General 
Accounting Office. While not normally thought of as a technology assess-
ment entity, the GAO performs occasional studies which are clearly 
germane to technology assessment even though primarily di::::ected to fiscal 
and administrative aspects of technological projects. For example, the 
GAO made a Report to the Congress on the "Administration of Project 
Moho1e by the National Science Foundation" (April 23, 1968). The Annual 
Report 1968 of the Comptroller General (of the U.S.) states: 
Among the underlying factors which led the Congress to 
discontinue funding Project Mohole (a project to pene-
trate the mantle of the earth) was the steady escalation 
of the estimated cost and time to complete the project. 
These estimates increased from $46.7 million to $127.1 
million and from 5 to 8~ years. The report contains an 
analysis of the reasons for these increases and points 
out that under the approach followed, the Foundation' 
was not in a position to determine adequately that the 
project objectives were worth the money and resources 
that were necessary to attain them. Yet it was totally 
committed to the project. 
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We suggested an alternative approach to be used by the 
Foundation in future major research and development 
projects involving totally new or exploratory concepts, 
calling for the projects to be conducted in a number of 
sequential phases. Each phase would r.epresent a specific 
limited agency commitment whereby it would determine the 
feasibility of the project objectives, the means to attain 
these objectives, and ~)hether the objectives would be worth 
the costs. involved before a contractual commitment was made. 
. . 
A rec.ent. report of the GAO was directed. to an "Examination into the 
Effectiveness of the Construction Grant Program for Abating, Controlling, 
and Preventing Water Pollution" (Federal Water Pollution Control Admini-
stration, Department of Interior) (November 3, 1969). This Report states: 
(p.3) 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS 
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of the 
Interior require that the States, in establishing 
priorities for the construction of waste treatment 
facilities, and FWPCA, in approving grants for 
such construction, give consideration to (1) the 
benefits to be derived from the construction of 
the facilities and (2) the actions taken, or 
planned to be taken, by other polluters of the 
waterways. 
FWPCA should consider utilizing systems analysis 
techniques in the planning for and implementation 
of water pollution control programs. FWPCA should 
consider also the practicability of providing, 
through its storage and retrieval of data (STORET) 
system (see p. 96), data needed by the States in: 
--determining their water pollution control 
requirement s, 
-~identifying alternatives available to solve 
water pollution problems, 
--formulating water pollution control plans, 
and 
--establishing implementation schedules and 
priorities for the construction of waste 
treatment facilities. 
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Another report of the GAO relating to the operations of a 
Agriculture Research Service of the Department of Agriculture 
illustrates how GAO functions involve not only the mechanisms and 
processes of assessment but also the potential for conflict-of-
interest situations to arise in the use of private consultants. 
(Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1969, p. A2, col. 1.). While most GAO 
investigations relating to technology assessment pertain to completed 
or existing programs, some are anticipatory in character such as the 
special study made of some of the legal, competitive, consumer 
service, and other probable implications of the sale of AEC gaseous 
diffusion plants to private owners. A further example is the clas-
sified evaluation made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of 
the Nike X/Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system in terms of econ-
omy, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
The GAO has not developed a special capability for technology 
assessment nor is its professional staff broadly representative of 
professional skills in comparison, for example, with the Legislative 
Reference Service. However, the GAO's long experience in the appraisal/ 
evaluative function, its movement toward enlarging its skill base so as 
to take into account a broader spectrum of social costs and benefits, 
and its increasing emphasis on the systems approach to major public 
projects are definitely compatible with a more comprehensive technology 
assessment function. Even the existing fiscal and management analysis 
capability of GAO would provide indispensable support to an OTA in tak-
ing a comprehensive view of given applications. 
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Yet, however substantial the services now performed by the LRS 
and the GAO in technology assessment, neither is organized presently 
to perform the types of functions that a Congressional Component such 
as that posited herein could perform. Neither is really a technology 
assessment manager in a comprehensive sense. The bolstering up of 
either of these organizations would, in effect, require that a new 
organizational entity be established. The question then becomes whether 
there is promise of greater net benefit from the grafting of the expanded 
technology assessment function onto one of the exist ing organizations 
or by establishing a separate entity. The latter approach may add 
somewhat to the complexity of the organizational structure, but it 
would provide visibility for the assessment function which would not 
likely emerge if such function is subsumed in the existing LRS or GAO. 
Further, a new organizational entity would provide the conditions for 
the unique tasks with which OTA would be charged. For example, it would 
not be expected to serve a "mass of masters" as does the Legislative 
Reference Service. To put the matter differently, if the Science Policy 
Research Division were given the amplified assessment job, would it be 
able to meet its "on call" obligations while at the same time perform-
ing the information management tasks which will be required of the OTA? 
No doubt the GAO could also develop a comprehensive assessment capability, 
but would not this effort inevitably be subordinated to traditional GAO 
fiscal and management functions? What the Congress would seem to need 
and the JSC/OTA would provide is both the. management apparatus and 
the "feel" of being in control of the situation. This latter element 
of establishing confidence in our understanding and control of the move-
ment of technological development is perhaps the most significant objective 
of all. In brief, the Congressional Technology Assessment Component posited 
herein would fully utilize the assessment capabilities of the LRS and the GAO 
and, in so doing, provide for an effe.ctive allocation of assessment tasks. 
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A further massive allocation of assessment responsibility (which will 
facilitate the performance of the JSC/OTA component) ca.n be made to the 
Executive Branch Departments, Administrations, and Programs which 
are deeply involved with technological applications. One of the p'rimary 
tasks of the OTA will be to .assure cotnprehensive total impact assessments 
of given applications, as well as special purpose assessments for partic-
ular social problems. The most logical loci for total impact assessments 
are those agencies having primary authority over relevant technological 
applications such as DOT in transportation technology. Here is where 
the basic data relating to technological applicatiuns are or should be 
assembled, analyzed, and reported. Apparently, DOT does not yet have 
this data management system, but surely it is the locus ror total impact 
assessments of transportation projects, not the OTA. The recent Re~ort 
on "Transportation Information" to the Committee on Appropriations, 
u. S. House of Representatives by the Secretary of Transportation of 
May 1969 states: 
Good decisions depend on careful analysis of 
pertinent information, yet decisions involving 
billions of dollars in transportation expenditures 
are frequently based on inadequate informat ion. 
Without adequate information, the chances of costly 
errors in these decisions are greatly increased. (p.vii) 
Present transportation information is characterized 
by significant gaps, fragmentation and incompatibilit;i.es. 
It is not possible to examine the transportation system 
as a whole or in terms of its related parts. The inform-
ation problem is so great that considerable efforts "li11 
be required to bring about needed improvement~\ in trans-
portation information. (p.vii) 
The magnitude of expenditures involved in many decisions 
on transportation items is so great that even relatively 
small savings - resulting from the informatio~ program -
will in large in absolute terms. These savings will pay 
for the cost of the information program many times 9ver (p.xi) 
Measures of the performance of the transportation system 
(in aspects besides safety) do not exist. There has been 
recognition recently of the need for national sc~~al indio 
cators to parallel the long-established economic indicators. 
Indicators of the performance of the transportation system 
are a most important element in a general set of social 
indicators (p.127) 
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The foregoing relates only to one major technological application 
area. It demonstrate;~ the truly staggering proportions of the informa-
tion management task. ':It is not only undesirable that the OTA assume this 
entire tasle but ,~ould appear wholly infeasible for it to do so. Assess-
\ 
ments made by the Executfye agencies might to some extent be discounted 
\ 
by the ingrained skeptici~:m of the Congress. But it would be the task 
of the OTA to evaluate such assessments. The implementation of the 
operation of the JSC/OTA cc:mponent may require the reorganization of 
the information/assessment structure of the Executive agencies to a far 
greater extent than is herein posited for the Congressional Assessment 
Component. It would seem that these two assessment devel,i}pments must 
proceed concurrently and iu coordination. Being highly interdependent, 
the Congressional and Execut.ive Components must closely mesh if the 
overall assessment function is to be effective. There must be a high 
degree of concurrence on what data is sought, means of identifying such 
data if existing, and means of specifying data which needs to be generated. 
A real difficulty exists, however, in connection with making total 
impact assessments of many, perhaps most, technological applications. 
The formal authority for operations of those government agencies which 
are the most likely candidates: for a total impact assessment responsibility 
re a particular application or applications is not necessarily co-exten-
sive with either the full scope of effects of the application nor with 
the totality of aspects of the social problem context. ,As has been 
pointed out, fragmentation of the assessment function is basically a 
reflection of assessment entities with different authority, objectives, 
and capabilities. Hence, each might reasonably ask why it should 
accept responsibility for a total impact assessment. The Highway/Motor 
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Freight Carrier application and the Aircraft Noise Problem are excellent 
examples of this division of formal authority and assessment responsibi1-
ity. This is not only evident as in the fragmentation of authority in 
the Federal government but also as between the Federal, State, and 
Local levels of authority. Since operational programs with specified 
and usually narrow authority constitute a substallt ia1 segment of the 
assessment entities in most technology assessment systems having to do 
with major applications, the crucial problem of the OTA will be to inte-
grate the outputs of such entities into a Total Impact Assessment. 
In view of the need for most the the assessment burden, 
particularly with respect to governmentally sponsored technology, to be 
performed by Executive Branch entities, will not the e~fective function-
ing of the Congressional Technology Assessment Component depend upon 
a viable focal counterpart in the Executive Brancn? Highly pertinent 
to this point is an article on "Presidential Staffing in the Sixties 
and Seventies," by William D. Ca(o:ny (Public Administration Review, 
September/October 1969, at 450), who has long experience in Bureau of 
the Budget affairs. After noting that "The modern President must cope 
with shortened decision intervals and reaction times, and his responses 
to domestic and foreign challenges must be immediate and certain," 
Mr. Carey states flatly: "The Presidency is weak in policy analysis" and 
follows up this discussion by pointing to a "second flaw!! in these terms: 
In an age noted fO\c advanced theory and 
technology in organizing and applying inform-
ation, the presidency has no information 
system whatsoever. (p. 452) 
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He further states: 
It is hard to see how the presidency can grip the policy 
dilemmas of the 70's with its present shaky staff struc-
ture. There are limits' to what can be asked of the Bur-
eau of the Budget, which is staffed at the level it 
reached 20 years ago. The Council of Economic Advisors 
limps along with barely a score of professionals, while 
the Office of Science and Technology with some 35 
employees cannot even begin to reshape national science 
goals. These units, together with the immediate White 
House staff, constitute the troops. (p. 457) 
The NAS Report strongly emphasizes the need for an Executive 
'-"~-. I 
1 
Assessment Component as a focal point of Executive Department Assessments 
and as the locus of a comprehensive information system. One might 
question wheth~r Congress should rely solely upon this data source. The 
NAS Report does suggest that the Congress might wish to establish an assess-
ment data system of its own. It would seem that the JSC/OTA component would 
feel considerably more confident if it had control of its own overall 
data source, although such system should make use of OST assessment data 
instead of duplicating the data generation process. In any event, the OTA, 
even if agreeing with the impacts identified by the Executive Component 
re a given technological application, may have quite different notions as 
to the social significance of such impacts, if measured against social 
indicators reflecting a Congressional rather than an Executive perspective. 
A total Impact assessment capability in the OST, for example, which would 
undertake to ii,!' cgrate the outputs of Executive agencies and departments 
and private sector entities into total impact assessments would surely 
lend tremendous assistance to the OTA. If such capability is not established 
on a regularized basis then there would seem to be no alternative for the 
OTA than to develop direct communications links with all relevant Executive 
Departments and Agencies. 
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b) Notion of "Independence of the Assessment Function 
Considerable attention has been given to an assumed relationship 
between the credibility of the assessment process and the establishment 
of appropriate conditions for detached, non-partisan performance of the 
assessment function. This relationship has several facets and has been 
expressed in different ways. In this presentation it would have specific 
reference to the posited Office of Technology Assessment. The Report of 
the National Academy of Engineering on Technpl9~foss~Esme~t is relevant 
to this matter: 
Technology assessments should be produced in an 
environment free from political influence or pre-
determined bias. It can be inferred from the pilot 
studies that the selection of a preferred course of 
action, among alternative strategies derived from 
the assessment, is not a suitable task for the tech-
nology assessment group. This function should remain 
the prerogative. of the legislator after he has been 
provided with the bases for the application of his 
judgment. (p.3) 
Members of a technology assessment task force should 
be chosen for their expertise but not as represent-
atives of affected parties or special interests.(p. 4) 
Experience shows that the task force members possessing 
a wide range of personal interests have been able to 
focus on the public interest and to set aside the biases 
of the organizations with which they are associated. 
(p.4) ) 
The NAS Report on Technology Assessment makes a number of observations 
and suggestions with respect to this matter: 
(A) central defici.ency of existing mechanisms for 
assessment is that they fail to separate promotion 
or protection from evaluation, and thereby compTO-
mise both their integrity and their credibility. 
To overcome that deficiency, any new mechanism we 
1?E.0e.~s~ ~ll:st b.~.~ar.~~~lly ~~sulaE~~_from~.!r~ct 
~olj_c). makJ:r:!LP~~t:.~ __ ~!ld _.re~pon~ib~~~t~~. (p. 80) 
The Report also states that granting a power to "censor all technological 
developments" could not be insulated from external political pressures 
and further; 
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(E)ntEusting such sweeping powers to a new assessment 
entity would rob it of any special claim to objectiv-
ity and would render its judgments at least as suspect 
as those of any other regulatory body. (p. 81) 
More directly to the point, the Report states: 
Any new assessment entity we propose, therefore, should 
be empowered to study and to recommend but not to act. 
It must be able to evaluate but neither to sponsor nor 
to prevent. We confront, however, something of a para-
dox, for though we wish to assure the neutrality of the 
new mechanism, we wish also to assure that it be influen-
tial. The panel has no thought of urging the creation 
of another organization simply to add one more voice to 
the many that already cry out for change. Thus, while 
it must itself seek to be apolitical, any new assessment 
mechanism must be located close to the centers of power 
in the political process; given the vast powers of the 
contending interest that will surround it, any organiza-
tion less centrally situated would have no realistic 
hope of materially influencing public policy. (p. 82) 
The most we can hope for in creating a new mechanism 
for technology assessment is to introduce a greater 
degree of objectivity into the process and to inject 
a body of criteria and assumptions that reflect a wider 
set of interests and values than do the specialized 
organizations currently engaged in fragmented assessment 
activitie s. (p, 83,) 
The thrust of the foregoing extracts from the NAS and NAE Reports 
seem clear enough, although some of us might wish to substitute other 
terms such as "non-partisan" for "neutral" and the concept of "adequacy 
of assessment" for "objectivity of assessment," Perhaps the critical 
issue in addressing the proposed OTA function would be the reference 
to the "paradox" confronted in attempting to design an apolitical 
mechanism which will exert an appreciable degree of influence on the 
political process, What we must do, it would seem, is to brush away 
the "logical impasse" and get on with the job of designing the most 1 j 
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creditable assessment function feasible for the express purpose of 
introducing useful and reliable assessment data into the legislative 
process. This does not eliminate the inherent difficulty, but it does 
present a socially desirable task rather than a verbal "hang-up." 
The GAO statutory scheme and practices are instructive in this 
connection. The Comptroller General is an 11 agent of the Congress. 11 
Among other things, the GAO has the authority and the responsibility 
to "make such investigations of revenue, appropriations, or expenditures 
as ordered by either House of Congress or any Committee having juris-
diction over such matters.1I (31 USCA 53(b». The Comptroller General 
also has the responsibility to report to the Congress, and if requested, 
to the President, including "recommendations concerning the legislation 
he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition 
and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating 
to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds as h~ may 
think advisable." (31 USCA 53 (a». One might contend that such matters 
are more susceptible to consensual agreement, that is, less controversial, 
than the subject matter of technological assessments, i.e., the identifi-
cation and evaluation of the full range of social values affected. But 
certain investigations and reports of the GAO are clearly politically 
sensitive. Nevertheless, it is my impression that the GAO generally enjoys 
a reputation as a highly competent, reliable, and non-partisan activity. 
The high respect status enjoyed by the GAO is perhaps largely attributable 
to an intelligent use of discretion by the Comptroller General and his assoc-
iates as to what types of investigations and reports the GAO capability can be 
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applied usefully as distinguished from those which are so highly 
politicized as not be be amenable to analytical treatment. It is 
also my impression that the National Transportation Safety Board of 
the Executive Branch (DOT) is gradually building a similar reputation 
for its impartial, delibarate process of accident investigation. 
Meapured against the criteria offered by the NAS/NAE Reports 
and the eiperience of the General Accounting Office, how might one 
evaluate the prospects for the effective functioning of the Congressional 
Assessment Component posited herein? 
Would not the establishment of both a Joint Select Committee on 
Technology and Society and an Office of Technology Assessment provide 
an organizational focus of attention commensurate with the significance 
of advancing technology to social problem areas? This would provjde an 
instrument for taking a total systems view of the interaction of technol-
ogy with relevant participants, institutions, and values. 
The Office of Technology Assessment is envisioned as an assessment 
support group directly responsible to the Congress through the Joint 
Congressional Committee on Technology and Society. It would be an 
entity separately identifiable from the staff of the Joint Committee. 
Would not such an arrangement provide organizationally for independence 
of function and operations by the OTA while at the same time providing 
for a direct link to the legislative process through the Joint Select 
Committee? In view of the enormi"ty of the task that vlill be required 
if any substantial increment of assistance is to be provided the Congress 
on technology assessment, it would seem abundantly clear that an Office 
of Technology Assessment is needed in addition to the Joint Select 
Committee staff. 
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As noted, the NAS Report warns against the assumption of too 
extensive a power over technological development and attempts to clarify 
the conceptual conflict between the maintenance of a non-partisan stance 
and the exercise of influence on decision making. But it would appear 
that at a certain point on the curve the two characteristics can be 
mutually supportable. Once an entity has gained a rep'ltation fol.· useful-
ness and credibility, meaning that it is "listened to," it is also 
likely to be strengthened in its "independence" since the preservation 
of conditions for a detached analysis is recognized as serving the needs 
of all concerned. Again, it would appear that the GAO has come close to 
approximating this status. But the achievement of this status is not 
simply a matter of organization. Other variables are evident First, 
the recognition by the Congress of the significance of our technological 
resources and the disposition to assure their effective utilization is 
essential. The OTA will have to be given broad authority similar in scope 
to that of the GAO in order to establish the importance of the OTA function 
and to assure access to relevant assessment data. Provision must be made 
for a staff which will provide an assessment capability of the highest 
order. A strategy of implementation must be designed which will gain 
the support of relevant assessing entities, including opportunity for 
general public participation in the assessment function. Ultimately, 
independence of operations, as well as influence on decisions, will be 
achieved through performance and through public confidence resulting frcM 
professionalization of the assessment function. 
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One mark of independence is the degree of control over the 
activities of an entity. Surely, the broader the range of controllers, 
in the sense that an official or organization is in position to request 
or demand the performance of certain tasks, the less control the entity 
has. If all Congressmen or even all COIDQittees can call upon the OTA 
for assessment tasks, then the independence of the OTA will clearly 
become diluted. This does not mean that the OTA would operate entirely 
outside the perimeter of Congressional needs. Such needs can be expressed 
through the JSC, and periodic consultation can keep the OTA currently 
apprised of Congressional needs. Nor would occasional ad hoc requests 
of Congressional Committees through the JSC necessarily be excluded. 
But the point is that the Director of the OTA should have the final 
determination of what assessment activities the OTA can usefully under-
take. Consultation with the JSC, as well as the requests for assessment 
assistance which will inevitably be directed to the OTA, will surely 
keep the latter finely attuned to the types of assessment tasks which 
the Congress and other agencies consider of importance. The Director 
will surely wish to be responsive to the Congress, but he must be in 
position to make a determination on the basis of an informed judment as to 
what the more urgent existing and prospective needs are, and he should have 
the statutory authority to do so. It would seem that a workable accommoda-
tion can be made. GAO experience is to some degree relevant here. The 
Comptroller General is not obliged by statute to respond to every individual 
Congressional request but apparently undertakes to do so within the limits 
of GAO capability. 
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Two processes are always working in conjunction: the political, 
partisan, adversarial system on the one hand and the non-partisan, 
detached, professional, "respected source of information and anaLysis" 
approach on the other. The first is nurtured by partisan interests, by 
differences in attitudes toward priorities in social values, and by 
uncertainties as to facts, predictions, and social consequences. The 
second has its source of strength in the need for a trusted source of 
information and in the need for the positing and explication of public 
interest-oriented standards of judgment against which partisan claims 
and demands can be tested and judged. In the assessment component posited, 
the JSC provides the link to the political decision process while the 
OTA provides the second, informational-analytical need. 
The critical problem is to develop an OTA that is useful and 
credible. The danger of the OTA's abusing its powers appears remote. 
When an entity becomes influential, it simply means that it has an appreci-
able effect on immediate or ultimate determinations of legal rights and 
duties or of the allocation of resources, i.e., benefits and costs. Hence, 
those who are or may be affected will demand having either an input 
to the assessment forum or the opportunity to challenge assessment out-
comes which may be contrary to their interests Such provision must be 
made, of course. But in addition, it would seem a reasonable assumption 
that the wide diversity of interests represented in the Congress would 
effectively curb any undue exercise of influence over political decisions 
by the OTA. Furthermore, whether obliged by statute or not, the OTA would 
surely follow the information access and dissemination policy as set 
forth in the Freedom of Information Act (5 USCA 552). 
This practice would not only be desirable in order for the OTA to 
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develop effective working relationships but for the purpose of 
establishing its credibility with relevant governmental and private 
sector entities. Such informational practices themselves are 
effective constraints on arbitrary or thoughtless act.ion. 
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c. Representation of Affected Participants in the Assessment Process 
The concept of total impact assessment of technological 
applications requires that the fu~l spectrum of social interactions 
be explored by the OTA. The staff of the OTA, representing all 
relevant professional and disciplinary skills, will be in position to 
identify most likely impacts of an application. However, this internal 
process of analysis may not in many instances provide a fully confident 
basis for assessment even though one purpose of the OTA in using assess-
ment project contractors, institutional grantees, advisory groups or 
special ad hoc commissions will be to assist the OTA in identifying 
the social impacts of given applications or of alternative technological 
projects and making determinations on the magnitude, intensity, and 
persistency of such impacts. In addition to the identification of 
effects, however, there is the further dimension of assessment which 
will arise in connection with some assessment tasks, i.e., the evalua-
tion of the social desirability or undesirability of such impacts. 
Certain segments of the public may well view such impacts as benefits 
or threats in quite different ways. Every application involves both 
benefits and costs, but it does not follow that those segments of the 
public which share the benefits necessarily coincide with those segments 
of the public which must bear the costs. It is often difficult to gain 
full appreciation of these considerations without direct inputs from 
such affected Eublics. Perhaps in a majority of situations those seg-
ments of the public affected will have an organizational channel for 
expressing their views which will come to the attention of the OTA. 
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It is likely, however, and especially with prospective applications, 
that segments of the public will be affected which are not represented 
by an organized interest group or such group might not have perceived 
the implications of the application. Hence, the question arises as 
to how the OTA is to be assured of data on the full span of actual 
or probable social consequences. 
Some sort of modified public hearing procedure which would invite 
relevant informational inputs during the assessment process need not 
be incompatible with the concept of a professional, impartial, public 
interest-oriented entity such as the OTA. A question does arise as 
to the extent such procedure should be formalized. Many entities shy 
away from the judicialization of what are essentially assessment determin-
ations, feeling that the rigid procedures characterizing the formal 
adjudicatory adversarial process deter rather than facilitate access to 
relevant data. The view is sometimes expressed that the adversary pro-
cess is not suitable to the temperament of those whose professional 
modes of inquiry tend toward the dispassionate search for "truth" rather 
than to the extraction of the "facts" through partisan, sometimes compul-
sory questioning. One must face the reality of those assessment situa-
tions, however, where the assessment concerns existing applications as 
contrasted with prospective projects. In these situations, the assess-
ment outcome will inevitably affect legal rights and duties or the 
allocation of power, political or economic. This situation invites 
controversy and demands to assert partisan claims. 
I j 
, ..·.-A 
r I I 
i 
I [ 
-- .,.----- -- ---.- -----~-r--·--· ---
l 
-51-
It would not seem advisable for the OTA to be made subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act or that it pursue hearing procedures which 
would require the imposition of similar processes. The Congress is, of 
course, specifically excluded from the definition of "agency" provided 
iii. the APA. Furthe:L, the OTA would not have any "rule-making" or "adjudi-
catory" funct ions. In such hearings under the APA "A party is entitled 
to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to sub-
mit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be 
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." (S .556 (d». Pos-
sib1y relevant as a "policy" to follow in OTA assessment processes, how-
ever, is the provision in Section 556 (e) that IlWhen an aJ?;ency decision 
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence 
in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity 
to show to the contrary." Yet, even the APA provides in the same Section 
that "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as 
a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immater-
ia1, or unduly repetitious evidence." 
Probably something is to be learned from the procedures and practices 
of the National Transportation Safety Board in connection with "public 
hearings." The Board is an unusual type of Assessment e.ntity, the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act specifically stating that in the exercise of 
its functions the Board is charged with a continuing review of the safety 
situation with respect to all modes of transportation. (Public Law 89··670, 
Sect. 5). The Act further states that the Board in the exercise of its function 
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powers, and duties shall be " ... independent of the Secretary and other 
offices and officers of the Department. It Section 5 (b) of the Act 
prescribes that the Board shall have responsibility for determining 
cause or probable cause and reporting the facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstances of accidents investigated under authority transferred to 
the Secretary of Transportation. Reports and recommendations of the 
Board, as well as special studies, must be made public. The Board is 
concerned with the fullest possible information. It is not concerned 
with authoritative deterulinations of placing fault or assessing legal 
liability. Its findings are not admissible in court. In order to 
obtain the most candid and uninhibited evidence feasible it is my un-
derstanding that adversarial procedures have been discouraged • 
This operati.,on raises an extremely in.teresting and critical ques-
tion, however, relating to the status of an independent, non-partisan 
entity rendering assessment decisions which may ultimately have an 
influence on the allocation of benefits and costs in the political 
process or in the determination of rights and duties in the legal process. 
The NTSB is responsible for establishing the probable cause of accidents 
and this finding is directly related to fault and liability. In acci-
dent investigations the accident has occurred. Liability for cert,l.in 
parties and remedies for others potentially exist. The Board's rec-
ommendations have been generally accepted; thus its assessments sub-
stantially influence official decisions. Hence, various participants 
have a stake in its findings or may feel they do. This encourages 
a partisan approach which may inhibit full disclosure of facts. In I 
1 
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But the Board has also employed so~called "public hearings" to 
evaluate means of solving problems. This is more or less equivalent 
to the assessmen.t of a prospective technological application rather 
than an existing one. On October 31, 1969, "The National Transpor-
tation Safety Board ... announced that more than 18 aviation organiza-
tions and government agencies (would) testify during the Safety Board's 
public hearing beginning November 4th seeking to find ways and means 
to define and cor.rect the national aviation problem of midair colli-
sions." (SB 69-88). Rather than following the somewhat formal pro-
ceedings of accident investigations, the Board set forth the rules 
to be followed, namely that the hearings would be a "sernina'i::-type pro-
ceeding" and that "only Board Members will question witnesses." This 
procedure would seem to fit more closely Section 5 (d)(2) of the Trans-
portation Act providing for "special studies" than to Section 5 (d)(4) 
of the Act pertaining to "accident investigations." Yet even the ini-
tiation of the latter is limited to those the Board "deems necessary 
and appropriate." But the point of interest is that by structuring 
a hearing in this manner the NTSB provided a means of assembling rele-
vant data from affected participants without being burdened by the 
legal apparatus of a formal hearing. Subsequently, of course, should 
a recommendation of the NTSB be implemented by the FAA, then a rule 
making proceeding would be initiated in accord with the APA. Does 
this suggest that the OTA should restrict its "public hearings" to a 
similar essentially informal procedure and avoid efforts to judicialize 
the information gathering function? This approach would accommodate 
a modified adversarial system enabling relevant partisan interests to 
register their views on the technological application involved. It would 
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avoid most of the inquiries raised in Question A6 in Part III, although 
it would not eliminate the situation implicit in Question C7, i.e., 
data needed from a non-cooperative private sector entity. The experience 
of the National Commission on Product Safety (Joint Resolution 33, 90th 
Congreos, November 20, 1967, Public Law 90-146~ should be reviewed in this 
connection. The Commission was authorized to hold public hearings, to 
require private participants to submit reports and answer surveys, to 
administer oaths, and "to require by subpeona the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses and the production of all documentary evidence relating to 
the execution of its duties," (Sec. 3 (a), 81 Stat. 467). Several public 
hearings have been conducted by the Commission which apparently have been 
instrumental in securing official or voluntary action on behalf of con-
sumer protection. (I1Progress Report on Results of Commission Work," National 
Commission on Product Safety, November 18, 1969). 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
B. Some Implications of the 
Technology Assessment Function 
for the Effective Public 
Decision Making Process 
Louis H. MAYO 
May 1971, pp. 16-22 
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IV - Technology Assessment; Some Illustrative Effects 
Some of the probable or possible results of technology assessment can 
be illustrated by reference to the phases of the Policy Formulation and Pro-
gram Implementation Process. These projections should be considered as hypoth-
eses to be tested rather than predictions. 
Problem Perception 
• Development of a systematic Early Al~rt Sensing Function 
for: 
Seeking out incipient crisis situations or 
social problem areas and matching, on a provis-
ional basiS, the means of preventing or of other-
wise coping with such conditions 
Seeking out prom~s~ng opportunities to apply 
resources, technological or otherwise, to the 
achievement of desired social goals 
Identifying prospective implications of proposed 
new technological applications 
Problem Definition and Formulation 
-----;Tti~e Problem Context 
• Continuously improving capability to apply Ilcontextual 
thinkingll to social problem analysis, as for example: 
Skills and techniques (including systematized reference 
materi[l.ls such as comprehensive lists of effects related 
to social problem contexts) applicable to the task of 
identifying affected participants and value-institutional 
processes with cespect to particular technological appli-
cations and the nature of such effects (planned or deriva-
tive; direct or indirect; immediate or remote; inevitable, 
probable, or possible; etc.). 
• Greater sensitivity to "process thinkingll with respect to 
technological applications, as for example, in terms of 
the effects which will occur dUiing the Initiation, Imple-
mentation, and Operational Stages or in the phases of the 
Policy Formulation and Program Implementation Process. 
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• Improved capability to perform "Quick Response" preliminary 
assessments (after brief inspection of the relevant social 
problem context involved with a given technological applica-
tion) which will provide rough policy guides without serious 
risk of ignoring significant implications. 
Information Assembly and Management 
• Assuming the development of structured data management sys-
tems in the major mission-oriented agencies such as DOT and 
the development of an effective capability through the NEPA 
of 1969, Section l02(2)(C) experience to utilize ad hoc and 
informal, semi-structured assessment data "networks" within 
and between various levels of government, the tendency of 
individual agencies to spin off into autonomous orbits can 
be partially counteracted. Such assessment data net'V70rks 
will also assist in overcoming organizat i 0nal deficiencies 
which hinder total social impact assessments of major techno-
logical applications. 
• The more comprehensive and "in-depth" assessme:nts become, 
the more aware various participants will become of the dis-
closure and use of information which may be considered harm-
ful, i.e., claims of unjustified exposure of private compet-
itive data or claims of invasion of individual or institutional 
privacy. Continuing attention will necessarily be giv·.m to 
control over access to data banks and to the dissemination of 
assessment outcomes. 
• The rapidly growing information on assessment outcomes and 
assessment methodologies will require the initiation of a 
Reporter System which will systematize assessment experience 
in such manner as to make such data and methodologies applied 
available to the "assessment connnunity" in readily usable form. 
This will gradually lead to regularization of the Technology 
Assessment Function and to "professionalization" of assessment 
skills. Failure to initiate such a Reporter System will likely 
result in stifling assessment methodology development. 
Invention and Development of Alternative Means 
(i. e., Res ource Conf igur a tions [techno logical or otherwis e) , 
Statutory Schemes, Social Action Program Organization and 
Procedures) 
• There will be an identifiable .shift in emphasis from narrow 
issue, rule-oriented, progrannned thinking to contextual, prob-
lem-oriented, alternative thinking as ~ore adequate methodologies 
are developed for performance of the assessment function. 
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• One of the most significant effects of applying the 
contextual approach to Technology Assessment will be 
a gradual shift from "one-factor-fix" thinking (legal" 
economic, or technological) to "problem context" and 
IniLiation-Implementation-Operations Process thinking. 
The analytical implication of this shift will be, for 
example, that with respect to proposals for new techno-
logical applications, the relevant assessment policy 
mak.ers will consider means in tenus of the Total Techno-
logical configuration (the combination of facilitating 
and supporting resources through time! legal, political, 
economic, social, etc.) rather than in tenus of the tech-
nology per se. 
• Excessive emphasis on socio-political constraints in 
particular assessments may, on occasion, inhibit tech-
nological initiative and innovation. Overall, however, 
assessment activities will create an increasing number 
of opportunities for innovative technologies to be applied 
in combination with other resource/means in order to allev-
iate existing social dislocations or to achieve desired 
social goals. 
• The continuing development of the Technology Assessment 
Function in the various agencies of the Federal Executive, 
the Regulatory agencies, and in the Congress, as well as 
in entities at the State and local levels~ will gradually 
bring about a regularized system of hearings or other mech-
anisms by which orderly inputs can be made by all community 
participants affected by or who might be affected by a new 
technological project. In addition to this "adversarial" 
input to the assessment function, an increasing number of 
"inclusive assessment outcomes" should be available from 
university policy analysis groups and other entities having 
no partisan stake in the assessment other than its adequacy. 
Evaluation, Selection and 
Recommendation of Means 
• Assessment methodological concepts and skills will provide 
more reliable (adequate) outcomes. Analytical skill levels 
will improve appreciably with respect to: 
Problem perception and formulation 
Organization of assessment data 
Development of Alternative Configurations 
(Means, technological or otherwise) for 
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attaining a specified social objective 
or set of objectives. 
Projection of alternative future social 
enviro nments reflecting all maj or value-
institutional processes. 
Deve.lopment of more useful models of indi-
vidual and organizational behavior for 
application in the contextual/process 
approach to assessment. 
Simulation of changing social process/ 
environment through time, including the 
interrelationship of conditions and trends. 
• Both complex and simplistic assessment methodologies 
will be developed within the next few years, the former 
to accommodate comprehensive, inclusive, in-depth efforts 
and the latter for preliminary assessment testing or for 
"r.;.uick response" outcomes for urgent policy decisions . 
• One of the most difficult assessment tasks will continue 
to be the conversion of effects into measurable social 
impacts. Reference NEPA of 1969, Section l02(2)(B). 
• The necessity to introduce certain social value schemes 
into the assessment process in order to translate effects 
into measurable social impacts will require that much 
greater attention be given to alternative concepts and 
techniques of designing social value schemes as empirical 
inputs into the assessment process. This required assess-
ment input can also be viewed and posited as alternative 
concepts of Social Justice, i.e., alternative ways of dis-
tributing social costs and benefits (including resource 
allocations and the assignment of legal rights and duties) 
among affected participants. 
G As a general proposition it is likely that Technology 
Assessment as a regularized function will gain more rapid 
acceptance and application in the Executive Agencies and 
Departments than in the Congress. It is only sensible for 
the mission-oriented agencies, for example, to make use of 
inclusive, non-partisan assessments to identify objections 
and sources of opposition to new proposals in order to cor-
rect the configuration of the proposed project or otherwise 
minimize difficulties with the development of socially use-
ful technologies. However, we shall no doubt see various 
participants in both the Public and Private sectors apply 
such comprehensive, inclusive assessments as a technique 
for more sophisticated advocacy of partisan positions. 
j 
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• As the T~chnology Assessment Function develops, 
missiC'11-oriented agencies will continue to be 
caught in a difficult position as to their assess-
ment ~esponsibilities. They are designed to promote 
research into and the development of technologies 
which presumably advance the public interest. But 
this general objective often involves an inner contra-
diction. The mission agency cannot act as freely part-
isan as many participants who might be affected by 
a new application. On the other hand, it may consider 
that its primary role is to adapt technology to social 
uses as it sees the problem rather than to attempt to 
be an impartial participant in the research and devel-
opment process. The latter is the role of non-partisan, 
inclusive-oriented analysis groups such as university 
programs. Hence, the mission agencies will continue 
to be confronted with this eternal dilemma between pro-
motion of its cognizant technology per se and develop-
ment of such technology in terms of a supposedly general 
public interest. Regulatory agencies, on the other hand, 
would seem to have a clear mandate to make inclusive 
contextual assessments rather than to prefer the develop-
ment of its regulated technological applications over 
other equally desirable social interests. 
Formal Prescription ofa New Statutory Scheme 
And/or Authorization of a 
New Social Action Program 
• The decision to approve or disapprove technological 
projects can be expected to depend, in many instances, 
upon assessment outcomes. Such outcomes, especially 
those based upon an inclusive approach, if persuasively 
documented so as to show a clear net social gain or a 
clear net social loss with respect to a given project 
could be decisive. Assessment outcomes will also be 
utilized in making determinations as to whether a greater 
social benefit will result from the allocation of resources 
to one social problem context rather than another . 
• Technology assessments will probably be influential in 
shaping the specific provisions of new statutory schemes 
authorizing public programs in that the assessment of 
alternative implementing means (as to organization, mode 
of operations, regulatory schemes, etc.) will disclose 
that certain implementing arrangements offer a greater 
Ret social gain. Assessment outcomes will also assist in 
the development of more adequate statutory standards, i.e., 
standards/criteria which are clearly relevant to the social 
objective sought, which are adaptable to the operations 
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under scrutiny, which are "measurable" for decisional 
purposes, and which readily provide for detection re com-
pliance. 
Application of New Statutory Scheme and/or 
Implementation and Operation of 
New Social Action Program 
• Administrators, managers and operators of programs and 
projects which have been designed and implemented with 
the assistance of adequate assessments will be increas-
ingly cognizant of the full scope of effects of the pro-
gram's ope'rations and will therefore be in position to 
maximize the social benefits and minimize the social 
costs to suppliers, users, and other participants affected. 
• An adequate assessment function will lend useful support 
to all agencies (Federal, State and local levels) having 
a regulatory or enforcement function by providing reliable 
data for matching appropriate offical action with relevant 
social problem contexts. 
Appraisal of the Effects of the Application of the 
New Statutory Scheme or of the Operations of the 
New Social Action Program 
• Anticipatory technology assessments will inevitably lead 
to post-implementation appraisals of new technological 
applications and public programs involving significant 
technological components in order to determine if the 
degree to which application/operation produces effects 
consistent with those projected; such applicatjon/opera-
tional appraisals will also evaluate the effects of such 
programs for their consistency with the achievement of 
national policy goals in related areas of public interest. 
• This amplified evaluative function will place continuing 
and persistent pressure on all entities (Public and Private) 
required for the assessment, implementation and operation 
of public programs to coordinate their activities so as to 
maximize social benefits and minimize social costs. This 
pressure will serve to counter the natural, inevitable, 
tendency of individual entities to maintain their activi-
ties as an autonomous "closed system" for purposes of juris-
dictional sovereignty and bureaucratic survival. 
• One significant resultant of the regularized Technology 
Assessment Function will be the development of alternative 
and increasingly refined concepts of what constitutes an 
"adequate assessment" in various patterns of social prob-
lem/technological application contexts. 
r 
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Modification or Termination of the Statutory Scheme 
or the Social Action Program as Outcome of 
Continuing Monitoring and Appraisal 
& When appraisal subsequent to program implementation 
and operations discloses the desirability for abrupt 
or premature termination, such result may mean that 
the original anticipatory assessment was inadequate 
or in some manner faulty or that conditions which 
existed and were appropriately projected have, for 
unforeseen reasons, changed substantially. In any 
event, continued attention to the assessment function 
will disclose that continuing appraisal is as indis-
pensable to the overall Technology Assessment Function 
as anticipatory assessments. 
.. The essential point ~vith respect to the relationship 
of continuing appraisal to program modification is 
that an increasingly greater degree of control can 
be maintained over the relationship between program 
output (performance) and the social goals the program 
was designed to-promote. Put otherwise, the overall 
Technology Assessment Function, which includes consid-
eration of all phases of the Policy Formulation and 
Program Implementation Process, is the means by which 
feed-back (cybernetic) control can be applied to the 
Effective Public Decision Process. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
C. Implementing Technology 
Assessments 
Raphael G. KASPER, ed. 
John M. LOGSDON, ed. 
Ellis R. MOTTUR, ed. 
July 1974, pp. 151-161; 
165-169; 
75-90; 
257-284 
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Limitations On Implementation Of Technology Assessment 
Harold Green began the discussion by briefly reviewing the 
history of the concept of technology assessment.* He felt that 
... Congressman Daddario introduced the notion of technology 
assessment ... because he was concerned that while technology 
was developing very rapidly in many areas, the adverse 
consequences of technology were also increasing at a very rapid 
rate. Somehow our system of social control was not keeping pace 
with the risks of technology. In the early days, it seems clear 
to me, technology assessment had more of a negative than an 
affirmative thrust. Congressman Daddario was somewhat more 
interested in protecting our society against the risks of new 
technologies than he was in trying to assure that we had the 
maximum possible benefits from new technology. 
But the notion of technology assessment began to change: 
Whereas Daddario clearly regarded technology assessment as 
something which would assist Congress in making decisions by 
trying to give Congress a fair dose of the adverse, negative, 
risk factors of technology as well as the affirmative or 
beneficial factors of technology, the more people that talked 
about technology assessment, particularly in the scientific 
community, the more people came to think of it as the kind of 
exercise which might help in the making of correct decisions. 
[That is, they thought of it as] ... something which would 
insure that rational, logical, correct decisions would be made. 
Professor Green was puzzled by the idea that the results of technology 
assessments should be implemented. To talk about the lIimplementation 
of technology assessment" 
... we have to talk about a technology assessment that is 
performed by a body of grea t stature . . .. Therefore I am 
rather skeptical that the mere fact that a committee of PSAC, 
for example, undertakes a study of the supersonic transport or 
DDT or what have you, and comes up with some conclusions, ought 
to justify an assumption or belief that the particular result 
ought to be implemented. 
* The full paper is printed in a separate appendix. 
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We have never had a "reall y authoritative technology assessment 
group" which is recognized as such by all members of the society. 
But even if a group of such character existed, there would be 
important limitations on the extent to which the results of that 
group's deliberations ought to be implemented. 
Part of the difficulty, Professor Green held, lies in determining 
just what the "results" are. Are they a "balanced assessment of 
benefHs and risks? If so, "there's really nothing to implement." 
Are they a "range of possible alternatives which might achieve the same 
beneficial end?" Are they "recommendations or a ranking of 
alternative courses of action in terms of a net appraisal of benefits 
and risks?" The limitations described in the seminar paper are 
"applicable, at least to some degree II to all of these results. 
Professor Green turned to a discussion of the "inherent limitations." 
The first of these is lithe limitation on the identification and 
measurement of benefi ts . II 
I don't think that it is possible in any real functional sense 
for one person to reach a valid conclusion about what another 
person would regard as a benefit. . . . This problem is tremendously 
complicated and exacerbated when one is trying to ascertain what is 
a benefit to a community or what is a benefit to a nation. There 
you are really coping with the summation of a very large number of 
individual judgments as to what is and is not beneficial. When a 
technology assessment body attempts to identify and measure benefits, 
it does so by reference either to the assessor's own value system 
or to the assessor's opinion of what the value system of the 
community is. I would suggest that there is no possible way that 
any assessment body can accurately ascertain what the community as 
a whole would regard as a benefit. 
The second limitation is lion the identification and measurement of risks: 
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I think the difficulty there is that it is virtually impossible 
to measure the risks of a new technology. It may be possible 
to identify risks just by letting your imagination run. But 
they are only possibilities. Until you have actually tried 
something and have some experience with it, it seems to me that 
there is no way you can tell for sure whether or not there is 
a risk. One may be able to say with validity that the risk is 
small or the risk is large. For example, the Congressional 
Research study of the SST characterizes the environmental risks 
of the SST as minor. But there is always a problem of the risk 
which is attributable to uncertainty. I would suggest that one 
of the most difficult jobs that one has in identifying and 
measuring risks is to place a value on the degree of uncertainty 
one is willing to assume. 
Then there ;s a limitation connected with "any attempt to balance, 
either implicitly or explicitly the benefits against the risk." 
Professor Green noted 
... The fact that in the early stages there is usually 
absolutely no evidence of ri~k and the fact that in the 
early stages of a technology there is always immense promise 
of benefit. This means, it seems to me, that in almost every 
technology at an early stage the benefits are going to outweigh 
the risks. 
He drew a distinction between a privately financed technological 
development and a publicly financed enterprise. In the latter case 
there is a tendency to "force the development beyond the level that 
the market place would permit." 
Professor Green called attention to the fact that it is difficult 
to stop an already established technology: 
The reality of the matter is that it is very easy to start a 
technology going; all you have to do is provide the money. 
But when people's jobs become dependent upon it and when 
people become accustomed to the benefits ... it becomes 
quite a difficult exercise to turn off the technology. It 
is almost impossible to turn it off before very substantial 
harm has been done. 
In addition to the inherent limitations already discussed, 
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Professor Green called attention to the "political limitation." 
He used the example of cigarette smoking which Was presented in 
the seminar paper. In this case~ in addition to the purely 
"technology assessment elementsll there are a host of political 
"I imitations: 
There is the problem of the people whose livelihood ;s 
dependent 11pon growing tobacco and manufacturing cigarettes. 
There is the problem of people who really enjoy smoking 
cigarettes and who don't care if they die ten years earlier 
because they are having fun while they are doing it. There 
is the problem of liberty -- whether the government ever 
ought to interfere with what a person does with his own 
body. And so on. 
He continued: 
Any technology assessment, of necessity, has to be only a 
very small ... part of the totality of the interests of 
individual Congressmen and the Congress as a whole. No 
matter how important a technology assessment may appear 
to the assessors or to particular government officials . 
it really ;s a small part of the total picture. There is 
no way for a technology assessment to make the kinds of 
trade-offs that have to be made by people who are concerned 
about the total picture .... [In addition] each member 
of Congress has his own particular value system. Some of 
them ... have no interest in life whatsoever other than 
to advance the economic interests of their own constitutents. 
And some of them, on the other hand, don't care much about 
their own constituencies and are interested only in being 
statesmen. Some are mainly interested in agriculture and 
some are mainly interested in space exploration. I think it IS 
only to be expected that a Congressman will respond to any 
particular technology assessment in the light of his own 
particular interest and priority of values. 
He concluded his opening remarks by stating that 
... in a democ.ratic society like ours, with pluralistic 
interests, one c~nnot expect that truth and logic and 
rationality are going to prevail in legislative decisions 
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about anything. Why therefore should we be particularly 
concerned about singling out policy for scienco. and 
technology and ask that it be rational. I am not ~dvocating 
irrationality. I am simply saying that in the democratic 
process, where tremendously diverse inter.ests have to be 
taken into account ... , you cannot expect to have uniform 
rationality. Rationality is, I think, more of an exception 
than the rule. And if one looks at the tremendous range of 
important df~cisions that are made in our society, like, for 
example, what our policy should be with respect to the -
Vietnam War or who should sit on the Supreme Court ... , 
I think it kind of anomalous that we even think about 
singling out policies for science and technology and expect 
that we should have a higher order of rationality or 
correctness in that area than in these others . . . . I think 
that technology assessment is vitally important. . . • But 
I think we are doing the concept of technology assessment 
and our whole political system a disservice if we try to 
cast technology assessment. , . as some kind of rational, 
error-free orthodoxy to be imposed upon our political system. 
We ought to concentrate our efforts with respect to technology 
assessment on trying to give the Congress the kinds of 
information that can enable it to do a better, but certainly 
not an error-free, job in enacting laws. 
A. VaJue?, Politics, and Assessment 
A lawyer agreed with the speaker that technology assessments 
generally contain value judgments: 
I think that what the paper is pushing for makes eminently 
good sense: to surface the value decisions that are in the 
assessment itself, in addition to those which are made after 
the assessment is delivered. The values that are implicit 
in the assessment have to be surfaced somehow if a reasonable 
or responsible, but not necessarily rational, debate is to 
pro.ceed. 
A university researcher saw many of the recent technology 
efforts as seeking to do this by increasing 
. . . the number of poi nts of contacts between the overa 11 
political system and the scientific and technical community. 
In earlier days, decisions that were made within the 
scientific and technical community '.'Iere viewed by society as, 
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on the one hand, so highly technical that the public at large 
could not really understand them and, on the other 'hand, not 
of much general, inmediate significance to the society .... 
In that period, it was thought that you could have some sort 
of perfect technology assessment which would just yield a' 
solution which could be imposed. We are now at a point where 
< •• science has got to become an integral part of our 
overall society just like any other segment of the political 
community in America. 
A goverrment official felt that it was possible to separate 
questions of value from questions of data and facts in assessments. 
Many issues lI are perfectly well subject to analysis and eXperiment. 1I 
He cited certain environmental effects of the SST as being amenable 
to such analysis. He continued: 
It simply takes a will ingness to invest a certain amount of 
thought to find out what the factual information ;s and to 
lay ... such questions to rest. Now that's the kind of thing 
that I can see as a totally do-able assessment project. That 
is where the questions involve hard, empirical data that you 
can simply go out and get if you hav~ the willingness to do so. 
They are quite different from the questions that are measures 
of the public will and public policy. I think it is necessary 
to make reasonably sharp distinctions between those things 
that you can pretty well settle on the basis of numerical 
evidence and experimentation and those things that are 
primarily normative. We have institutions that already are 
supposed to worry about most of the technical issues. 
A university professor, however, was "not sure that we can dispose 
of the technical versus the pol itical that easily. II He too referred 
to the SST controversy and cited the Congressional Reference Service 
Study IIwhich was intended as a technical report ... but which has 
some very interesting political implications. 1I The report, which 
minimized the environmental effects of the SST, II ra ised some interesting 
questions about the i~volvement of an agency like the CRS in a very 
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sensitive legislative issue. II He noted that "you are really 
involved in the political process just by the act of giving 
a technical report on a very sensii'iv~ issue." A Congressional 
Research Service representative agreed that Congress makes 
decisions by a 
... process of negotiating, of bargaining, of kicking 
around ideas -- some of which are highly technical and 
some of which are highly emotional, political, normative, 
value judgments. There are all kinds of reasoning 
processes that go on all the time in the Congress ~r in 
the public. 
The Congressionai Research Service SST study sought to "help the 
Congress ask the right questions ll and not lito argue in favor of 
the SST.II The study tried to point out that the economic 
problems, rather than the environmental ones, were the crucial 
ones. A member of the National Academy of Sciences staff, 
however, felt that the selection of environmental data used in 
the study prejudiced its conclusions. The choice of data and 
the choice of issues to be considered make the process of 
assessment a IIvalue-ladenll one, "even though there is a sincere 
attempt on the part of the assessors to make sure that value 
considerations are excluded. 1I 
B. Limitations on Assessments 
A government official and'futurist' disagreed vehemently with 
Professor Green's contention that there are limitations on the 
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analysis of benefits. He commented that the notion that an analysis 
of benefits cannot be made 
· .. flies in the face of roughly forty years of sociological 
and social psychological investigations which tell you that, 
in fact, there is no aspect of human behavior or human 
enterprise which cannot be effectively evaluated and scaled. 
It ;s "not impossible to establish benefits.1I As for risks, he 
continued 
there is a whole enterprise called Bayesian probabilities 
which is designed to deal with the very area that the paper says 
one cannot deal with; namely, subjective probabilities. This is 
a quantitative, well regarded, respectable academic enterprise. 
Another government official sought to pursue the role of 
empirical evidence in the assessment process. He called attention 
to the fact that the seminar paper indicates that 
· .. risks cannot really be identified and measured with any 
real confidence until the technology has been used sufficiently 
· .. to provide a basis for empirical judgment. I wonder if 
we could expand at all on the prospect for having an empirical 
approach playa larger role in the kind of questions that are 
add~essed by technology assessments. Is it feasible to get the 
society in a state in which we will try a little of something 
and observe the consequences befol'e we try a lot? 
Professor Green enlarged upon this point: 
There is no substitute for experience. I do not think that 
the mind of man is capable of predicting events with the 
degree of accuracy required to provide assurance for the 
protection of the public interest. 
But a university professor saw problems in such an approach. Some 
effects of technology are irreversible. 
· .. If something is reversible, then we can let society 
respond to it and react to it; but there are some things 
that we are dealing with or will deal with in the future 
where a yes or no decision may be catastrophic. ~ 
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It may be difficult to know, in advance, which decisions will have 
di sastrous results so that the deci sion to experiment may be 
fraught with danger 
c. Other COlilnents 
There was brief discussion of the differences, for the 
assessment process, between privately and publicly funded technology. 
One participant disagreed with the seminar paper's contention that 
private financing will necessarily result in slower development than 
public funding. He cited the introduction of large numbers of Boeing 
747's in 1970 and 1971, as evidence that "investment decisions are 
made from the viewpoint of optimizing the return on investment and 
they don't necessarily imply a very systematic or orderly introduction 
of new technology." He continued: 
People who have been involved in environmental controversies 
think that sometimes it is better to oppose private projects 
and other times it is better to oppose a government project. 
It just depends upon the power of the particular agency and the 
resources and political savvy of the industry inv'olved. 
Professor Green felt that perhaps too much significance had been 
attributed to limy so-called dichotomy between public and private;" 
but that 
. generally speaking, I would defend the proposition that 
it is easier to shoot down a privately financed technology than 
a publicly financeg technology. On the other hand, I would also 
make the point that a technology assessment is really required 
when the Congress has to make a decision on whether to appropriate 
a large sum of money for the supersonic transport; and you don't 
necessarily need a technology assessment when Boeing or Lockheed 
makes a corporate decision to spend a large sum of money. 
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In all likelihood, we would not feel any need to have a 
technology assessment of a privately funded SST until the 
plane was about ready to go into the air. 
One participant saw a basic problem in "an imbalance in 
the sources of information available to decisionmakers." 
Opponents of new technologies, he held, often are unable to 
generate and present information to the same extent that 
proponents can. 
A lawyer drew an interesting parallel between attitudes 
toward technology and attitudes toward assessment: 
~ 
I would suggest that one's attitude toward technology 
assessment reflects one's attitude as to whether technology 
holds the promise of solving the perceived problems in the 
society.. Those who think technology holds many or most of 
the answers ... are likely to be more generous in their 
treatment of technology assessment; and those, including 
myself, who are less satisfied that technology has in it 
solutions to existing problems are likely to be much less 
charitable towards the concept of technology assessment. 
He went on to hold that it is necessary to develop ways to achieve 
a greater pluralism in examining the effects of technology; 
"wha tis needed . is to have a wide variety of people giving 
their own views on the likely consequences of technology." The 
failures evidenced to date indicate that "we haven't had enough 
• /I 
van ety. 
One government official and 'futurist' attacked the speaker 
for an alleged lack of logic in his paper and presentation, and 
voiced his distress at 
... the absolutely incredible anti-intellectual tone of the 
whole discussion, largety.because the people who are involved 
in the discussion have absolutely no appreciation of the limits 
of science and technology and are primarily wedded to technology 
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as pictured in the textbooks of 1920 .... The discussion 
has essentially reflected the attitudes of lawyers and soft 
scientists toward what technology means. There wasn't a 
single discussion ... that mentioned such things as computer 
simulation which is a major input into anticipating outcomes. 
There wasn't any discussion of the place of modelling in 
addressing these questions. There was no discussion of a 
calculus of values. Now all of these are fundamental to what 
vie are tal king about; but they no\"here entered into the 
discussion and I don't think that you can adequately address 
the issues without drawing on them. 
r 
"Technology assessment" has been so broadly defined that it can 
credibly describe almost any analysis of the impact of a technological 
application. The diverse phenomena classified as technology assessment 
tend to a corresponding diversity in the processes by which assessments 
are linked to action. This chapter consists of five case studies of 
specific technology assessments and the ways in which they influenced 
(or did not influence) the development the assessed technology. These 
case studies were chosen to illustrate the variety of situations which 
must be analyzed before any generalizations regarding the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process can be advanced. The case studies are: 
A. Jamaica Bay/Kennedy Airport 
B. Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement 
C. NiJclear Power Plant Radiation Standards 
D. CaY~lga Lake Power Pl ant 
e. Storm King Power Plant 
The Jamaica Bay/Kennedy Airport case, which involved a study of the 
environmEJy~al impact of an extension of the runways at Kennedy International 
Airport into Jamaica Bay, is a good example of the potential influence of 
expert opinion and public sentiment which coalesce in the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process. The assessment was performed by a multi-
disciplinary team of experts operating independently of the Port of New York 
fl.lJthority, the agency which initiated the study. Contributions from the 
public were encouraged and numerous public groups were involved in the per-
formanc~ stage of the assessment. The results of the assessment were widely 
disseminated through local and national media, thus providing a focal point 
~ , 165 
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for aggregating public opinion. The results of this comprehensive assessment 
and the anticipated public reaction to it were responsible for the Port 
Authority's decision to abandon its plans for a runway extension at Kennedy 
Airport. 
The Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement study involved action by both the 
executive and legislative branches of government. The assessment in question 
was initiated in the Executive Office of the President. Members of a White 
House Jet Aircraft Noise Panel performed the assessment and recommended a 
comprehensive plan for solving the noise problem. The Congressional response 
to the panel's report was to authorize the Federal Aviation Administration 
to prescribe rules and regulations for the control ard abatement of aircraft 
noise. The absence of significant organized public involvement and the 
problem of communicating highly technical information to a non-technical 
audience resulted in the public's virtual exclusion from the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process. A concomitant result was a dispropor-
tionate amount of Pl"l?SSUre from the aviation industry on the FAA and its 
rule-making process. The result was a piecemeal approach to the jet noise 
problem, one which lacks both sufficient evaluative criteria and the coordina-
tion necessary for generating workable and effective regulatory standards. 
The Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards case illustrates clearly 
the potential problems created when various biases (or appearance of ~iases) 
are introduced into the assessment-acceptance-implementation process. The 
same analysts initiated and performed the assessment. The distinction 
between the regulatory and promotional roles of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) became blurred in both the performance and presentation stages of the 
assessment. The influence of special interests, accompanied by their own 
group biases, reached its zenith during the decision-to-act stage. Such 
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biases were evident, however, throughout all phases of the study and highlight 
the role of the adversary process in the conduct of technology assessments, as 
proponents and opponents of existing standards present conflicting points of 
view. The public had little direct involvement in the assessment; the pre-
ponderance of experts and interest groups favorable to the development of 
nuclear power as well as the promotional bias of the AEC and the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy were powerful forces contributing to the AECls decision 
to formally reject the assessment. 
The Cayuga Lake Power Plant case was distinguished by a lengthy and in-
tensive performance stage marked by a variety of investigations into the New 
York State Electricity and Gas Co (NYSE&G) plans to build a nuclear-fueled 
powerplant on the shores of Lake Cayuga. In addition to NYSE&G, analysts, 
groups of scientists, public-interest groups, and state policymakers and 
regulators actively participated in the performance stage. Numerous viable 
alternatives to the nuclear powerplant were presented. ~et, while each of 
the parties involved appeared prepared to promote its own alternative, none 
gave much consideration to the other alternatives. NYSE&G eventually decided 
to postpone activity on its construction permit application to AEC as a cross-
current of pressures flowed from the various participating groups. The case 
illustrates the problems which may accrue from the absence of any integrative 
mechanism for bringing together the results of alternative assessments and 
for funneling those results into the policymak;ng process. 
The Storm King Mountain Power Plant case, which involved an attempt to 
balance the requirement for increased electric power with the need for a 
greater effort to protect the environment, highlights the importance played 
by the nature of the initial assessment in the acceptance-implementation 
process. None of the major parties involved in the Storm King controversy 
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had the capacity or the responsibility for performing the broad assess-
ment that was required. Even if such a capability and accompanying mandate 
had existed, the absence of a hierarchy of priorities for environ-
mental policy would have made it difficult to assess accurately alter-
native policies and programs. The case is still being argued in the 
courts and the uncertainty of the litigation has forced Con Ed 
to delay project implementation. In the meantime, the assessment 
process continues and new problems are being identified. The case 
illustrates how prOblems associated with the performance of the 
assessment can continue to affect the implementation process. 
In order to provide a common framework for the description and 
analysis of these case studies, they are each organized in terms 
of a single analytic framework. This framework is constructed in 
terms of steps in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process 
and the participants in that process. Eight steps in the process 
have been identified: 
1. Initiation--the stimulus or situation which leads to the 
conduct of an assessment. This could be as specific as 
a directive from an appropriate authority to perform a tech-
nology assessment or a statutory requirement to do so or as 
broad as public reaction to a situation which makes an 
assessment desirable. 
2. Performance of the Technology Assessment--the actual analysis 
of the consequences of applying a technology. Since this 
study is not primarily concerned with th~ conduct of a 
technology assessment per se, the consideration of this step 
will be limited to those factors real ted to later steps in 
the process. 
3. Presentation of Results--the report of assessment findings and 
recommendation, if any. The assessing entity presents 
the results of its analysis to other interested parties, 
formally and/or informally. 
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4. Decision to Act--the determination that an action is warranted. 
Legitimate authorities formulate a decision on the issue 
to which the assessment was directed. Such a decision may 
or may not reflect the findings of the assessment. The 
decision to act may incorporate some aspects of the assessment 
or use information or data generated in ~h~ ~ssessment. 
5. Planning of Action--separate (at least analytically) from 
the decision to act. A plan of action is aeveloped which 
implements the assessment findings . 
6. Approval of Plan--acceptance of the plan of action. The 
plan of action is approved by appropriate authorities. 
7. Implementation of Plan--The plan is put into effect by the 
appropriate participants. 
8. Monitoring and Evaluation--determination of the effectiveness 
of the action. The impacts of the plan are recorded and 
compared to the desired impacts. 
Seven participants in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process, 
differentiated in terms of their roles in the process have also been identified: 
A. Developer/User/Promoter--These participants have direct, 
usually economic, interest in the application of the technology under 
consideration, because it would provide some positive benefit to them. 
B. Analysts--These participants carry out the assessment and monitor 
and evaluate its results. 
C. Policymakers --These participants have the legitimate authority and 
responsibil ity to make decis'ions initiating courses of action 
legally binding the opoulation and/or affected segments thereof. 
D. Administrators--These participants are responsible for executing courses 
of action recommended by policymakers. 
E. Regulators--These participants are responsible for applying general 
standards established by policymakers in order to control 
operations or activities covered by those standards. 
F. Adjudicators--These participants have the responsibility for resolving 
conflicts which result from the execution of the policy decision or 
from the application of standards to specific cases or situations. 
G. Public/Public Interest Groups--These participants are identifiable pri-
marily by their absence from the other six categories of participants; 
specifically, public interest groups are those organized entities which 
purport to speak for some segment of the general populace. 
The analytic portion of each of the following case studies uses 
these concepts as a tool for extracting from the case studies potential aspects 
of general relevance to the assessment-acceptance-implenentation process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Automotive Air Pollution 
And Problems of Implementation 
of Technology Assessment 
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John Esposito began the discussion by stating that he operated 
on the lIassumption that the automobile is here to stay. 11* He noted 
that in examining the problem of air pollution from automobiles we 
are 
. . . attempt; ng to deal with an unforeseen consequence 
of what is a giant enterprise in the United States. For 
two-thirds of this century, the automobile industry has 
not been subject to any really substantial regulation. 
I think this results in there being a large vested 
interest in warding off government regulation and 
retaining the freedom to do things pretty much as the 
industry pleases. . . . It is a natural tendency 
on the part of organizations to want to operate as 
freely as possible. 
He felt that the central thesis of his paper bore repeating: 
I . . . emphasi ze the structure and self-defense mechani sms 
of the auto industry because I believe that the making 
and implementing of technology assessments is an 
intensely political process. A system of politics 
requires that government make choices from among the 
demands of competing interests. In short, in its role 
as arbiter of a particular controversy, government must 
decide which groups will win and which will lose. When 
power, access to government, and control over information 
are virtually monopolized by one group, the outcome will 
be predetermined. With a relatively few insignificant 
exceptions, this is what has occurred in the field of 
automotive air pollution control. 
* The full paper is printed in a separate appendix. 
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The speaker then reviewed the stages in the automobile industry's 
response to the air pollution problem: 
First there was a period of outright denial ... on 
the par't of the industry which said that there was no 
evidence to indicate any real connection between the 
automobile and health hazards. This is, I think, a 
standard pattern in the sense that the general thrust 
has been to assume that the public has the burden of 
proof as far as health hazards are concerned and that 
industry will conti nue to do pretty much what it 
pleases unti1 the government has proved rather 
conclusively that the activity is a dangerous one. 
When scientific evidence began to mount, the industry 
entered a second stage and that is the study stage. 
The next stage \'/a5 an acknowl edgment that there was 
an air pollution problem and it was related to the 
automobile, but that it was confined to Los Angeles 
because of L.A. 's particular topographical and 
meteorological patterns. 
The next step, when the forces of government and the 
public began to close in, was an attempt to delay 
regul a tion, 
Mr. Esposito felt that the lesson to be drawn from this sequence 
is that "a tightly oligopolistic market does not respond to demands 
which it has not created. 11 He continued; 
It seems clear that the industry meticulously limited 
the dissemination of information concerning its capacity 
to control pollution and was shaken out of its complacency 
only when it found itself under the gun. 
A major impediment to the implementation of programs designed 
to reduce automotive air pollution was the inclusion, in the National 
Emission Standards Act of 1965, of the phhLse 
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· .. "technological and economic feasibility." In 
other words, in setting the standards, the Secretary of 
HHI had to take into account the technolog'ical feasibility, 
as far as the industry was concerned, and the economic 
burden that it might place on the industry. This sounds, 
at first blush, like a perfectly reasonable position to 
take except when you are dealing with a situation 
where the sources of information are so tightly controlled 
as they are in the automobile industry. As a consequence, 
· .. Federal standards were not very ambitious. But 
even these rather modest standards were not effectively 
met by the automobile manufacturers. 
The speaker discussed two "rudimentary technology assessments" 
of recent years: the Morse Report which concluded that electrically 
powered vehicles were not presently feasible and which "rather strongly 
endorsed the potential for steam engines and the turbine engine;" and 
the report of the Senate Commerce Committee entitled "The Search 
for a Low Emission Vehicle" which "emphatically endorsed the steam 
engine as a feasible alternative to the internal combustion engine." 
There has not been a great effort on the part of the manufacturers 
to develop alternative engines. Chrysler has done a great deal of 
work wi th the turbine e,'lgi ne 
· .. but it ;s my feeling that we are not Qbout to 
see the introduction of the turbine engine by the Chrysler 
Corporation. This is directly related to the structure 
of the automobile industry. Although Chrysler is the fifth 
or sixth largest manufacturing corporation in the United 
States ... it cannot realistically make any innovations 
that the General Motors Corporation does not accept. 
General Motors, in effect, calls the shots in the automobile 
market. It sets styl-ing trends; it has enormous advertising 
budgets; and it can effectively divert consumer choices 
away from those areas it does not want to see emphasized. 
Mr. Esposito charged that "the automobile industry has spent 
irresponsibly small amounts of money on air pollution control." He 
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repeated the questions raised in his paper about whether even the 
small amounts spent in this area go into a "sincere effort to develop 
effective pollution control devices" or into discouraging the 
discussion of innovative proposals. 
He felt that 
... much of the monolithic stand of the industry could 
be traced to a cross-licensing agreement which has 
existed since 1955. Very simply, that was an agreement 
among the automobile manufacturers to pool all of their 
information resulting from research in air pollution 
control and also, very importantly, to jointly assess 
patents offered by outsiders to anyone of the companies. 
I think this effectively disarmed the inventor of any 
bargai ni ng po\ver he mi ght have had and effecti ve ly 
precluded competition in the area of air pollution control. 
The paper outlined the charges made by the Justice Department in its 
complaint filed against the Automobile Manufacturers Association and 
the four major automobile manufacturers. The case was settled by 
consent decree, and 
... I think there are some questjons about the 
remedi a 1 effect of the consent decree. I don 1 t thi nk it 
reached all the questions raised by the complaint itself. 
Secondly, I think the consent decree foreclosed the 
opportunity for what was probably the first really open 
discussion in a court of law of at least one very important 
aspect of the self-defense mechani sm of the automobile 
industry. 
The speaker endorsed the concept of legislative standards for 
pollution control and noted that the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, 
which set such standards, indicate a change in attitude from the past: 
In the 130 1s, I think reformers tended to see the 
administrative process as the answer to all problems. 
They saw the judiciary as the enemy, and such notions 
as due process and the rest as being unnecessary devices 
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in bringing about social change. Now there is a great 
disillusionment with the administrative process; there 
is a feeling that it has become antiquated; it's 
atrophied; it has become a. captive of the regulatees, 
and the points of access are monopolized by those,who 
are supposed to be regulated. So I think that what occurred 
in the Muskie Legislation, the idea of legislating a 
specific deadline, is excellent. This is something we 
may begin to see in many other areas. It is interesting 
to note, also, that in the lobbying it was ... the 
automobile companies and other industries that lobbied 
for continued administrative discretion in these areas. 
Mr. Esposito concluded his opening remarks by noting the three 
areas in which he feels public policy decisions must be reevaluated: 
the scope of the assessment, which should be greatly broadened; the 
size 3nd structure of the automobile industry, which must be 
considerably altered; and Federal research into alternatives to 
the internal combusion engine, which must be expanded. 
A. Alternatives to the Automobile and the Internal Combustion' Engine 
Mr. Esposito called attention to the need to develop an 
alternative to the internal combusion engine: 
I think that one of the reasons for the push toward 
alternative sources of power 'is that it makes such 
good sense to put an engine which has inherently low 
emission characteristics into an automobile. Such an 
engine can be compared to the internal combustion 
engine which is a "Rube Goldberg,1I and which is a 
very complicated engine and a very dirty engine. Then 
you tack on a device, a cork, and charge $50, $75, or 
$100 for that cork. And you are not sUre whether that 
cork is going to work. Why not go to a propulsion system 
that has inherently low emissions as part of its operating 
characteristics. 
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An industry representative pointed out that all of the alternative 
sources yet proposed are either difficult to develop or cause 
environmental problems themselves. For instance, electric vehicles 
would produce less pollution from the automobile itself, but would 
cause pollution problems from the huge generating capacity required 
to provide electricity for charging the batteries. But a 
Congressional aide found this to be a specious argument: 
The easiest place in the world to control pollution is 
in an enormous electric plant where you can afford to 
install all kinds of ... equipment. This is the, 
place where economies of scale help to control pollution. 
Mr. Esposito granted that there were problems connected with all of 
the alternatives to the internal combustion engine, but he felt that 
these problems could be resolved more readily than could those of 
the internal combustion engine. He agreed with the point about 
controlling pollution from the generation of electricity: 
Electric cars ... would provide a way to concentrate 
the environmental problems in the sense that you might 
be able to control emissions from a utility or from a 
relatively small number of power stations that might be 
located throughout a city more easily than you could 
chase after every single driver in the city. 
A Congressional aide raised a more basic question: IIIsn't 
there a better way of moving people around this world than in 
automobiles of one sort or another? A university professor agreed 
that this was an important question to address for 
... it never fails to amaze me that the American 
people are so devoted to this uneconomical and 
rather bizarre transportation system to the extent 
that they will fight traffic jams and parking jams 
morning and evening. 
, l 
1 
i 
': 
l 
~-~~~"--T~~ ~-~~~, -~r~~ 
1 ~ 
I 
81 
When one participant attributed this acceptance of the automobile 
to the fact that "they don't really have many alternatives" a 
university professor pointed out that 
... you can't really say that other forms of transportation 
didn't exist. They did exist but they couldn't survive. 
There was a time when mass transportation was well-
developed and extensive, but it just couldn't survive the 
competition of the automobile. You have to ask the 
question of whether the failure to survive was essentially 
economic or political. I think that it was economic. 
Now you can ask whether mass transportation was driven 
out because the automobile was given a sUfficient 
unfair advantage through various subsidies. I don't 
know if that's true. I really do suspect that 
competing forms have disappeared because they couldn't 
stand the competition in view of consumer preferences. 
You see this going on in Europe. Europe still has well-
developed and attractive public transportation systems. 
But look at the way the use of automobiles is escalating 
in Europe with the growth of incomes there. They 
are goi ng through exactly the same sort of thing that 
we went through twenty or thirty year3 ago. 
A university researcher agreed: II . the fact remains that no 
matter how good a mass transportation system you have, it can never 
offer the mobility and flexibility of cars.1I 
Several participants attributed the lack of viable alternatives 
to the automobile to the fact that the automobile manufacturers, 
with their powerful lobby, have made certain that attractive alternatives 
are not made available. But a university professor was 
... not so sure that General Motors is not doing 
precisely what the overwhelming majority of the 
members of the American public want it to do. I think 
that a very strong argument can be made that the 
automobiles which are being manufactured today, from the 
exhaust to the asbestos brake lining, are precisely 
what the American public wants . . .. If the American 
public were confronted with all of the facts about air 
pollution, the effects of air pollution on health, and 
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the economic costs of eliminating air pollution, I have 
serious doubts that it would opt to eliminate ·3.i't 
pollution if the costs were going to be substantial. 
What is happening today with respect to General Motors 
is precisely what the political system is permitting 
and encouraging. I don't think we should damn General 
Motors. 
Mr. Esposito did not agree: 
I think that your universe is too narrow when you say 
that GM is doing precisely what the public wants. You 
are assuming consumer sovereignty. But the options 
have not been offered to the public. I would like to 
see the results of a referendum taken after a thorough 
analysis and a comprehensive scheme and real options 
were offered to the people. Until then, I think that 
of all the principles or assumptions one could adopt, 
the assumption of consumer sovereignty is one of the 
weakest. 
He added that II Detroit , and others who have profited from the 
automobile, have foreclosed or have tried to foreclose our options." 
A Congressional aide agreed. He called attention to the fact that 
... when you try to talk about a rational transportation 
progrum in Congress, the way the automobile lobby descends 
on you is really frightening to see. 
B. The Need for a Broader Assessment 
Mr. Esposito noted that 
. . . we have never had a wide enough scope of assessment 
so that the other options are made available. I don't 
think you can really say that the people will inevitably 
choose the automobile if, in fact, they have a comfortable, 
low-cost, and non-dehumanizing form of mass transportation 
available. But no assessment has presented a series of 
options from which to choose. 
But a university researcher insisted that 
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... the fact is that you are all contaminated with that 
American idea that you can do anything that you want 
to do. But at any point in time, it's possible that 
some problems are insoluble. 
While this speaker was referring to the possibility of producing 
attractive alternatives to the automobile, a university professor 
was bothered by a similar attitude toward cleaning up the 
automobile : 
I am sort of intrigued by the tremendous amount of this 
19th century faith in technology as being able to solve 
every problem. There is the assumption in this discussion 
that technology can solve the problem and make a clean 
car if you just put enough money in it. This isn't 
necessarily true. 
But Mr. Esposito insisted that such comments were of limited value 
because the scope of the assessment to date has not been broad 
enough: "All the issues you raise are legitimate issues and should 
be evaluated in a rational way;" but we are not assessing things in 
a comprehensive enough manner today to arrive at definite conclusions 
about public choice or the ability of technology to help solve the 
pollution problem. 
C. Setting Standards and Enforcing Regulations 
'-"i. 
: f;z~ An interesting exchange occurred between an industry representative 
and Mr. Esposito over the proper interpretation of the fact, reported 
in the seminar paper, "that up to 75% of the so-called controlled 
vehicles actually in use failed to meet federal standards." The 
industry representative pointed out that air pollution standards are 
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set inorder to preserve a certain level of air quality. Thus, it 
is not important that all cars meet the standards; if is only 
important that the total of all emissions from all cars be less than 
a certain standard. He noted that 
.•. when the regulations were set up, they were 
supposed to take care of the atmosphere. The 
atmosphere is the greatest averaging thing there is. 
Thus, the intent of the regulations is to maintain an acceptable 
level of environmental quality, which will prevail if the average 
emission from all cars is low enough. He claimed that the emission 
from any single car is insignificant; thus it is not essential that 
any particular car meet the standards. 
When the industry spokesman tried to explain his point by 
claiming that emissions from automobiles fallon a "bell-shaped" 
curve, Mr. Esposito noted wryly that lithe bell has a tremendous crack 
in it." It was clear to him that the meaning of the regulations was 
that each and every car must meet the standards. In fact, if this 
were not the case the regulations would be absolutely unenforceable. 
He pointed out that there is no provision in the regulations that 
only some of the cars produced must meet the standards. Although 
the limiting of total emissions of an cars may well have been the 
intent behind the regulations, the actual regulation as written 
requires each car to meet the standards. This is the only way that 
the regulation can be realistically enforced. 
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D. Role of the Economic System 
An industry representative felt that it was somewhat 
"incongruous" for defenders of the consumet to argue for increased 
pollution control since 
... in the kind of society we are in -- no matter 
who might pretend to pay for thing -- it is the 
general public which pays for everything in its taxes 
and in the price of products. So this Lpollution 
control] ends up being a price that the public is 
going to pay somehow or another. 
But Mr. Esposito noted that the public is already paying for pollution 
control devices -- he estimated that one and a half billion dollars 
ha~ been paid for the II cl ean air package" and the like -- but that 
those devices do not work. In addition, while he agreed that lithe 
consumer will have to absorb the additional cost of pollution 
control ," he claimed that 
... there is a strong likelihood, to say the least, 
that the costs of pollution control as they affect the 
consumer don1t reflect the cost to the manufacturer. 
He related this point to the nature of competition in the 
automobile industry: 
I think that until we return to some semblance of a 
true market situation here, costs will be passed on to 
the consumer with no guarantee that they accurately 
reflect costs to the manufacturer. Pat't of the 
reason is that the industry is not subject to 
traditional market restraints. 
However, a university professor wondered whether breaking up the 
oligopoly was any solution. He wondered whether 
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... the chances for pollution control or any other 
protection for the consumer might be greater in a 
market which is concentrated than in a cut-throat 
market which is very competitve. I wonder whether 
firms in a competitive market would want to add to 
the costs of business. It would seem easier for a 
company ... to absorb the cost if it could control 
the market. 
But Mr. Esposito believed that 
... the larger the number of industrial units we have, 
the more difficult it is ... for industries to come up 
with unanimous positions. In addition, in a de-concentrated 
market you will have increased the possibility that you 
will have some diversity, in quality as well as choice. 
In a more ideal market, some of the competitors might 
see pollution control as one of the ways of getting 
competitive advantage. 
In response to a questi on about the amount of funds whi ch 
industry is spending on pollution control, an industry representative 
sai d that "there has been no 1 imit on the amount of money tha t we 
want to use in any project as long as itls for emission control." 
This led to the following excha~ge bet~ecn a university researcher 
and the industry spokesman 
Researcher: Are you really asserting that if the 
government were to offer GM and the other manufacturers 
an additional $150 to $300 million for R&D on this, the 
companies couldnlt find ways of using it? 
Industry Representative: I meant what I said. We get 
all the money we want. 
Researcher: People always cite the space program as 
an example. Why is it that the country could move to 
a budget of billions of dollars so quickly in areas 
which are much more difficult and require much more 
innovation? Why is it that it is so difficult to build 
the pollution control effort into a more extensive 
and effective effort more rapidly? 
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Industry Representative: The know-how basically to do 
the job was known when the goal was set to be on the 
moon in ten years. We knew, but we didn'thave the 
hardware developed. The money was involved in the actual 
hardware development, not in developing the principles 
for doing the job. 
Researcher: So the actual technical principles that 
you have to contend with are more difficult than those 
in the space program? 
Industry Representative: We don't know some of them yet. 
One participant was bothered by industry's "self-righteousness" and 
arrogance in dealing with its critics. He doubted that industry 
was really serious about pollution control. A Congressional aide, 
however, saw no reason to be surprised by the attitude of the 
automobile industry: 
It is naive for people to believe that General Motors 
is acting as a good citizen; it is equally naive for 
people to believe that General Motors should act as a 
good citizen. The job of the corporation, as it functions 
in our society, is to make a certain amount of money. 
The only reason it would possibly change its policy would 
be that it becomes more expensive to do business 
wi thout a change'. 
E. Industry and the Political Process 
A university professor saw two ways that industry could react 
to the problem of automotive air pollution: 
One which is the undertone of Mr. Esposito's paper, is 
to use its power within the confines of the political 
process to undercut any effective government regulation. 
The other ;s to respond to coercion, such as government 
subsidies to their competitors, and to actually do 
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something [to reduce pollution]. This second course may 
be the one which the industry is following. You know, 
large organizations want to avoid having government 
sitting on top of them. If the most effective way that 
they can see that avoided in the near future is by 
developing some kind of process that will make government 
keep off their backs, rather than exerting their 
weight in the political province, why not give them 
the benefit of the doubt? 
But several of those present felt that the industryls record in the 
past made clear that no benefit of the doubt was deserved. A public 
interest lawyer noted that 
... many of us feel that the automobile industry 
doesnlt seem able to meet the pollution problems; it 
doesnlt seem able to meet the safety problem; it 
doesn't seem able to meet the repair problem. It 
will not make a cheap, easily repairable model which 
does not change its design from year to year. What 
do you think of the suggestion that the design of 
automobiles be taken away from industry and be 
given to government agencies with the industry 
simply allowed to contract to make the automobiles? 
Mr. Esposito saw this as a "potential option;" but a Congressional 
aide felt that this would be a disastrous alternative "since Federal 
agencies very quickly become the satraps of the industries they are 
supposed to regulate." He quipped, "I Id be very leery about setting 
up a Federal agency to do something better than GM because I suspect 
they Id work out an agreement in restraint of trade. II 
A university professor fel t that the problem under discussion 
had profound implications for our political system: 
We all have ideas about the values and precepts 
that should underlie a Constitutional system which 
says that there is a public sector and a private sector 
and the job of the public sector ... is to arbitrate 
among competing private interests. But "private 
r 
'.., 
89 
sector" isn't the right phr-ase when you speak of 
General Motors . . . . The whole set of values that 
underpin our political system don't tell us a thing 
about how [the relationship between GM and the 
government] should work. We need a new system of 
thinking about our political values. 
F. The Relative Roles of Administrative Bodies and Legislatures. 
A government official took issue with Mr. Esposito's critical 
remarks about the role of administrative bodies concerned with the 
environment. He noted, for example, that the Environmental 
Protection Agency was ne'lIly formed and to call it "antiquated, 
atrophied, or the prisoner of the regulatees is not quite fair." 
This led to the following exchange: 
Mr. Esposito: You said that EPA is not atrophied yet? 
Government Official: I suggested that it would be unfair 
to assume so at this point. 
Mr. Esposito: It is basically an umbrella organization 
for a whole host of atrophied agencies. 
Government Official: That's a provocative way of 
putting it. 
Mr. Esposito: Maybe some life tan be injected into 
them. 
An industry representative saw need for a.regulatory body of 
some sort: 
Because the auto industry supports the administrative 
approach to the application of regulations, it ;s assumed 
that the admi ni strati v.e approach must be wrong. I don't 
know if I necessarily agree with the logic. 
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He endorsed the basic procedure whereby government should set 
clear requirements for the industry to satisfy. But· 
· •. our problem here is that we need some people in 
the regul a tory group (whether it turns out to be . 
legislative or administrative) that understand the 
technical part of the problem. We don't have those 
kinds of people in the Legislative Branch today. 
If you are going to propose that we do all future 
regulation by legislation, then let's get the 
technical expertise into the legislature. Aft~r all, 
the business of building an automobile is a technical 
one. 
Mr. Esposito responded that 
• •. there is a need for additional expertise, but I 
think this is a basically political judgment. I think 
the Legislative Branch is the appropriate branch to 
resolve thi s •.. 
The industry representative claimed that the Legislative Branch 
· .• usually doesnit have the time or staff to .•. 
assess the technical problems. For example. if Congress 
should decide that there should not be any more 
automobiles because the air pollution problems are 
so bad, that would be a technical decision. 
Mr. Esposito disa~Jreed: 
I think it is a clear-cut political decision. If 
Congress should decide to ban the automobile, there 
are not many technical questions to be raised. I 
think it pushes all technology aside. 
A university professor emphasized the political nature of the 
decisions involved. He argued that 
· .• it is misleading in the extreme to talk about a 
particular technological impact, such as air pollution 
from the internal combustion engine, as being good or 
bad, right or wrong. Whether it is good or bad or right 
or wrong is a political question. It's not really 
susceptible to factual analysis in any meaningful public 
policy sense. The problem lies at the doorstep of the 
political process which has allowed it to exist. Everything 
in our society is controllable through the political process. 
The real problem is how to perfect the political process ... 
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CHAPTER 15 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT-
ACCEPTANCE-IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
In order to discuss the acceptance and implementation of technology 
assessments, it is first necessary to identify briefly various types of 
technology assessments. This. is so because the notion of accepting and 
implementing an assessment implies that, explicitly or implicitly 
the assessment includes findings or conclusions which point to a particular 
policy choice. Thus, a summary discussion of assessment-acceptance-
implementation requires an analysis of how the findings of the assessment 
influence policy formation, selection, and execution. Yet, not all assess-
ments are designed with this function in mind. 
Coates differentiates three types of assessments: (1) a neutral 
analysis; (2) a search for desirable choices; (3) an advocate's tool. 
A neutral assessment would be an "application of scientific analysis to 
future outcomes and alternatives." This type of assessment, says Coates, 
is "raw material" for those who wish to influence policy choice. The 
second type of assessment is one that "goes a step beyond the even-handed 
analysis of consequences" to "highlight various desirable policy options." 
The final variant of assessment is one which is used to support "whatever 
position an advocate chooses to take."l 
Obviously, what is meant by acceptance and implementation of a tech-
nology assessment varies with the type of assessment involved. If the 
assessment is a neutral one, with no explicit policy recommendations, 
then its acceptance means that some partisan of a particular course of 
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action either has become convinced that that course is desirable because 
of his evaluation of the assessment or that the assessment's findings 
reinforce his own preferences. If the assessment is one which identifies 
desirable choices in its conclusions, then its acceptance means the acceptance 
of its policy recommendations. Finally, if the assessment ;s an advocate's 
tool, designed to support a preselected point of view, its acceptance 
means that the advocate's viewpoint prevails in the conflict over policy 
outcomes. 
The five case studies in the preceding chapter can be separated 
according to assessment type. 
1. J~?ljaica Bay/Kennedy Airport 
This assessment probably comes closest of the five cases analyzed to being 
a neutral analysis. It concludes that "runway construction will damage 
the natural environment of the Bay and reduce its potential use for 
conservation, recreation, and housing. 1I2 Even this assessment, however, 
was reported in a document which then went on to outline recommendations on 
issues beyond that of runway construction including plans for the management 
of the Bay and the improvement of service at Kennedy Airport. All of the matters 
considered in the assessment had been and continue to be matters of great 
publ ic and pol itical interest. This may suggest that "no matter how objective 
an assessment might be, it will become embroiled in political controversy if 
3 
the matter is important. II 
2. Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement 
This assessment is clearly an example of the second type--a search for desirable 
choices; it assessed the sources and consequences of jet noise and recommended 
a comprehensive set of policies required for noise abatement. 
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3. Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards 
This assessment is also an example of the second type, although it is much less 
clearly so. Gofman and Tamplin's initial analysis seems to have met most of 
the canons of scientific inquiry, and their findings and the conclusions could 
have been challenged by challenging the scientific validity of the research 
which led to them. However, the challenge took the form of attacks on the 
analysts and their actions, and in later presentations Gofman and Tamplin 
began to treat their analysis more as an advocate's tool than as the result 
of purely scientific inquiry. 
4. Cayuga Lake Power Plant--
This assessment was in fact composed of a set of partial assessments. 
Without analyzing any of these in great detail, it is probably valid to 
conclude that the overall assessment has elements of both the second and 
third of Coates' types. Some, perhaps most, of the partial analyses were 
performed by competent scientific teams and the findings of these analyses 
led to specific conclusions regarding preferable courses of action. But 
apparently, there were also elements of partisanship in the design and 
execution of some of the studies, particularly those commissioned by the 
promoters of the nuclear power plant. 
5. Storm King Power Plant ---
In this assessment, which again was a series of partial analyses con-
ducted by different performers, elements of advocacy seem to have been pre-
valent. This is probably because most of the analyses were conducted with-
in the context of the proceedings of a regulatory agency and a court. As 
Coates comments, those who see assessment primarily as an advocate's tool 
"see the courts and regulatory agencies as taking the lead in managing 
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technology. Since the law operates on an adversary basis," he says, 
technology assessments tend to be IIstructured to fit that pattern ."4 
A. The Political 'Nature of An Assessment 
One conclusion that emerges from the preceding discussion is that, 
viewed from the perspective of its acceptance and implementation, any 
effective technology assessment is, in part, political.* That is, in order 
to have influence (to be acted upon), an assessment must be an element 
in the public policy-making process. That process, through 
which a course of action is selected from among competing alternatives, 
is. itself. always political in that its outcome is determined, at least in part, 
by considerations of power. Acceptance and implementation, in this view, 
are IIsocio-pol itical processes flowing from and anticipated by early 
phases of the policy process. This ... is recognized in the consideration 
of technical, economic, and political feasibilities in the ration~l analysis 
and political negotiation leading to the formulation of policy content. liS 
Even "neutral" technology assessments imply decisions, and decision-making, 
as Bunker notes, is a combination of rational analysis and political nego-
tiation. Etzioni suggests that lithe effectiveness of a decision will 
depend as much on its power-backing as on the validity of the knowledge 
and the decision-making strategy which were used. 1I6 If an assessment is 
viewed as an input to, and thus a part of, decision-making, then it is 
possible to analyze the assessment-acceptance-implementation process in 
terms of how its early stages--initiation and performance of an assessment--
affect the later stages of acceptance and implementation. As Etzioni conments: 
The two processes [decision-making and implementation] ... 
are closely interwoven, with decisions affecting implementations 
and initial implementations affecting later stages of decision-
making ... There is a continual give-and-take between decision-
making and implementation. 
* This theme runs throughout the seminar discussions in Part I, as well. 
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Moreover, "early decisions shape the power which affects later decisions, 
and the more the initial decision took relevant power into account, the 
more effective implementation is going to be. ,/ Folk makes the above point 
specifically related to technology assessments: "If viewed as part of the 
policy-making process, ... technology assessment must be adapted to the 
existing political process in which special interests, restricted and 
fragmented government jurisdiction, and untrustworthy advice flourish."a 
At a recent meeting on technology assessment, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, 
a Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, emphasized strongly that 
policy-makers and decision-makers will ignore technology assessments as long 
as assessors feel that their work can be done in the seclusion of ivory 
towers, divorced from the realities of the political process and from the 
wants and desires of the constituents of elected officials. He urged that 
technology assessment be viewed not as a purely academic pursuit but rather 
as an input to policy and decision-making responsive to the needs of govern-
ment decision makers and their constituents. 9 
If the assessment-acceptance-implementation process is viewed as Folk and 
Benn see it, that is, as one type of the general relationship between analysis, 
policy choice, and policy execution, then it is possible to consider that 
process in terms of more general discussions of publ ic pol icy-making. 
One basic issue that arises immediately is: how do policies get selected 
and executed in a pluralist political system in which power is widely 
distributed? The accepted answer is that pluralist policy-making is 
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based on a dynamic process of the formations and dissoluticms of coali-· 
tions in support of a part; cul ar cout'se of action. Bunker conments that 
IIpolicy activation cannot be achieved on a corrmand basis, but must be 
accomplished through mobilization of support and the interweaving of 
both information and performance contribuions from a variety of sources." 10 
Lindblom describes the effects of pluralism: IIpower is always held by a 
number of persons rather than by one; hence policy is made through the 
complex processes by which these persons exert power or influence over 
each other. II 11 If this perspective is valid, then the assessment-
acceptance-implementation process can be analyzed in terms of how an 
assessment is involved in the formation of the coalition of 'interests 
and/or power which leads to its acceptance and eventual impleme!ntation. 
The issue can be stated somewhat differently: at what stage of the 
assessment-acceptance-implementation process should coalition formation 
occur if an assessment is to be acted upon? 
There seems to be a consensus in the policy studies literature that 
the likelihood of policy execution is increased if coalitions in support 
of such action are formed during the early stages of the policy process. 
Dror notes that 
Identifying a "good" best policy and executing it 
are two different phases; the second does not necessarily 
follow from the first. Some Ifmotivation" ... must be 
introduced for executing the policy, allocating resources 
to the executing, and "pushing" the executing ... 
Giving or withholding such motivation is a main 
function of political power. Gaining the necessary 
support for a policy involves building a coalition 
of power centers that together control most of the 
power that is concerned with the problem the policy 
is about. 
Dror al so notes that "action-oriented pol icy making allocates a con-
siderable weight to the policy·s chances of being supported by a 
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coalition strong enough to motivate its execution, and this allocation 
distinguishes such policy-making from 'utopian ' policy-making" and that 
"groups which are most likely to be in the coalition often should be 
involved very early in the policy-making activity itself. 1I12 Bunker 
suggests that II pol icies which emerge from the interaction of rational 
analysis, political leadership, and administrative discretion are not 
only more likely to be made operational; but a policy process charac-
terized by active 'involvement of participants from these functions is 
likely not to be so fragmented as to impair capacity for execution. 1I 13 
It is necessary at this point to attempt to specify the acceptance 
and implementation outcomes of the cases studied: 
1. Jamaica Bay/Kennedy Airport --
This assessment was accepted and implemented. The logic of its analysis 
called for the abandonment of plans for a runway extension; this recom-
mendation was acted upon immediately after receiving the assessment. 
2. Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement --
This assessment was accepted by both the President and the Congress, but 
its implementation, which was the responsibility of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, has been partial at best. 
3. Nuclear Power Plant Radiation Standards 
This assessment was rejected by those with legitimate authority to take 
actions based on its recommendations but these same authorities did later 
take actions closely resemb'Jing those recommended by the assessment. 
4. Cayuga Lake Power Plant 
This assessment was conducted in the context of an adversary process in 
which many positions were taken. Thus it is not easy to speak in terms 
of acceptance and implementation of an assessment, since there was no 
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one such analysis. Rather. the assessments here were integral parts of 
the process of policy debate, not outside inputs to it. The decision naf 
to continue to seek a construction permit from the AEC represents the 
acceptance and implemenation of what came to be the "majority" 
view.among the performers of assessments in this case. The meaning 
of "majority" is crucial here: Given the perspective adopted in this 
chapter, it can mean only that greater power was held by the coalition 
of interests opposed to the power plant than by the plant's supporters. 
5. Storm King Power Plant --
The assessment of the Storm King Power Plant, like that of Cayuga Lake, 
was conducted within an adversary process in which many positions were taken 
and most of the preceding comments on the Cayuga Lake case apply to it. 
However, in the Storm King case, the power held by those supporting and opposing 
the construction of the plant varied with the forum in which the debate 
took place. The ultimate outcome--rejection of the opponent's analyses 
and at least the interim approval of the Storm King project--seems linked 
to the fact that the project's promoters performed a successful enough 
"counter-assessment' to undercut the advantages the opponents had gained 
in the judicial forum. 
Different coalition-formation strategies were followed in each of 
the cases. In the Jamaica Bay study, there was prior agreement that the 
findings of the study would be publicly disseminated. The issue was 
highly salient to the media, interested citizen groups, and the general 
public. This tended to assure that the public would be made aware of the 
assessment and that public opinion would support any assessment finding that 
reinforced existing attitudes. The study team, although it conducted the 
assessment in isolation from day-to-day outside pressures, did actively 
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seek citizen involvement in its deliberations, This meant that, at least 
in part, the assessment could be said to reflect a public consensus (or 
the study team's perception of a public consensus). When the findings of 
the expert analysts turned out to parallel that consensus in most respects, 
a powerful coalition of experts and the public was formed, and given the 
political and environmental context of the time, it was impossible for 
PONYA to make any decision e~cept to abandon plans for runway extensions. 
The coalition between expert and citizen illustrated in this case is 
becoming an increasingly powerful one, especially with respect to environ-
mental issues. A National Academy of Sciences study of technology assess-
ment recognized the importance of extensive citizen participation in the 
assessment process both for practical reasons and in the light of demo-
cratic theory. That study suggested that early citizen participation 
helps avoid belated citizen opposition and that "objective evaluation" 
of social costs and benefits is impossible unless the diverse views of 
. d t' 'd d 14 lntereste par les are cons, ere . 
In the jet noise abatement case, acceptance and implementation were 
dependent on the supp0rt of different sets of participants.* Analysts and 
policy-makers cooperated in initiating, performing, and accepting the 
assessment, but the resulting implementation plan delegated authority to 
administrators for its execution. As is often the case, the most influential 
clientele of the administrators was directly affected by the policy 
the administrators were supposed to implement. The coalition of interests 
and perspectives between bureaucrat and clientele groups is often strong 
enough to resist major policy shifts imposed by top level policy-makers, 
even with expert and some public support. The delegation of implementing 
* The participation of various interests in this case is also discussed 
on pp. 141 ff., above. 
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authority to administrators often results in potentially significant policy 
shifts being transformed into incremental changes only.* This was the 
situation in the jet noise abatanent case. 
A similar description fits the radirtion standards case. Here expert 
analysts consciously attempted to create a coalition in support of their 
views because they recognized the power of the opposing coalition, which 
consisted of the AEC (in a joint promoter-regulator role), nuclear 
industries, the l estab1ishment" in nuclear science, and the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy. In their attempts to form a coalition based on Congressional, 
professional, and especially informed public support, Gofman and Tamplin 
alienated the opposing coalition to the extent that a compromise on 
the explicit acceptance of their recommendations became impossible. As 
the case study suggests, it is not possible to state unequivocally that 
the power of the "Gorman-Tamplin coalition" was great enough to force 
informal acceptance and implementation of the analysts· conclusions. 
The Cayuga Lake case was marked by the development of a variety of 
positions ranging from relatively uncritical interest in the construction of 
a nuclear power plant on the lake to virtu.al oppotion to the project. 
A central role in the assessment was played by. an ad hoc citizen group, 
The Citizens Committee to Save Cayuga Lake. This group attempted to play 
a mediating role by organizing a coalition which would agree on a plan for 
the construction of a power plant modified to reflect opponents· critic)sms. 
Ultimately, the attempt to organize such a moderate coalition failed, dnd 
opponents of the plant were ab1 e to persuade its promoter to end the 
quest for a construction permit. It appears that the extreme positions 
in support of and opposition to development of the plant had become so 
* Milton Katz commented on the relationship between administrative discretion 
and administrative power in the discussion of his paper, p. 126. 
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firm during the course of the assessment that it was impossible to bring 
the various parties into a compromise agreement. 
The, coalition-formation strategy in the Storm King case was even more 
marked by the polarization of positions. like the Cayuga lake case, an 
ad hoc citizens group was formed, the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference. 
But unlike the Cayuga lake group, this group served as a focal pOint for 
organized opposition to the power utility's plans and the government 
regulatory conmission's support of those plans. The task of allocating 
values between promoters and opponents of the plant went to a Federal 
Court of Appeals. Reliance on a formal mechanism for resolving the 
conflict, rather than on the informal process of negotiation and bargaining. 
mitigated against any tendency to compromise on the part of the plant's 
opponents, who felt that the courts gave them a means of achieving 
their desired end--abandonment of plans for the plant. However, the 
majority of the court became satisfied that the plant's supporters had 
so modified both their plans foro the plant and their analyses supporting 
their plans that there were no grounds for court intervention in the 
licensing process. In so dOing, the court in effect joined the coalition 
of interests in support of the plant's development, 
It is apparent then that in the one case in which an accepted 
assessment was not implemented--the Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement case--
those involved in implementation efforts were not included in the coalition 
of power which had supported the performance and acceptance of the 
assessment and its findings. One analyst suggests that IIfrom the point 
of view of facilitating the utilization of analysis, mutual adjustment 
between the analyst and the user is essential. 1I15 Such adjustment was not 
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the case in the assessment of strategies for jet noise abatement nor even 
in the formulation and passage of legislation to accomplish that end. The 
insertion of the "economically reasonable and technologically practical" 
clause in aircraft noise abatement legislation represented the emerging 
influence of the user/regulator coalition late in the policy formulation 
process. This type of coalition was able to use that clause to delay 
implementation of stringent noise standards for aircraft engines. The 
situation here illustrates Theodore lowi IS compla int that "modern law has 
become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a series of 
commands to citizens. Delegation has been elevated to the highest of 
virtues ...• Bargaining must be preferred over authority at every level and 
phase of government. III 6 
In the other four cases, there were attempts to form coalitions between 
analysts, public interest groups, and/or the public. In one of these cases. 
Jamaica Bay, the technique used was to ensure in advance that the results 
of the study would be publicized and then to actively involve citizen groups 
in the assessment itself. To the degree that the assessment findings 
would reflect the citizen input, the assessors could feel confident of public 
support, even if PONVA decided not to accept those findings. The Authority 
recognized this, it seems, and decided not to try to advance its plans 
over the combined opinions of citizens and experts. By contrast, 
Gofman and Tamplin performed their assessment without public involvement, 
and then tried to mobilize broad support behind its findings. It is not 
clear that they were completely successful in this attempt. This may suggest 
that citizen involvement in the performance of the assessment itself can contribute 
importantly to the acceptance and implementation process, particularly 
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when the policy-makers involved in policy choice and execution are in 
postions relatively more susceptible to influence by public opinion. 
The separate roles of expert analyst and public interest representative 
collapsed into a single, joint role in the Cayuga Lake and Storm King 
cases. Here the performers of many of the partial assessments were experts 
who had been motivated to carry out the assessments by their concern as 
citizens and were interested, in the assessment findings because they 
would be useful tools in the conflict over whether the power plant (in 
each case) would be built. ThiS is a good example of what Lindblom calls 
"partisan analysis." In this form of assessment, "policy analysis is no 
10nger an alternative to a play of power; it becomes largely an instrument 
of influence or power. 1I Such analysis is practiced by interest groups, 
including public interest groups,' which wish to influence those with the 
ability to make policy choices. This is particularly true when policy-
makers must IIloo~ realistically into the merits of alternative policies 
and .•. demand competent analysis"17 in order to be able to decide which 
alternative is most desirable. In both power plunt cases, the original 
assessments were prepared by those with a vested interest in the tech-
nology application under consideration, and it was not until opposing 
IIpartisan analyses" appeared that those with the power to decide were 
forced to consider not approving that application. The judicial 
process, of course, provides an institutionalized forum for IIpartisan 
analysis,1I since decisions are reached only a,fter assessing the merits of 
opposing arguments. 
Lindblom argues convincingly that it is "unrealistic" to expect 
that policy analysis--and technology assessment is being viewed here as 
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a particular type of policy analysis--can reach "conclusive determinat.ions 
of correct policy." But the fact that analysis is not determinative does not 
mean that it is not influential. Rather, "policy analysis is incorporated ••. 
into the play of power, changing the character of analysis as a result." l8 
Charels Schultze suggests that 
The purpose of the advocacy process and political 
bargaining is to reach decisions about specific 
programs in the context of conflicting and vaguely 
known values. Systematic analysis makes a majer, 
and essential, contribution to this process by 
forging links between general values and precific 
program characteristics. 19 
Certainly, this is what happened in the Cayuga Lake and Storm King cases, 
and perhaps, in all the cases studied. By focusing attention on the 
total range of impacts of a technological applications, assessments 
tended to force policy-makers to consider alternate means for the 
achievement of objectives agreed upon by a limited elite.* 
B. Stages of the Assessment-Acceptance-Implementation Process 
In addition to the preceding discussion of the overall process of 
a~:sessment-acceptcmce-:implementation, it is possible to make some specific 
comments about each of the stages in that process. 
* The tendency for technology assessments to force explicit consideration 
of alternative goals and values as well as of alternative means was 
frequently mentioned in the seminar discussions in Part I. See, for example, 
the discussion on pp. 155-156. 
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1. Initiation. In all of the cases studied, assessments were 
performed without any formal or legal requirement that they toke place. 
Institutionalhed initiations of technology assessments, such as by 
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, did not 
influence directly the decision to perform assessments in these five 
cases, In most of the cases, ass,essments were performed either as a 
result of or in anticipation of generalized public pressure which 
demanded some form of assurance that a proposed or existing activity 
would not threaten important values held by the public. This pressure was 
particularly strong when the effects of the technology application 
were highly visible to the generai public, as in the jet noise and Jamaica Bay 
cases. When the potential effects were important but not readily apparent, 
those perceiving the issue organized public interest groups to create the 
pressure required to include technology assessment as a part of the 
policymaking process. Only in the radiation standards case was an assess-
ment initiated without any explicit pressure from the public for its conduct. 
Thus in none of the cases studied was there a structured means for public 
involvement in the decision that an assessment was required or in the decision 
regarding what to assess. Yet these were critical decisions, and much of 
the IImessinessll of the performance stage, especially in the Cayuga Lake and 
Storm King cases, was a result of public demands for the broadening of 
previously narrowly-defined assessment to include a wider range of considerations. 
By contrast, the Jamaica Bay study was broadly conceived at the initiation 
stage, and publ ic participation in the performance stage was both orderly 
and constructive. 
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Policymakers seem to prefer not to have assessments performed at all, 
and if they are performed, to have them designed to examine only a narrow 
range of issues. The pressure to initiate broad technology assessments, 
or to transform narrow ones into broad ones, comes either from analysts 
acting as public interest representatives or from the public itself. Because 
there was, at the time Gofman and'Tamplin conducted their study of radiation 
effects, no public pressure for careful attention to this problem, the 
Atomic Energy Commission was able to claim that there was no need for the 
Gorman and Tamplin study or (or any further AEC analysis. 8y contrast, 
there was enough public attention being paid to the jet noise issue to 
force both the PONYA and the Johnson administration to initiate assessments 
related to that issue. 
In the absence of institutionalized means of initiating technology 
assessments,; such analyses are likely to be begun only in response to 
pressures for their existence. But the presence of such pressures increases 
the likelihood that the performance of the assessment will be to some 
degree politicized, since those demanding an assessment are likely to also 
demand an active role in carrying it out. Perhaps the development of 
assessment as a routine activitiy to be performed prior to discussions 
related to the application of a technology will increase the likelihood 
that assessments can be carried out in a less politicized environment.* 
2. Performance. The case studies provide clear contrasts with 
respect to the performance stage of the process. In three cases, the 
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assessments were performed by analysts functioning more or less in 
isolation from outside pressures. In the other two cases, the performance 
stage was characterized by the involvement of a wide range of participants 
and by the assessments themselves explicitly befng part of an adversary 
process preceding a policy decision. Yet, no clear pattern emerges as to 
which mode of assessment is more likely to produce the enlightenment 
policymakers require in order to improve the quality of their decisions. 
Mayo suggests that nei.ther what he calls the "scientific method ll of tech-
nology assessment nor what he calls the lIadversarial system" will result 
by itself in an adequate assessment. He argues that uncertainty during the 
performance of an assessment both as to facts and as to val ue preferences 
among affected populations will inevitably lead to the use of some form of 
an adversarial mode of inquiry as part of the process of technology assess-
120 
ment. This seems to have been the situation in four of the case studies. 
In the one assessment which had the least impact--the jet" noise study--
there was little controversy over assessment findings either during the 
performance stage or thereafter. In the other cases, conflicting views 
were considered as a structured part of the assessment process (Jamaica 
Bay), were an integral element of the process (Cayuga Lake and Storm King), 
or were generated by the initial assessment (radiation standards). Folk 
* Affecting the initiation of assessments, according to Green, is the 
likelihood that, in early stages of a technological development, there 
is a greater perception of potential benefits than of potential costs 
of further development. This means the pressure for an assessment (in anticipation of future problems) is not likely to be great unless 
there is general agreement that assessments should be undertaken or 
there is an institutional mechanism for initiating assessments. 
See p. 153 ff above for a further discussion of this point. 
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suggests that "criticism and debate is sic an essential part of the 
democratic process. It is only through adversary proceedings that that 
part of a policy assessment which is solid may be identified, and that 
part which is insupportable may be shown up for what it is. 1I27 The case 
studies suggest that this will be more likely if the adversary proceedings 
(or, at least, the expression of conflicting views and interests) are 
somehow incorporated into the performance of the assessment itself. 
One effect of an adversary element in the performance of assessments 
and illustrated by the case studies is the potential for extending the 
performance stage itself for an indefinite time, as adversaries continue 
to disagree, or until some authoritative policymaker takes an action' which 
effectively terminates the performance stage. Also, if the assessment 
becomes a continuing process and not a specific time-defined analysis, 
there is a tendency for assessments to become increasingly partisan and to 
be used as an advocate's tool, with the qualificiations and limitations 
of assessment findings given less and less prominence as the process 
continues. This suggests the need for some balanced means of obtaining 
diverse views and for challenging emerging conclusions during the assessment 
process while at the same time providing for terminating the assessment 
and presenting its findings on a timely basis. 
3. Presentation. One generalization that emerges from the case 
studies is that, if an assessment is to be implemented through the actions 
of governmental authorities, then the findings of that assessment must 
be presented in such a manner as to generate pressure on government for such 
action. This means that there is a need fonnaking the assessment conclusions 
accessible and 'Jnderstandable to a non-specialist audience, probably 
through media coverage. The importance of making impact analyses intel-
ligible to laymen was emphasized in a recent court decision concerning a 
river basin development project in Texas. Although that decision deals 
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with envi rOn!'lenta 1 impact s ta tements rather than with complete techno 1 ogi ca 1 
assessments, the point made by Judge Bue of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas is easily generalizable: 
All fe"ltures of an impact statement must be IIwritten in 
langua~e that is understandable to non-technical minds 
and y~t contain enough scientific reasoning to alert 
specialists to particular problems within the field of 
their expertise. II [Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Cor s of En ineers of the U.S. Arm, 348 F. Supp 916, 
9 N .• 1SS" 7 he reason for this standard 
is that impact statements must assist in rational, 
thoroughly informed decision making by officials 
higher up in the agency chain of command, including 
the Congress, the Executive and the general public, 
some of whom may not possess the technical expertise 
of those who evaluate the impact and prepare environ-
mental statements .... Additionally, when technical 
procedures are discussed, such as with t.he benefit-cost 
analysis issues, the applicable law and methods 
employed should be adeauately explained so that all 
may understand them. 22 
This did not happen to any great extent in the jet noise case, since 
the assessment findings were contained in a report prepared for 
the Executive branch and not given wide distribution. Gofman and 
Tamplin faced this problem in publicizing the results of their ar.alysis, 
and, in the attempt to make their conclusions dramatic enougb to gain wide 
general support, seem to have so departed from lIacceptablell modes of pre-
sentation that they al ienated many of their peers in the nuclear energy 
community. The choice of a target to receive assessment findings may be an 
important -=1ement in increasing the likelihood of their acceptance and 
implementation. In neither the jet noise nor the radiation standards case 
did the performers of the assessment attempt directly to convince the technolog'y 
users--the AEC and power utilities in one case; the FAA and the airlines in 
the other--to accept their findings. Rather, they attempted to present 
those findings in ways that would create outside pressure which could then 
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be used to force such acceptance. This seems to have been a less successful 
strategy than the one followed in other cases in which assessment findings 
were presented both directly to those with the authority to accept and 
implement them and to a broader audience whose pressure could force the 
authorities to consider the assessment. This is related to earlier dis-
cussion of the, fact that asse~sments change the IIresistance pattern ll 
decision-makers face \lInen they feel the necessity to act. It would be 
desirable to understand more fully the relationship between how the 
findings of an assessment are presented and the degree of influence that 
the assessment has. 
4. Decision to Act. Most of the generalizations which might be made 
regarding this stage in the assessment-acceptance-implementation process 
have already been analyzed in earlier portions of this chapter. Our 
central conclusion is that the decision-making process cannot be made 
totally rational through the ,Jerformance of technology assessments, since 
those assessments cannot provide a conclusive IIcorrect" analysis in any 
meaningful situation. This is so primari7y because decision-making with 
respect to the application of technology involves not only the choice of 
appropriate means but u1so selection among conflicting values. Dror notes 
that lirational elements play an important, though limited, role in 
specifying and ordering of values .... Final values and their order of 
priority can only be determined by valve judgments, not by rational 
processes. 1123 
The method for making such collective value judgments for a society 
is the political process. Technology assessments link specific proposed 
activities with their value implications in a way which permits the 
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bargaining, negotiation, and power play of the pol itical process to produce 
a meaningful translation of social values into specific decisions." 24 
Technology assessments appear to affect the decision to act in two 
ways. One is by making more clear the consequences of various alternative 
actions. The other is by assessments themselves being instruments of 
power which directly act on the decision-makers; this power is exercised 
through the persuasion of "partisan analysis. 1I Lindblom observes that 
"officials are not on the whole pushed around ... [T]O be effective interest 
groups do indeed have to persuade--and with better instruments than mis-
representation. 25 The case studies illustrate both effects. In the 
Jamaica Bay and jet noise cases, the assessments served primarily to high-
1 ight the 1 ink between particular actions and their social impact. In the 
other cases, the assessments served both this function, and perhaps to a 
greater degree, the function of instruments Of direct influence on the 
decision to act. 
5. Planning of Action. In the five cases studied, only two, the jet 
noise and Storm King cases, included this stage. Both demonstrated the 
difficulty of developing an integrated and coherent plan of action in the 
context of a pluralistic political and administrative system, one with 
many interests represented at many points. Lowi's complaint seems 
relevant here: illiberal government cannot plan. Planning requires the 
authoritative use of authority. Planning requires law, choice, priorities, 
moralities. Liberalism replaces plann~~g with bargaining. 1I26 This 
somewhat extreme view might be tempered by modifying it to suggest that, 
in our governmental system, "l aw choice, priorities, moral ities ll are most 
often the result of a political process rather than any more "rational" 
} 
I 
r 1 
i 
',,'4.. 
.. ~..::' 
I ---- -------1·">----''''-1 -'.'. ! } j 
278 
mode of activity. Thus planning (as well as decision-making) takes place 
in the context of conflicting interests, usually guided by some general 
policies which set limits to acceptable plans. But often, those involved 
in such planning activities are able to modify the intent of a general 
policy to suit their particular interests. Gergen notes that lIalthough 
an idea may be effectively initiated, it may function as any empty 
'campagin promise' until specific plans have been laid out be qualitied 
persons. The leverage of such persons is often far greater than would 
meet the public eye. 1I33 The case studies suggest that there is considerable 
leverage held by administrators and regulators, often in cooperation with 
users or developers, is considerable when it comes to developing specific 
plans for the implementation of assessments, even after the findings of 
those a ssessments have been accepted by po 1 i cyma kers. 
6. Other Stages. The discussion of the approval of plan, implementation 
of plan, and monitoring and evaluation stages in Chapters 10-14 essentially 
exhausts what might be said about these stages on the basis of the five 
case studi es. The last two of these stages are found on~J in the jet noise 
case. 
C. IMPLEMENTING TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS 
The analysis in this chapter, and indeed the whole report. suggests that the 
crucial time to insure that the findings of an assessment are accepted and imple-
mented is in the early stages of the assessment-acceptance-implementation process, 
particularly during assessment initiation and performance. Once an assessment is 
completed and the decision to act towards which the assessment was directed is 
made, the process of implementation, at least as shown by the case studies, 
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does not appear to dtffer very much from the process of implementing any 
other policy decision. ,This suggests that the influence of technology 
assess:m:r.ts is likely to be higher' on the policy formulation process than on 
the policy execution process. Yet the findings of assessments appear also to 
have had at least some indirect effects on policy execution in addition to 
those effects flowing from policy decisions influenced by assessment findings. 
The modification of low-level radiation standards by the AEC, even after the 
rejection of the Gofman/Tamplin analysis, is one example of this. Another is 
the redesign of the Storm King plant by Con Ed even though the Federal Power 
Commission did not require such action. 
In general, however, the problem of implementing technology assess-
ments seems to be similar to the problem of assuring that laws and other 
policy decisions are carried out by administrators and regulators in a 
manner consistent with both their letter and their spirit. The relation-
ship between policymaker and bureaucrat in contemporary government ;s one 
of the most important ones in determining whose interests are served by 
government. The existence of technology assessments can (but not neces-
sarily will) assure that policymakers, and the public that they represent, 
have a powerful tool in the effort to make government policy serve the 
public interest (as determined through the political process) ana not only 
limited interests with access to the non-representative elements of 
government structure. 
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D. Technology Assessments and Value Conflict 
Probably one of the most important impacts of technology assessment 
is that it shifts confl ict and bargaining from means to ends. This shift 
in the arena of conflict, of course, makes it more difficult for those who 
control political decision-making to ass~ble the agreement required to 
insure that selected policies are carried out. Etzioni notes that 
lIa major task of any political elite is to construct a whole from societal 
parts; dissensus is costly and hinders the elite's ability to fulfill 
this function. 1I28 One conclusion that emerges from the case studies is 
that the performance of a technology assessment as part of the policy-making 
process modifies that process in terms of how general values are translated 
into specific policies.* Dror suggests that "organizational decisionmaking 
tends to follow the 1 ine of least resistance. ,,21 The performance of tech-
nology assessments can be viewed as changing the "resistance pattern" 
which forms the context of decisionmaking. The question, the, is the 
nature of this change and its implications for effective and responsive 
social policymaking. 
* This point WdS made by Representative George Brown, arguing 
that lithe process of assessment in itself creates a wider perception 
which is the essential ingredient in the ultimate program of 
implementation ... ,II (p. 108) 
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By exacerbating the value conflicts that the political process attempts 
to reconcile, technology assessments can produce one of two general ty~~s 
; ..... 
of result: A first possibility is that technology ass~ssments are more 
effective as instruments of "technology harassment" than as instruments 01 
balanced decisionmaking. By highlighting the confl icting value implications 
of particular proposals. an assessment may make it impossible to reach a 
consensus on an acceptable course of action, and thus nothing is done even 
in situations when most of those involved in the policy process agree that 
some activity is desirable. This perhaps was the case in the Cayuga Lake 
situation. Dror notes that "sometimes specifying values can be dangerous 
to the very existence of the system" designed to sel ect pol icy by 
reconciling conflict. 3D Gawthorp notes that: 
The zone of viable negotiation, which can be con-
trolled exclusively by the professionals as long 
as conflict can be narrowly contained, diminishes 
substantially when the bargaining arena is forced 
to absorb a high influx of amateur advocates. 
When the nonprofessional enters into a conflict 
situation, he introduces many of the elements that 
the professional is committed to ignore .... As a 
consequence, system instability dramatically increases 
while the prospects of a compromise solution 
achieved by professionals within a collegial 
atmosphere visibly evaporates. 31 
A second possible result of technology assessments is that they increase the 
gualityof social policymaking by forcing policymakers to give attention to 
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ends as well as means, while at the same time providing a way of minimizing the 
social and political conflict such attention can produce. This is probably 
most likely if asse5sme~ts include as meaningful performers those likely to 
be involved in accepting and implementing their findings. Such involvement, 
however, is likely to change the assessment process itself. Dror says that 
lithe need to form a coalition sets some limits on how explicit goals can 
be, and determine some structural characteristics of optimal policymaking in 
that the groups which are most likely to be in the coalition often should be 
involved very early in the pol icymaking activity itself. ,,32 
What is implied here is the conclusion that in order to have a 
"productive" impact, assessments must be designed and executed in the overall 
context of political decision-making. This does not mean necessarily that 
assessments, to have influence, must themselves be advocate's tools. It does 
mean that the design of the assessment and the choice of those involved in its 
·'P~.rformance should be made with a sensitivity toward the pol itical feasibil ity 
." 
of- getting the assessment findings acted upon. This suggests that the design of 
mechanisms for public participation in at least setting the value context within 
which assessments take place, if not in the actual performance of the assessment 
itself, should be a central element in the assessment process. The requirement 
for meaningful participation increases the need for and difficulty of what 
Dror call s "metapol icymaking," 1. e., concern with the impact of the structure 
and operation of the policymaking system on the substance of policy. 33 To design 
a means for increasing public participation in the early stages of the pol icy-
making process (beyond providing the generalized demand for action that 
stimulates the pol icymaking system into operation) is a "meta pol icymaking" 
task of the first order. Technology assessments represent an opportunity 
to provide such a means, if they can avoid being either mere symbolic manifestita-
tions of public participation or convenient instruments for the opponents of 
technology-based change. 
" 
1 
I 
1 , 
i 
1 
I 
J 
1
·.1 
l. • 
ifi;,-.ML. 
283 
1. Joseph F. Coates, IITechno1ogy Assessment: the Benefits .•. the Costs ••. 
the Consequences,1I The Futurist, December, 1971, pp. 227-28. 
2. See Chapter 10. 
3. Hugh Folk, liThe Role of Technology Assessment in Public Policy,1I in 
Albert Teich, ed., Technology and Manis Future (New York: St. Martinis 
Press, 1972), p. 248. 
4. Coates, pp. 227-28. 
5. Douglas Bunker, IIpo1icy Sciences Perspectives on Implementation 
Processes, II paper del ivered at meeting of American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Chicago, Illinois, December 27, 1970 (mimeo), 
p. 2. 
6. Ami ta i Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1969). 
p. 303. 
7. Ibid., pp. 303-04. 
8. Fol k, p. 246. 
9. Talk by Rt. Hon. A. Wedgewood Benn, M.P., at the First International 
Congress on Technology Assessment, June 1, 1973. 
1 0 . Bu n ker, p. 16. 
11. Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 29. 
12. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler, 
1968), pp. 188-89. 
13. Bu n ker, p. 7. 
14. National Academy of Sciences, Technology: Processes of Assessment 
and Choice (Washington: Governt:1ent Printing Office, 1969), chap. III-IV. 
15. Bunker, p. 5. 
16. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 144. 
17. Lindblom, Chapter 3 and pp. 117 and 65. 
18. Ibid. , pp. 117 and 30. 
19. Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1968), p. 74. 
l 
1 
I )1 
I 
1 
l 
l 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
1 
r 
284 
20. Louis Mayo, Scientific Method. Adversaria1 System, and Technolri9Y 
Assessment, Monograph No.5, Program of Policy Studies in Science a 
Technology, George Washington University, November, 1970. 
21. Folk, p. 249 . 
. 22. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, SERC 1033, 1067 (Southern District of 
Texas, Houston Division, 1973). 
2~. Dror, p. 165. 
24. See Schultze, pp. 55-56; for a further discussion of this point. 
25. Li ndb1 om, p. 66. 
26. Low;, p. 101. 
27. Kenneth Gergen, "Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of 
Policy Formation," in Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen, eds., The Study 
of Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 187. 
28. Etzioni, pp. 177-78. 
29. Dror, p. 82. 
30. Ibid., p. 176. 
31. Louis Gawthorp, Administrative Politics and Social Chan e {New York: 
St. Martinis Press, 197] , pp. 48-49. 
32. Dror, p. 189. 
33. Ibid,' pp. 160 and 164-76. 
• "'f:"--'-----
I j 
1 
, i 
I 
i 
j 
J 
I 
I 
l 
I 1 
I 
i 
j 
I ] 
I 
r I r 
'''--~~:~~~I~ 
II 
.1 
t: 
II 
II 
! , 
i: 
l; 
~ 
ti 
f: 
i: 
III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
D. Technology and Public Policy: 
The Process of Technology 
Assessment in the Federal 
Government 
I !: Vary T. COATES 
Ii 
fi I' July 1972 (Summary, pp. 1-47) 
U ' I _:r .::...:. ':, ~~.----'"-'-'-
I 
l 
1 
J 
1 
r 
",,.., 
, J 
...... 
.. -.. ~-~. '---. -- "~~-'~~~--"-~~-I'~""""""'~'~1 
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology assessment is the systematic identification, 
analysis, and evaluation of the real and potential impacts of 
technology on social, economic, environmental, and political 
systems and processes. It is concerned particularly with the 
second and third order impacts of technological developments; and 
with the unplanned or unintended consequences, whether beneficial 
or detrimental, which may result from the introduction of new 
technologies or from changes in the utilization of existing tech-
nologies. Technology assessment seeks to identify societal 
options and clarify the trade-offs which must be made; this 
approach is designed to provide an objective and neutral input 
to public decisionmaking and policy formulation with regard to 
science and technology. The analytical techniques of technology 
assessment may be integrated into t,he on-going process of plan-
I 
ning, designing, and evaluating technological projects and programs, 
and may also provide an external review and evaluation of such 
projects and programs at any point in time. 
In a highly industrialized society such as the united States, 
the interaction between technology and public policy is continual 
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and complex. Federal executive agencies perform and fund research 
and development; they foster, subsidize, use, and regulate 
technological applications. Political theorists of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries have grappled with the problem of the 
capacity of democratic systems to control and direct technological 
forces to se,rve societal needs and to protect public interests. 
The relationship between the State, the corporation, interest 
groups, and the individual is a central concern of modern political 
thought. On a more immediate level of concern, the interaction 
of social goals such as rising standards of living, equitable 
distribution of material goods, and maintenance of the physical 
environment has brought into question the viability of existing 
governmental institutions and their capability to deal with complex 
problems arising from socio-technological change. 
Technology assessment has been advanced as a way of enabling 
decisionmakers to better understand and anticipate the societal 
impacts of technological developments. If technology assessment 
techniques can. be developed and routinely integrated into legisla-
tive and administrative decisionmaking and public policy formulation, 
more rational choices can be made among alternative policies and 
actions. Anticipating problems and detrimental side-effects which 
result from any public action will permit their moderation or 
reduction. 
In 1966, Representative Emilio Daddario, as chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, introduced the concept of 
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technology assessment, in proposing the establishment of an 
Office of Technology Assessment to serve the Congress. This 
occurred at a time of rising public alarm over alleged hazard~ 
3 
to life and health resulting from contamination of the environment 
by the byproducts of chemical and industrial processes. Moreover, 
large public projects such as highway and airport development 
had occasioned numbers of public protests, demonstrations, and 
legal actions resulting in costly delays to many such projects. 
Growing hostility to technological programs aroused political 
pressures which intensified congressional suspicion of the process 
of planning and programming in executive agencies, and congression-
al resentment of the failure of executive agencies to provide 
Congress with adequate information about the impacts of govern-
mental programs. 
In this atmosphere the concept of technology assessment 
gained acceptance both among legislators and among professionals 
and academic specialists in science policy research. In the five 
years since Mr. Daddario first used the term "technology assess-
ment," many academic and professional conferences and seminars 
have explored the concept of technology assessment, numerous 
papers have been presented at meetings of scientific societies, 
and scholarly journals and publications have carried treatments of 
the subject. The Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment, chaired by Mr. Daddario and later by Representative John 
Davis, held several series of hearings and commissioned four 
reports on technology assessment, by the Library of Congress 
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and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Public 
Administration. 
An underlying assumption in all of the discussion during this 
five years was that the existing process for planning and eval-
uating technological projects and programs within federal execu-
tive agencies is fragmented, diffuse, and inadequate in scope and 
depth. The purpose of the research reported in the present report 
was to carry out an empirical investigation of this assumption, 
and to prov'ide a descriptive and analytical overview of the process 
of technology assessment as practiced in federal executive agen-
cies in 1970 - 1971. 
The objectives of this research were: 
- To identify the loci at which technology and 
technological programs are assessed by federal 
executive agencies, 
- To describe the process of technology assessment 
used by federal executive agencies, 
To identify the loci at which the same or similar 
technologies are assessed, and to determine where 
and how such overlapping assessments are or could 
be compared, weighed, or integrated, 
- To identify gaps in the existing technology 
assessment process and to determine where and 
how such gaps might appropriately be filled, 
To describe typical technology assessments in terms 
of their initiation, purpose, methodology, research 
teams, costs, and results, and 
- To provide a base of information :f:or use in 
improving technology assessment in federal agencies 
and in constructing new assessment mechanisms if 
these are needed. 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I , 
I 
J 
1 
L--4 
\" I --- -1 
I ! , 
I 
I ) 
r 
i 
I 
I 
I 
; ~ 
i 
--- .-.----------. - -.. -----.-. ~ -~~--. -,~. '---.'~'. ~. _e __ ~"'----·"---"·l~" -~-... -~ 
5 
Departments and agencies of the Executive Branch were 
surveyed. Military and national security agencies and departments 
were excluded to limit the scope of the study. One hundred and 
forty offices within the civilian agencies were contacted, and 
their statutory charters, statements of responsibility, organiza-
tion charts, publications, and research programs analyzed. On 
this basis, 86 offices were identified as having technological 
projects and programs. 
One hundred and ten interviews were held with officials in 
the 86 offices. A series of questions, t~sted and refined through 
a preliminary set of ten interviews, were used to structure the 
interviews; however, the interviews were kept informal and ques-
tions worked into the conversation as unobstrusively as possible. 
(These questions appear in Appendix D of the full report.) The 
interviews lasted from one to two hours and were designed to 
elicit detailed description of the way in which projects and pro-
grams are selected, planned, and evaluated, and of the resources, 
personnel, and methodologies used in this process. 
In the course of, interviews, 97 examples of technology 
. assessment and closely related studies were identified, and a 
further set of questions was used to develop information about 
their initiatiop, costs, research techniques, dissemination, and 
utilization. This analysis was an important final phase of the 
research. 
The remainder of this summary volume presents the conclusions 
drawn from the research, with a series of recommendations for the 
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improvement of the technology assessment process in federal 
agencies. It addresses the following points: 
- Who is doing technology assessment? 
- The organization of technology assessments. 
- Disciplines and techniques used in technology 
assessment. 
- Analysis of a sample of technology assessment studies: 
initiation, disciplines, techniques, costs, scope, 
purpose, and utilization. 
Gaps and overlaps in governmental assessment of nine 
major technologies. 
- Prerequisites for further improvement of technology 
assessment. 
- Recommendations. 
6 
The full report of which this volume is a summary will appear 
in two parts -- the report itself, and a volume of appendices 
designed to serve as a reference volume for full substantiation 
of the report. The appendices include detailed descriptions of 
the offices studied, data on each of the 97 exemplary studies, 
a list of officials interviewed, and the questions used to struc-
ture the interviews. 
The process through which decisions are made within bureau-
cratic structures is complex, highly convoluted, and poorly 
understood. It is anticipated that the information provided by 
this study will usefully contribute to attempts to understand, 
rationalize, and improve the decisionmaking process in the federal 
government. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Federal executive agencies have, within the last five to ten 
years, improved and broadened the process through which they 
plan and evaluate technological projects and programs. Whereas 
economic considerations, especially cost/benefit analysis of 
immediate planned effects, have been the mainstay of planning 
and programming, agencies are now taking into account a somewhat 
wider range of possible consequences of governmental actions 
and the exercise of federal r~sponsibilities. Most are trying 
to take account of potential impacts which are derivative of the 
basic actions or programs, difficult to quantify, and not always 
satisfactorily translatable into monetary.terms. The lack of 
generally accepted methods for integrating such considerations 
into administrative decisionmaking, and into the justification 
of agency programs, and the lack of sustained impetus and 
encouragement from the highest levels of the Executive Branch, 
cause this improvement to be slow and not uniform across agencies. 
But in many executive agencies, these new considerations 
encompassed in the concept of technology assessment -- are 
gaining general acceptance and systematic technology assessment 
processes and techniques are developing. 
Congress is demanding from public administrators more soundly 
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grounded information about the possible consequences of govern-
mental actions. The movement in the 1960 i s for increased public 
participation in decisionmaking, widespread alarms over alleged 
environmental hazards, and public protests over many public 
works projects created political pressures to which Congress 
reacted. Controversies culminating in court actions against 
highway, airport, and water resource projects caused costly 
delays in many projects and created new political obstacles to 
governmental objectives. Congressional concern crystallized in 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which has been 
the single most important factor in moving executive agencies 
to accept the idea of technology assessment. The proposed 
legislation to create an Office of Technology Assessment to 
serve the Congress (passed by the House in February 1972) under-
lines the continuing congressional dissatisfaction with Executive 
Branch methods of assessment and their demand for an independent 
accounting. 
Who Is Doing Technology Assessment? 
Eighty-six offices in federal executive agencies were identi-
fied as chiefly responsible for projects and programs of a 
technological nature. These offices were located in seven 
cabinet-level Departments, nine independent agencies, eight 
commissions, and four components of the Executive Office of the 
President. (Defense and security agencies were excluded.) In 
these 86 offices, extensive interviews showed that 24 percent 
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were concerned only with primary pt:::rformance characteristics of 
technological systems C!.nd their direct dollar costs. Sixty-
three percent perform or sponsor some technology C!.ssessments; the 
bulk of these are partial or narrow assessments which take into 
account some of the secondary consequences of technological 
applications, most often the secondary economic impacts or 
environmental impacts. The remaining 13 percent of the offices 
consistently perform or sponsor technology asseS3ments and 
regard technology assessment as their major responsibility. 
In the offices where it is performed or sponsored, technology 
assessment is viewed as support for agency planning and program-
ming or as ancillary to substantive basic and applied research 
l2Eograms. It is most often found in offices bearing the title 
"Policy, Programs, and Evaluation" or an equivalent designation 
(25 percent) or offices solely responsible for resea,;.:'ch. 
Thirty-five percent of offices sponsoring technology assess-
ment reported,that most or all such work was done in-house; the 
remainder preferred contract studies or a mix of in-house and 
contractor assessments. On 97 exemplary studies collected, 38 
percent were performed in-house, 42 percent by contractors (15 
percent by university researchers and 27 percent by other organi-
zations), 9 percent by agency and contractors togetht~r, 4 percent 
by interagency groups, and the remaining 6 percent by panels of 
non-government experts convened by the a9'encies. Contractors 
performed or participated in all categories of studies but were 
j 
j 
1 
1 
I 
r 
10 
most heavily used for partial or narrow technology assessments 
(70 percent). 
The Organization of Technology Assessments 
The advantages of in-house assessment, which was preferred 
by 35 percent of the offices, were reported to be: 
they had greater credibility for agency management, 
they showed greater likelihood of producing institu-
tional change in the agency, 
individual assessors were protected from constituency 
pressure by their bureaucratic anonymity, 
the data base remains available to the agency, 
in-house expertise is developed and maintained, 
the assessment activity can be flexibly scheduled in 
terms of time; resources, and workload. 
The corresponding disadvantages of in-house assessments were 
perceived as: 
the lank of a multidisciplinary staff in most offices, 
a relative lack of external credibility, 
the possibility of institutional bias, 
the ease of suppression of assessments by administrators 
displeased by the findings or implications. 
Most offices divide assessment activity between in-house st~ff 
and contractors depending on the size of the study, the availabil-
ity of expertise, and the pressure of time and workload. A few 
officials preferred as a policy to have technology assessments 
performed by contractors rather than staff. 
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The advantages of technology assessments performed by contrac-
tors were reported as: 
there is less institutional bias and greater objectivity, 
they have greater external credibility, 
more disciplines can be used than are present in most 
agency offices, 
the regular work of the staff can proceed without 
interference. 
In order to further enhance the opportunity for multidisciplinary 
,assessment, there is a growing trend toward the use of consortia 
of research organizations. 
Difficulties and disadvantages of having assessments done by 
contractors were reported: 
there are severe difficulties of coordination and 
management when agency and contractor are geographically 
separated, 
contractors tend to t~ll agencies what the agency wants 
to hear (as the contractor perceives it), 
contractor reports can also be ignored or suppressed 
by agency management. 
Officials showed a tendency to prefer independent research 
organizations over university-based groups, which were reported 
to have difficulty in organizing a management structure for large 
interdisciplinary research projects. When only one discipline 
or one or two researchers were to be involved, some officials pre-
ferred university research on the grounds of greater objectivity 
or greater prestige. Some univ~rsity researchers who were con-
tacted alleged that their findings were suppressed or misused by 
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agencies. University groups were also unable in some cases to 
compete for research contracts because of the rules of their 
institutions. Analysis of collected studies showed that costs 
per professional man-year were considerably lower for university 
groups than for independent organizations. 
The advantages of using interagency mechanisms for performing 
assessments were reported to be: 
they may have high level visibility and influence, 
depending on the level of personnel assigned to them, 
they provide the opportunity for continuing monitoring 
and assessment, 
they provide the opportunity to coordinate and rational-
ize policies of several agencies. 
The off-setting disadvantages of inter-agency assessments are: 
they are difficult to initiate because of the lack 
of a sponsoring authority, 
they are avoided because of conflicting agency missions, 
responsibilities, and interests, 
agency viewpoints and interests are seldom overridden, 
especially if the tasks of analysis are divided among 
the participating agencies. 
"Blue-ribbon panels" of experts from outside of the government, 
especially from industry and universities, are sometimes convened 
to conduct assessments, especially those focused on societal 
probler,I"j related to technology. The advantages of using expert 
panels are: 
they allow mobilization of expertise from many sources 
at low cost, 
they tend to have high visibility, prestige, and influence, 
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they offer the possibility of co-opting powerful segments 
of society for support of policies or decisions emerg-
ing from the assessment, 
they allow representation of affected interests. 
Expert_panels also involve disadvantag'es: 
there may be bias, or alleged bias, from institutional 
and occupational affiliations of the members, 
they show a tendency toward conservatism in approach 
to problems, 
the analysis may lack continuity, diligence, and con~ 
sistency. 
It is likely that maximum independence and comprehensiveness 
is gained when 
the assessment is sponsored by a source not directly 
responsible for the program or project being assessed, 
such as the National Science Foundation or the Execu-
tive Office of the President, and 
the assessment is performed by an independent research 
group or university group which values its reputation 
for objectivity as a chief stock-in-trade. 
But unless the agency responsible for the program or project 
under assessment is fully prepared to accept the assessment and 
integrate the results into its own planning and programming 
process there will be little gain in terms of responsible deci-
sionmaking • 
Disciplines and Techniques Used 
in Technology Assessment 
Engineers, economists, and physical scientists make up the 
bulk of the staff of offices which perform and sponsor technology 
assessments. Fifty-four percent of these offices had one or 
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more engineers engaged in technology assessment activity, 46 
percent had economists, and 33 percent had physical scientists, 
while only 19 percent had one or more social scientists working 
on technology assessment. In most such offices, social scien-
tists when present constituted only a small percentage of the 
staff. Analysis of specific studies, however, indicated that 
social scientists were somewhat more likely to be used in assess-
ment studies than the above figures would indicate, because only 
a8 percent of the studies were done by agency staff; contractors 
m9re often included social scientists on their teams. On these 
research teams, however, the number of social scientists was 
again usually small compared to the number of team members 
claiming other disciplines. 
Type of 
Assessment* 
Percentage of research teams on which disciplines 
were represented by one or more team members: 
Econ. Engineer Phy.Sci. Biol.Sci. Soc. Sci. 
Wide-scope 
Assessments (9) 55% 33% 66% 33% 55% 
Partial T.A. (40) 41 25 25 16 44 
Problem-
oriented T.A. (14) 30 20 40 10 10 
Futures 
Research (17) 50 63 13 13 13 
Most t:echnol09::i assessments rel:i heavil:i on the collation 
jud9:mental anal:isis of existin9: information, along with field 
studies :in the case of planned projects. Techniques from 
*See definitions on page 18. 
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established disciplines and academic areas, such as cost/benefit 
analysis, surveys and interviews, and input-output tables, are 
often augmented by sophisticated techniques of systems analysis, 
operations research, and modeling and simulation. Wide-spread 
government acceptance of and use of these tools for analyzing 
complex problems is helping to persuade administrators that the 
complexities of social impact analysis are not beyond reach. 
Innovative techniques borrowed from futures research, such as 
Delphi, cross-support matrices, and decision trees were reported 
to have been used by a sma:!.]. number of offices. Researchers 
reported that the use of ·these new techniques occasioned scepti-
cism and resistance in higher echelons of management. Officials 
also reported with some consistency that the regulatory process 
in particular has suffered from the fact that civilian agencies 
(in contrast to DoD) have lagged behind industry in developing 
a capability for technological forecasting. 
The effect of bias from institutional and occupational 
affiliations of members of expert panels conducting technology 
assessments is an area in which behavioral research is needed. 
Such panels are sometimes used, especially for problem-oriented 
assessments focusing on societal problems (such as pollution, 
deviant behavior, or regional development) to which technology 
is either a contributing cause, a possible solution, or both. 
The use of a panel allows for representation of affected interests, 
and thus tends to increase awareness of political and institutional 
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feasibility and constraints; but it introduces a problem of 
bias and weighting in what is intended to be an objective and 
neutral evaluative process. 
The appropriate role for public participation in assessment 
also needs further research and innovation. conventional 
techniques such as public hearings necessarily occur at an 
advanced stage of planning or development and tend to crystallize 
opposition without significantly adding to the base of available 
information, without generating alternatives to the proposed 
action, and without providing for representation of the entire 
range of interests affected. Representation of interests implies 
the desirability of weighing interests in terms of numbers of 
people affected (and usually their political or economic power). 
Technology assessment aims at evaluating impacts in terms of 
desirable changes for society as a whole. These concerns may 
or may not be coincident in any particular case for any particu-
lar time period. 
No innovative methods of incorporating public participations 
were discovered in this study. NASA has experimented with 
utilization conferences in planning space station programs, and 
FAA with consultative planning conferences. Both allow the 
expression of interests of potential users of systems, but do 
not provide input from other potentially affected parties, nor 
do these techniques seek out and identify unplanned consequences 
of agency actions. 
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Technology assessment "methodologies" advanced by a number 
of analysts are basically similar; they can be reduced to a 
structured analytical process involving several simple steps or 
tasks: 
Definition of the subject of inquiry; description of 
the subject technology and its parameters; development 
of data base. 
Description of alternative, supporting, and competitive 
technologies. 
Development of state-of-society assumptions, for 
present and future time periods. 
Identification of potential impacts. 
Analysis of and evaluation of impacts in terms of 
(a) affected parties, systems, and processes, 
(b) probability of occurrence, direction, magni-
tude, and duration of induced changes. 
Identification of possible action options. 
Assessment and comparison of alternative action 
options. 
On the basis of evidence from this study, it appears that 
technology assessment is most adequately performed by inter-
disciplinary teams using a variety of analytical techniques to 
accomplish the above tasks, augmented by on-site investigations 
of specific projects, and with the option of commissioning 
additional research if needed • 
Analysis of a Sample 
of Technology Assessment Studies 
Eighty-six offices in federal executive agencies provided a 
total of 97 examples of technology assessment and related studies 
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which were in progress in 1970-1971 or recently completed by the 
agency and its contractors. Since these studies were provided 
by agency officials they constitute neither a random sample nor 
an exhaustive list, but substantial evidence suggests that they 
made up the bulk of relevant research underway at that time. 
For purposes of analysis they were divided into six categories: 
Wide-scope 
Assessments 
Partial 
Assessments 
Problem-
Oriented 
Assessments 
Environmental 
Impact 
Statements 
Futures 
Studies 
Miscellaneous 
. nine 
studies 
- forty 
studies 
- fourteen 
studies 
- fourteen 
studies 
criteria: open-ended consideration 
of possible impacts in several 
categories; multidisciplinary teams; 
the intention to support and in-
fluence public decisionmaking; a 
level of funding sufficient for 
in-depth examination. 
- Criteria: Consideration of pre-
selected secondary consequences in 
one or more categories. 
- Criteria: Focus on a societal 
problem to which technology is a 
contributor or a possible solution. 
- criteria: Required by the National 
Envi~onmental Policy Act of 1969, 
and offered by an agency as an 
example of technology assessment. 
These are treated separately from 
other partial assessments. 
- seventeen -
studies 
Criteria: Dealt with trends affect-
ing future utilization and develop-
ment of technology -- supply/demand 
studies, technological forecasts, 
long range planning studies. 
- three 
studies 
- Criteria: TWO technology assessment 
methodologies, one survey of tech-
nology assessments. 
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(a) Wide-Scope Technology Assessments 
Initiation of broad policy research by an agency appears 
~~ the wide-scope technology assessments were almost all 
initiated by Congress or at a higher level of the Executive 
Office. 
19 
Research teams had an average of 4.5 disciplines per team. 
Physical scientists, economists, and social scientists were most 
frequently included. The study efforts took the form of inter-
disciplinary interaction of the team, using a variety of analyti-
cal techniques, and included field or on-site investigation in 
the case of specific projects. One study relied heavily on 
modeling and simulation, three provided for input from affected 
publics by hearings or surveys and one included a large program 
of origional research. 
The average cost of these studies was $381,000. The mean 
cost was $149,000, there being a wide range of costs. Average 
elapsed time* was 16 months. This was somewhat shorter than the 
average elapsed time for partial assessments (wide-scope tech-
nology assessments generally constituted the entire workload of 
the research team during the time of the assignment, which was 
often not the case with partial assessments). The contention of 
many agency officials that wide-scope technology assessment was 
impractical because it would add greatly to the decisionmaking 
time, was not supported by the evidence of these studies. 
There appeared to be a significant learning period in the 
*From initiation of research to final report. 
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performance of wide-scope assessments; experience in p~rforming 
wide-scope technology assessment would very likely shorten the 
average elapsed time for studies conducted by experienced teams 
or team members. 
The most significant aspect of the wide-scope technology 
assessments was a greatly broadened or restructured analysis 
compared to that originally proposed for the study. This was a 
consequence of new information emerging in the course of 'the 
study. Unexpected potential impacts suggested new policy issues 
or alternative technological approaches for exploration. 
Four kinds of recommendations were produced by these assess-
ments: 
New or altered research priorities, 
Specific policy formulations, 
Modification of accepted practices or projects, 
Termination'of projects. 
Administrative changes or legislative actions appear to have 
resulted from all wide-scope assessments which had been available 
to decisionmakers for a period of months prior to this analysis. 
They ranged from "informal changes in practices" and "definite 
influence on the ordering of research priorities" to outright 
termination of two large projects. 
(b) Narrow or Partial Technology Assessments 
Partial technology assessments had usually been initiated by 
an agency, often as a result of unsolicited proposals. They were 
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performed or funded as part of the on-going substantive research 
effort or for purposes of agency programming and evaluation. 
Therefore they were less likely than wide-scope assessments to 
be directed toward a particular instance of decisionmaking or 
policy formulation. 
Seventy-eight percent dealt with either one or two categories 
of impacts, most often economic impacts or envirommental impacts. 
[Environmental impact statements required under the National 
Environmental Policy Act are treated separately below.] Usually 
the impacts to be investigated were selected before the study 
began, i.e., the investigation was not open-ended. Economic 
impacts were analyzed in 55 percent of the partial assessments 
and environmental impacts in 38 percent. When social impacts 
were investigated, it was most often in terms of socio-economic 
changes such as migration of farm workers or "quality of life" 
(treated qualitatively). 
The most frequently used mode of procedure was collection and 
analysis of existing data. Twenty-two percent of the studies 
included some input from affected publics, usually through 
questionnaires or interviews. 
The research teams included an average of two disciplines per 
team. The most frequently used were economics and social sciences. 
The average cost of partial assessments by university research 
groups was $85,000; the average for assessments by independent 
organizations was' $139,000. No figures were available for those 
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performed in-house. University studies had an average cost per 
professional man/year expended which was little more than half 
of that for independent research groups, probably because 
graduate students were used in a professional capacity at low 
remuneration. No measure for comparison of quality was attempted 
in this study. 
The average elapsed time for partial or narrow technology 
assessments was 18.5 months. For university efforts, average 
elapsed time was 13.5 months, for ir.dependent research organiza-
tion studies it was 22.2 months. 
(c) Problem-oriented Assessments 
Three broad themes were found in this group of 14 studies: 
environmental and health problems, inadequate public services, 
and the probable need for federal regulation in new areas. 
Problem-oriented assessments were initiated from outside the 
agency in nearly all cases, either by unsolicited proposals or 
as a result of requests from Congress, the Executive Office, or 
public or professional groups. This suggests that federal 
agencies rarely initiate exploratory investigation of societal 
problems. 
Less than a third of the problem-oriented assessments appear 
to have resulted in traceable administrative or legislative 
action. These assessments began by conceptualizing a societal 
problem in which technology is a factor; to some extent they 
open up new areas and represent a preliminary evaluation of the 
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magnitude of a problem. Thus their influence may be slow to 
mature. 
The average cost of the problem-oriented studies was 
$678,000. This is nearly twice the cost of wide-scope technology 
assessment. The relatively high cost is not fully explainable 
and may be spurious since cost figures were available for a 
relatively small number of studies. The average elapsed time 
was about the same as for partial assessments but teams were 
larger. 
These studies were more multi-disciplinary than wide-scope 
assessments, with an average of 6.3 disciplines per team. 
Physical scientists, engineers, and economists were most often 
included. There were social scientists on only ten percent of 
the teams, although they were dealing with societal problems. 
One-third of problem-oriented assessments utilized panels of 
experts from outside the government, more than any other category 
of studies. 
(d) Environmental Impact Statements 
Environmental impact statements offered by agencies as 
examples of their assessment activity ranged from brief and 
cursory documents to elaborate research reports. All were clas-
sified as partial assessments since they dealt primarily with 
the physical environment but in some cases other impacts were 
discussed, such as effects on ethnic groups and communities. 
One-half of the statements were the subject of considerable 
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public controversy. Two, and possibly a third, have been or will 
be the subject of law suits. Five of the fourteen were the 
subjects of public hearings. Thus these statements were far 
more likely than other partial assessments to enter the arena 
of public discussion. 
Environmental impact statements probably cost less than other 
partial assessments. Since they were prepared within agencies, 
no cost figures were available. Officials estimated the costs 
as generally in the neighborhood of $15,000 to $50,000, on the 
basis of professional staff time. If the average level of effort 
is much lower, for example $10,000 or approximately 3 man/months, 
the annual cost (at a rate of 200 per month) is $24,000,000 or 
600 man/years. This is probably a low figure, and moreover 
does not include the cost of multiple agency review. 
Environmental impact statements are effective in forcing 
agencies to collect information necessary for technology assess-
ment, in providing experience in multidisciplinary consideration 
of secondary consequences of actions and projects, and in pro-
vi ding a mechanism for public review of executive decisionmaking. 
The National Environmental Policy Act thus created and maintains 
a strong stimulus to the development of the technology assessment 
process in federal executive agencies. 
(e) Futures Studies 
Technology assessment necessitates and benefits from the 
further development of capability in futures research. Technology 
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assessments for governmental projects and programs must deal 
with potential or anticipated impacts. They must therefore 
consider the trends in technological invention and innovation, 
the possible changes in applicat.ion and levels of utilization 
of technologies, and the possible social environments of the 
future within which the technology may be utilized. 
Seventeen examples of the 97 collected were concer;;,\ed pri-
marily with trends influencing the future levels of utilization 
of technologies: they were supply/demand projections and extrap-
olations, technological forecasts, and long range planning 
studies looking to government-wide or agency programming needs. 
i 
Only one study attempted systematically to layout alternative 
socio-political scenarios for the future. This study was concerned 
primarily not with the social utility of a technology but with 
planning agency strategy to insure acceptance of its programs; 
it was therefore promotional rather than assessment-oriented in 
its intent. 
The three technological forecasts were initiated by agencies 
to help with planning research programs or future regulatory 
trends; they were performed by contractors. As has been noted, 
civilian agencies tend to lack capability in technological fore-
casting. These three studies cost an average of $140,000. 
Supply and demand studies and long-range planning studies 
were intended. to explore the need for new federal policies, or 
to support agency planning and programming. Three were requested 
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by Congress or the Executive Office, eleven were initiated by 
agency personnel. About half were performed in-house and half 
by contractors. Estimates of cost are difficult since so many 
were performed in-house. Four supply and demand studies for 
which estimates are available had an average estimated cost of 
$743,000, higher than that for any other category, but because 
of the small number this figure should be treated with caution. 
A variety of analytical techniques was used in futures studies, 
including modeling and simulation, trend projection and extrapo-
lation, surveys, Delphi techniques, economic analysis, and 
reliance on concensus of experts. A majority of studies relied 
on one or two of these methods, mathematical modeling and con-
sensus of experts being the most frequently used. Only one study 
combined as many as four techniques. 
Futures studies were not strongly multi-disciplinary~ an 
average of 2.1 disciplines was used, engineering and economics 
being the most frequent. Most of the studies concentrated \.r, ,,me 
trend or subject area such as materials supply and demand, econ-
omic projections, or a pattern of technological development. 
(f) Miscellaneous Studies 
Two studies, one by the Water Resources Council and one by a 
contractor for OST, were attempts to formulate methodologies for 
assessment. Both codified approaches which are already in use 
and neither produced innovative techniques qualitatively different 
fxom present assessment procedures. Their usefulness lies in 
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providing systematic elucidation of the steps in analysis for 
researchers who have not had experience in technology assessment. 
The Water Resources study also included testing by a number of 
assessment teams of the proposed procedures, allowing for some 
experimentation in applying such procedures in a field situation. 
The variations which resulted suggest that the proposed assess-
ment procedures will give results which are not strictly repro-
ducible but which are comparable, useful, and defensible for 
decisionmakers. 
The final study wa$ a survey of current technological activity 
in the federal, state, local, institutional, and industrial 
sectors. These findings have not yet been released. 
Gaps and Overlaps 
in Federal Technology Assessment 
Technology assessment in federal executive agencies (in the 
civilian sector) is chiefly concerned with: 
technology related to basic human needs: food and 
fibre technology, housing technology, biomedical 
technology, water resource technology; 
technology critical to an industrial society: power 
technology, mineral resource technology, transporta-
tion and cor, .. nunications technology; 
technologies over which the federal government 
eXl3rcises a unique degree of control, largely because 
of astronomically high costs of research and develop-
ment and their derivation from early military appli-
cations: space and nuclear power technology. 
All of these technology assessment areas were covered by the 
present study with the exception of communications technology; 
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because of a series of reorganizations and institutional changes 
which were going on during the period of this study, communica-
tions was not well covered, except for the activity of the U.S. 
Postal Service~ This area of federal technology assessment needs 
further attention and description. 
In space and nuclear technology, NASA and AEC are in a unique 
position to control the development of technology from basic 
research to final application and utilizt:!tion. These agencies 
therefore have a unique responsibility for, and opportunity for, 
technology assessment. Both have in the past largely ignored 
this responsibility and opportunity. Both agencies interpreted 
their mandate as chiefly promotional. AEC's statutory charter 
for regulatory activities was written narrowly; the narrow 
regulatory power was carried over to the development activities 
as a justification for non-attention to potential detrimental 
impacts of technological development. Under the pressure of 
judicial interpretation of the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the Calvert Cliffs case, AEC has publicly signified its 
intention of reconstituting its planning and evaluation pro-
cedures. 
NASA has not only failed to develop a capability for technology 
assessment but has consistently taken an aggressively promotional 
stance toward the technology which after all provides its raison 
d'etre. Even the "benefits studies" which NASA sponsors or 
performs to display the spin-off of benefits from space activity 
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to the civilian sector, have taken second place to the glamour 
of manned space flight in NASA justification of its programs, 
and secondary benefits and costs have not been thorough,ly assessed 
from the standpoint of determining the appropriate poation of 
space programs in national priorities. 
Food and fibre technology assessment is centered in the 
Department of Agriculture. The Department produces a large 
volume of partial or narrow assessments of high quality, usually 
concerned with economic, and more recently environmental, impacts. 
It tends to avoid, ignore, or suppr08s assessments dealing with 
controversial or sensitive social changes. In other areas of 
technology, the lack of a single agency with clear responsibility 
for planning and evaluating technological developments over a 
wide area of concern contributes to a paucity of wide-scope 
assessment. In agriculture, however, the chief factors are fear 
of constituency pressure and congressional reaction, stemming 
from the incompatibility of two primary Departmental mandates: 
service to industrialized agriculture and protection of the small 
farmer. 
Successive waves of agricultural technology development have 
generated serious social problems as well as world-wide benefits: 
the mechanization of farming, the development of chemical fertil-
izers and pesticides, and the change in ownership and management 
farming. These changes, and trends such as production of 
synthetic fibres, integration of chicken and livestock farming, 
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and the advent of frozen foods, occurred without comprehensive 
anticipatory asseissment which might have allowed alleviation of 
resulting dislocations. 
New developmen'ts for which assessment is urgently needed are 
biological pesticides, fabrication of structured proteins, inte-
gration of pork farming, automated underground irrigation, and 
controlled environment farming. 
Housing technology is perhaps the least adequately assessed 
of major technologies. Federal involvement in this area was 
relatively late. The housing industry is highly fragmented, 
reflecting the fragmentation of the market and the lack of 
industrialization of the industry. Federal policies such as 
post-World War II ve~terans' mortgages have had a tremendous 
impact on urban-suburban development without benefit of antici-
patory assessment. The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment views provision of additional housing and stabilization of 
costs as an urgent and critical problem and therefore puts 
emphasis on action proq-rams rather than evaluative research. 
Continuation of current trends and preferences is assumed un-
critically; there is little attention to new developments such 
as the movement toward communal living, delayed marriage, or 
smaller families. Some assessment of new materials and building 
procedures and industrialized housing is performed, but most 
evaluation is limited to performance characteristics. The view 
of housing needs as an impending crisis impedes the development 
of technology assessment in HUD. 
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Biomedical technology assessment is located in several federal 
agencies such as NIH, NIMH, and FDA. They all take a narrow 
view of technology assessment, concerning themselves almost 
entirely with the safety and efficacy to the individual recip-
ient of drugs and medical devices, and to a lesser extent with 
costs of delivery and impact on medical training and practice. 
Consequences of biomedical technology to the public or society 
at large and consideration of wider public issues are not found 
to a great extent. In large part the explanation for lack of 
comprehensive assessment of biomedical technology is the pre-
vailing American view of the private and privileged relationship 
between doctor and patient, which is rigorously defended by the 
medical profession against interference by public authorities. 
Recent advances in biomedical technology such as new contra-
ceptives, behavior modifying drugs and techniques, organ 
transplants, genetic manipulation and laboratory conception, 
have ethical and public policy implications which make broader 
technology an urgent need. The National Science Foundation 
through its RANN Program (Research Applied to National Needs) , 
has initiated some assessments in this area. NIH and NIMH have 
sponsored some wide scope technology assessments, usually by 
scientific advisory committees, but these tend to avoid defining 
options or addressing policy issues. 
FDA, like other regulatory agencies, has a statutory charter 
which gives it little discretionary authority in evaluating new 
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drugs and medical devices. Within this context FDA interprets 
its authority as narrowly as possible and tends to resist 
extensions of its responsibility. 
Assessment of water resource projects and technology is highly 
important for a number of reasons: 
Water resource projects constructed with federal funds 
may affect many communities in several states or impact 
on an entire region, 
Water resource projects create both public and private 
goods, 
They require large capital investments, 
They need long lead-times for planning and construction, 
and 
They make large-scale, permanent changes in the physical 
environment. 
There is a long history of federal involvement in water resource 
projects and at least six federal agencies have major responsi-
bilities. 
The major constraints on assessment of water resource programs 
and projects are institutional (the need to maintain and expand 
agency programs and funding) and political (the actions of 
congressmen in seeking new projects for their districts, and in 
responding to constituency pressures in favor of maintaining the 
status quo). 
In water resource technology ass~ssment, however, the process 
has been broadened and improved over the last five years, largely 
to meet the demands posed by the environmental movement and the 
passage of the National Environment.al Policy Act. There is also 
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reason to suppose that the improvement will cont,inu,-~. In 1965 
the Congress created the Water Resources Council which provides 
a mechanism for integrating technology assessments performed in 
federal agencies. This interagency organization has developed 
and tested new standards and criteria for water resource projects 
planning and evaluation, to be used by ~ll agencies. While 
these by no means guarantee wide-impact assessment, they take 
into some account not only 1.:mvironmental concerns but social and 
community impacts, and must realistically be appraised as a long 
step forward over previous criteria. 
In 1968 Congress also established the National Water Commission 
to provide an independent assessment of alternative national 
water policies (including interbasin transfers, which the Water 
Resources Council was statutorially forbidden to consider) and 
their economic, social, environmental, and aesthetic consequences. 
Thus there is no\v both a mechanism for integrating agency tech-
nology assessments and a mechanism for providing 'an independent, 
non-agency, assessment of federal water resource projects, pro-
grams, and policies. 
Power generation and transmission technology assessment is 
important for reasons similar to those operating in the field of 
water resource technology: a long history of federal involvement, 
multi-state or regional impacts, large capital investment, 
creation of public and private sector goods, significant changes 
imposed on the natural environment, ,and the existence of federal 
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regulatory responsibility. The private sector power industry 
is large and fragmented, and makes relatively little investment 
in research. Demand for power is rapidly rising, while at the 
same time it is becoming difficult to find acceptable sites for 
new power plants because of competitive demands for land near 
large bodies of water and because of the opposition of environ-
mentalists. Application of nuclear technology to power genera-
tion and two problems associated with this innovation (thermal 
pollution and alleged radiation hazards) have contributed a new 
factor to severe problems of public acceptance. 
A comprehensive technology assessment which considers all of 
the implications of a power-intensive society is urgently needed. 
Although technology assessments of power projects are performed 
by a number of agencies, and power generation is a factor in 
virtually all assessments of water resource projects, no one 
agency appears to have the motivation, resources, comprehensive-
ness, and responsibility to perform an overall assessment of this 
kind. Such an effort might well be sponsored by the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness, the Office of Science and Technology, or 
the National Science Foundation; this will probably require 
initiation by a mandate from the President or at the request of 
Congress. 
More research is also needed to identify new sources of energy 
and to assess these alternatives. While the National Science 
Foundation's RANN Program has identified this as one of its 
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program areas, most attention has been given to hardware research 
and very little so far to assessment. 
Mineral resource technology is also an area where federal 
responsibility is fragmented. Several offices within the Depart-
ment of Interior are concerned with mineral resources located in 
the public domain (about one-third of the u.S. land area). The 
Bureau o'f Mines is responsible for mineral conservation, environ-
mental problems, technological development, and health and safety 
regulation. Interior also has ecological and conservation 
responsibilities, and this dual mission creates internal pressures 
on departmental assessors. The petroleum and coal-mining indus-
tries are reported by some observers to be able to successfully 
bring pressure to bear on technology assessors; substantiation 
of this charge is beyond the scope of this study. 
The amount of federal technology assessment activity in the 
area of mineral resource extraction is very low. This may 
reflect the relative importance of the states in this area, and 
the influence and power of the minerals industry vis-a-vis its 
regulators. In view of the size and economic power of these 
industries, the critical importance of mineral resources to the 
nation, and the environmental damage associated with many kinds 
of minerals extraction, more assessment is badly needed. This 
is particularly true of strip mining, off-shore drilling for 
petroleum and transmission of petroleum by sea and pipeline. 
No single agency has cognizance over a single mineral or source 
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or over mineral extraction technology. An integrating mechanis~ 
i=or performing comprehensive technology assessment i,n the minerals 
extraction area is badly needed. 
Transportation is a critical technology in the United States 
because of the very large land area, a geographically dispersed 
population, and a highly integrated industrialized economy. 
Although state and local policies have strong influence on trans-
portation, the Interstate Commerce Clause has given the federal 
government a dominant role in transportation planning when it 
chooses to exercise that role. Highway, rail, air, water and 
urban mass transportation systems are affected differently by a 
welter of federal, state, and local policies and actions, such 
as taxes, user charges, safety regulation, capital charges, and 
planning activity. The result is a serious imbalance between 
modes, with nonproductive competition and uneconomic duplication 
of facilities and routes in some areas and a lack of any service 
in others. 
until 1966 federal planning, promotion, an.d regulation of 
transportation was also on a modal basis and dispersed between 
a number of agencies and commissions. In 1966 most promotional 
and safety regulation responsibilities were given to the newly 
created Department of Transportation. To a greater extent than 
is typical of other federal agencies, DOT officials profess to 
have responsibility for, interest in, and enthusiasm for the 
development of technology assessment capability. The establishment 
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of DOT is beginning to payoff in a strong effort to develop a 
planning, analysis, and evaluation process directed toward the 
creation of a national transportation system. 
There are great obstacles to this development both internally 
and externally. Internally, the obstacles are a scarcity of 
funds for intermodal technology assessment, but even more impor-
tantly, the lack of coordination and cooperation between the 
constituent modal administrations and between the modal admin-
istrations and departmental planners. Externally, the obstacles 
are legislation which freezes inflexible relationships and 
competition, and the Highway Trust Fund which stabilizes past 
inequities. 
The record of the Federal Aviation Administration in technology 
assessment is poor. Although it cooperated in a recen~ DOT-NASA 
civil aviation policy study which recommended greater attention 
to social science analysis in research, including social impact 
analysis, FAA continues to adopt a promotional stance toward new 
air systems and airports. FAA officials claim no responsibility 
for or interest in broadening their assessment process. A few 
FAA officials expect this attitude to change rapidly under pres-
sure from DOT and Congress. The change is not yet apparent. 
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is displaying new 
interest in social and environmental impact studies, although it 
is not yet clear to what extent these will be integrated into 
decisionmaking. Highway transportation enjoys the benefits of 
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the Highway Trust Fund and the political protection of an 
allegedly powerful highway lobby. Assessment in FHWA has suf-
fered from this political pressure and that which arises from 
State Highway Departments. But public controversy over urban 
segments of the Interstate and Defense Highway System begun in 
1956 caused costly delays and forced some improvement in the 
planning process. The first congressional response, a require-
ment for comprehensive metropolitan planning written into the 
1962 Highway Act, helped to rationalize regional highway planning 
but also created a gap between regional highway planners and 
local decisionmakers in which social impacts of highway location 
was largely ignored. 
Public reaction to community disruption and massive relocation 
built up, and concern for the natural environment provided 
additional pressure. Congress added, in successive highway 
legislation during the 1960's, requirements for consideration 
of environmental and social impacts, new restrictions on reloca-
tion, and a requirement for consultation with other agencies. 
Under these pressures the FHWA which had sponsored some environ-
mental and social impact studies (and collected large numbers of 
those done by states and universities) over a period of two 
decades, has greatly expanded this activity and provided addi-
tional guidelines for state and local planners. 
The Federal Railroad Administration has begun preparations 
f.or several large wide impact technology assessments. Until 1971 
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FRA had little or no money for social impact research. With 
American railroads approaching a state of crisis, Congress has 
provided more funds an.d expanded FEA responsibilities in the 
areas of safety, efficiency, and environmental considerations. 
FRA is now planning technology assessments of relocation of rai
l 
facilities in rail-locked communities, of alternative safety 
devices for rail crossings, and of extension of the Alaska 
Railway. Plans for these studies are couched in technology 
assessment terminology and indicate a comprehensive study plan 
but serious const;raints of timing and funding. 
Urban mass transit, until recen~',he step-child of federal 
transportation planning and funding, is now given "highest 
priority" by DO'!'. Until recently, the Urban Mass Transportation
 
Administration regarded its primary mission as that of subsi-
dizing local transit system development. While capital grants 
is still the primary thrust, there is now a policy that local 
projects should provide test cases for development of innovative 
approaches which have general applicability in other urban areas
. 
UMTA displays something of the same crisis mentality shown by HU
D 
in housing; since urban transit is an urgent need, emphasis is 
put on action programs, rather than on evaluation of social 
impacts of alternative solutions. 
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Futures Research mUl;t be upgraded and emphasized to allow 
improved forecasting of technological innovation and application, 
improved anticipation of possible impacts, and improved under-
standing of the al·ternative social contexts in which these trends 
may be experienced. 
Current practices reinforce shortsightedness. When cumulative 
detrimental impacts reach serious proportions, or when the need 
for new technology or for technological solutions to societal 
problems is perceived as critical or urgent; action programs are 
emphasized. The evaluation of the potential social impacts of 
alternative solutions is downplayed or avoided lest it delay or 
interfere with immediate solutions. Urgent priorities and the 
demand for fast solutions constrain time, money, and personnel 
for foresight. More reliable and comprehensive forecasting 
techniques may hefp avoid such situations by anticipating prob-
lems before they become urgent and encourage alternative techno-
logical plans in advance of immediate needs. However, it 
appears that agencies will allocate sufficient funds and 
expertise to long-range planning and forecasting only if they 
receive a strong directive to do so from the Administrat.ion or 
from Congress. 
Further major developments in technology assessment methodology 
will come from experience and experimentation to performing 
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technology assessment: the sponsoring of comprehensive technol-
ogy assessments should not be contingent upon the general 
acceptance of systematic or eleg~nt scientific methodologies. 
The development of an exhaustive and universally accepted list 
of social indicators, and the working out of quantifiable 
relationships between technological applications, impacts, wid 
processes of social change is desirable. Development of tech-
nology assessment as an integral part of planning and evaluation 
of technological projects and programs can proceed without 
standardization of procedures if there is a strong and continu-
ing demand from Congress or from the President through the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
The demand for technology assessment from the agencies should 
be substantive rather than procedural. Institutionalization of 
technology assessment on the model of the filing of environmental 
impact statements is not desirable. It is likely that formal 
procedures such as the f~ling of technology assessment state-
ments would quickly degenerate into a procedural requirement to 
be satisfied. at the lowest possible level of effort, and by 
adding greatly to the workload of the agencies would absorb 
resources and time better spent on high priority projects and 
anticipatory, long-range assessments. 
In some areas" particularly housing, biomedical, space, mass 
transportation, and mineral resource extraction technologies, 
immediate and significant increase in volume, as weli as the 
j 
r 
42 
quality, of technology assessments is necessary. The pressing 
need for more housing and more urban mass transportation, the 
rapid development of biomedical science, and the uncritical 
attitudes and policies of NASA and of agencies promoting mineral 
resource development, have resulted in serious gaps in govern-
mental technology assessment. These gaps can be corrected if 
Congress and the Office of Management and Budget provide both 
the requirement and the resources for improvement of the planning 
and evaluation process within existing agencies. 
In other areas, interagency organizations are needed to 
collect, compare, weigh, and integrate technology assessments for 
the use of decisionmakers. For technologies such as power and 
chemicals (pesticides, fertilizers, and food additives), where 
a number of agencies share responsibilities, each agency has a 
narrow mission or a specialized constituency. Partial assess-
ments are conducted by various agencies but none is balanced 
and comprehensive. 
The report of the National Academy of Public Administration 
(A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch, 1970) 
recommended that the Council on Environmental Quality become the 
center for policy, monitoring, and review of technology assess-
ment for the Executive Branch. This recommendation now appears 
ill-advised. The Council on Environmental Quality is within the 
Executive Office of the President. To expand its function to the 
extent necessary to monitor assessments from all agencies and to 
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improve the process substantively, would require resources and 
multidisciplinary personnel far in excess of what is appropriate 
for an office in that locus. As it presently operates within a 
narrower range of responsibility, the Council's work is largely 
procedural. Broadening of the substantive responsibility of 
agencies as a result of the National Environmental Policy Act 
has come, and probably will continue to come, not because of 
pressure from the Council so much as from public pressure 
acting through Congress and the courts. 
A better alternative is the creation of a small staff for 
each major area of technology, following the model of the Water 
Resources Council. A professional staff not under the direction 
of any single agency could collect, compare, and evaluate tech-
nology assessments performed by all agencies impinging on the 
technology, and from other assessment entities in the private 
sector, and could also suggest and sponsor other assessments 
which are needed. 
Finally, a source of independent assessments is neede~. In 
all areas of federal involvement with technology, performance of 
objective comprehensive technology assessments is constrained by 
the demands of institutional protection. Agency performance is 
judged in terms of the volume of successful projects and programs 
and in terms of growth of appropriations and personnel. The 
success of programs and projects is generally judged in terms 
of planned or intentional performance rather than in terms of 
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second or third order effects which show up later and are some-
times difficult to relate to specific decisions or programs. 
These factors make inevitable some agency bias. Therefore a 
source of independent assessments should also be provided. 
This function is best served by an organization which has no 
responsibility either for the projects and programs being 
assessed, or for avoiding or correcting their possible conse-
quences. An agency which funds research but which has no line 
responsibility is in the most appropriate situation to sponsor 
independent technology assessments and to make these available 
to the Executive, the Legislature, and the public. Technol-
ogy assessments sponsored in this way can cut across agency 
missions and can be consucted at any stage of development, 
including the critical anticipatory stage. They can potentially 
be given maximum exposure for all elements of the public decision-
making process. 
In order to achieve these two advantages fully, however, 
three things are necessary. The first is a system of publication 
and dissemination of assessment results so they reach the public 
and decisionmakers quickly, and in a readable and usable form. 
Most research-funding agencies have not yet developed such 
dissemination systems. The second necessity is for congressional 
funding which is both ample and sustained. The third requisite 
is that the management of the sponsoring agency adopt and maintain 
an attitude toward assessment needs which is fiercely indepen-
dent, daring, and farsighted. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. More attention to anticipatory assessment and long-range 
planning must be demanded from all agencies. Congress and 
the Executive Office (especially OMB) should provide addi-
tional resources and 9trong directives for expanded futures 
research, including technological forecasting, technology 
assessment, and social forecasting. 
II. Emphasis on performance of technology assessment should 
not wait upon the development and acceptance of systematic 
methodology. Federal executive agencies are now in a 
position to perform and use technology assessment, and 
further methodological development should and will come 
from experience and experimentation in conducting technology 
assessment. 
III. Strong and continuing pressure from Congress and from the 
Office of Management and Budget will be necessary to over-
come built-in institutional inertia and ensure that federal 
agencies continue to improve and broaden the planning and 
evaluative procedures for technological projects. OMB 
t, should take steps to provide this pressure. 
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IV. The demands made by the Office of Management and Budget 
and the Congress should be substantive but not procedural. 
Formal requirements for technology assessment statements 
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on the modal of environmental impact statements are not 
desirable. 
V. Pressure for a greatly expanded volume of technology 
assessment is especially needed in housing technology, 
biomedical technology, space technology, mass transporta-
46 
tion technology, and mineral resource extraction technology. 
VI. New organizations with small professional staffs should 
be provided for certain major areas of technology where 
many federal agencies have partial, overlapping, or conflict-
ing responsibilities, such as power generation, chemicals, 
and biomedical technology. The function of these offices, 
following the model of the Water Resources Council, would 
be to collect, compare, weigh, and integrate technology 
assessments from the public and private sectors. 
VII. A source of independent technology assessments should be 
provided. Maximum objectivity ana usefulness to public 
decisionmakers can be achieved if assessments are sponsored 
by a federal entity having no respon3ibility for the project 
or program to be assessed, and are conducted by independent 
research organizations or university research groups. 
VIII. An agency which fund~ research but which has no line 
responsibility can best provide this source of independent 
assessments. Such agency must develop a systere for 
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publication and dissemination of assessment results to 
decisionmakers and to the public in a speedy and usable 
form. Funding for this agency must be ample and sustained. 
IX. An immediate research effort should be undertaken to 
identify possible future innovations and inventions which 
need assessment. The National Science Foundation should 
sponsor a national survey of industry, research centers and 
government sources, aimed at identifying technology assess-
ments which should be undertaken at once (some of which have 
been pinpointed through the present study). These would 
include recent and imminent developments in the experimental 
sciences, and also areas in which dramatic changes in level 
of application or utilization of existing technology are 
occurring or are likely to occur. The study should also 
include a large-scale effort in technological forecasting 
to anticipate developmental trends which have not yet become 
apparen~. The fruitful approach to societal problems arising 
from technology is not alleviation but anticipation and 
avoidance. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
E. Candidates and Priorities 
for Technology Assessments: 
A Survey of Federal Executive 
Agency Professionals 
Howard C. REESE, P.I. 
July 1973, pp. 1-18 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The National Science Foundation requested the Pro-
gram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology of the 
George Washington University to provide a list of can-
didates for technology assessmen t as proposed by high-
level Federal executives. The purpose of the list would 
be to assist NSF in its role of supporting planning and 
assessmen t activities in and ou t of governmen t. 
The task was to result in four items: 
• A list of subjects which survey participants sug-
gested needed technology assessment together with an 
indication of the frequency of each subject mentioned; 
• Suggested criteria for categorization of subjects 
for assessment; 
• A preliminary evaluation of the urgency and of 
the significance of each candidate based on responses 
obtained by the survey; and 
• Levels of governmen t and agency location for 
recommended technology assessments. 
Discussion 
The study is an in forma tional instrument and an edu-
cational tool. Used as a conventional data-gathering de-
vice, there are specific questions to be posed and an-
swered. Less obvious but no less significant, a survey has 
a corollary aim of c.onveying knowledge about the sub-
ject on which opinions are sought. The study was based 
on mail questionnaires and face to face interviews. These 
two modes served the dual purpose of seeking necessary 
information and of educating the participants on tech-
nology assessment. 
The survey offered the participants an opportunity to 
reflect on technological developments that warranted 
technology assessment, and provided a framework in 
which they should be considered. Which of these devel-
opments are in limited use? When would others achieve 
general or widespread use? What would be the social 
benefits or costs and what would be the scope in world-
wide, national, regional, State, and local terms? On 
which groups, professional, industrial, geographical 
would the technological developments impact? By way 
of summing up, which agencies would have residual re-
sponsibility for technology assessments, and under what 
heading, research, regulation, enforcement, or funding 
would this accountability be exercised? 
Methodology 
The methodology consisted of a maHout of 206 
questionnaires to officials in 24 Federal agencies and 54 
interviews held in nine. I t was necessary to iden !ify a 
participant popUlation, to design the questionnaire, to 
classify the technologies, and to analyze the data re-
ceived quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Classification of the nominees for technology assess-
ment produced a three-by-three matrix with one dimen-
sion consisting of physical, biological, and social rows, 
and the other problem, technology, and project col-
umns. Nominated technologies were assigned to one of 
the nine cells of that matrix. 
Conclusions 
In general, it can be concluded that social impacts are 
less fully understood than their physical counterparts for 
at least two reasons. One, social impacts are less suscepti-
ble to detection and to quantification, nor are there pre-
cise legislative requirements to report them. Two, there 
are fewer social scientists as compared to physical scien-
tists in most Federal agencies. Despite these conditions, 
it is encouraging to note that anticipatioii of social im-
pacts occurred as often as indicated. Mom specifically: 
1. Some subject areas for technology assessment 
were proposed 20 or more times: 
• transportation, 
• energy, 
• management, 
• automation and computer.;, 
• communications, 
• resource use, 
• health care, 
• policy, 
• education. 
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2. Respondents indicated that 78.7 percent of the 
technological developmen ts proposed for assessmen t 
were already in limited use, 17.2 percent in general use, 
and 4.1 percent in widespread use. 
3. The periods of time in which proposed techno-
logical developments were anticipated to achieve general 
use were: 
a. Ten percent in one to two years; 
b. Less than 23 percent in two to four years; 
c. Nearly 28 percent in four to eight years; 
d. The remainder in over eight years. 
The periods of time for technological developments 
to attain widespread usage were: 
a. More than eight years, the majority (60 per-
cent); 
b. Four to eight years (20 percent); 
c. Four years (14 percent); and 
d. The period 1973-75, less than six percent. 
4. Most important impact areas to assess: 
Environmental impacts received double the 
number of entries as those noted for social impacts. 
5. The scope of impacts attributed 1.0 technolOgi-
cal developments rated "most important," "next most 
important," and "third most important," was: 
a. Worldwide effect (42.8 percent) 
b. National impact (41.2 percent) 
c. Regional impacts (6 percent) (State and 10-
cal) 
6. Groups impacted: 
Respondents tended to use general inclusive terms 
such as "all," "many," "society," or "the general pub-
lic." More limited groups (e.g., agriculture, taxpayers, 
scientists or specific industrial groups) were also cited at 
times but it was noted that affected groups were often 
thought of as institutions (banks, the schools and univer-
sities) or occupations (scientists, retailers, farm workers) 
rather than in socioeconomic or physical terms (poor, 
the undereducated, the handicapped, the aged). 
2 
7. Type of impact: 
The technologies rated as "hamlful" or "very harm-
ful" showed no pattern of concentration, and in fact 
were often the same technological developments rated 
by others as beneficial or very beneficial. Virtually wi th-
out exception, developments rated "harmful" were al-
ready in use. Either widespread faith in progress, or a 
lack of discrimination appears indicated in that individ-
uals depicted their nominees as "very beneficial" in over-
all impact in 38 percent of citations. 
8. Preliminary evaluation of the urgency and the 
significance of selected subjects for technology assess-
ment: 
Because of the low number of entries in the category 
that could be taken to be an urgent and significant cate-
gory for technology assessmen t, that is, the very harmful 
category, and the cluster of entries in the very beneficial 
and in the benefiCial categories, it is difficult to draw 
definite conclusions regarding the urgency and signifi· 
cance of selected subjects for Technology Assessment. 
(See Tables 4 and 5.) 
9. Levels of government and agency location for 
technological responsibilities: 
Survey participants most often indicated Federal 
agencies as having primary concern for technology devel-
opments with State governments second. Within the 
Federal framework, the Environmental Protection 
Agency was most often cited as the agency which should 
have responsibility. Research, in contrast to enforcement 
or regulation, was most often given as the area of reo 
sponsibility. 
10. in general technologies should be assessed by 
more than one institution. Federal agencies were recom-
mended 153 times, the Congress 91 times, State govern-
ment 50 times, local government 40 times, industry 19 
times, international organizations seven times, and uni-
versities eight times. Numerous other groups were men-
tioned. 
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II. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSfSSMENT 
The PUrposes of Technology Assessment 
Technology, it can be said, is the imposition of 
change on a product, process, institution or relationship, 
usually for the purpose of improvement and progress, 
and also usually with some real or imagined rational jus-
tification. 
Postindustrial (or technological) man has learned that 
changing a single element of a complex and poorly un-
derstood system usually produces unexpected, and often 
highly undesirable results in addition to the intended 
improvement. Because of this, he has devised yet an-
other technology, that of examining changes to ascertain 
as best he can all of the substantial effects. To ascertain 
all the substantial effects of a change, past, current, fu-
ture, is the purpose of technology assessment. 
By examining past changes, technology assessment 
can leam how seemingly wholly desirable technological 
impositions have resulted in unintended, unexpected and 
undesirable impacts. This is instructive, both as to how 
indirect and downstream impacts occur, and how they 
can be anticipated by technology assessment. 
By examining changes which are still underway, tech-
nology assessment can discover undetected or hidden im-
pacts. With this infonnation, attempts can be made to 
avoid, to modify or to enhance, as appropriate, the pre-
viously hidden impacts, or to modify the basic change 
itself based on a careful consideration of all of the signif-
icant impacts involved, rather than on the one that in-
spired the change in the first place. 
By examining possible future changes, teclmology 
assessment attempts to provide policy makers with 
better data and analyses for making policy decisions. As 
with most forecasting exercises, the results will seldom 
achieve perfection, but the effort will result in a more 
rational and effective policy decision process. 
The Significance of Technology Assessment 
Technology assessment is significant for at least three 
equally important reasons. 
First, technology assessment is the use of systematic 
methods to examine applications of science and technol-
ogy. 
Second, when man's ability to alter his environment 
was puny and his alterations were small and temporary, 
it was worth little to foretell all of the effects of those 
changes because both changes and effects soon passed. 
Now, however, changes are large, impacts are massive, 
and moreover may be irrevocably disastrous. 
Third, in a modem democratic society, accurate, dis-
interested, and complete knowledge is essential for via-
ble operation. Not to provide that information subverts 
the intent of democracy. Lacking such knowledge, 
power moves from the people to those special interests 
which, seeking their own narrow goals, are not likely to 
search for reasons to oppose them. The interests of 
those who may be adversely affected are thereby usually 
ignored until too late. Technology assessment is, there-
fore, significant in at least three principal ways: scien-
tific, democratic, and human survival. 
Technology assessment is significant in still another 
way, social justice. For example, why should all the 
downstream users of a stream suffer loss of that use to 
provide a free sewer for an upstream user? Not all tech-
nological changes are so clear cut, yet there are always 
beneficiaries and "disbeneficiaries." In the realm of con-
flicting values, an ethical society is interested in equity. 
Technology assessment is a means of deciding the rela-
tive costs and benefits to each of those affected by a 
technological change. In that way the equity of the pro-
posed change can be determined. Certainly technology 
assessmen t itself does not determine the equity, nor 
should it try. But it does provide an essential ingredient 
for such a determination. 
If scientific data and analysis is not used in making 
equity deciSions. such decisions become guesses, blind 
chance, or responses to hidden biases and pressures. 
Table 1 shows the complete list of 457 technologies 
nominated by participants in the study. Since many 
were nominated more than once, 382 candidates for 
technology assessment result from the questionnaires 
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and from the interviews. Nominees are organized accord-
ing to the source of interest -- a technology, a problem, 
or a project, and by the kind of technology - physical, 
biological, or social (See Figure 1). The cells are designa-
ted by letters for convenience in presenting the material 
in Table 1, i.e., the contents of each cell. 
A more detailed discussion of this taxonomy will be 
found in Appendix D. 
The material in Table 1 was further organized into 31 
subcategories. Their distribution in relation to the ma-
trix is shown in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 1- Classification of Technology Asseuments 
Origin 
Technologies Problem Technology Project 
Physical A1 A2 A3 
Biological B1 B2 B3 
Social C1 C2 C3 
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Thirty-one subcategories were used to group all T.A. 
candidates. All candidates were assigned to a sub-
r~---'-"""--
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category, but not all subcategories were represented in 
each cell of the matrix. 
FIGURE 2 - Nominees by Subcategories 
Subcategories 
1. Transportation ..•...••.......................... 
2. ManagelT)P.nt •.............•................•.... 
3. Energy .............•.......•.................... 
4. Communications ....... _ ........................ . 
5. Computers/Automation .•......................... 
6. Resource Use ...........................•..•.... 
7. Health Care ......•...........•.......•.......... 
8. Policy ......•.•.............•...............••. 
9. Education ..................................... . 
10. Pollution .........•.......•..................... 
11. Community Development ................•..•...... 
12. Economics ..................•................... 
13. Public ~~t,fety ................................... . 
14. Politics ................................•......... 
15. Weather Modification ............................. . 
16. Nuclear Tel,hi'iolO!lV ....... " .......... " " .....•.. 
17. Space/Satellites ••............•... : .............. . 
18. Agriculture ...........................•......... 
19. Water ............................. '" ......... . 
20. Mental Health .................................. . 
21. Resource Conservation ........................... . 
22. Sociology ..................................... . 
23. Electronics ................................... . 
24. Biology ..............•..................•...... 
25. Birth Control .................................. . 
26. Nutrition ...................................... . 
27. Consumer Behavior .............................. . 
28. Disaster Planning .............................•... 
29. Construction 
30. I ndustrial Production ............................ . 
31. Cartography ..................................•. 
TOTAL .......................... , ............ . 
Matrix Cell Codes 
A,l Physical-Problem (I 1) 
A,2 Physical·Technology (12) 
A,3 Physical·Project (I 3) 
B,I Biological·Problem (21) 
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Matrix Cells 
A,1 A,2 A,3 8,1 8,2 8,3 C,1 
10 47 11 
1 1 15 
13 19 1 
2 12 13 1 
1 9 4 5 
4 9 4 6 
2 2 5 6 2 
10 
7 
6 9 2 
2 10 
5 
4 
6 
8 4 
8 1 
5 4 
1 1 3 2 
3 4 
6 
3 3 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 
58 136 51 8 15 6 80 
B,2 Biological. Technology (22) 
B,3 Biological·Project (23) 
e,I Social·Problem (31) 
C,2 Social·Technology (52) 
C,3 Social-Project (33) 
C,2 C,3 Total 
2 71 
11 6 35 
33 
28 
5 3 28 
1 3 27 
3 6 26 
4 7 21 
10 3 20 
17 
2 2 16 
5 5 15 
4 5 13 
3 3 12 
12 
10 
10 
8 
8 
7 
7 
6 7 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
51 52 457 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The proposal set forth four main objectives for the 
study: 
1. To suggest criteria for categorization of sub-
jects proposed for technology assessment; 
2. To develop a list of technological developments 
for which Federal officials believe technology assessment 
is needed; 
3. To provide some preliminary evaluation of the 
urgency and the significance of the selected topics; and 
4. To suggest levels of government and agency lo-
cation for recommended technology assessments. 
Possible Criteria for Categorization of 
Subjects for Technology Assessment 
1. Time Span for the Technological Development 
The survey approached the question of when assess-
ment of a suggested invention, innovation, or application 
should be undertaken by asking two questions: whether 
the technology ·is in limited, general, or widespread use, 
and the period of time which the technological develop-
ment would take to achieve general widespread use (see 
items 5 and 6 of th.e questionnaire, Appendix B). To 
provide the reader with an overview of the relative ur-
gency of suggested afo,essments from the standpoint of 
judgments related to these two criteria, Tables 2 and 3 
list these candidates in each developmental category. 
Respondents indicated that 78.7 percent of the tech-
nological developments were already in limited use. Only 
17.2 percent were reported as being in general use, and 
4.1 percent in widespread use. 
Of those T.A. candidates not now in use, barely 10 
percen t of the nominees were seen as achieving general 
use within one or two years, and slightly less than 23 
percent in two or four years. Nearly 28 percent of the 
nominees were anticipated within four to eight years, 
and the remainder, 39 percent,in over eight years. In 
this category, some nominees were seen as requiring as 
much as about 20 years to achieve general usage,e.g., 
liquid sodium nuclear reactor (see Table 7, p. 26).* 
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The majority of the nominees, 60 percent, were 
placed in the category of requiring more than eight years 
to achieve widespread usage, e.g., dietary changes for 
prevention of arteriosclerosis (see Table 7, p. 35). Some-
what less than 20 percent were considered as taking four 
to eight years, e.g., breeder reactors (see Table 7, p. 37). 
Nearly 14 percent were thought to require four years, 
e.g., iriIproved resolution for Earth Resources Technol-
ogy Survey (ERTS) (see Table 7, p. 37), while fewer 
than six percent were expected to realize widespread use 
in the period 1973-75, e.g., the Marine Mammal Act (see 
Table 7, p. 30). Most respondents, it appears, took very 
seriously the anticipatory nature of technology assess-
ment. 
2. Nature, Scope, and Significance of Potential Impacts 
The heart of the survey is to be found in the respon-
dents' anticipation of potential impacts. Three of the 
eight criteria for categorization of subjects for teclmol-
ogy assessment dealt with impacts. The survey handled 
references to impacts under five direct or corollary items 
of the questionnaire. 
(a) Most Important Impact Areas To Assess 
(Questionnaire items 7a, 8a, 9a). 
Sixty respondents indicated the impacts related to 
the environment as a necessary area for assessment, al-
most double the number of 35 that put forth social or 
sociological impacts for assessment (e.g., the displace-
ment of people as a result of farm mechanization). Eco-
nomic benefits-costs received 25 citations, and the cost-
effectiveness of systems was mentioned 23 times. 
Federal officials thus reflected recent public concern 
over environmental degradations and hazards to health 
and to safety. Many of the respondents have been in-
volved in preparation or review of Environmental Impact 
Statements required under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, which has undoubtedly sensitized 
them to possible impacts on the physical environment. 
*Table 7 is a summary of the raw data for the study. 
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Sociai impacts are more poorly understood, and at pres-
ent less susceptible to detection and to quantification. 
Nor is there a systematic legislative requirement for their 
reporting. There are also relatively few social scientists, 
as compared to physical scientists, economists, and en-
gineers in most Federal agencies. * Given these condi-
tions, it is encouraging that anticipation of social im-
pacts occurred as often as indicated. 
(b) Scope (Scale) of Impacts (Questionnaire items 
7b, 8b, 9b). 
Eighty-four percent of the impacts identified as 
"most important," next most important, and third most 
important were depicted as having a worldwide effect 
(42.8 percent), or a national impact (41.2 percent). 
Nearly 11 percent were estimated to have regional im-
pacts, and less than six percent to have consequences 
primarily for State and local areas (see Table 3). This 
may indicate that technology assessment will continue 
to be concentrated at the Federal government; but it 
should be noted that respondents in this survey were all 
Federal officials. They were also thinking pri:narily of 
technological developments at a fairly high level of ab-
straction. Increased funding for development of innova-
tive energy technology, or national policy concerning 
water resources, for example, might best be assessed at a 
national level, while assessment of a particular power 
plant or dam might be an appropriate subject for local or 
regional level assessment. 
(c) Groups Impacted (Questionnaire items 
7c, 8c(1), 9c(1). 
Respondents gave 807 responses identifying groups 
who would be affected by the potential technological 
developments. One hundred and five responses singled 
out "all," "many," or specific industrial groups as being 
affected by the technological development. Almost the 
same number (102) entries) pointed out "society" as 
being affected, and another 72 responses named the 
"general public," a subset of society. More limited 
groups (e.g., agriculture, taxpayers, scientists) were fre-
quently mentioned, but it is noticeable that affected 
groups were more often thought of as institutions 
(banks, educational institutions) or occupations (scien-
*In 86 Federal offices it was reported that social scientists 
(anthropologists, historians, political scientists, psychologists, 
and sociologists) make up 19 percent of the professional staffs. 
By contrast, engineers (54 percent). economists (46 percent), 
physical scientists (33 percent), biological and medical scientists 
(28 percent), and operations research analysts (21 percent) 
showed the disparity in emphasis. See Vary T. Coates, Technol· 
ogy ahd Public Policy, The Process of Technology Assessment ill 
the Federal Government, I, p. 2-13. 
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tists, retailers, agricultural workers) than in socio-
economic or physical terms (the poor, the under-
educated, the handicapped, the aged). 
(d) Type of Impact (Questionnaire items 
7c, 8c(1), 9c(l). 
A total of 753 different entries indicated the nature 
of an impact on specific groups (profeSSional, industrial, 
geographical, and SOCial). Forty-three .impacts were spec-
ified as very harmful, and 170 as harmful. A much larger 
proportion, about one-third of the .impacts, or 255, were 
depicted as beneficial, and nearly 38 percent, or 285, as 
very beneficial. (See Tables 4 and 7): 
The technologies which individuals rated as harmful 
or very harmful showed no pattern of concentration, 
and in fact were often the same technological develop-
ments rated by others as beneficial or very beneficial 
(e.g., changes in work scheduling or retirement, air pollu-
tion controls on automobiles). Almost without excep-
tion, the developments rated harmful were either already 
in use (e.g., existing decision processes and criteria for 
land use, concentration of farming) or were expected to 
be in widespread use within the next four to ten years. 
Either widespread faith in progress, or a lack of dis-
crimination seems indicated by the fact that individuals 
rated their nominees as very benefiCial in overall impact 
in 38 percent of the cases. Nominees called very bene-
ficial covered a wide range, but were especially con-
centrated in telecommunications and information 
technology, transportation, energy generation and re-
sources, environmental enhancement measures, and 
building materials and techniques. However, in nearly 
three out of four cases a technological development 
rated as very beneficial was also judged by the same 
individual to have significant disadvantages. Most often 
the disadvantages were problems of transition (obsoles-
cence of existing technologies, need for new institu-
tions), costs (either development and investment costs, 
or increased costs of a service to users), detriments to 
those with a vested interest iil existing technologies 
which would be replaced, or possible environmental 
de5radation. COT!~cming improved telecommunications 
and informlition tecfu,ology, a threat to privacy was 
often cited as a significant disadvantage. As for innova-
tive transportation, effects on urban land use and popu-
lation distribution were often cited. 
(e) Principal Benefits (Planned and UnpltInned) 
And Principal Disadvantages (Questionnaire items 
10(a)(bXc). 
Table 5 shows a selected listing of benefits and dis-
advantages that were associated with particular techno· 
logical developments. (Table 7 gives the full display of 
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benefits and disadvantages). Eighteen respondents cited 
improvement or enhancement of the enviroment as the 
principal plannc~ benefit of individual technological 
developmen ts. 
Thirteen respondents identified environment im-
provement as the principal unplanned benefit resulting 
from their nominees for technology assessment; '15 
respondents pointed to environmental damage as the 
major disadvantage of technological developments. Four-
teen respondents referred to improvement in transporta-
tion systems, and 13 to the quality of life as the princi-
pal planned benefits. 
3. Preliminary Evaluation of the Urgency and the Signif-
icance of Each Candidate 
The survey used the distribution of the potential 
overall impacts and the order of subcategories of techno-
logical developments as a basis for determining a prelim-
inary evaluation of the urgency and the significance of 
selected topics. The distribution of data, however, makes 
it difficult to draw definite conclusions. 
I t would appear logical to indicate a very harmful 
technological development would suggest categorization 
for preliminary evaluation and urgency. Yet only two 
nominees fell under this heading, the breeder reactor 
program and the present decision-making process and 
criteria for land use. Interestingly, one respondent re-
ported this technological development as favorable. Out 
of 189 entries this amounted to only 1 percent. The 
harmfu~ category, e.g., development of a hydrogen 
energy transport system, mobile homes as a way of life, 
and regulating use of farm chemicals to reduce pollution 
of streams and lakes furnished 17 en tries, or 9 percent of 
the total. 
By contrast, a cluster of entries appeared in the very 
beneficial and beneficial categories. In the first, e.g., vid-
eophone or televised closed-circuit conferences, remote-
controlled railroad freight cars, ocean offshore break-
waters and islands, mining and processing shale for oil, 
individuals rated 80 of their nominees in this group (42 
percent). In the second, e.g., improved resolutions of 
Earth Resources Technology Survey (ERTS) Cameras, 
environmental controls, impact of computer technology 
on the Federal bureaucracy, and technology for utiliza-
tion of renewable energy resources, individuals scored 58 
of their nominees (30 percent) fell with this group. On 
the basis of these contrasting potential overall impacts, it 
is difficult to be definitive about the urgency and signifi-
cance of topics. 
Nor is it less difficult to order technological develop-
ments according to subcategories. Candidates were 
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grouped according to innovation or invention, and not 
by problem or impact. Yet it is possible to conclude that 
transportation within both dimensions of the matrix had 
a clear lead over the next subcategory, management (see 
Figure 2). More definitely established were agencies con-
cerned and their types of responsibility. 
4. Levels of Government a~d Agency Location for 
Responsibility over the Technology 
With regard to technologies proposed for assessment, 
responsibility for research, enforcement, regulation, and 
other activities is seen as res ting principally in Federal 
agencies. State governments were the second most fre-
quent locus for those responsibilities (responses to ques-
tion 3). 
Within the Federal framework, the Environmental 
Protection Agency most often was cited as the place for 
these responsibilities (see Table 6). 
Of 409 answers, 50 percent cited research as a prime 
responsibility. Twenty.eigllt percent cited regulation as 
the prime responsibility. The remainder were split be-
tween enforcement (13 percent) and "others" (10 per-
cent). 
5. Where Technology Assessment Should Be Conducted. 
In response to question 12, 417 suggestions were 
made for where technology assessments should be con-
ducted. There were as follows: 
(5 specific agencies were cited 6 times) 
Federal Agencies ................ 153 
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 91 
State Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 50 
Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . " 40 
Industry .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19 
Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 
lntematiowu Groups. . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 
Others ...................... 49 
Others included non-profit groups, the National 
Academies, blue-ribbon commiSSions, and neighborhood 
and environmental groups. 
Federal agencies and the Congress were frequently 
cited simultaneously, as were State and local government 
frequently cited along with the Federal government and 
the Congress. 
The general impression is that more than one agency 
or institu tion should be assessing the candidates pro-
posed. 
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TABLE 1 - List of Nominees and Candidates by Matrix Rows and Columns 
Nominee Count Nominee Count 
(Candidate Count) (Candidate Count) 
Nominee Nominee 
A. 
Ques-
tion- Inter-
naire "iew Total 
Physical 13.3% 
1. Problll!T\ 
a. Agriculture .•...••.• (1) 1 (1 ) 1 
(1) Concentration of 
Farming .0 •• 0 •• 1 
b. Communications •... (11 2 (1) 2 
(1) General .•.....• (1) 2 
c. Computers/Automa-
tion .•.•.••.•...... (1) 1 (1 ) 1 
(1) Interconnected 
Data Systems .... 1 
d. Construction •...... (1) 1 (1 ) 1 
111 New Materials for 
Housing .••.•••• 1 
e. Disaster Planning _ •.. (2) 2 (21 2 
111 Aircraft Disaster 
Provisions ...... 1. 
(21 Capability of U.S. 
Commercial Ship-
ping in DOD Op-
erations ..•... _ . 1 
f. Energy .... _ ..••..• (6) 6 (2) 7 (8) 13 
(1) General '0 ••••• 0 1 (1) 5 
(2) New Sources of 
Energy ...•..•.. 1 
(3) I ncreased Energy 
Consumption ••.. 1 
(4) Non-fossil Fuel En-
ergy System ..... 1 
(5) Renewable-energy 
Sources _ ....... 1 
(6) Energy Planning 111 2 
(7) Energy Technolog-
ies _ •....••...• 1 
g. Health Care . ........ (2) 2 (21 2 
111 Architectural Bar-
riers for Handicap-
ped ........... 1 
(21 Design Standardi-
zation for Handi-
capped .. _ ...... 1 
h. Nuclear Technology. _ (1) 1 (11 1 
(1) Nuclear Disaster 
Planning ....•... 1 
i. Pollution .....••••.. (1) 2 (31 4 (4) 6 
(1) Noise Pollution. _ • 111 2 
(21 Effluent Waste Dis-
posal •..•••.••. _ 1 
(3) Solid Waste Dis-
posal. _ ......••• (1 ) 2 
(4) Poison Gas Disposal 1 
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Ques-
tion- Inter-
nairtl "itlw Total 
j. Resource Conservation (1 ) 1 (2) 2 (3) 3 
(1) Natural Resource 
Conservation •..•. 1 (2) Use of Waste Mate- 1 
rials ............ 
(3) The Finite Limits of 
Minerals and Fossil 
Fuels •• 0 ••••••• 1 
k. Resource Use ....... (1 ) 1 (3) 3 (4) 1 
(1 ) Resources Deple-
tion Problem .... 1 
(2) Use of Nominal 
Solid Waste for 
Road Construction 
Material ........ 1 
(31 Sea Resource Ex-
traction .....•.. 1 
(4) Rising Costs of 
R&D .•........ 1 
I. Space/Satellites ..•..• (11 1 (11 1 
(1) Space Program ..• 1 
m. Transportation ...... (5) 6 (3) 4 (8) 10 
(1) General .... ~ .... (1 ) 2 
(2) Auto & Highway 
Safety .....•... 1 
(3) Low-capital AI-
ternatives ...... 1 
(4) Public Transport 
of Handicapped . 1 
(5) Urban Mass Tran-
sit .Systems .... 1 
(61 Vehicular Moving 
Power ......... (1) 2 
(7) Propulsion .....• 1 
(81 Integrated U.S. 
Transportation 
Plan .....••••. 1 
n. Water •.•....•..•.. (21 3 (21 3 
(1) Water Needs (Po-
table and Agricul-
tural .....•. , ., . (11 2 
(21 Runoff Problem 1 
o. Weather Modification. (1) 6 111 1 (21 7 
(11 General. '" .... 6 2 
Subtotal (18125 (23133 (39158 
2. Technology 36.7% 
a. Agriculture ......... 111 1 (1 ) 1 
(1) Agricultural Chem-
icals ....•.•••.. 1 
b. Communications .•... (51 7 (41 5 (9) 12 
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TABLE 1 - Lilt of Nominees and Candidates by Matrix Rows and Columns - Continued 
Nominee Count Nominee Count 
(Candidate Count! (Candidate Count) 
Nominee Nominee 
Ques- Que,-
tion- Inter- tion- Inter-
neire view Total nll;ra view Total 
-
(11 Information/Com- (2) The Transistor .. 1 
munication Techno- (3) Microwave ....• 1 
logies •.•.•...••• (1) 2 f. Energy ...... '" ... (13) 14 (5) 5 (15) 19 
(21 Communication - (1) Coal as Interim 
UHFNHF/HF etc. 1 Energy Source .. 1 1 
(31 Broad-band Com- (21 Coal Gasification (11 2 
munications .•..• (1) 2 (3) Coal Liquefica-
(41 Low-cost Com- tion ...•.....• 1 
munications •.••. 1 (41 Mining & Proces-
(5) Interconnection of sing Shale for Oil 1 
Computers/Satel· (5) Hydrogen as 
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puter Technology of Power ..•..• 1 
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logy ...• _ ••.... 1 Goods ........ 1 
WI Computer Net- h. Management .•• ____ (1) 1 (1) 1 
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tion Through Waste Conserve Energy. 1 
Reclamation 111 2 
f. Computers/ Automa-
.... 
(2) Desalinization of tion .•....•...•... (2) 2 (2) 2 (4) 4 
Sea Water 1 (1) Office Automa-...... 
(3) Water Recovery tion .•.....•.•• 1 
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d. Economics •.•.•...• (4) 5 (4) 5 (6) Need for Manager. 
(1) Decline of Defense ial Science Diffu· 
Spending in Real sian •...•...... 1 
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cation .•.••.•..• 1 111 2 System 
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tural Progress •... 1 tural Breakthrough (4) Patterns of Demago- Potential (Japan & guery .0 ......... 1 China vs. Latin (5) Rule by the Techno- America & India) 1 logical Elite .•.... 1 
15 
1 
1 
1 
i 
i 
I 
1 
\ 
1 j 
T-1 
l 1 
f 
TABLE 1 - List of Nominees and Candidates by Matrix Rows and Columns - Continued 
Nominee Count Nominee Count 
(Candidate Count) (Candidate Count) 
Nominee Nominee 
Oues· Oues· 
tion· Inter· tion· Inter· 
naire vif:w Total naire view Total 
b. Computers/Automa- f. Health Care ..••.•.. (3) 3 (3) 3 
tion .•.........•.... (4) 4 (1) 1 (5) 5 (1) Technological 
(1 ) Increased Demand StMdardizatlOn 
for I nformation on for the Handicap· 
Transfer of Bonds ped ........... ~:~:". ~. 1 & Funds .•...•... 1 (2) Diversionary Pro· 
" 
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i. Politics ..•.•.•.•.•.• (3) 3 (3) 3 (1) The Public Morale 
(1 ) Separation of Pow- of the Thirties as a 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
F. Southern Regional Workshop 
on Technology Assessment 
Vary T. COATES and 
John E. MOCK 
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FOREWORD 
A three-day conference on technology assessment for State and local officials was held on the campus of 
the Georgia Institute of Technology, in Atlanta, May 6-8, 1974. Participants included scientists, engineers, 
planners, economists, and administrators from most of the Southern States and from many of that region's 
universities and research centers. The Conference was co-sponsored by the Governor's Science Advisory 
Council of Georgia and The George Washington University Program of Policy Studies in Science and Tech-
nology. The objective was to provide information about, and training in, technology assessment for those 
who must formulate policy and make critical decisions about technological programs and projects at the 
State and community levels, where the impacts of technological development are most directly felt. The 
Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment was supported by the National Science Founda-
tion, Office of Intergovernmental Science and Research Utilization. 
Technology assessment is applied, problem-oriented, multidisciplinary research which aims at anticipating 
and evaluating the consequences of a technological development in terms of its impact on the economy, the 
environment, the institutions, and the quality of life of a community or a society. Technology assessment is 
intended to inform and improve decisionmaking in the public and the private sectors, by broadening the 
considerations that go into that decisionmaking, giving it a IGInger-range perspective, and taking account of 
secondary, unintended consequences as well as immediate, direct costs and benefits. 
Since Congressman Emilio Daddario first introduced the term "technology assessment" in p-oposing the 
establishment of a Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1966, the Federal Government has 
taken the lead in developing and using technology assessment. The National Science Foundation, over the 
last two or three years, has provided more than eight million dollars for comprehensive technology assess-
ments in a wide range of technological and problem areas. An Office of Technology Assessment was estab-
lished in 1972 (P. L. 92-484, October 13, 1972) to serve the U.S. Congress. But State and local governments 
also must grapple with the complex issues raised by science and technology as they imr,)act on people's lives. 
Power plant siting, highway and airport construction, development of natural resources, cable T.V., and 
health care delivery systems-these and many other technological programs and projects require decision at 
the State and community level and raise complicated problems of equity and conflicting interests. 
In 1971 a Working Conference on Technology Assessment was sponsored by the National Science 
Foundation and convened by the National Academy of Public Administration. From this Working Confer-
ence grew the State Technology .Assessment Panel, which in 1972 produced a report which said: 
Technology assessment is a legitimate and necessary State function. To be most effective the tech-
nology assessment process must be applied where the principal authority to act is located. 
The Panel therefore recommended that: 
The National Science Foundation should undertake a series of projects to develop better information 
about how successful technology assessment has been accomplished in States and to stimulate interest 
among key State officials in technology assessment. 
The Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment is one product of the National Science 
Foundation's effort to carry forward that recommendation. As Co-Chairmen of the Conference, we wish to 
express our appreciation for the full cooperation and great effort of the sponsoring organizations; of Mr. 
Edward T. Kelly, the National Science Foundation Program Manager; of the host institution; and of the many 
Speakers and participants in the Conference. We hope that this may be the first of a number of similar 
conferences in other regions of the United States; we also hope that this Conference has been of value to the 
dedicated State and local decisionmakers and administrators who daily struggle with the complex problems 
of our highly technological society. 
-Dr. Vary T. Coates and 
October 15, 1974 Dr. John E. Mock, Co-Chairmen 
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THE PROGRAM 
FIRST SESSION. WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT? Dr. John E. Mock, Chairman 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
Mr. Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress 
SURVEY OF RECENT FEDERAL ACTIVITY IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Dr. VaryT. Coates, Associate Director, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George 
Washington University 
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: The Honorable Dean Rusk, Professor of Law, University of Georgia 
SECOND SESSION. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS. Dr. Vary T. 
Coates, Chairman 
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Mr. Edward T. Kelly, Program Manager, Office of Intergovernmental Science and Research Utilization, 
Nation3: S :ience Foundation 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS DESIRED BY THE STATES 
Dr. John E. Mock, Science Advisor to the Governor of Georgia 
THIRD SESSION. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, METHODOL-
OGY. Dr. John E. Mock, Chairman 
HOW TO DO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Mr. Joseph F. Coates, Program Manager, Office of Exploratory Research and Problem Assessment, Na-
tional Science Foundation 
HOW TO ORGANIZE A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Dr. Steven Ebbin, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington 
University 
COUNTER-INTUITIVE THINKING AND ITS PLACE IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Dr. Marvin Cetron, President, Forecasting I~ternational, Ltd. 
HOW TO DO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS FOR LESS ~HAN $5000. 
Dr. Andre Delbecq, Chairman, Department of Management, University of Wisconsin, Madison 
HOW TO WRITE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT. 
Professor Gene Willeke, Environmental Research Center, Georgia Institute of Technology 
LUNCHEON SPEAKER: Professor Melvin Kranzberg, Georgia Institute of Technology 
<.0;', 
FOURTH SESSION: WORKSHOPS. 
Demonstration workshops conducted by Mr. Coates, Dr. Ebbin, and Dr. Delbecq 
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FIFTH SESSION: THREE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS. Dr. Vary T. Coates, Chairman 
PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Mr. Wyatt Rogers, Associate Director, Western Interstate Nuclear Board 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN CONNECTICUT. 
Dr. JUles Mirabal, General Electric Research and Development Center 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: INTEGRATION OF HOG FARMING. 
Or. Ivan Smith, Midwest Research Institute 
AN EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. 
Mr. Walter A. Hahn, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology, Science Policy Research Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress 
NOTE: Due to travel schedules, the speakers did not appear in exactly the order listed. 
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL: 
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
The Southern Regional Conference on Technology Assessment pulled together and gave visibility to ex-
perience which States and communities have recently gained in Technology Assessment. Each assessment is 
unique, yet the problems encountered, the alternative solutions tried, and the lessons learned can often be 
helpful to others who must struggle with the complex issues of a highly technologized society. It will there-
fore be useful to highlight themes which emerged in the discussions and salient insights offered by speakers 
at the Confererce. 
1. The Need 
There can be little doubt that Technology Assessment-or as many prefer to say, social impact analysis-
is not only appropriate but necessary in planning and decisionmaking at all levels of government. This is 
now widely recognized by State and local officials. How to institute improvements in established procedures, 
and where to find the resources and capability to do Technology Assessment, are more difficult questions. 
It is in communities and small regions-where people live and work-that the real impacts of technological 
development are felt. However "quality of life" may be defined (and definitions are legion), it is surely 
manifested in the everyday conditions under which individuals and families live, work, and spend their 
leisure. Housing, transportation, energy, utilities, social and health services, education, public services-these 
are the problems with which State and local governments continually grapple, under intense pressures of 
scarce dollars, unavailable information, conflicting political demands, and uncertain outcomes. Federal pro-
grams can help, but may disappear at the end of a fiscal year. Federal poliCies may change not only with a 
change of Administrations, but overnight. Research and information coming from the National level may 
not be applicable to local situations. But State and local problems continue, and decisions made today may 
lock a community into a unforeseen chain of consequences or limit options for years to come. 
Areas smaller than the nation are moreover particularly vulnerable to converging trends: for example, 
underdevelopment and unemployment, rising demands for resource extraction, and increasing pressure for 
environmental protection. Many decisions involve irreversible and large scale changes in the phYSical en-
vironment and in land use, or commitment of funds and nonrenewable resources over long periods of time. 
Caught in a vise of conflicting and converging needs, responsible officials must of necessity make decisions, 
usually without sufficient information to identify all possible alternatives and fully evaluate necessary 
trade·offs. 
Public policy related to technology, often thought of as a "national" concern, is therefore directly and 
intimately a part of local and State decision making, and all techniques which hold promise for improving 
and broadening the process of formulating and implementing wise public policy are increasingly of interest 
in all levels of government. Technology Assessment, which aims to provide decision makers with better in-
formation about the possible consequences of their actions and to help them better manage uncertainty, is 
such a technique. 
2. The Experience 
Two States have already established an institutional base for Technology Assessment: The Georgia Center 
for Technology Forecasting and Technology Assessment in 1970 and the Hawaii State Center for Science 
Policy and Technology Assessment in 1971. Other States are investigating or experimenting with assessment 
through their Governor's science advisors, through legislative councils, or through other mechanisms. Re· 
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gional cooperation is another device used, for example in the assessment of Operation Plows
hare, reported 
at the Conference. Most States, however, although paying increased attention to environme
ntal concerns 
and gradually broadening the scope of planning, have not attempted comprehensive Techn
ology Assess-
ments. As one speaker at the Southern Regional Conference summed up the situation, asse
ssment at the 
State level has been "problem-oriented rather than technology-focused, reactive rather than
 anticipatory, 
and limited to the three E's-energy, economics, and environment." Newly emerging technolo
gies and social 
technologieS, with few exceptions, have been neglected. 
Such assessments as have been made have generally been intended to serve the needs of the
 Executive 
branch of State governments_ Little or no Tp,(;hnology Assessment-in the States or in the Federal Govern-
ment-has been done for or by regulatory agencies, although regulation and rate-setting are am
ong the most 
effective methods of directing and controlling technological development. State legislatures, u
sually poorly 
supplied with informational and staff services, have not yet followed the lead of the U.S
. Congress in 
establishing an Office of Technology Assessment, although policy making is pre-eminentl
y a legislative 
function. 
3. The Obstacles 
Money, time, and 'trained people are in short supply in State and local governments. Staff p
eople with 
experience and capability in interdisciplinary, policy-oriented, applied research are partic
ularly scarce_ 
Agency administrators (and State legislators) tend to be suspicious and intolerant of proposals for "me·re 
studv" rather than immediate action. 
Political pressures and interest group demands are immediate and intense. In each of the th
ree Assess-
ments presented at the Conference the study teams had encountered problems related to pol
itical sensitivi-
ties-interjurisdictional rivalries, the suspicion and fear of a "threatened" industry, the affiliation of legis-
lators with interest groups affected by tha technology_ 
Technology Assessments, by their nature, usually deal with controversial subjects. A Conference partici-
pant noted thatwhile assessors at the Federal level may argue about the value of public partici
pation or how 
to achieve it, "the closer you get to the grass roots, the more public participation you will ge
t"-whether or 
not you invite it. Potential detrimental impacts may appear more dramatic and galvanize op
inion more ef-
fectively than social benefits (which may be more important but more generalized). Because of this intense 
public interest, there is more danger of Technology Assessment becoming "technology arre
stment" at the 
local than the national or societal level. 
State agencies are of course subject to the same barriers that Federal agencies find in attempting to 
broaden planning and evaluation procedures. Bureaucratic inertia, institutional and personal 
biases, special 
constituenCies, and the necessity for self-preservation do not contribute to an ability to ask h
ard questions 
about downstream consequences. Fragmented responsibilities and narrow organizational ch
arters are not 
conducive to comprehensive analysis of social impacts. For State as well as Federal decisionma
kers, the pres-
sures push toward short-term optimization rather than anticipatory, even-handed judgment. 
4. The Strengths 
As compared to national or societal assessments, subfederal Technology Assessment can deal w
ith smaller 
geographical areas, less heterogeneous populations, and more easily identifiable parties at in
terest. Data is 
likely to be less aggregated. Direct access can be had to potentially affected segments of the 
population. A 
"home-grown" Assessment team, attuned to the mores and idiom of the locality, has a sub
tle advantage 
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which can best be appreciated by researchers who have had the experience of being regarded suspiciously as 
"outsiders. " 
Some areas of technology are at present extremely resistant to assessment because so little data is avail-
able. This is particularly true of very innovative physical and social technologies-for example, the guaran-
teed annual income, or at one time, the contraceptive pill. It may not be possible to predict public ac-
ceptability of the technology, O'r the ways in which people will use, misuse, and abuse it. In such cases, 
"social experimentation," or a monitored trial in a limited area, can provide a firmer base for Technology 
Assessment. Local communities provide the ideal site for many such social experiments. 
In some cases such social experiments will occur naturally-for example, when one or two communities 
in a state adopt cable television, a Technology Assessment by the State of the impacts in these commun ities 
can assist other local governments to make wise decisions about cable television franchising. 
5. Priorities 
In a survey conducted for the National Science Foundation, State officials indicated the following as 
priority areas for Technology Assessment: 
-Natural resources and environmental management: coastal zone and wetlands management, solid 
waste management systems; 
-Energy systems: power plants, off-shore oil wells or supertanker facilities, solar and geothermal 
energy; 
-Human resource programs: manpower training and educational equalization programs, educational 
technology, health care delivery systems; 
-Transportation: special bus lanes, parking restrictions, mass transit systems, airports, highways; 
-Government function~: integrated information systems, "little city halls," mobile police units; 
-Economic development: industrial parks, shopping centers, new factories; 
-Communication systems: cable television franchises; 
-Community development: golf courses, other recreation facilities, high rise or scattered site public 
housing, annexation. 
Although local governments have been engaged in such services and funct~ons for a very long time, there 
is still no reliable way of anticipating how much benefit will result for the community from a new project, 
or of judging the comparative benefits of competing demands for scarce resources. 
6. Ways and Means 
Comprehensive Technology Assessments are expensive: experience gleaned at the Federal level indicates 
a minimum of $100,000 to $200,000 'for broad-scale assessments. State and local governments, especially 
the poorer or less populous, do not have such resources to command for applied research. But comprehensive 
Technology Assessments have been done at the regional level, through: 
-industry and government cooperation; 
-pooling of regional resources; 
-Federal funding. 
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A study of solid waste managernent systems for the State of Connecticut (reported at the Conference) 
was done by a corporation which also made a substantial contribution to meeting the cost :>f the study. The 
assessment of Operation Plowshare, also reported at the Conference, was a cooperative effort of four states. 
The Port of New York Authority, established by interstate compact, funded a comprehensive assessment of 
proposed extension of Kennedy Airport runways into Jamaica Bay. A Technology Assessment of the inte-
gration of pig farming, of interest to several regions of the country, is being sponsored by the National Sci-
ence Foundation, and it is worth noting that several State universities are now performing Technology 
Assessments of interest to their areas with NSF funding. 
Georgia and Hawaii have had much success in carrying out Technology Assessments using blue-ribbon 
panels made up of leaders of industry, academic experts, government officials, and civic leaders. These as-
sessments are usually exploratory rather than comprehensive, but tend to carry substantial impact with 
State Governors and legislators. 
"Mini-assessments" (that is, short exercises designed to draw out information and expert OpinIOn, 
identify areas of consensus (and disagreement), and develop recommendations for policymakers) can be 
used where there are not funds or time for comprehensive Technology Assessment. The Hawaii State Center 
for Science Policy and Technology Assessment has successfully adapted the Nominal Group Technique 
(demonstrated at the Conference by Professor Andre Delbecq) for use in two- or three-day sessions to 
assess the potential impacts and policy considerations related to mariculture and other technologies. Other 
techniques for structuring small group interactions can also be used for this purpose. 
Every State has un-utilized resources for Technology Assessment. State universities may contain a nucleus 
of people familiar with Technology Assessment, experienced in interdisciplinary research, and having a 
commitment toward public service (and in some cases, with available research funds). Depending on the 
university, interdisciplinary science policy programs, Departments of R&D Management, or broadly-based 
Engineering Schools are possible routes of ingress to such people. Corporate management, State academies 
of science, and professional societies are other sources of expertise. The Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 
1970 can som'~times be utilized to borrow talent from the National Government agencies. State and local 
agencies themselves can be tapped for people who are dissatisfied with conventional modes of evaluation 
and not afraid to ask hard questions. 
Public interest and environment groups often include members with training and experience in physical 
and social sciences who are under-utilized because they are presently homemakers or retired. Many citizen 
groups are experienced in organizing people with diverse backgrounds into study groups to gather informa-
tion and explore issues. They are also ab'le to disseminate and build community support for implementing 
the results of the Assessment. Organizing Assessment efforts, managing interdisciplinary groups, and reducing 
representational bias, on the other hand, call for a trained and experienced Project Leader. 
7. Implementation 
Experienced Technology Assessors at the Conference warned that the quality of an assessment is no 
guarantee that its conclusions or recommendations will be implemented. Many factors and considerations, 
other than reliable information about long-range consequences, are necessarily involved in making a decision. 
Even if a Technology Assessment directly leads or contributes to a wise decision, it will seldom be given the 
credit, since the political leaders will instead point to their own discernment and wisdom. 
It is seldom, however, that a Technology Assessment will produce definitive and clear-cut recommenda-
tions. More often, if successfully done an assessment will layout a range of alternative policy strategies, 
each involving uncomfortable trade-ofts which must be made. Technology Assessment is an input to and an 
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aid to good decisionmaking; it does not seek to usurp the prerogatives of the responsible decisionmaker. The 
ultimate rationale for Technology Assessment is that, at any level of government, a decision made on the 
basis of all available information and clearly recognizing the inevitable uncertainties is likely to be better 
than a decision made in avoidable ignorance. 
-Vary T. Coates 
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SUMMARY OF THE SESSIONS 
WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTI 
Dr. John E. (Ted) Mock, Co-
Chairman of the Conference, is 
the Science Advisor to the Gov-
ernor of Georgia 
Emilio Daddario was then Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on 
Science, Research and Develop-
ment of the Committee on Sci-
ence and Astronautics, U.S. 
House of Representatives 
Public Law 92-484 (Oct. 13, 
1972). A complete legislative 
history, and a listing of members 
of the Technology Assessment 
Board and Advisory Council, may 
be found in ANNUAL REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS by the 
Office of Technology Assess-
ment, March 15, 1974 
THE CONGRESSIONAL OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY AS-
SESSMENT 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
Mr. Daniel V. De Simone, Dep-
uty Director, OT A 
... 
Technology assessment, said Ted Mock in opening the Conference, 
"may be the answer to Murphy's Law." (Murphy's Law, in its classical 
formulation, states that "whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.") 
Technology assessment, he explained, is "the systematic study of the 
effects on society that may occur when a technology is introduced, 
extended, or modified, with special emphasis on impacts which were 
unintended or delayed." 
During the 1960's, he reminded the audience, many Americans 
became concerned with the impact of technology on their environ-
ment, on their safety, and on the quality of their life style. Long 
accustomed to think of science and technology as harbingers of 
progress and a better way of life, Americans-faced with smog, pol-
luted rivers, congested cities, and disastrous side-effects of drugs such 
as thalidomide-woke up to the idea that the most promising of 
technologies may also have unanticipated, unwanted consequences. In 
their alarm and dismay, Mock pointed out, some have veered toward 
anti-scientism and even anti-intellectualism. 
It was in this context that Congressman Emilio Daddario in 1966 
first proposed to the U.S. Congress that it establish an Office of 
Technology Assessment. 
Mr. Daddario and his Subcommittee began systematically to explore 
the feasibility of a better system for anticipating the effects of 
technological development and for supplying Congress, other deci-
sionmakers, and the American public with the information needed to 
formulate wise policy. Six years later, the Office of Technology 
Assessment was established, and former Congressman Daddario, who 
earlier had resigned from Congress, was appointed as its first Director. 
The Deputy Director of OTA, Mr. Daniel V. De Simone, was 
present to give the keynote address for the Southern Regional 
Conference. 
"It is impossible to go back," said Dan De Simone. The sense of 
progress and optimism once natural to an increasingly affluent society 
gave way in the 1960's to a questioning of the inevitability of progress. 
That unguarded optimism, he said, cannot be restored, but neither can 
the development of technology be reversed, nor would we wish it to 
be. Instead, society must learn to handle technology more wisely, "but 
we must assess its real benefits and costs before we can handle it 
wisely," 
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OVERVIEW OF STATE AND 
LOCAL TECHNOLOGY AS-
SESSMENT 
Edward T. Kelly. Program Man· 
ager. Office of Intergovernmental 
Science and Research Utilization. 
National Science Foundation 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT STATE AND 
LOCAL LEVELS 
Ed Kelly began the second session of the Conference by observing: 
"Technology Assessment is too important to be left to the Federal 
Government." The State and local levels are where Federal technology 
is implemented, the impacts felt, and services delivered. Moreover, 
State and local governments themselves initiate and implement tech-
nological decisions and programs. But at this level the description of 
T_A. is vague and its organization undefined. T.A., Kelly said, may be 
defined operationally, at the State levels as "whatever the states say 
T.A. is," just as planners often have defined urban development as 
"whatever we are doing now." 
Kelly characterized present State and local technology assessments 
as follows: they tend to be problem-driven rather than technology-
driven, reactive rather than anticipatory, and focused largely on the 
three E's-environment, energy, and economics_ Social technology, 
though of great importance, is all too likely to be ignored currently as 
as a subject for assessment. The States have one great advantage, that 
of flexibility; if a technology (or a technology assessment) does not 
work in one State, it still can be tried in others-States and local com-
munities offer laboratories for societal experiments. Technology as-
sessments at the subnational levels of government can deal with tech-
nologies and problems common to many States or specific to their 
own area. But they must, Kelly warned, be particularly sensitive 
to the "convergence of events," the coming together of divergent 
trends, changes, and pressures to pose unexpected problems-and 
opportunities. 
Public participation is a "given" in State and local assessments, 
Kelly noted: "the closer to the grass roots you are, the more public 
participation you will get-whether it is wanted or not./1 By the same 
token, there is more danger of "technology arrestment" as a result of 
assessment, because the pressures are more immediate and more effec-
tive at the grass roots level. 
Technology assessment is needed for both the legislature and the 
executive in State governments. (And, Kelly said, it is particularly 
lacking in State regulatory agencies, as it is at the Federal level.! j'he 
policy 'formulation process is basicallY a legislative function, he re-
minded his listeners, but State legislatures have very little informational 
and analytical support and assistance. 111 general, the lack of :n-depth 
capability for evaluative research in the State government!. led Kelly 
to call for strong links between universities and their State govern-
ments. The universities can provide the resources and the opportunity 
that wi.ll allow the States to carry their rightful share of technology 
assessment. 
11 
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS 
DESIRED BY THE STATES 
Dr. John E. Mock, Science Ad-
visor to the Governor of Georgia 
CANDIDATES AND PRIORI-
TIES FOR TECHNOLOGY AS-
SESSMENT: A SURVEY OF 
STATE OFFICIALS, by John E. 
Mock for the Office of Explora-
tory Research and Problem As· 
sessment, Research Applications 
Directorate, National Science 
Foundation, August 1973. This 
is Volume III of a series entitled 
CANDIDATES AND PRIORI-
TIES FOR TECHNOLOGY AS· 
SESSMENTS. The other volumes 
are: Volume I, SUMMARY OF 
FOUR STUDIES OF CANDI-
DATES AND PRIORITIES FOR 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESS· 
MENTS; Volume II, A SURVEY 
OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY PROFESSIONALS; 
Volume IV, AN APPROACH TO 
PRIORITIES; and Volume V, A 
SURVEY OF CANDIDATE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
"From urban blight to rural flight," said Ted Mock, "it is the States 
which must face the most difficult problems requiring technology as-
sessment, yet they lack the tradition of doing such anticipatory evalu-
ation." They also lack the expertise, the money and the institutional 
framework for T.A. Vet some States, notably Hawaii, New York, 
California, and Georgia, have established an irl~titutiDnal base for T.A. 
and are rapidly acquiring the experience, the capability, and the tradi-
tion. The State of Georgia, for example, under the aegis of the 
Governor's Science Advisory Council, has done assessments of health 
delivery, cable T. V., natural gas supply, geothermal energy potential, 
an information service center, development of new cities, remote 
sensing (ERTS), metrication, and the impact of the energy crisis. These 
studies were useful and influential, Mock asserted, and they could be 
done at fairly low cost to the State because of services donated and 
capability supplied by industry, local communities, and State agencies. 
Early in 1973 Mock carried out a survey of State officials to 
identify candidates and priorities for technology assessment. The 
survey, commissioned by the National Science Foundation, was 
addressed to Governors' Science Advisors, Directors of State planning 
agencies, Directors of State departments of natural resources, and 
Directors of economic development. The respondents (34% of the 200 
officials) identified approximately 250 different candidates for T.A. 
Areas of major concern were natural resources and environmental 
management (land use, power plant siting, coastal zone management, 
desalinization, pollution control); energy (coal gasification, geothermal 
energy, strip mining, nuclear power plants); and human resources 
(health care delivery systems, educational technology). A number of 
officials identified as especially important those areas where there is 
pressure from converging trends; energy shortages and environmental 
enhancement, increased automation in industry and lengthened life 
spans. As predicted earlier by Ed Kelly, Mock noted that State 
officials framed their candidates in terms of problems rather than in 
terms of a specific technology, 
Mocl< advised the participants that not all of their assessments will 
show immediate results-if measured by direct implementation of 
findings or recommendations. Decisionmaking is still the province of 
the Governor and the Legislature-it is a pOlitical process and reflects 
other considerations and imperatives besides those informational 
inputs from the assessment. And, he also noted, even when assessments 
have a direct and positive influence on the decision, it is likely that 
the influence will not be acknowledged or spotlighted, since political 
leaders will themselves take the credit for the wisdom of their deci-
sions. Nevertheless, the T.A. will provide a more rational and far-
sighted base for decisions than States and communities in the past have 
had available. 
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pro forma fashion; and, above all, Willeke concluded, one must be 
prepared to revise and modify, as only through a reiterative process 
can an environmental impact statement, or a technology assessment, 
be performed adequately. 
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OPERATION PLOWSHARE 
Mr. Wyatt Rogers, Associate Di-
rector, Western Interstate Nu-
clear Board 
PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: IMPLICATIONS 
TO STATE GOVERNMENTS. 
Glenn A. Whan, Project Director 
A TECHNOLOGY ASSE~ 
ME NT OF SOLIO WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT 
Dr. Jules Mirabal, General Elec-
tric Research and Development 
Center 
THREE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS 
Three recent ongoing technology assessments of interest to State 
officials were described at the Conference: an assessment of Operation 
Plowshare (the use of nuclear explosives to produce oil and gas in 
Western States), an assessment of solid waste management technology 
for the State of Connecticut, and a technology assessment of integra-
tion of hog farming, sponsored by the National Science Foundation. 
Although only one of these appeared to the Conference palticipants 
to fit the definitjon of comprehensive technology assessment, all of the 
presentations provided valuable insi.ghts into the organizatioh and 
management of complex, multidisciplinary, policy-oriented applied 
research-a problem with which ail State officials find themselves in-
creasingly forced to grapple. 
The assessment of Operation Plowshare, for example, as reported 
by Wyatt Rogers, demonstrated that it is feasible for States to cooper-
ate in assessing developments of mutual concern and that through 
this technique States can have an impact on Federal programs. The 
assessment, funded jointly by the National Science Foundation and a 
compact of twelve States, grew out of a serious concern by west.~rn 
States about a proposed, large-scale commerciRI program which would 
utilize nuclear explosives for oil and gas stimulation. The proposed 
development was viewed by many as an unacceptable assault on the 
environment, safety, and resources of one region in order to produce 
presumed benefits for the nation as a whole. The Western Interstate 
:'~uclear Board and researchers from five Universities in the Rocky 
Mountain region conducted fourteen separate studies over a fourteen-
month period (with an additional six months of integrating and 
"recycling" the results of these studies). Major emphasis was on four 
areas of concern: impacts on the environment, impacts on utilization 
of the region's other natural resources, jurisdictional and legal implica-
tions for State and commercial Plow,'hare technology, and methods of 
encouraging public participation in related decisionmaking. The final 
results of the study were published by WINS in early 1974. Following 
the study, representatives ofthe affected States met to discuss possible 
joint policy actions to regulate Plowshare projects. 
The technology assessment of solid waste management technology, 
reported by Jules Mirabal, was thought by most Conference partici-
pants to represent more nearly a technical feasibility study than a 
technology assessment. But as a highly sophisticated example of 
multidisciplinary applied research in a complex and politically sensitive 
area, it was nonetheless of great interest to the audience, particularly 
since it demonstrated a successful cooperation between industry and 
State government. (The industry-General Electric Research and 
Development Center-specifically removed Itself from subsequent 
competition to develop the solid waste management centers which 
were recommended by the study.) The assessment grew out of legisla-
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
OF INT!:GRATION OF HOG 
FARMING 
Dr. Ivan Smith, Midwest Re· 
search Institute 
--... , ~ -------. -~-----, 
tion calling for a State-wide masterplan to solve solid waste problems 
in 169 cities and towns in Connecticut. The master plan was required 
by the legislation to identify and implement solid waste technology 
which was "environmentally sound, economically feasible, and socially 
acceptable." On the basis of competition, G. E. was awarded a one-
year contract for $450,000, with G. E. contributions bringing the total 
cost of the study up to $1.15 million. The study was organized around 
five major tasks: market analysis, transportation aspects, public in-
formation, business impacts, and capital acquisition. Mirabal mentioned 
in passing that because of "political realities" in the State of Connecti-
cut, the aW3 of solid waste collection was omitted from the study; the 
audience was quick to note the inference and comment on the politi-
cal pitfalls that await technology assessors in dealing with public 
service functions in the State and local arena. 
Ivan Smith reported on a comprehensive technology assessment of 
the integration of hog farming underway at ttlP. Midwest Research 
Institute and funded by the National Science Foundation. The assess-
ment team was instructed to look at the broad societal and regional 
implications of the possible movement to vertical integration of the 
pork industry (from production of piglets through feeding to butcher-
ing) following the model offered by the beef and chicken industries. 
The study is to include impacts on the family farmer, the consumer 
(e.g., food prices and quality of product), labor and management needs, 
financial institutions, energy utilization, world food needs, and a 
variety of other affected parties and institutions. Ultimately, and 
unexpectedly, Smith said, the team find themselves forced to address 
such broad moral issues as whether the U.S. is justified in making red 
meat the staple of our diet, given the fact that it takes ten pounds of 
grain to produce one pound of beef. 
The scope of the assessment, Smith pointed out, is reflected in the 
composition of the research team, with its consultants, which include 
agricultural experts, management experts, swine nutritionists and vet-
erinarians, engineers, geologists, economists, political scientists, tech-
nology forecasters, transportation specialists, regional developers, land 
use lawyers, social psychologists, and marketing experts. An Oversight 
Committee further adds to the viewpoints and disciplines represented. 
Describing the ongoing T.A. in detail, Smith drew some lessons 
which the team is learning and some goals which they are pursuing, 
which he feels should be a part of every assessment. A basic need, he 
said, is to analyze the driving forces which are bringing about a new 
technology (or a significant change in the way we perceive or use a 
technbfG~y). This includes a thorough understanding ofthe boundaries 
and H'i:! current state-of-the·art of the technology under study, 
Secondly, Smith went on, methodologies must be found and improved 
which are fitted to the special problems being investigated. Here 
Smith advised the group, "Watch out for the development of still 
more jargon-it is importa-nttoLfSetlie user's language," that is, to be 
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COMMON THEMES 
able to communicate directly with those who will need the informa-
tion which the assessment will produce. Finally, the assessment report, 
Smith believes, should be organized by impact areas, and elements of 
the report directed at and written especially for the various segments 
of the population who will need to use it. He described for the group 
how the outline of the hog farming T.A. was developed early in the 
study to be used as a framework for the analysis as it developed. Sepa-
rate sections of the report, aimed at categories of users, will be sep-
arable from the entire report for fuller and more targeted distribution. 
Several insights emerged from the presentations of ongoing assess· 
ments and the vigorous discussions which followed. In each of these 
studies, non-scientific political and bureaucratic individuals and sci-
entists had managed to cooperate productively in spite of pronounced 
difficulties in communication and differences of viewpoint, values, and 
objectives. In each of the studies there were, or there may be in the 
future, political sensitivities and cross-currents which may limit or 
pose serious problems for the assessment as well as for its implementa-
tion: jurisdictional ambiguities in Operation Plowshare, control of 
solid waste collection by a powerful organization with alleged under-
world ties, conflicts of interest between small farmers and agribusiness 
in the hog farming area. There is also the problem of scarce resources 
and limited capability when States must grapple with big science and 
high technology and the complex issues they pose-a theme constantly 
replayed during the Conference. This problem is most acute for the 
smaller or poorer States. Three possible means of dealing with the 
problem were illustrated by the three studies presented: regional 
pooling of resources by a number of States, cooperation between 
State governments and industry, and the seeking of funding from a 
Federal agency, in this case the National Science Foundation through 
its Research Applied to National Needs Program. 
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EMERGING TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
Vary T. Coates, Ph.D. 
Associate Director and 
Head, Technology Assessment Group 
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology 
April 1974 
This paper reviews recent and emerging trends and problems in 
Technology Assessment. In 1971 I conducted an extensive survey of T.A. 
activities. 1 Today I will update that study by describing what has been 
occurring in the last two or three years, as I have been able to observe 
it, and highlight some of the problems and issues which I see determining 
the future of Technology Assessment. 
The bill establishing the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment was passed in October 1972. I begin with that Office, because 
I believe that what happens in and to that Office will be the critical 
factor in the future of T.A. The Technology Assessment Board, which is the 
policy-making organ, was appointed in February 1973. As most of you know, 
the Board consists of six Senators, three from each party, and six Represen-
tatives, again three from each party, and the Director, who is a non-voting 
member. (This is, I believe, the first time in more than thirty years that 
what is essentially a Congressional Committee has been established on the 
basis of party parity.) Senator Edward Kennedy is the first chairman, and 
will hold office throughout the 93rd Congress. The law provides that the 
next chairman shall be a Member of the House. 
The Technology Assessment Advisory Council has also been appointed 
and consists of ten public members, whose names and affiliations appear on 
, " 
the ~ttached list, along with the comptroller-General and the Director of 
the Library of Congress. 
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Mr. Emilio Daddario, who introduced the first bill to establish 
the Office in 1966 while a Representative from Connecticut, and thereby 
initiated the technology assessment movement, was appointed as the Director 
of the Office. The Associate Director is Daniel De Simone. Mr. De Simone 
had not been closely associated with technology assessment hitherto by those 
who had closely followed the developing movement. However, he had been the 
director of the large study, "A Metric America," while at the National Bureau 
of Standards, and had since moved to the National Science Foundation's 
Science and Technology Policy Office. 
The Metric America study was in fact an assessment of social impacts 
of conversion to the metric system, relying in large part on public hearings 
and representation of interests--although the study was not called a techno-
logy assessment. Dan De Simone appears to have done his homework well and 
to have a good working understanding of technology assessment and what possi-
bi1ities and pitfalls await the new Office. 
Those pitfalls are, I believe, real and threatening. When the new OTA 
was first conceived by Mr. Daddario, he envisioned something like a much 
smaller GAO or Library of Congress; that is, an entity which would serve 
the Congress by supplying it with hard, reliable information, but which would 
be more or less independent of the internal politics of Congress. The new 
Office, unfortunately, much more closely resembles a joint committee, and 
,,:~ 
~Zr· thus faces the difficulties of accomplishing its work without appearing to 
violate the territory and jurisdictions staked out by other committees, of 
'I 
r ~ 
which it must at the same time attempt to serve the needs. A further diffi-
cu1ty and danger is that the present chairman of the T.A. Board is widely 
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viewed as a potential presidential aspirant. Without alleging in any way 
that Mr. Kennedy would attempt to, or would wish to, or would deliberately 
1er..d himself to, exploitation of the issues with which the Office mus t 
struggle in order to f~rther his own political image, I fear that this 
potentiality \o)i11 be arlOther complication as the Office attempts to establish 
its initial role ~lld record. The organization of the Office will lend itself 
to this suspicion. The T.A. Board has interpreted the establishing law in 
such a way that the Board has a small staff of its own, that is, a staff 
which serves the Board rather than the Director; Senator Kennedy's Science 
Advisor is the Executive Secretary of that staff. 
As with any Congressional Committee, OTA will be subjected to 
pressure as it begins staffing. Mr. Daddario's strategy has been to delay 
appointment of program managers until after initial program areas and 
major topics were selected. Whether he will be able to select people with 
both knowledge of the technological subject areas and in-depth familiarity 
with technology assessment concepts and methodology, or whether his choices 
will be constrained by political considerations, we can only wait to see. 
Those observers who had for months been predicting the first few appointments 
have so far been surprised every time. Public hearings were scheduled to 
have been held in January or February to hear testimony from the heads of 
Executive agencies about their technology assessment programs and plans, 
but those Hearings did not occur, for reasons which are not clear; they 
may be held later this spring. 
When the bill was passed last fall it was not highly controversial, 
but neither did it evoke great interest in Congress. The bill provides that 
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the assessment activities of the O'fA may be initiated "upon the request of" 
the chairman of any Congressional committee, acting for himself, for the 
ranking minority member, or for a majority of the members of the committee; 
or may be initiated by the T.A. Board or by the Director in consultation 
with the Board. The fact is that most committee chairmen have .little or no 
understanding of what technology assessment is, or what the Office could do. 
Their temptation will he either to try to use the OTA as a quick response 
information service to augment their own staff, or to play secrecy games 
and resent any "intrusion" of OTA into their territory. Mr. Daddariu has 
been diligently calling on committee chairmen to educate them and to solicit 
their views in an attempt to ,'lard off these dangers. 
The "Energy Crisis" has generated in some quarters new cynicism about 
the ability of the government to manage complex technological issues or to 
prepare for problems which it has been possible to foresee for some time. 
At the same time, again in some quarters, the energy cr:sis has fueled a 
reaction against the environmental movement, or pushed environmental con-
cerns into lower priority. This kind of facile cynicism, however, appears 
to be less important and will probably be less long-las·ting than a much 
more important effect, a widespread realization that those who raise hard 
questions about national pctorities, conservation of resources, and the 
necessity of exerting some public control and direction over economic and 
technological development can no longer be safely ignored or brushed away. 
This change in attitude may in the long-run cause the OTA to be treated 
with more seriousness than would otherwise have been the case, and if OTA 
can, in its first year or two, produce studies of demonstrable excellence, 
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insight, and value it will establish a credibility and influence that can 
make it a major innovation in the American governmental system. Certainly, 
although the Office itself lacks the usual levers of power hitherto con-
sidered absolutely necessary in Congress, it has leadership of great integrity, 
knowledge, and influence in its Board and in the Directorships and it is, 
above all, in the right place, at the right time in history. 
The first task the Office has accomplished is to select six areas 
of emphasis for their first year ($2 million is to be committed before 
July 1, 1974). Obviously the OTA had some obvious criteria--they presumably 
wanted to fund technology assessments in areas which were important in terms 
of potential impacts, areas in which Congress must in the near future make 
decisions (but areas in which the major decisions far the next five to ten 
years have not already been made, or will not have been made before an 
assessment could be completed). One would also suppose that OTA would wish 
to choose areas in which its assessments might have a strong influence and 
the Office thereby establish prestige and credibility. OTA did make use of 
four NSF-funded studies of T.A. priorities. 
The six areas chosen for technology assessments are: technologies 
related to food, energy, materials resources, oceans, bioequivalence of 
drugs, and international trade. Now Mr. Daddario, Mr. De Simone, and their 
(so far very small) staff will begin the task of problem and program 
-j 
definition within those six general subject areas. 1 , 
There are a number of ways OTA may go, and a number of obvious mis-
takes they may make. If they tie themselves too closely to the iminediate 
needs of the other Congressionai conllnitte3s, they may ask for assessments 
only of technologies which are already widely used but controversial--
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such as off-shore oil drilling, pesticides, or strip-mining. It is true 
that in many such subjects comprehensive assessments are lacking and 
urgently needed. But too much emphasis on relevance to already obvious 
decision-making needs may lead them to ignore the decision needs which 
will arise in the future--that is, to overlook the more speculative and 
uncertain technological options and possibilities which will then catch 
us unprep~r.ed at some future time.' OTA will then be trapped in the 
behavior Congress has always exhibited--reacting to today's crisis, solving 
yesterday's problems, and backing rumpfirst into the future. 
OTA also runs the risk of concentrating too much on areas which, 
however important, are chosen because they are now a matter of public 
concern and thus already are generating action programs. It is unfortunate 
~vhen action programs are initiated, and continue, without both a urior and 
an on-going assessment of their impacts. Nevertheless, to have a strong 
effect on decision-making, it is too late to begin a comprehensive 
assessment after a "crisis" is evident and action programs become the 
order of the day. By then directions have already be·en .c',osen--or dictated, 
political and economic capital has been committed, bureaucracies have b~en 
generated, and interests have been mobilized. If only very limited 
resources can be allocated to assessments, they should be more, not less, 
anticipatory--to maximize the opportunity to lay a grounding of objective, 
authoritative information before the subject becomes controversial. 
The Congressional Office and what happens to it appea1;s to be 
critical because Executive agencies will take their direction accordingly. 
To fully appreciate that, it is necessary to recall how the concept of 
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technology assessment originated. 
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The 1960's were a time when the 
cumulative effects of technological advance burst into public consci-OtiS-
ness in the form of alarms over alleged hazards to health and safety from 
industrial byproducts or unexpected physiological effects of chemicals 
such as thalidomide. Rapid economic growth and a national program of 
highway and airport building suddenly intruded into the suburban sanctuary 
of the affluent middle class, bringing pollution, noise, and competition 
for residential land. In the cities Black and ethnic communities, newly 
politicized, began to resist disruption of settled neighborhoods. Court 
battles resulting in costly delays to projects, and aroused constituent 
pressure, brought response from Congress--new requirements f9r planning, 
community participation, agency coordination, and, above all, demands 
that Congress be furnished with more comprehensive information. The 
development of technology assessment as an interdisciplinary, policy-
oriented class of studies was one result. A closely related result 
was the National Environmental Policy Act and the requi.rement for 
environmental impac!: studies. I found in the survey which I mentioned 
that execut:ive a.gencies--reacting to these demands--in the ensuing five-
year period began significantly to broaden the processes by which they 
plan, program, and E\valuate techno1ogical proj ects, although the extent 
and pace of improveItent varied considerably from agency to agency. This 
improvement is cleal:ly a defensive reaction to Congressional, and ultimately 
to public, press'.lre. There has been little or no pressure for better 
management from the top echelons of the Executive branch and there is not 
likely to be. Hence the agencies--the only possible source of sustained 
funding for T.A.--will take their lead from the Congressional OTA and take 
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its activities as a model or a challenge. 
Rumors are circulating widely, and I believe they are well:-fuunded, 
that the Office of Management and Budget has directed Execu.tive agencies 
to minimize the direct support they give to OTA. Pr«sumably this is a 
direct effect of the political problem I have already mentioned, i.e., 
the Presidential potentiality of the Chairman of the T.A. Board, although 
I believe the reason given is that OTA might "raid the research budget" 
of the agencies. If these rumors are true, the effect may nevertheless 
be minimal, because the agencies have not only to defend their budgets 
and programs to OMB but to Congress. In the vresent situation in 
Washington, the Executive Office is not able to keep as strong a hand on 
the bureaucracy as it could a short time ago. 
In the last two years there have been small but significant signs that 
some agency officials believed Congressional pressure would continue. From
 
time to time RFP's appear in the Commerce Business Daily with the words 
"Technology Assessment" in the description and solicitations for evaluative
 
studies commonly use the phrase "including social impacts." The AEC now 
has .at least one employee with the job title "Technology Assessment 
Specialist." The Federal Highway Administration uSes the acronym "SEES" 
or "social, environmental, economic impact studies." The Department of 
COJllI!lerce has a "Technology Assessment Office" (in fact a misnomer), 
and most of the agencies have had conferences, seminars, or requested 
j 
I 
briefings on technology assessment for their staff. This protective 
reaction, it seems to me, comes almost entirely from the middle management , 
echelons where program justification and defense must be prepared, and 
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j is resisted or ignored by the upper echelons and the lower operational 
echelons respectively. In a number of other agencies, there are on-going 
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studies which constitute technology assessments. To mention only a few 
examples: There is the major study proceeding in DOT, Climatic Impacts 
of Atmospheric Pollution, which has a broader scope and greater depth 
than its title might suggest. DOT is also studying the impact of 
alternatives to the internal combustion engine, and the impacts of rail-
road electrification. The Environmental Protection Agency is studying 
the potential impacts of electric automobiles on the Los Angeles area. 
The National Science Foundation, chiefly through the Office of Explcratory 
Research and Problem Assessment within RANN, is still the only source 
of sustained funding for comprehensive technology assessment within the 
Federal government. This is in fact probably the best site for this 
activity. One of the recommendations which emerged from my study of 
Federal T.A. was that, while all agencies should be pressed to incorporate 
T.A. concepts and techniques in their day-to-day planning and evaluative 
procedures, comprehensive and credible T.A.'s were best sponsored by a 
source which had no operational responsibility for the programs and 
projects being assessed, in order to provide a broad scope for potential 
assessments, reduce institutional bias and maximize public access to 
the results. NSF had $2.1 million for T.A. in FY '74 and expects to 
have $ 2. 7 million for FY '75. The range of topics in whi.ch HSF has 
funded technology assessments is broad ••• 
- alternatives to the internal combustion engine 
- solar energy 
geothermal energy 
- off-shore oil and gas exploitation 
- energy conservation measures 
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- weather modification (snowpack augmentation) 
- integrated hog farming 
- biopesticides 
- conversion to the metric system 
- alternative work schedules 
- remote sensing 
- videophone 
- c[:o.ble television 
- electronic banking 
NSF has also funded some supporting work in T.A.: the survey 
which I conducted in Federal agencies, the comparative study which Martin 
Jones has described,2 another survey of technology assessment activity 
including the state and local and private sector, four studies of priorities 
for T.A., and several workshops and conferences On technology assessment. 
There are several additional points to be made here. 
NSF has apparently decided not to fund further studies of a 
strictly methodological nature, but to encourage experimentation with 
a variety of techniques and methods appropriate to the technology being 
assessed--in other words, to let the configuration of the technology drive 
the research design. 
The techniques of technology assessment are considered to be equally 
appropriate to social techntology as well as physical and biological tech-
nology; note that alternative work schedules is a social technology, and 
that several of the other subjects (the metric system, integration of hog 
farming) have important elements of both physical and social technology. 
While none of the areas picked by OTA for its first year is purely 
a social technology, Mr. Daddario and Mr. De Simone have stated that they 
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expect to choose such areas in the future. 
Nearly every technology assessment which has been done reached 
a similar conclusion either explicitly or implicitly--namely, that 
institutional obsolescence, maladjustment, or inadequacy is critical 
in problems arising from or foreseen for technological development; 
or that new institutional arrangements must be invented in order to 
direct or control the direction of development or minimize undesirable 
side-effects. 
Even when sponsors of assessments have explicitly directed the 
performers not to make policy recommendations, such findings seem 
inexorably to em~rge. Some organizations and researchers have refused 
or resisted the opportunity to carry out the logical final steps in 
technology assessment considered as support for policy making--that is, 
to layout policy and action alternatives and assess their comparative 
impacts. It is often claimed that such tasks intrude the "values" of the 
assessor into the decision-making process. But technology assessment is 
intended to support and inform the deci8ion-making process, and the public 
cannot be e~ected to understand, nor the decision-makers to have the time, 
to penetrate a dense technical report and work out the implications for 
alternative policies and actions in order to make a wise choice. Either 
the assessors themselves must draw out and elucidate these alternatives 
(without intervening in the final de~ision) or some other entity 
su~h as OTA must provide the translation. NSF has recently 
required that a substantial portion of the funding be allocated to 
providing a popular version of the technical report which is both accurate 
and easily readable by the layman, and to providing a plan for popular 
dissemination of results through publications, filmstrips, broadcast 
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media, and open conferences. This is a substantial and significant 
departure for NSF, which in basic research grants can rely on scholarly 
publications and peer group interest to get research results to users. 
An interesting trend has developed in would-be contractors and 
grantees responding to NSF program announcements and to some eJctent to 
co~petj.tive solicitations for assessmento by other agencies: the formation 
of consortia of universities, or of universities, non-profit and profit-
oriented research organizations, and industry research and development 
units. Most organizations cannot within themselves meet the requirements 
that more and more become apparent as experience with technology assess-
ment accumulates. 
It is interesting that industry, which has not rushed to perform 
or sponsor technology assessments of technological developments which it 
may be pushing, should respond to Federal initiatives. Those companies 
which have done so usually have a potential interest in the potential 
technology being assessed, and evidently saw this as an opportunity to 
perform an assessment and gain valuable information which the corporate 
structure would not be willing to pay for (and even mak~ a slight 
I 
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profit to sweeten the deal), but also saw it as an opportunity to learn a 
skill which it may be necessary to possess in the future. In many cases 
the industry group chose a University research team as subcontractor or 
joint participant. In all likelihood the sponsoring agency will get 
I full and valuable return on this investment by tapping into expertise and experience (in the technology) which industry has in abundance. The 
University teams on the other hand have a queasy foreboding that--having 
absorbed the knowledge and e~perience the University group has developed 
in assessment--industry will go it alone the second time around and 
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attract the lion's share of future T.A. funding. 
Technology assessments should (a) be widely interdisciplinary, 
(b) include or have access to both data from advanced basic research and 
experienced applied, problem-oriented researehers, (c) be free of the taint 
of or suspicion of institutional bias, (d) be protected from pressure by 
client, constituents, political activists, (e) be well-managed and coor-
dina ted , and (f) be sensitive to the real needs of the ultimate user (who 
often does not know his needs). To have the desired impact (that is, 
to be in a position to support and inform decision-making) te~hnology 
assessments should also have credibility, visibility, and a means of 
communicating the findings to the public. 
Interdisciplinary research is and has always been a problem for 
universities except in extraordinary circumstances. The chief difficulties, 
as Jack White has pointed out; are the reward structure and the inability 
of experts in one field to communicate information and insights to experts 
in other fields, especially where the disciplines differ widely in 
assumptions, theories, methodology, terminology, and acceptable degree of 
uncertainty. The reward structure for interdisciplinary studies of the 
T.A. type is slowly improving. In part this is a result of the emphasis 
on relevancy during the past decade, but its practical manifestations are 
the emergence of interdisciplinary journals (offering the opportunity for 
publication), the development of interdisciplinary degree-granting programs 
(job-opportunities, promotions, and prestige), a growing opP0rtunity for 
consultantships for social scientists, experienced "generalists," and applied 
methodology experts. When, as has been the case with the University of 
Oklahoma's off-shore oil and gas assessment, the study receives wide 
attention from Federal agencies and Congress, a new (for academics) reward 
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structure comes into play. It is noteworthy that large independent 
research organizations appear to have their own difficulties with 
interdisciplinary studies, a point not often recognized. Internal 
organization of any information-oriented bureaucracy (as good a definition 
of both universities and research organizations as can be found) seems to 
have an irresistible tendency to harden along disciplinary lines. This 
probably results from the fact that advanced knowledge and training becomes 
ever more specialized. There is probably no way to overcome this tendency 
except by interdisciplinary training, or, more likely, interdisciplinary 
experience on the part of more scientists. Social scientists are usually 
poorly educated in natural sciences,even in an understanding of the physical 
laws of the world they live in ; physical scientists seem to have two 
parallel deficiencies: an inability to deal intelligently with uncertainty 
and low probability, and an inadequate understanding of how people react 
with, and use and misuse, technology. 
Universities have an even more serious problem. Theoretically they 
can draw on a wide range of disciplines, and have an advantage over 
independent research organizations in that they do not become constricted 
to those areas well supported by long-term clients, but they almost in-
variably lack management capability. Management of a university inter-
disciplinary research team should not be located within one of the 
participating departments, but should be outside of the academic structure 
and supported by a core staff which is not tied to the vagaries of the 
university teaching calendar; even so, by the nature of the beast, to the 
extent that it utilizes faculty and students (and is not simply a think-tank 
grafted onto the university) authority and discipline, to impose coherence 
and deadlines, will still be difficult. The University. on the other hand, 
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has some additional advantages for technology assessments--it can provide 
ready access to basic research at the developing edge of a science or 
technology; it generally enjoys both the substance and the reputation for 
objectivity and neutrality; it can exploit trained personnel (graduate 
students) at outrageously low costs with good conscience since it is 
offering them a valuable commodity in return, real world experience and 
a chance to build a track record. 
The role which public participation should or can play in technology 
assessment is not yet resolved. (Here I am not raising a question as to 
the role of public participation in decision-making; that it must and can 
play such a role is indisputable.) But technology assessment is not 
decision-making--its function is to provide an objective base of informa-
tion for decision-makers--as nearly complete and neutral as human capability 
can aspire to. Some argue that public participation is also vital in that 
step, to ensure that all affected parties and all potential impacts are 
detected and evaluated. Others would argue against that proposition on 
the grounds that 
- "the public" by definition can add nothing to, and lacks 
the specialized knowledge to evaluate, the scientific and 
technical knowledge that must be brought to bear during 
the analysis; 
- public participation converts the analytical process into 
an adversarial process (or political process) which con-
sists of balancing or weighting obvious interests rather 
than detecting and tracing unsuspected impacts; 
- the interests represented will be only short-term and 
narrow interests; since no one speaks for the community 
or society as a whole or for the long-term future, such 
concerns will be outweighed and downgraded; 
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- public participation generates and solidifies opposition 
(or support) too early in the evaluative process, before 
sufficient data is available; later information tends not 
to overcome the political and psychological "investme.nts" 
already made (i.e., minds are difficult to change); 
- some segments of society can rarely or never be involved 
in "public" participation; also, assessors may make 
biased choices of the "public" who are to participate, 
or may co-opt their support for later implementation. 
The development of technology assessment, in which the u.s. has 
led the way, is not a national but a multi-national development. Several 
international conferences have been held, bringing together those inter-
ested in technology assessment in both industrial and developing countries. 
Groups of government, industrial, and academic representatives from western 
and eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and Japan frequently visit" the u.S. to 
discuss technology assessment. The International Sociecy for Technology 
Assessment, which held a major conference in The Netherlands last spring, 
is now' planning a more specialized conference in Tokyo in conjunction with 
the Japan Techno-Economic Society. DEeD has an international group 
actively studying technology assessment. One of the most promising 
trends to be noted is the way in which assessors and planners in many 
countries with different forms of government, legal systems, ideologies. 
and economies are experimenting with the same techniques and methodologies 
and grappling with the same problems--such as how to communicate and make 
the results of assessment more useful to decision-makers, how to develop 
scenarios of the future in which technological impacts will be manifested, 
and how to deal with and manage the inevitable uncertainties of assessment. 
What is emerging here is a kind of cooperative effort which transcends 
language, politics, and ideology in an effort to come to grips with common 
practical problems. 
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I have said that what happens to the u.s. Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment is a critical factor in the behavior of Executive 
Agencies, but I do not mean that it will be the determining factor in the 
further development of technology assessment. That development, as a 
practical and useful, albeit only a first and uncertain, approach to 
dealing with the problems of increasingly complex society, is not only 
"an idea whose time has come, " but an idea which is logically inevitable. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Vary T. Coates, Technology and Public Policy, Summary Report 
(Rept. No. NSF/RA/X-72-003S, July 1972). A Study performed at 
The George Washington University Program of Policy Studies in 
Science and Technology, for the National Science Foundation. 
Available through NSF, Office of Exploratory Research and 
Problem Assessment. 
Martin V. Jones (Director, Impact Assessment Institute, Bethesda, 
Md.), "Technology Assessment: A Framework for Comparison," Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, San Francisco, February 28, 1974 
(Sessions on Science and Public Policy). 
L. (Jack) White (Science and Public Policy Program, University of 
Oklahoma), "The OU TeChnology Assessment of OCS Oil and Gas 
Operations," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco, 
February 28, 1974 (Sessions on Science and Public Policy). 
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TEOHNOLOG Y ASSESSMENT BOARD 
Republicans Democrats 
Senate OASE (N,J.) 
DOMINICK (Col.) ;'; 
SOHWEIKER (Penn.) 
MOSHER (Ohio) 
GUBSER (Calif.) 
HARVEY (Mich.) 
KENNEDY (Mass.) 
HOLLIN GS (S. Car.) 
HUMPHRE Y (Minn.) 
DAVIS (Ga.) 
TEAGUE ('rex.) 
UDALL (Ariz.) 
House 
1- __ 
l': Senator> Stevens of Alaska has been appointed to r>eplace 
Senator> Dominick, who r>esigned fr>om the Boar>d. 
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
~~OU5E OF REPRESENTATIV~S SENATE I Standing, Special, Select and Joint Committees 
- ~ - . ------ . - --------- 1- ----, , --. , -- '1 
OFFICE I TECHNOLOGY 
OF TEOINOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD I ASSESSMENT 
TECHNOLOGY I ADVISORY 
ASSESSMENT Director ~~~ Staff t COUNCIL 
, ____ , . , _ , . _____________ 1_ - - - - - - - - - - - - , - J 
rcongreSSiOnal I I National ,I I cenerall 
Research Science. Accounting 
Se.rvice Foundntioo Office 
C~ Contractors, Consultants, Loaned Pet;'sonnel, etc. I 
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
November 29, 1973 
RESOLUTION ON APPOINTMENT OF 
TEN PUBLIC MEMBERS TO ADVISORY COUNTIL 
The Chairman is hereby authorized to effect the appointment of 
the following ten public members to the Technology Assessment Advisory 
Council: 
Harold Brown 
J. Fred Bucy 
Hazel Henderson 
J •. M. (Levi) Leathers 
John McAlister, Jr. 
Eugene P. Odum 
Frederick C. Robbins 
Edward Wenk, Jr. 
Gilbert F. White 
President 
California Institute of Technology 
Executive Vice President 
Texas Instruments, Inc. 
Author and lecturer on environmental 
and social issues 
Executive Vice President 
DOW Chemical Corporation 
Associate Professor 
Department of Engineering-Economic Systems 
Stanford University 
Director 
Institute of Ecology 
University of Georgia 
Jean 
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Medicine (Nobel Laureate) 
Professor of Engineering and Public Affairs 
University of Washington 
Director 
Institute of Behavioral Science 
University of Colorado 
:. ... '" 
III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
H. Technology Assessment 
and Citizen Action 
Ellis R. MOTTUR 
March 1971, pp. 10-26 
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liThe judgment then converts what the economists call a 
"soc ial ll cost into What the economists call an "enterprise ll 
cost. rt internalizes the so-ca1led external cost. In a 
similar way the legal system can maintain the incidence of 
a cost by declinihg to recogn;:ze a cause of action in tort 
against the company. 
"Through tort law, the legal system operates directly upon 
the incidence of costs. Through the law of contract, the 
legal system may operate indirectly upon the incidence of 
costs. Contract law may enable the persons involved to 
adjust or modify the incidence of a cost by giving effect 
to agreements among them designed to effect such an adjustment. 
On the other hand, contract law may frustrate efforts of 
the persons involved to modify the incidence of costs by 
declining to give effect to agreements among them designed for 
such a purpose. 
"In the long history of the common law in America, changes 
have occurred from time to time affecting the incidence 
of costs. Changes have also been made by legislation, 
such as industrial safety and accident legislation and 
workmen's compensation laws. Comparable changes may 
occur in the future in the continuing evolution of the 
law in response to the changing realities of American life. 
"Let me take a moment to hammer the point home. When is 
it a good business proposition to put something on the 
market? From the point of view of the business enterprise, 
it is a sound step if the product to be marketed will make 
money. I want to emphasize first, that the enterprise's 
own estimate of anticipated income and expense takes for 
granted the existing provisions of the legal system; second, 
that the existing provisions of the legal system at any 
time are the result of a long evolution; and third, that 
the legal system in America continues to evolve. Any 
changes which you gentlemen may make through new legislation 
will become part of this continuing evolution. You would 
not be altering the basic structure of the legal system nor 
of the business system. You would be altering the incidence 
of costs whose incidence has been altered before in the 
evolution of the business and legal systems." 
H -- The final element in the nation's assessment system ;s the 
essential role of citizen participation, the topic to which the remainder 
of this paper is devoted. 
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I II - THE NEED FOR CITIZEN ACTION 
It is believed that the national assessment system sketched out 
above would afford a feasible framework of institutions and mecha,nisms, 
within which the asse~sment process could proceed effectively -- provided 
that the ~ssential element of citizen participation is forthcoming to 
the extent necessary for assessment to reflect the underlying needs and 
demands of the society. Technology is interwoven throughout the fabric 
,of our society; yet as widespread as ;s its role today, its potential 
range of ramifications is likely to be even more extensive tomorrow. 
As war is said to be too important to be left to the generals, so 
technology assessment is far too crucial to the shape of our future to 
be left to the professional assessors and the special interest groups 
involved, regardless of how excellent their qualifications or how 
altruistic their objectives may be. 
The world of tomorrow will be increasingly a technological 
society. Technology assessment -- regardless of how recondite its details 
may be -- must become an integral aspect of the nation's total social, 
political, economic decision-making processes, in which all citizens have 
the opportunity to participate. Otherwise, in a technology-permeated 
society, it will become increasingly difficult -- if not impossible --
to mainta'ln, much less enhance, the democY'atic character of our society 
and the qualfty of freedom in ow' lives. 
Bence, citizen participation must be an absolutely essential 
aspect of the assessment process. There are innumerable impediments, 
however, which stand in the way of citizens' taking effective assessment 
action. These impediments fall in three interrelated areas: (1) finance, 
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(2) organization and motivation, and (3) information. Each is treated 
in turn below. 
(1) Finance. With rare exceptions, individual citizens do not 
have the financial resources to enter deeply into the assessment process 
as individuals. Those who are professional experts in a particular 
area can often express their assessment views in the open literature, 
in Congressional testimony, or as expert consultants. But apart from 
this group (which is generally quite small relative to any particular 
issue), and from the even smaller group of extremely wealthy individuals 
who make a practice of espousing causes, individuals as such cannot play 
a significant role in the assessment process, except through exercising 
their power of choice in the operation of the market or po1itical system. 
By joining together in groups, citizens can, of course, exert 
a much greater influence, depending on the size of the group, its 
financial resources, and its cohesiveness with respect to the issues 
under contention. We are all familiar with the divers conservation, 
environment, and consumer groups which have been proliferating in recent 
years, not to mention the various political action groups which have been 
emerging recently in response to issues such as Viet Nam, civil rights, etc. 
One problem common to almost all such groups is inadequate financing; 
fund raising ;s usually a persistent problem, and much of these groups· 
energy and effort is generally devoted to replenishing their depleted 
coffers. This lack of money imposes severe limitations on thl: iinfluence 
such groups can exert, especially vis"a-vis well"financed special interest 
groups with which they may be contending, either for broad public support 
or for Congressional decisions. 
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Effective citi.zen participation in the assessment process requires 
new financial mechanisms whereby such groups can obtain the necessary funds, 
on a continuing basis, to compete on an even-footing with the well-heeled 
special interests. Part IV of this paper, below, presents a specific 
proposal for meeting this financial problem. 
(2) Organization and Motivation. The problems of launching such 
groups, of organizing them for effective action. and of motivating 
citizens to join them and to support their efforts are intimately 
intertwined with one another, and are all dependent on meeting the essential 
financial prereqUisites. For example, consider the problem of motivation. 
This problem does not apply to the initial formation of the group, by 
a small number of highly motivated individuals, but rathe~ to the difficulties 
involved in motivating large numbers of members to join and actively 
support the group's programs. Assuming that the group addresses a real 
need in our society and has some inherent appeal for some segment of the 
public, then the problem becomes one of proper promotion of the group's 
objectives .and programs and the values associated with membership. This 
in turn resolves into a financial problem: if sUfficient seed money is 
available. then an effective promotional campaign can be mounted and 
additional members obtained, who in turn generate additional funds. 
The problem of organization is similarly dependent on financial 
considerations. Many such groups are reported to be relatively inept at 
developing a strong internal organization and at structuring their external 
rel ationships wi.th executive agencies, the Congress, the publ ic-at-large. 
or other specific groups they may Wish to influence. But I suspect that 
whatever ineptness there may be, in fact, is probably due far more to 
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limitations in funds than to ~ny lack of potential for the pragmatic 
exercise of power. One may certainly cite examples of highly successful 
efforts supported with meagre financial resources. (Ralph Nader, of 
course, started out by himself; and even today I doubt whether the powerful 
'machine' he leads is exactly affluent, especially vis-a-vis the interests 
he and his adherents are opposing.) But the fundamental point, I think, 
remains valid: that given a group with inherent appeal to some segment 
of the public, the problems of motivation and organization are largely 
dependent on the flnancial resources which can be obtained. 
(3) Information. While the problem of obtaining and utilizing 
tnformation effectiv~ly is also dependent in large part on the availability 
of adequate financial resources, there are also research problems and 
time delays involved here which are of crucial importance. For example, 
one may know that the dumping of industrial wastes into bodies of water 
has deleterious consequences, without knowihg the nature and extent of 
those consequences, or the relative damage contributed by particular 
components of the overall mix of industrial wastes. Answers to such 
questions, however, are frequently extremely important to the design and 
implementation of practicable anti-pollution programs. Yet obtaining 
valid answers often requires extensive research, and the research in turn 
entails time and money. 
The difficulty of obtaining adequate information is further complicated 
by the fact that many of the consequences of technology, beneficial as 
well as adverse, do not occur -- at least sufficiently so that they can 
be identified -- until considerable tlroe has elapsed, and vast resources 
have already been irretrieVably committed to particular courses of action. 
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Once such resources have been so committed, powerful special interest groups 
are generated with the objective of maintaining and enhancing their stake 
in the technology under consideration. 
In view of this situation, the performance of adequate technology 
assessment entails the incorporation of an 'early warning ' capability 
which can identify such problems well before they arise, and before the 
related patterns of resource allocation have been cemented in place. The 
development of such an 'early warning' capability requires a great deal 
of additional research and experimentation in such areas as technological 
forecasting, social indicators, and the application of systems analysis 
to social and behavioral problems. Society still has a long way to go 
in devising appropriate 'early warning' techniques. 
In addition, there is a corollary capability which must be 
developed if 'early warning ' efforts are to prove of any avail. This is 
the capability to take appropriate action, after society has been duly 
forewarned. In certain limited areas, there are some existing mechanisms 
directed at this objective. For example, if a food additive is shown to 
induce cancer in a test animal, its use is prohibited. Similarly, if tests 
of new drugs show them up as ineffective, or as yielding adverse consequences 
which outweigh their positive effects, the drugs can be prohibited. Thus 
in a few areas, there are mechanisms, however imperfect they may be, for 
implementing thr. results of 'early warning ' research. In the vast majority 
of instances, however, in which technology can impinge on society and human 
life, there are no adequate mechanisms for acting upon 'ear1y warning' 
results. Thus, for example, if a new type of container material were 
developed today which research indicated would come to constitute a serious 
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environmental pollutant two decades from now -- after certain quantities 
had accumulated and certain chemical changes had occurred -- there would 
be no way of halting productions short of new legislation specifically 
aimed at that product. 
Another approach to the problem would be general legislation 
calltng for a vast expansion 1n government regulatory control over industrial 
operations and products. This would be bound to have an inhibiting 
effect on the rate of technological innovation and would probably dampen 
the overall vigor of the economy. At the same time it would go a long 
way toward radically altering the balance of power in the country between 
the Federal Government and private enterprise. In any event, it is not 
an approach likely to achieve widespread support and enactment in the 
foreseeable future. 
The fundamental problem remains, however, for technology assessment 
to prove effecth,', sod ety must have the research capabi 1 ity to perform 
the 'early warning' function. as well as the implementation mechanisms 
whereby such warnings can be acted upon before it is too late. 
We can summarize the requirements for effective citizen action in the 
assessment process as follows: Society must afford existing and prospective 
citizens groups the opportunity to obtain adequate financing on a 
continuing basis. With such financing, citizens groups can motivate their 
potential membership to join and participate, and can organize themselves 
far effective action. They can also use the financial resources to obtain 
the necessary base of information to further their causes, supporting the 
performance of research When necessary. Furthermore, as the 'early warning' 
capability is perfected, they can assess the future consequences of current 
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and projected technologies. Finally, as mechanisms are developed whereby 
society can take prompt action i.n response to the resul ts of 'early 
warning' research, citizens groups can come to exert the extensive 
influence they deserve to Wield in shaping the course of the future. 
IV - CITIZENS ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION 
A - ... General 
The following proposal has been designed to meet the objectives 
outlined above. It does not purport to be a finished end product, 
but is put forth as a preliminary proposal solely to serve as the basis 
for further thought and discussion along these lines. 
The proposal calls for the establishment of Citizens Assessment 
Assoc'i?tions whose functioning would be fostered and regulated by a 
new Federal agency, the Citizens Assessment Administration. Through the 
financial mechanisms described below, the CAA's would be enabled to obtain 
adequate funding on a continuing basis, which would provide them with 
the essential financial resources required to assert significant influence 
in the assessment process. With this financial base, they would be able 
to promote their objectives and activities, motivate sufficient numbers of 
their potential membership group, and organize themselves for the effective 
exercise of influence on the assessment process. To cope with the 
important information requirements for effective assessment action, they 
would be empowered to assemble, process, and analyze information relevant 
to their assessment topiCS; and whenever necessary to conduct or commission 
necessary research relevant to their assessment areas. 
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When CAA's had accumulated and analyzed relevant information 
needed to perform the desired assessments, they would be empowered to 
disseminate the results of their assessments to the public-at-large, 
as well as to appropriate decision-making organizations within the 
society (congressional Committees, Executive Agencies, etc.). They 
would thereby perform a pubHc information function, as well as be in 
a position to lobby for legislation or executive regulations in keeping 
with their findings. 
In addition, however, they would have the extremely important 
power to institute legal, class action proceedings against any organization 
or individual within the society {including agencies of Federal, state, 
and local government}, which were making use -- or planning to make use 
of technologies whose assessments indicated detrimental consequences to 
the persons or interests of certain segments of the public. These functions 
of the CAA's, along with their facilitating mechanisms, are discussed 
in turn below. 
B -- Citizens Assessment Administration 
This would be an independent government agency with its Administrator 
reporting directly to the President. The Administrator would formulate 
and carry out the policies of the agency within broad guidelines laid 
down by a Citizens Assessment Board, whose members would be appointed by 
the President, and who would represent a wide spectrum of interests in 
American society. 
The CAA would be responsible for developing criteria for, and 
regulating the establishment and functioning of, Citizens Assessment 
Associations. In addition, the CAA would administer various financial 
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measures (described in the section on Financing below), which would be 
designed to protect the viability of Citizens Assessment Associations. 
(Although there are many substantial differences, the relationship of the 
Small Business Administration to small business firms can be thought of 
as somewhat analogous to what is intended here.) 
C -- Establishment and Organization of CAA's 
Any group of citizens, meeting the criteria set forth by the 
CAA, could establish a new Citizens Assessment Association. In addition, 
existing non-profit organizations could be converted into CAA's, if they 
meet the necessary criteria. The purposes for which a particular CAA 
if formed could be as broad as 'protection of the environment' or as 
narrow as 'assessment of consumer products containing asbestos.' The 
specific purposes would be spelled out in the CAA's incorporation charter 
within quidelines established by the CAA. The initial financial s~pport 
for CAA's could come partly through individual donations and membership 
dues and partly through foundation grants or government grants and 
contracts. In addition to these currently available sources of funds, CAA's 
would also have the new mechanism available of issuing Citizens Assessment 
Bonds (described below). These bonds would provide CAA's with the continuing 
financial stability essential to making a real impact on the assessment 
process. Once established, the new CAA would be empowered to use a portion 
of its funds for promotional purposes to sell more Citizens Assessment 
Bonds and to increase its membership. There could be different classes 
of membership and voting rights depending on whether an individual or 
affiliated organization made a contribution, paid dues, or purchased a CA 
Bond. (The CAA agency would have to regulate these matters carefully to 
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preclude the seizure of control of a CAA by contending economic interests, 
e.g., the purchase of a controlling amount of bonds in a CAA oriented 
against oil spill pollution by the oil industry.) 
o -- Functioning of CAA's 
The primary purpose of each CAA would be to perform technology 
assessments in its areas of interest, or to draw upon assessment results 
obtained by others; and to utilize those results to affect the decision 
processes regulating society's use of the technology or technology-
based system under consideration. 
To accomplish that purpose, each CAA would have inhouse, or 
available to draw upon~ a capability for arriving at assessment judgments. 
Thus the CAA coul d have its own staff and/or adv; sory council of assessment 
authorities who would form the assessment judgment upon which the CAA 
would act. Or the CAA could draw upon avai.lable results of assessments 
by groups such as the National Academies of Science and Engineering; or 
contract with universities or research institutes, to carry out specific 
assessment assignments. When further research was required before an 
assessment judgment could be formed, the CAA could similarly carry out such 
research inhouse, or contract with others for its performance. 
Regardless of which of these patterns was followed, the CAA would 
arrive at an assessment judgment upon which it wished to act. (Since the 
essence of the CAA concept is citizen participation, there should be prOVision 
in the agency rules regulating CAA's that such assessment decisions must 
be duly ratified by the CAA' s membershi p before they can be accepted and 
acted upon. This would help preclude the CAA's from being subverted into 
elitist, expert-dominated organizations.) 
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Upon acceptance of an assessment, the CAA could follow one or more 
of a number of possible courses of acti.on. 
(1) The CAA could disseminate its results publicly and attempt 
to influence overall public opinion, or the views of selected segments 
of the public. 
(2) The CAA could lobby directly (or ind:irectly through other lobby 
organizations) with Congress, state legislators, government agencies at, 
Federal, state, and local level, the White House, governors, influential 
private organizations and individuals, etc. The purpose of such lobbying 
would, of course, be to induce the target group to accept the assessment 
results and take appropriate action on them. 
(3) The CAA could institute class action, legal proceedings on 
behalf of its membership and other potentially affected parties. These 
legal proceedings could be directed at any organization or individual in 
society (including agencies of Federal, state, and local government when 
appropriate), which were making use -- or planning to make use -- of 
technologies whose assessments indicated detrimental consequences to the 
persons or interests of certain segments of the public. 
This power to intiate litigation includes several important components: 
Ca) The suits would be class actton suits that would apply 
to whole classes of affected parties. 
(b) The detrimental consequences could be either to the 
Ipersonsl or the linterests l of certain segments of the public. Thus if it 
could be shown in court that it was to the interest of a certain segment of 
the public to maintain the beauty of a national park intact and uncontaminated, 
then action which would injure that park would be detrimental to the interests 
of the affected segment of the public. 
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(c) The technologies with the detrimental consequences need 
not be functioning already for the litigation to commence. The planned use 
of technologies with detrimental consequences would also be subject to 
appropriate litigation. 
What kinds of results would ensue from such litigation? In the 
case of technologies which were already in operation, with attendant 
detrimental consequences, the courts could award damages to the CAA and 
associated affected parties. (In addition, appropriate criminal action 
could be initiated when criminal violations had occurred.) 
In determining damage awards, the CAA Act establishing the agency 
and the associations would extend the concept of damages and associated 
costs to include not only real and punative damages when applicable, and 
the litigation costs borne by the CAA, but also that portion of the CAA's 
operating costs which enabled it to prosecute the suit successfully. Thus 
the CAA would be entitled to be reimbursed for: (a) its own operating costs 
relative to the preparation for and prosecution of the suit; (b) the costs 
of relevant research contracts and consulting fees; and (c) an appropriately 
prorated portion of the interest on the CAA's Citizens Assessment Bonds. 
This statutory extension in the concept of damages and associated costs 
would go a long way toward assuring the financial viability of CAA's. 
In the case of technologies whose detrimental consequences had not 
yet occurred, the following kinds of results would be possible. This would 
include technologies which were planned but not yet in being, as well as 
techno1ogies in existence, whose detrimental consequences had not yet occurred, 
but could be scientifically forecast with some degree of confidence. 
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In such cases, the CAA could seek a permanent injunction to 
prohibit further implementation of the particular technology, as well as 
appropriate dismantling of what was already in being. If such an 
injunction were awarded (and sustained of course), the organization on 
whom the injunction were placed would be liable to reimburse the CAA for 
its litigation costs, and also for the associated costs necessary to 
prepare the case (as outlined above). Again this would greatly aid 
the CAA's in maintaining financial viability. 
E -- Financil'g of CAAls 
As noted above, CAA's would be permitted to accept charitable 
donations, membership dues, and grants and contracts from private and 
government organizations. But the primary source of their funds, and the 
foundation of their financial stability would be the Citizens Assessment 
Bonds they would be empowered to issue. 
The interest rate on these bonds would be regulated by the CAA 
agency. The rate would be set at a hiqlher level than that permitted on 
savings bank accbunts, and probably somewhat higher than that permitted on 
bank certificates of deposit or savings and loan association rates. 
Bonds would be issued for ten year periods, and interest on them 
would be guaranteed by the CAA agency in case of default on the part of 
a particular CAA. 
Other sources of funds availabie to CAA's, besides the bonds, donations, 
dues, grants, and contracts, would be reimbursement for operating costs 
(as broadly defined above) arising from successful litigation. CAA's would 
redeem outstanding bonds at the end of ten year periods through these sources 
of funds, as well as through additional bond issues. 
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With these ground rules, some CAA's would undoubtedlY become 
financially insolvent. in such cases, the remaining assets of the CAA 
would be distributed to the bond holders on a pro rata basis. Thus there 
would be some element of risk in these bonds; and it is for this reason 
that their interest rate would be set somewhat higher than bank savings 
certificates, for example. 
The interest rates would not be set too high, however, because 
the purpose of these bonds is not to provide a desirable form of investment 
in general. Its purpose is instead to enable citizens who care about 
particular assessment issues, like water pollution or noise due to the 
SST, to contribute to society's resolution of the issue, at minimal risk 
to their normal savings. 
To those who would doubt the appeal of such bonds, I would merely 
point out how voluntary citizens organizations have managed to survive 
financially without this reimbursement mechanism. With it, I think they 
will flourish, and citizen participation will rightly become a powerful 
factor in the assessment process. 
F -- Balanced Approach of CAA's 
Although much of the preceding discussion on the CAA has been couched 
in terms of the negative consequences of technology, there is nothing 
inherent in the CAA concept to exclude the promotion by CAA's of particular 
technologies with expected positive consequences. For example, a CAA could 
be formed to promote the development and use of electric cars, or certain 
systems of public transportation, or solar energy systems, etc. The purpose 
of the CAA concept is not to facilitate citizens' attacks on technology, 
but rather to enable citizens to achieve fun domocratic participation in the 
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process of technology assessment. Without such participation, the whole 
character and quality of our democracy would ultimately be vitiated. 
v - IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZEN ASSESSMENT ACTION 
The Citizens Assessment Association concept as presented represents 
an institutional innovation which could prove significant. Accordingly, 
it is worth exploring some of its major implications. 
If the CAA concept were implemented, there would probably be 
extensive use of class action suits. At the same time the proposed 
legislation would foster an extremely broad interpretation of the 'interests' 
of certain segments of the public. Recent lawsuits filed in the environmental 
area have been filed partially on behalf of future generations. While 
this is perhaps an extreme case of a broad interpretation of 'interests', 
it is nonetheless the general direction toward which the CAA concept would 
move 1 iti ga tion. 
The broad interpretation of associated costs of litigation -- to 
include the operating and research costs of the CAA necessary to establish 
the assessment case -- appears to be of some legal significance. Whatever 
its significance, however, I believe this interpretation is absolutely 
essential to enable the judicial system to play the crucial role with respect 
to society's utilization of technology that it has played in other areas 
of society's evolution. For the complexities of technology are so great and 
the future consequences of present technological activity are so difficult 
to determine, that relevant research must be seen as an essential aspect of 
litigation on these matters. 
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Finally, there are the implications of using present scientific 
research as evidence to assert that it is reasonable to conclude that 
certain consequences are probable to occur in the future. For example, 
scientific research could well conclude that the use of a certain chemical 
in small doses over a period of time would cumulatively constitute a 
future hazard to a statistically significant segment of the population. 
On such grounds under the CAA proposal, an injunction could be obtained 
against the promoter of the chemical, with his incurring a financial 
liability to the CM which successfully sought the injunction. This seems 
to me again to pose some legal issues of apparent significance. But I 
am convinced that the legal system must find a way of taking account of 
such considerations, if the system is to fulfill its role in a technology-
centered, highly interdependent society. Put i!~ other terms, I believe 
the legal system must find a way of making present determinations of 
fact on the basis of scientific evidence regarding probabilities of 
future occurrence. 
As challenging as some of these problems may be to the legal 
community, the industrial world will also have its share of adjustments 
to make. The concept of imposing costs on an industrial firm on the basis 
of some of its planned activities, or on the future consequences of present 
activities which are scientifically forecast to prove detrimental, is certainly 
something of a radical notion. But again, I am personally convinced 
something of that sort is essential for society tn order to control the 
evolution of technology-based industry in socially desirable directions --
or at least in directions which are not soctally detrimental. One point is 
cl ear in thts regard: if such costs were i.mposed on industry, firms woul d 
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certainly think much more deeply and carefully with regard to the social 
consequences of their actions. The I total systems, future-oriented 
approach ' to technology assessment would undoubtedly gain many adherents 
in industry! 
A final implication of the CAA concept which may be cited derives 
from the Citizens Assessment Bonds. These bonds are predicated on the 
assumption that it is proper for citizens to receive a financial return 
(even if a modest, limited one) on relatively low-risk investments they 
may make, with the objective of enhancing the overall assets of society, 
such as environmental qual ity. It is interesting to ponder where such 
a radical notion may eventually lead. 
VI - CONCLUSION 
In this paper r have made a plea for the importance of citizen 
participation in the assessment process, and presented a proposal for 
an institutional innovation which would facilitate effective citizen 
assessment action. As I stoted initially, the proposal is a preliminary 
one intended to generate discussion on the myriad of issues involved. 
It contains a number of radical concepts and mechanisms which are 
undoubtedly open to a number of criticisms. Nevertheless, I believe the 
proposal contains the germ of an idea which is worth pursuing. If 
recent decades have taught us any lesson, it is that the radical 
concepts of one year rapidly become the cliches of the next one. On one 
final point, r am absolutely convinced: we have to ffnd a way of assuring 
effective citizen action in the assessment process if our society is to 
survive asa democracy -- in which the quality of individual life remains 
paramount. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
I. Technology Assessment: 
New Demands for Information 
Vary T. COATES 
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groups, both industry and public-oriented, were 
urged to attend and to express their views. The ex-
tent to which the media pick up these events and 
publications and give them even wider public no-
tice is not clear, but a recent controversy over the 
failure (so far) of the National Academy of Sci-
ences to publish an NSF -sponsored assessment of 
biomedical technology was reported at length in 
The New York Times. 
The Congressional OTA also has adopted a pol-
icy of open distribution of assessment results, even 
though its primary purpose is to serve the Con-
gress. 
increased public response seen 
One must suppose that public reaction to tech-
nology assessment reports may, in the future, par-
allel public response to environmental impact 
statements. Early statements were done more or 
less perfunctorily and were almost all unsatis-
factory in that they set out the agency justification 
for planned projects and programs and were one-
sided, incomplete, and often inaccurate. Improve-
ment has come about not so much because of the 
review of other federal agencies or the review of 
the Council on Environmental Quality, but be-
cause concerned citizens seized on the statements 
and carried them into the courts. The courts have, 
in interpreting the National Environmental Policy 
Act, steadily broadened and clarified both the pro-
cedural and the substantive requirements of the 
law. For example, one court ruled that "go .... ern-
ment agencies are directed to 'utilize a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the 
integrated use of the natural and social sciences 
"TA deals with impacts. Few social 
impacts are sptead evenly over 
society; some people will reap the 
benefits of a new technology, and 
some people will be hurt." 
and the environmental design arts in planning and 
ill decision making ...... (Memorandum opinion of 
Judge Gasch, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Hardin, 2 ERC 1424, 1 ELR 20207 (D. D.C. 
1971).) 
There is, of course, no law requiring teclmology 
assessment. One may conjecture, however, that 
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data produced in technology assessment may soon 
be carried into court and used to argue damages 
inflicted or denial of due process. 
Whether used in the courts or not, it seems cer-
tain that concerned citizens' action groups will not 
miss the opportunity to use ammunition provided 
by technology assessment to attack or to defend 
government programs in the political forum af-
forded by representative democracy. 
Public information, however, is not the same 
thing as public participation. I think there is no 
need in this country to defend the case for public 
participation in decision making-directly, 
through voting, and indirectly, through lobbies, the 
agitation of organized groups, and through pres-
sure exerted on elected officials by private citizens. 
In recent decades the right of the public to be in-
volved in long range planning or in program evalu-
ation and review has also been incorporated into 
many pieces of legislation. Does this mean that 
public participation should be incorporated into 
technology assessments? 
The case for public participation 
There are two points of view on this matter that 
warrant discussion. Bear in mind that technology 
assessment is not decision making, nor jR it in-
tended to usurp the duties and prerogatives of 
decision makers. TA is intended to provide an in-
formational input into decision making, to identify 
potential problems, to provide data for the rational 
evaluation of trade-offs, to specify areas of uncer-
tainty, and to layout alternativeEt. Those who ar-
gue for public participation make the followinv 
points: 
" The way in which problems are defined . o,,~ 
alternatives identified controla the range of 
possible decisions. If the public is nnt in-
volved early in the process it has Inl'1; thp. 
most I;ignificant opportunity to influence dp.-
cision making. 
to Th!l most effective way of identifying ~he "af-
fected parties"-those who will t-pnpfit or 
suffer-and to measure their stakes in the 
outcome, is to seek them out and ask them. 
The technological elite and the academicians 
are all too apt to overlook 01' misjudge the 
interests and the wishes of the ordinllrv 
citizen, especially the poor and difladva~­
taged . 
• Technology assessors necessarily bring their 
own values to bear in carrying out an asses;t-
menlo Public participation will bring to bear 
a wider range of values-since there is no 
such thing as "scientific neutrality." and cer-
tainly not in applied, problem-oriented social 
research-different sets of values must be 
brought into consideration. 
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\\ it seems certain that concerned citizens' action groups will not miss the 
opportunity to use ammunition provided by TA to attack 01' to defend govern-
ment programs in the poiitical forum .. . /1 
• Since technology assessment includes, though 
it is not limited to, analysis of economic 
benefits and costs, the viewpoints and inter-
ests of industrial and financial organizations 
will be considered, These "interest groups" 
will in some way participate in the assess-
ment; "public interest" or citizens groups 
should also participate. 
• Assessments made by government agencies, 
by industry, or by research groups which 
regularly serve these clients will always be 
biased toward the Establishment or the sta-
tus quo. 
The on-going assessment of solar energy by Ar-
thur D, Little is the most thorough attempt to date 
to incorporate public participation in technology 
assessment. A Public Interest Group Advisory 
Panel (somewhat unpleasantly known as PIGAP) 
W'lS established to review and criticize the assess-
ment throughout its course, and to submit a sepa-
rate report of its own. Prelimini'.ry reports are that 
in a number of instances PIGAP has turned up sig-
nificant data overlooked by the technical team, 
and that in other instances it contributed to rede-
fining the problems or to directing the investiga-
tion along lines the experts would have ignored or 
been insensitive to-for example, the feasibility of 
adapting solar heating to public housing needs. 
The neutral, scientific approach 
Now let's look at the arguments on the other 
side. Those who conceive of technology assessment 
as more nearly an objective, neutral, scientific ac-
tivity make these points: 
• T:A. is critical in just those areas, inherent 
in a high technology society, whe:.' issues are 
highly complex, data is technical and beyond 
the grasp of the untrained layman, and conse-
quences may be delayed, subtle, and uncer-
tain. The decision maker is already exposed 
to the conflicting interests and view-points 
of the public in the political process, but 
he badly needs eXllert guidance in evalu-
ating those conflicting viewpoints and trans-
lating them into sound technologically feasible 
options. 
• Public participation prematurely converts the 
investigative process into an adversary pro-
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PROGRESS (Vol. 70, No. 11) 
ceeding. Opinions tend to crystallize and be 
politicized too early, before all the' facts are 
known and all alternatives have had fair con-
sideration. 
.., Public participation is necessarily "political" 
in nature, that is, it tends to the weigh and 
balance of special interests rather than to seek 
out unanticipated and hitherto unidentified 
consequences. 
• There is no "public" but rather many pub-
lics, each of which will tend to speak for im-
mediate, short term, and already identified 
interests. Long range and uncertain im-
pacts which will affect future generations, 
or benefits and costs which are generalized 
over society, may have no organized or even 
latent groups to speak for them, and hence 
tend to be overlooked or downgraded in the 
assessment. 
• There is a constituency problem with pub-
lic interest groups-neither the assessment 
team nor the public interest group can ver-
ify that the group in fact speaks for its self-
proclaimed constituency, on a particular 
point or in general. On the other hand, 
there is also the possibility that public 
interest representatives may be co-opted by 
their involvement in an assessment. 
Summarizing the debate 
On the one hand, political decisionmakers, al-
ready buffeted by conflicting demands and values, 
need information and guidance from scientists in 
highly complex subject areas where they them-
selves are laymen. On the other hand, in the ab-
sence of public participation, the values of a tech-
nical elite, of economic power groups, and of the 
Establishment may come to dominate and deter-
mine public decisions before they emerge into the 
political arena. 111 either case, the ability of a 
democratic society to guide technological develop-
ment toward its own best interest is threatened. 
Self-constituted, non-responsible interest groups, 
whether elitist or populist, may interpose an im-
penetrable barrier between the individual and his 
elected representative. This is, I believe, why rea-
soned, dispassionate consideration of science and 
public information is very much needed. 
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III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
H. Evaluation of Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory Report 
on "Technology Assessment of 
Modular Integrated Utility 
Systems (MIUS)" 
Louis H. MAYO, Principal 
Investigator 
June 1975, Chao II, pp. 1-26 
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PART IT - FRAMEWORK OF EVALUATION 
A. Evaluation Criteria for Assessment of Proposed Public Actions 
We are becoming more acutelY aware of the necessity for increasing our 
capability to control the direction and rate of social change. This requires 
a future-oriented policy analysis function, whatever it may be called (Tech-
nology Assessment, Anticipatory Assessment, Social Impact Evaluations, etc.). 
For purposes of simplification, the remainder of the discussion herein will 
be in terms of Technology Assessment (TA). The purpose of TA is to clarify 
policy and project options in terms of their full social implications in 
order that intelligent choices can be jj;ade by responsible public and private 
sector decision-makers. 
The concern with technology assessment is not simply academic. Attention 
is invited to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and its 
requirements for environmental impact statements on all major Federal actions; 
the policy analysis and technology assessment programs of the National Science 
Foundation over the past few years; and the establishment of the Office of 
Technology Assessment for the Congress. These actions are initial manifes-
tations of the beginning of the institutionalization of the Technology 
Assessment Function. An editorial in Policy Sciences (1974), states in part: 
There are stirrings afoot that appear to indicate 
that the policy sciences may be some twenty-three years 
after the program's framework was laid out by Lerner, 
Lasswell, and others, emerging as an identifiable, 
respectable, even desirable professional activity. The 
creation of numerous training centers in universities 
and institutes throughout the world, the production of 
Ph.D. 's with degrees in policy analysis, the proliferation 
of journals with a decided policy-orientation, and the 
willingness of public and private funding sources to 
support and encourage these and other related activities are 
all propitious signs of professional development. 1 
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The various entities (public and private) which have been involved in 
TA over the past few years have been free to exercise the widest discretion 
in the development of various methodological approaches. This has resulted 
in innumerable approaches although all have certain basic common components 
and operations by virtue of the requirements of the task. Such experimentation 
has been productive, and continuing refinement of existing methodological 
concepts as well as new approaches should be encouraged. However, it is 
essential for the social problem assessment function to become "profession-
alized," at least to the extent that the performance of assessment efforts 
can be evaluated for their adeguacy, if this function is to have an appreciable 
impact on the public decision process. Basic to this task is the development 
of standards (criteria) which can be applied to measure the adequacy of 
performance. The TA function entails certain assumptions which are the basic 
characteristics for any assessment entity; that it adopt an independent, 
impartial stance toward the policy, concept, program, or project being assessed 
(as distinguished from having a stake in or a partisan interest in a particu-
lar outcome); and that it take into account, insofar as conditions permit, 
the full range of social consequences which will flow from the introduction 
of the project configuration or other action into the evolving social environ-
ment throughout the initiation, implementation and operational stages. 
There are, of course, somewhat different attitudes toward the TA function. 
Some analysts tend to favor the "enlightment ll value (the clarification of 
policy options) while others tend to give greater emphasis to the actual 
influence of the assessment on the follow-on decision. However, such 
differences are all the more reason why serious thinking is now required on 
the matter of establishing standards by which the adequacy of the performance 
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of particular assessments can be made. Further, some of those involved 
with the TA function may object to this effort to'lJard developing criteria of 
performance for reason that it may tend to inhibit continuing experimentation 
in methodological approaches. This concern is overstated. It is now time 
that those involved in the TA function submit their performances to evaluation 
as to their adequacy. Only in this way can the TA function achieve a position 
of respect and influence in the public decision process. We must be completely 
open as to our organizational and methodological approaches. We must be willing 
to accept criticism and we must strive to improve our capabilities and assess-
ment efforts in response to justified criticism. This continuous striving to 
achieve consensus as to the quality of analytical performance (even if often 
unachievable as to the relative weights to be given affected social values) 
is common to our scientific tradition of submitting experiemental/resear~h 
findings to peer review. To a lesser but important degree, it is also the 
method of most recognized professions to establish criteria of performance 
(including codes of ethics) by which performances by particular practitioners 
are to be judged. 
It would seem apparent that any public interest-obligated decision 
maker or decisi'onal entity would desire to have an understandable presentation, 
an analysis utilizing recognized techniques and performed in a professionally 
competent manner, and as clear an appraisal as practicable of the differences 
in the reasonably anticipated social benefit/cost ratio (and benefit/cost 
distributions) of one or more of the policy options under consideration. 
The general approach to the evaluation of the adequacy of a TA effort 
adopted herein has considerable support from other sources. A Report from 
the Urban Institute concludes that "many useless evaluations of Federal 
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programs (are) churned out. 1I2 Joseph S. VJholey finds that IIResults are not 
adequately conmunicated to decision makers. II He finds three II particularly 
serious ll defects in federal programs which suggest deficiencies in or at 
least appropriate indices of adequacy for judging the performance of a TA 
Effort. These are: 1) Lack of definition (liThe problem being addressed, 
the kinds of program activities intended, and the anticipated inmediate and 
long-range impacts are not spelled out in measurable terms. II); 2) Lack of 
clear logic (lack of demonstration that IIpursuit of action A will produce 
impact X.II); and 3) Lack of management (IlThose in charge of a program do not 
;lave the authority, motivation, or understanding to act on evaluation findings"). 
Wholey calls for a IIpreassessment of evaluabilityll to determine whether a 
program satisfies the requisites for useful evaluation: 
... that (1) objectives and planned activities have 
been defined in measurable terms, (2) plausible 
assumptions have been made linking expenditures, 
program, activities, and expected outcomes, and 
(3) policy makers or program managers are willing 
and able to jdentify specific needs for evaluation 
information. 
It is Wholeyls contention that a program or project is "unevaluablell unless 
these requisites are met and that evaluation efforts lacking these elements 
will simply be "non-productive. 1I 4 
Other scholars in the "policy analysis ll field have offered suggestions 
which have relevance to the criteria of TA performance. For example a 
recent issue of Policy Sciences contains several useful suggestions. The 
Editorial by Garry D. Brewer recognizes the significance of considering the 
"sequence of decision ll including 1) Invention/initiation; 2) Estimation; 
3) Selection; 4) Implementation; 5) Evaluation; and 6) Termination.5 James 
G. Abert applies a II ro l es and missions" approach to the "Policy-Making 
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Function in Government,,6 and defines five key functions: Planning, Analysis, 
Research, Demonstration, and Evaluation. With respect to Evaluation he states: 
Evaluation is the seeking out of information from 
an independent viewpoint not only with respect to 
demonstrations, but more importantly, on ongoing operating 
programs and activities not funded by the organization in 
question. The latter is a "sleeper. 1I It can cause many 
problems of a political nature. It is also often difficult 
to achieve cooperation in cases such as this, since there 
is no leverage. Yet, unless such programs are included, 
the scope of evaluation in many areas will be far too nar-
row, since federal expenditures may be only a small portion 
of national outlays in the area in question. Examples of 
this are health, education, and transportation, where 
federal spending is relatively small in comparison to the 
total national expenditure. Evaluation Management implies 
insuring that there are sufficient resources to do evalua-
tion; that administrative regulations and guidelines require 
evaluation; that there is planning for the expenditure of 
the available resources; that evaluation produces documenta-
tion in forms suitable for the various users of evaluation 
information; and that there is account9bility for the 
effective use of evaluation resources. 
In his surrnnary statement Abert emphasizes that "more attention needs to be 
paid to defining who does what to whom and when it is done. ,,8 
In their article on liThe Scholar as Artisan"9 Robert T. Holt and John E. 
Turner focus on a "producer-consumer relationship." They refer to the pro-
tection that consumers have under modern commercial codes for ordinary products 
and suggest that sponsors of studies should have a similar protection when they 
"purchase" the products of social sci enti sts. 10 They state: 
Implied warranty provisions establish another principle; 
"Hhere the seller at the time of contracting has reason 
to know any particular purpose for which the goods are 
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's 
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. 
he warrants that the goods are fit for that purpose. II 
II 
With respect to the enfol'cement of II accountabi 1 ity" of the scholar they say: 
By taking this side-trip to look at the guild system, 
we are obviously suggesting that the primary responsibility 
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for enforcing appropriate warranties on works of utili-
tarian scholarship rests with the scholarly community 
itself. .. In other words, the scholarly community 
as a collective entity should be responsible for the 
quality of the data, the use of tools of analysis, and 
the appropri ateness of the design (If the product.12 
They note the difficulties in "Policy-Oriented Research" and state in part: 
The specification of the system of variables 
appropriate to an applied analysis must include any 
variable with a social value attached that is affected 
by changes in the manipulated factors--a theoretical 
task that presents considerable difficulty. Moreover, 
to warrant a product as fit for a particular purpose 
carries with it the need to demonstrate that, in meeting 
the purpose, the product is not harmful in other ways. 
A pill, for example, could not be considered as fit for 
curing a common cold if it also precipitated heart 
attacks in a sizeable proportion of its users. Caveat 
emptor is not an acceptable rationale. 13 
The "nature of the warranty" is treated in the following terms: 
In liqht of the serious obstacles confrontinq the 
social science scholar who mines the veins of utilitarian 
knowledge, the question arises as to what the nature of 
his warranty to the consumer of the product should be. 
Given the underdeveloped state of the methodology that 
is to be applied to policy problems and the assumed lack 
of skill on the part of potential users, it may be advisable 
for the analyst to be explicit about the limitations of 
his research for policy purposes, just as the pill manu-
facturer labels the bottle "Not to be taken by people who 
have high blood pressure." The bill of particulars might 
include: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 ) 
(4) 
(5) 
The assumptions made in the analysis. 
A discussion of the limitations of the method. 
A listing of the important variables that 
are amenable to policy manipulation and 
those that are not. 
A listing of the variables that may be important 
from a policy point of view, even though they 
may not 100m prominently in the statistical 
analysis. 
An indication of what the study does not consider 
in terms of such factors as tlpoliticalclimate," 
cost-benefit analysis, etc., including the 
contingent conditions under which the analyzed 
variables operate. 14 
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Erich Jantsch in his article on "Education For Design" focuses on the 
concept of "tota1 human experience. 1I15 He is concerned with a "systems 
approach to total human experience and purposeful activity,1I16 and states 
that IIProgress toward an end-state may be called improvement, or increased 
dynamic stability, depending on the type of evolutionary metaphor applied." l7 
Jantsch utilizes the more prominent II sys tems ll concepts: 
A holistic measure of improvement for human activity 
may then be the effectiveness of design in integrating 
human systems towards an overall performance 'ideal' 
of eco-systemic stability, i.e., the effectiveness of 
both enquiry and creation to that end, with specific 
indices such as flexibility and modifiability of design. 
propens ity for se If-oy'gani za ti on and engagement of 
the members of the human systems, together with active 
motivation, openness to genuine leadership, i.e., 
proposals for redesign, etc. Obviously, education for 18 
design has to be geared to such measures of improvement. 
Jantsch views IIp1anningil as lIinherent1y design,1I stating: 
But planning in a broad connotation is inherently design. 
By its very nature it is dynamic, systemic in scope and 
based on the feedback interaction between appreciation 
and creative, exploratory and normative approaches. In 
dealing with knowledge, it is also inter- and trans-
disciplinary, focusing on the organizat,~n of knowledge 
for the task of building human systems. 
Yehezke1 Drer in his article on IIMode1s For Policy Analysis And Design 
In Complex Systems II 20 provides a far less esoteric approach than does Jantsch 
and a far more relevant treatment of the evaluative function for present 
purposes. In brief, Dror submits IIten interdependent components of an inte-
grated metho-:l ... ogyll whi ch he summari zes : 
As already indicated~ this paper presents an 
initial meta-model for policy studies, in the form of 
ten interdependent components of an integrated metho-
dology: (1) shated descriptive-explanatory and 
prescriptive concept packages; (2) IIpreferization" 
as the major criterion of policy studies' acceptability; 
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(3) value analysis; (4) benefit-cost-risk as framework; 
(5) search for novel alternatives; (6) prediction and 
uncertainty handling; (7) multiple assumptions, models 
and techniques; (8) innovative methods; (9) communicability 
to clients; and (10) methodological self-awareness. These 
components are designed to serve as a guide for eng~~ing in 
policy studies and as criteria for evaluating them. 
In the elaboration of these ten components Dror touches upon almost every 
notion of the evaluation of policy analysis efforts previously noted. A 
few points of primary interest include: 
• Preferization as a primary criterion of acceptability. 
This criterion poses the question as to whether a given 
study has improved the II policy-results li for the responsible 
client. He also states that "responsible acceptance 
criteria" provide "a safeguard against essentially political 
and personal recommendations being presented as 'science-
based'. "22 
• Clarification of the fullest meanings of the values involved 
in an assessment, having reference to the utility of such 
clarification to "legitimate value judges." 23 
• Necessity of comparing policy options in terms of "benefit-
cost-risk" criteria even though "no quantification or 
even commensurability of difference benefit-cost-risk 
dimensions is necessarily assumed."24 
• The development of "novel alternatives ll or policy options 25 
when the study task-objective is amenable to such efforts. 
• The lIadjustment of policy alternatives to irreducible risk 
and uncertainty through appropriate uncertainty-absorbing 
methods II and the "expl ication of rel evant value judgments, 
such as risk preferences" and "limitation on the domain of 
the study's validity and eXPlicatio~6with respect to 
unconsidered future contingencies." 
The necessity to make "positive redundancy essential as a 
basic methodology: "Simultaneous use of multiple and 
diverse assumptions, models, languages, and techniquei7 is 
necessary in all descriptive-explanatory research ... " 
Emphasis on communicability: "Attention to the communi-
cation problem and recognition of its importance throughout 
a study are therztore basic elements of the meta-model for 
policy studies. II 
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The conclusion that: "A standard requirement for all 
policy studies should be that their methodological bases 
are explicated, justified and hedged. II 29· 
B. Basic PPS/GWU Evaluative Criteria 
Members of the Program of Policy Studies Staff have drawn upon the 
foregoing scholars and numerous other sources to construct an evaluative 
framework which will be applied in this evaluation of the ORNL MIUS Technology 
Assessment. Three basic assessment performance criteria may be posited: 
1) Interpretability (presentation of the assessment outcome or report in such 
form as to be understandable to the relevant decisional entity or entities 
and those participants who will likely affect or in some manner be affected 
by the introduction of a given project configuration into the evolving social 
environment); 2) Warrantability (authenticity of assessment methodology, 
logical consistency, comprehensiveness, factual confirmation of outcomes of 
analytical operations, etc.); 3) and Serviceability or utility of assessment 
outcome to the relevant decisional entity or entities and others affected 
(explicitness of assessment outcome, degree to which the project configura-
tion appears to satisfy the criteria of alignment viability, utility for 
making comparative evaluations with alternative project configurations, etc.). 
Serviceability of the TA effort will usually increase with its Interpretability 
and Warrantability. However, in situations where the assessment entity has 
no control over the design of the technological systems models or of the 
particular project configuration (or alternative configurations) to be assessed, 
these being assigned or specified by the client agency, then the Warrantability 
of the effort may be high while the serviceability may be severely limited if, 
for example, the project configuration assigned for assessment turns out to 
be a totally inappropriate means to the specified social end. Of course, an 
assessment effort which better defines the problem confronting an agency is of 
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some serviceability. As subsequently emphasized, specificity as to the 
project configuration (technological system and implementing apparatus) anJ 
r 
1 
the relevant assessment context will normally contribute to serviceability. 
And serviceability will increase to the extent that an assessment clarifies 
Jlproject alignment viability" \'/ith respect to the project configuration (or 
configurations) considered. The Adequacy of an assessment effort performance, 
i.e., the extent to which policy options have been clarified, can be measured 
by eva.luating each of the conceptual/analytical/communicativEl operations of 
assessment methodology with respect to the three aforementioned basic criteria 
(and derivative detailed indices of adequacy as needed). 
Instructions by the National Bureau of Standards to PPS/GWU in connection 
with the evaluation of the ORNL Report entitled "Technology Assessment of 
Modular Integrated Utility Systems (MIUS)JI pursuant to Contract No. 5-35851 
provide that: 
Major emphasis in the review should be evaluation 
using the basic criteria of Interpretability and 
Serviceability with minor attention given to Warranta-
bi 1 ity Cri teri a. 
C. Alternative Technology Assessment Approaches 
Technology Assessments may be performed in accord with any of a variety 
of particular methodological approaches, but most such approaches will probably 
assume similar basic assessment tasks: the identification of the significant 
effects which will result from the introduction of a given (or of alternative) 
project configurations (technological system and implementing -institutional 
apparatus)into one or more projected future social environments and the evalu-
ation of the social impacts of such effects on participants and social value-
institutional processes in accord with specified concepts of social justice, 
i.e., schemes of social value weight and distribution. Certain characteristics 
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of technology assessment are normally accepted. This fUnction is future-
oriented; it is inclusive in its consideration of effects; and it is explicit 
with respect to the postulates, assumptions, and methodological techniques 
employed. These characteristics are consistent with the ORNL Report which 
states: "Contrary to the implication of the title of the report, the evalua-
tion does not focus on technology but rather on the consequences of its 
application." Some practitioners also place great emphasis on the 
assessment function as a means of providing an "early warning" device for 
undesinble effects, particularly the "higher order" or remote and indirect 
consequences of a particular technological project. Stress is here placed on 
the point that technology assessment seek~ the clarification of policy options 
confronting the responsible decisional entity. 
Numerous approaches to technology assessment have been developed and 
utilized with varying degrees of adequacy. The Task-Objective of the proposed 
assessment whether given by the sponsoring entity or posited by the assessing 
entity has a great deal to do with the technical assessment approach adopted. 
The basic concepts and analytical operations noted above are common with most 
assessment methodologies although the terminology may differ somewhat. Frequently, 
in assessment situations where the task-objective is focused on the general 
applications of a new technology the assessing entity will identify and define 
one or more "systems" using the technology for purposes of showing how it might 
be applied to various tasks or perform under different contextual conditions. 
Such dimensions of the assessment methodology as social envit~nment, relevant 
participants including authoritative decisional entities, legal/institutional 
processes for implementation and operation, funding arrangements, administrative 
structures, and other essential implementing components will be analyzed in 
terms. of available options without any necessary relationship to any particular 
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technological system proposed to serve a carefully defined social environment. 
Hence, the effects emerging from the application of this technology and the 
social impact evaluations of such effects will also be discussed, perhaps 
comprehensively, in categories of possible effects rather than the effects 
to be anticipated from a particular application in a precise social setting. 
The responsible mission agency then will have available data from which it can 
design numerous combinations of specific project configurations for promotion 
and implementation. (See Part III-D re Section 3 of the ORNL Report for a vari-
ation of this approach.) 
The second approach to assessment may be employed in those situations 
where the task-objective is focused on the assessment of well-defined project 
configuration (a specific technological system and the necessary implementing 
apparatus required to place the system in operation to perform a specified 
task in a precisely defined social environment). In such instances, all 
components nf the project configuration are linked or combined so that the 
full scope of effects which will flow from its introduction can be rather 
precisely identified, measured as to probability and magnitude, and evaluated 
by one or more relevant social justice (social value weight and distribution) 
schemes. Put otherwise, a particular option has been selected with respect to 
each of the essential and controllable design components of the project con-
figuration. Assessments of this type can normally be performed in a manner 
whi ch will be highly serviceable to the interested implementing agency, at 
least with respect to the likely total social benefits and costs (and the 
distribution of benefits and costs) which will be associated with the authori-
zation, implementation, and operation of the project configuration. 
Frequent references will be made in the PPS/G~JU Evaluation to this distinction 
between an flopen options" approach and the more precise project configuration 
I' 
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assessment task. It is obvious that the technical assessment methodology 
will vary to some extent with these two approaches reflecting the generality/ 
specificity of assessment concepts and analytical techniques employed. 
The ORNL Report ;s specific as to the basic methodology selected for 
its conceptualization and analysis of the MIUS technology. This "procedure" 
is set forth as follows in §2.2: 
Step 1 - Define the Assessment Task 
Est~blish scope (breadth and depth) of inquiry 
Develop project ground rules 
Step 2 - Describe Relevant Technologies 
Describe major technology being assessed 
Describe technologies competitive to the major 
and supporting technologies 
Step 3 - Develop State-of-Society Assumptions 
Identify and descri bE~ major factors infl uencing 
the application of the relevant technologies 
Step 4 - ldentify Impact Areas 
Step 5 - Make Preliminary Impact Analysis 
Step 6 - Identify Possible Action Options 
Develop and analyze various programs for obtaining 
maximum public advantage from the assessed technologies 
Step 7 - Complete Impact Analysis 
Analyze the degree to which each action option would 
alter the specific societal impacts of the assessed 
technology discussed in Step 5 
In the Introduction to the ORNL Report (Section 1) it is stated that 
a number of questions need to be addressed in this assessment of the comparative 
r 
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social benefits and costs of substituting MIUS installations for conventional 
utilities in certain developmental situations: 
1) What technologies are currently available for use in MIUS? 
2) What technologies are likely to be available in the next two 
decades for use in MIUS? 
3) How is MIUS likely to be applied and what type systems is it 
likely to replace? 
4) What would be the likely primary consequences of application 
of MIUS, such as reliability of service, cost, and environmental 
impact? 
5) What are likely higher order impacts - economic, psychological, 
social? 
6) What community or interest groups are most likely to be affected 
by the anticipated impacts of MIUS and are most likely to take 
action to influence these impacts? 
7) What are the most likely institutional problems and solutions to 
those problems? 
8) What benefits and costs are likely to accrue from government 
efforts to alter either the application of MIUS or its subsequent 
consequences? 
PPS/GWU conducted its Part III, Preliminary Evaluation of ORNL Responsiveness 
to HUD, against the above "procedure" and the specific questions the ORNL assess-
ment undertook to address as noted in §2.2. The following basic questions were 
considered of relevance in this connection with respect to each major section 
of the ORNL Report: 
1) What did ORNL propose to do in terms of the concepts, questions 
and tasks it undertook explicitly to perform? 
2) How well did ORNL perform the proposed tasks with reference to the 
assessment methodology selected and the questions and tasks posited 
to be addressed? 
3) ,what were the more obvious areas of adequate performance and \'Ihat 
were the more obvious deficiencies in the execution of the ques-
tions and tasks posited to be addressed? 
1.1. I . i ~ . 
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4) How adequately does each major section of the ORNL Report 
serve to relate to or support other major sections of the 
Report? 
5) How adequately does the ORNL Report, overall, contribute 
to the clarification of MIUS model options for the purposes 
of HUD policy/decision-making in terms of Interpretability, 
Warrantability, and Serviceability? 
Part IV of the PPS/GWU review relates to the Analysis and Evaluation 
of the Adeguacy of Particular Aspects of the ORNL Technology Assessment of MIUS. 
This part of the PPS/GWU Evaluation goes to the IInormative specification for an 
adequate assessment of MIUS II and hence does not adopt the ORNL methodological 
approach as the sole measure for an evaluation of the adequacy of the ORNL 
assessment effort. The Part IV review draws upon other study reports assessing 
the MIUS as well as alternative approaches to technology assessment as evaluative 
standards by which to measure the performance of particular aspects of the ORNL 
effort. 
By broadening the range of assessment performance evaluative criteria for 
the Part IV PPS/GWU review beyond the limited scope of Part III, experience 
can be drawn upon and insights gained which should enhance the utility of the PPS/ 
GWU review to all interested parties. Contract NOD 5-35851 requires that the three 
aforementioned basic criteria of evaluation be employed in this review and then states: 
Interpretability criteria shall be utilized to determine 
whether the document's format and content allows an intended 
user to properly interpret the operation of the Technology 
Assessment effort, the relative attainment of the task objec-
tive and the assumptions, social problem context, limiting 
constraints and areas of uncertainty encountered in the effort. 
Warrantability criteria shall be utilized in this effort 
primarily to establish the appropriateness of the Assessment 
Metholology used and to determine the acceptability of social 
value schemes utilized. Secondarily, the warrantability cri-
teria should be used within the bounds of personnel expertise 
to the extent agreed upon by the contractor and NBS to determine 
the extent to which factually established input/output data have 
been utilized and the completeness of technical aspects of the 
Assessment operation. 
r 
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Serviceability criteria shall be employed to establish the level 
of utility of the document as input to HUD decision making. To 
this end, the review should establish whether the assessment is 
defensible, whether the actual policy choices and action options 
available to HUD have been dealt with, whether the assessment has 
considered the alignment between HUD, other institutions and 
external factors to determine what extent implementation can occur. 
With respect to Task II assigned PPS/GWU, this review was to be carried 
out as represented by the PPS Performance Evaluative Matrix. 
It was also provided that the final evaluation report: 
••• shall detail the specific and general areas of the document 
requiring revision prior to publication, those areas of the 
document where the technology assessment methodology is defic-
ient and those viewpoints, impact areas, action options, social 
environments, and areas of uncertainty not fully considered or 
identified in the document. 
It is evident from the foregoing that questions such as those posed below were 
useful guiding techniques for the PPS/GWU review of Part IV selected aspects of the 
ORNL Report: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
What was the explicitly stated or implicit purpose of each particular 
section in the scheme of the assessment task-objective assumed by ORNL? 
What are the critical questions which one would have expected the 
particular section to address? 
What methodological concepts and analytical techniques were applied to 
the examination of these questions? 
What assumptions.and/or qualifications were made in the course of 
analyzing these questions? 
5) What alternative concepts, analytical techniques, and modes of reductionism 
might have been usefully considered by ORNL? 
6) Was the treatment of the questions posed or task proposed in accord with 
recognized technology assessment methodology? Or was it primarily in form 
of a general information inquiry? Or was it primarily in form of an 
implementation strategy for MIUS installations? 
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How were questions and/or tasks handled for which satisfactory data or 
basic analyses were not available, that is, situations of uncertainty? 
How does the particular section of the ORNL Report logically relate to and 
support other sections of the Report so as to provide a systematic and 
coherent development of the MIUS technology assessment? 
To what extent does each particular section tend consciously to deal with 
the assessment task in terms of explicating the analysis and social impact 
findings so as to be of greatest Serviceability to HUD; other relevant 
decision makers in the authorization, implementation, and operational phases; 
and all other participants in some manner affecting or likely to be affected 
by the implementation of the MIUS technology? 
What specific rearrangements of format, or r~visions in content, or suggestions 
for re-examination/t~-assessment are approprlate for the purpose of rendering 
the ORNL Report a publishable document? 
In addition to utilizing other MIUS studies, assessment methodologies, and 
the foregoing questions, the following brief exposition of an assessment methodol-
ogy is given for the purpose of presenting certain concepts which have utility in 
the evaluation of particular aspects of the ORNL MIUS assessment effort. This 
assessment approach focuses on relatively well-specified project configurations 
in contrast to the more or less Itopen-ended ll or "scoping out of possibilities" 
approach which is characteristic of task-objectives directed to the assessment 
of configurations specified only in terms of "technological systems" such as MIUS. 
This PPS/GWU approach is incorporated into the assessment Performance Evaluation 
Matrix along with additional technology assessment notions for the purpose of 
providing a graphic illustration of evaluation of an assessment effort against the 
basic criteria of Interpretability, Warrantability and Serviceability. The 
principal concepts of this particular technology assessment approach are: 
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1) A well-specified Project Configuration (technological system 
with implementing and operational apparatus is to be introduced 
into: 
2) The Relevant Evolving Social Environment defined as the full 
social context anticipated to interact with the project config-
uration and including: 
• time period projected 
• relevant geographical area 
• jurisdictional dimensions - authoritative 
(formal) and ~rivate sector 
• participants likely affected by or in some 
manner affecting the implementation and 
operations of the project configuration 
relevant conditioning factors and trends 
organized in terms of social value-institutional 
processes (public decision process; process of 
technological innovation; economic resource 
allocation; knowledge and skill capabilities 
and institutional processes; urban and regional 
development processes; societal behavioral 
patterns; processes of exercising options 
pertaining to individual well-being; processes 
affecting the quality of the natural environ-
ment, etc.) 
A critical aspect of the evolving social environment is: 
3) The System of Technology Assessment/Implementation Participants 
which deals explicitly and systematically Nith all those public 
and private sector entities, public officials, and private organ-
izations and individuals likely affecting or affected by the 
assessment/implementation procedures. Such participants having 
differing perspectives, claims and resources which will be used 
to develop strategies, based upon their resources and i~fluential 
social conditions and trends, whic(\ can be applied in relevant 
public/private decisional arenas to achieve outcomes which will 
satisfy the claims of such participants. Such claims (through 
appropriate strategies) will be asserted in: 
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4) The Policy Formulation and Program Implementation PF/PI Process 
which includes the phases of: 
• Perception of the "problem" or "task" or "action" 
proposed 
• Formulation of the "problem context II and problem 
definition 
• Assembly of relevant information 
• Invention of alternative means or courses of action 
• Assessment/Evaluation/Recommendation of the selected 
course of action (Project Configuration) 
• Formal prescription of law or authorization of new 
program based on the selected course of action 
Application of new statutory scheme in appropriate 
decisional contexts and/or implementation of the 
prescribed program, i.e., course of action 
Appraisal of the Effects of the application of the 
statutory scheme or of the operation of the program 
• Modification of the statutory scheme or of the program 
based upon continuing monitoring and appraisal 
The PF/PI Process provides for the clear identification of the loci of 
the num~rous interactions (decision points) whi~h will likely occur 
between the System of Participants in the assessment, authorization, 
implementation, and operation of the proposed project/program, i.e., 
suc~essive phases of the assessment effort. Each phase of the PF/PI 
Process will involve a somewhat different pattern of participants and 
produce a different set of interactions, decisions and follow-on actions. 
Hence, different effects with respect to type, magnitude, and participants 
will be produced which the assessment should recognize at each of the 
foregoing phases. This approach has the advantage of assisting in the 
specification of: 
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5) The Relevant Assessment Context which varies with the Project 
Configuration, the Evolving Social Environment, the System of 
Participants, the relevant Authorizing and Implementing Publici 
Private Decisional Entities, and the Phases of the PF/PI Process. 
In brief, the Relevant Assessment Context is the "zone of inter-
actions" which are anticipated to occur at the intersection of 
the System of Participants with the Public/Private Decisional 
Entities at each phase of the PF/PI Process. From each of these 
interactions, decisions, or follow-on actions, effects will result. 
The notion of the Re'levant Assessment Context is a means by which 
effects can be comprehensively, explicitly, and systematically 
identified. Explicitness as to the Relevant Assessment Context 
contributes to the specificity with which effects can be identified 
and measured. 
The concept of Project Configuration is basic to the assessment approach 
outlined above. Furthermore, it serves as a highly useful evaluative standard 
for the ORNL assessment. Project Configuration refers to the means by which a 
specified public goal is to be achieved in an evolving social environment. This 
requires that project design must be inclusive of the total implementing resources 
necessary to place the instrumentality into operation. Unless this inclus;;e 
approach is taken, the full range of planned and derivative effects cannot be 
identified nor can a confident evaluation be made of the probable social benefits 
and costs and their distribution. 
A crucial feature of assessment performance evaluation is its usefulness in 
determining whether the project configuration is a suitable means for ach'jeving 
the specified social goal in the evolving social context into which it is to be 
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introduced. This is one way of stating the notion of Project Alignment Viability. 
Such IIviabilityll will be achieved to the extent that the project configuration 
assessed will attain the desired goal in the social environment projected. 
If a project configuration having a major technological component is to be 
employed to achieve a specified objective (the satisfaction of certain transporta-
tion, housing, or energy needs), the inclusive project configuration would then 
need to specify such elements as the following: 
The precise technological component or system to be employed, its readiness 
or future availability . 
. The institutional-processes through which the proposed project must move for 
purposes of authorization, funding, implementation, operations, etc. 
The formal authority (legal prescriptions, statutory schemes) required for 
implementation and operations, and the authoritative decisional entities 
involved in the ongoing prescribing, invoking, applying, and appraisal 
functions. 
The financing/funding arrangements and the other resource requirements 
such as informational needs, professional skills, etc., for imple-
mentation and operations. including proposed allocations of responsi-
bilities and distribution of attendant costs. 
Special institutional-processes designed for utilization in the 
implementation and operational stages having the pr1mary purpose of 
soliciting viewpoints of those community participants who will be or 
may be affected by the proposed action (formal hearings. arrangements 
for review of environmental impact statements by interested parties. 
etc.) . 
The management/administrative arrangements which must be provided in 
both the public and private sectors for implementation, operation, 
and continuing appraisal. 
~ .. ' .. 
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The scheduling of the stages of authorization, implementation, and 
operations. 
An estimate of the costs of the planned configuration elements 
including "hardware," costs of the efforts required in personnel, 
time, professional skills, and other requisite resources throughout 
the authorizing, implementing, and operational stages. (Costs of 
condemnation of properties, relocation of residents and businesses, 
and the provision for new facilities and services incident to such 
a relocation may constitute a major cost item in many projects.) 
Enumeration of the legal (or other) requirements, constraints, and 
limiting conditions imposed upon the project design such as Public 
Health and Welfare standards, safety factor specifications, cost 
limitations, time for completion constraints, etc. 
After precise speCification of the project configuration and the relevant 
future social environment, it can be determined with greater accuracy whether 
the specified alignment of technology, formal authority, institutional 
structure, financial arrangements, administrative/management operation, the 
scheduling of events. and the attendant social costs present an effective. 
efficient and acceptable means of gaining the social objective sought. The 
viability test will impose the greatest diligence upon the assessing entity 
in making its social benefit/cost ratio determination and in sorting out the 
approximate distribution of such benefits and costs. Failure to test the 
alignment of the project configuration with socio-political conditions and 
anticipated results can be a serious impairment of both the reliability and 
the utility of an assessment effort for the responsible mission agency. 
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The crucial point to note about the notions of Project Configuration and 
Project Alignment Viability is that they represent more closely the realities 
of the social situation than do more generalized at~es6ment approaches. Put 
otherwise, they go to the question of whether a specified project configura-
tion when introduced into a relatively well defined evolving social environ-
ment will produce the desired results for which it is intended. Viability 
goes to the Goals-Conditions-Means-Results test. This approach is specific 
in that it undertakes to identify precisely what w'ill occur if a given action 
is taken with respect to a particular social context. This approach is to 
be contrasted with an assessment approach which presents a task-objective 
positing a generic system (technological or otherwise) for assessment, one 
which is thus inevitably "open ,ended II as to possibilities since numerous 
combinations of project configurations are under assessment rather than one 
or more well-specified actions. The "open ended" approach leads inevitably 
to the analysis of the various options open for each componen,t. of the 
project configuration as opposed to selecting out a particular option for 
each component and linking such components into a coherent identifiable 
project configuration. 
The development of this section on a framework of evaluation has served 
several purposes: 1) emphasized the importance of evaluating proposed public 
programs or other actions; 2) stressed the need to be precise as to the 
functions which a particular evaluation/assessment is to serve; 3) restated 
the task-objective of the MIUS assessment as perceived by ORNL and the 
explicit methodological approach adopted by ORNL; 4) suggested alternative 
assessment approaches (including that of posing questions relevant to the 
assessment task) by which the ORNL MIUS technology assessment might be 
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legitimately analyzed and evaluated); and 5) presented an Assessment Performance 
Evaluative Matrix (Assessment Process Operations vs. Basic Criteria of Performance) 
as a graphic illustration of the evaluative tasks undertaken by PPS/GWU pursuant 
to Commerce Contract 5-358510 As in the instance of the ORNL Report, Assessment 
Process Operations can sometimes be replaced with relevant sections of the Report 
evaluated. 
The outcome of this Evaluation is presented in abstract form for purposes 
of providing a succinct statement of the operational significance for ORNL and 
HUD of the conclusions of this Evaluation. The Abstract (Part I) is a condensa-
tion of Part V (Conclusions and Recomnendations) and is directed to: 
1) the specific sections of the ORNL Report which, as they 
presently stand, should be useful to HUD and other affected 
policy/decison-makers, as measured by the basic criteria of 
Interpretability, Warrantability, and Serviceability (with 
emphasis on Serviceability). 
2) Three Options suggested to ORNL as guidance for revision of 
the present ORNL Report for the purpose of assuring its 
Interpretability. Warrantabi1ity, and Serviceability a5 a 
published documento 
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ANTICIPATORY PROJECT ASSESSMENT (llPA) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION in Science and Technology Geo.Washington University 
(Illustrative) Louis H. Mayo. Director June, '/975 
ANTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT BASIC CRITERIA OF ACCEPTABILITY 
PROCESS 
OPERATIONAL PHASES OF INTERPRETABILITY WARRANTABILITY SERVICEABILITY 
EFFORT 
-
1. APA TASK-OBJECTIVE 
(Assigned by the Sponsoring 
Agency or Posited by the APA 
Entity) 
2. PROJECT CONFIGURATION 
(Same as 1. above) 
3. SOCIAL PROBLEM CONTEXT 
(Prescribed by the Sponsoring 
Agency or the Specific Decis-
ional Conte,,~ as Defined by 
the flPA Entity) 
4. PROJECT OF EVOLVING SOCIAL 
ENV IRONMENT 
(Projection of Plausible 
Future Social Environments) 
5. CONDITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON 
APA PERFORMANCE and STRATEGY 
OF ASSESSMENT EFFORT REDUCTION 
--
6. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
a. Selection of Concerts, Models, 
and Analytical Techniques 
b. Application of a. above to 
Identification & Measurement 
of Effects (Probability & 
Magnitude) 
c. Specification of Social Justice 
Concepts/Standards/Instrument-
alities to be Applied to Social 
Impacts of Such Effects) 
7. PERFORMANCE OF ASSESSMENT BY 
APPLICATION OF FORMAL APA 
ANALYTICAL MODEL 
a. Quantification of Models 
b. Data: Types & Acqu'isition 
c. Social Value Parameters 
d. D~cision Criteria 
e. Formal APA Analytical Model 
Procedures to Identify & 
Measure Effects & to Evalu-
ate Social Impacts of Effects 
8. ASSESSMENT OUTCOME 
a. Social Impact Evaluation -
Particular Effects 
b. Social Significance of Par-
ticular Social Impacts 
c. Social Benefit/Cost Ratio 
d. Dist. of Social Benefits/Co5ts 
- UK. IT::I'I: [AL .l" Alr.l!.i .us 
9. nUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS/PROCED- .-
URES OF ASSESSING ENTITY TO ASSURE PF P()( ~R QUALITY SERVICEABLE INPUT TO DECISION PRO-
CESS OF RELEVANT OECISION.l\L ENTITY ! 
." I 
10. COMMUNICATION OF ASSESSMENT EFFORT I OUTCOME TO RELEV. DECISIONAL ENTITY , J 
.J 
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IV. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE LAW 
A. Scientific Method, Adversarial 
System, and Technology Assess-
ment 
Louis H. MAYO 
November 1970, pp. 16-32; 78-109 
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III. Adversarial System 
Expressions such as "adversarial system," "adversary process," and 
"advocacy" tend to convey an image of an argument or a contest. Advocacy 
18 is often defined as "pleading for" a person or position. Some undoubtedly 
equate advocacy with rhetoric or "the art of influencing the thought or con-
duct of one's hearers.,,19 In his article on "Concealed Rhetoric in Scien-
tis tic Sociology" Richard M. Weaver states~ 
Rhetoric is anciently and properly defined as the art 
of pe'Z"suasion. We may deduce from this that it is 
essentially concerned with producing movement, which 
may take the form of a change of attitude or the 
adoption of a course of action, or both. 20 
In this brief statement there is little to suggest that advocacy or the 
adversarial system is or might be a method of inquiry as well as a tech-
nique of influencing a decision outcome. 
There is a great deal more to the adversarial system than rhetoric, 
however. In a recent treatise on th~ former, William A. Blaser commences 
his analysis with a discussion of the adjudicatory model of the adversarial 
system. Clearly, the assumption is entertained that, from the presentation 
of rival claims prepared independently by the interested parties, the 
"true" facts will emerge and that the "correct" rule will be applied. 2l 
l8The American College Dictionary. 
19Ibid • 
20Essay in Scientism and Values (Schoeck and Wiggins, Eds., 1960), 
pp. 83-84. "This means that rhetoric, consciously 'employed, is never inno-
ceut of intention, but always has as its object the exerting of some kind 
of compulsion." Ibid. 
21 Blaser, Pretrail Discovery and the Adversary System (1968), p. 4. 
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He makes the following points: 
The adversary system's method of investigating the facts 
of a case is conditioned by the system's ultimate aim of 
exploring disputes thoroughly, enabling all parties to 
present their claims in their own words, and settling the 
disputes decisively without violence. 22 
The adversary system distinguishes between the roles of 
advocate and judge becauseA it is assumed, one inhibits 
performance of the other.2~ 
The adversary system assumes that public respect for the 
courts is necessary and depends on judicial neutrality.24 
Additional assumptions relative to the adjudicatory model of the adversarial 
system pertain more directly to the development of relevant information: 
The adversary system plac(!s the burden on the parties and 
competitive relationship motivates each to find all the law 
and facts.2.5 
The adversary system gives each party the full responsibilit6 and opportunity to reveal defects in the rival's arguments. 2 
By separating the partisan advocate from the judge of the law 
and facts, the adversary system tries to ensure that the 
deci~ion-maker suspends judgment until all the arguments and 
proofs have been presented. 27 
Blaser advances a further proposition concerning cases of first impression 
for which there is no settled precedent that "the adversaries do not merely 
urge the court to adopt whatever well-defined but competing legal principles 
22 . 13. Ibl.d. , p. 
23Ibid • , p. 4. 
24Ibid • , p. 5. 
25Ibid • 
26 
Ibid. , p. 4. 
27 Ibid. 
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can apply to the facts most advantageously to themselves, but their argu-
ments and mutual criticisms help the court develop new and lnore clear 
28. 
principles of law for that class of cases." 
The assumptions made about the advantages of the adversarial system 
as a technique of inquiry are somewhat blunted by actual practices. As 
Blaser says, "Since the parties in a fight seek victory rather than truth 
for its own sake, their presentations may confuse rather than help the 
court. ,,29 For example, expert testimony is often shaped to partisan ends. 
Further, "While the trier of facts wishes to know everything that is 
pertinent, a partisan who discovers harmful information is motivated to 
30 
conceal it from the adversary and from the court." While the practice of 
concealment is to some extent considered to be in accord with the "rules 
of the game" in an adversary decisional arena such as a court or a regulatory 
agency adjudication where the primary objective of the advocate participant 
is to prevail, such practice could seriously hamper the assessment process 
where the objective is to assemble complete information on a given applica-
tion. 3l 
28 . 13. Ibl.d. , p. 
29 . 6. Ibl.d. , p. 
30 7. Ibid. , p. 
31 
See generally on the adversarial system, E. Barrett Prettyman, 
"Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy," 39 Va. L.R. 285 (1953) 
wherein Judge Prettyman discusses both brief writing and oral argument and 
quotes John W. Davis on oral argument techniques, at 299, as follows: 
"'The statement of the facts is not merely a part of the 
argument, it is more often than not the argument itself ••• ' 
" 'Always "go for the jugular vein".' By that is meant that 
upon oral argument the lawyer should pick the nub of the case 
and go for it. ' ••. (T)he quintessence of the advocate's art' 
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In an authoritative decisional arena, advocacy has as its objective 
the presentation of claims or demands that the decision or outcome allo-
cates values, i.e., rights and duties, ben~fits and costs, in designated 
ways. But advocacy in the sense of attempting to influence outcomes is 
also employed as a strategy in assessment forums. While the assessment 
process culminates in an informational outcome as contrasted with a 
binding value allocation, it nevertheless involves a decision or determin-
ation as to the outcome which distinguishes such processes from a mere 
"bull session." Advocacy in the assessment forum is directed toward 
gaining recognition for certain types of effects of a technological ap-
plication and toward persuading the assessment entity to apply evaluative 
criteria to such effects (socially desirable or undesirable and the 
magnitude thereof) so as to reflect the participant's preferences. 
Mr. Davis calls the ability to pick one single point and drive 
it home as the only worthy topic in the case. If you are 
superbly courageous, you can concede impossible and even dubious 
points." 
Arthur S. Miller, in "Drawing the Indictment," Saturday Review, Aug. 3, 
1968, pp. 39-40, summarizes the adversary system thus: 
"The adversary system, in sum, is based on two premises: first, 
that the lawyers and judges are competent in the matters dealt with, 
and second, that the system can provide enough of the right type of 
data to make viable decisions." 
Professor Miller believes that both assumptions are incorrect with regard 
to courts as they are presently constituted. See ~p. 81 of this paper. 
See also, on the adversaria1 system, Milton Katz, The Relevance of 
International Adjudication, (1968) chap. 2. 
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IV. Similarities, and Differences 
We can probably agree that scientific method is aimed primarily 
toward enlightenment, i.e., the production of knowledge, while an adver-
sarial system is directed primarily toward power, i.e., the assertion of 
claims and the influencing of decision outcomes. 32 But the adversarial 
system clearly includes an enlightenment component. The adversarial 
system not only attempts to shape the outcome directly (as with mere 
rhetoric), but is supported to some degree by the organization of relevant 
information including both factual events and appropriate rules or criteria 
of decision. For example, when applied in the ultimate political decision 
arena where the issue involves a technological application, the adversar-
ial system subsumes the assessment function. 
32 
To draw on a social science example rather than a technological 
application, consider the following observation in the review by David M. 
Schneider of Rainwater & Yancy, "The Moynihan Report and the Politics of 
Controversy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1968, pp. 20-21: 
"But the major problem remains, this time fairly and well 
put by the authors: 'The central issue raised by the Moynihan 
Report for the government social science relationship is that 
of the political use of social science findings.' That is, the 
Moynihan Report is not basically a research report or a technical 
document; it is a polemic which makes use of social science tech-
niques and findings to convince others. It was designed as a 
persuasive document because Moynihan felt that the social science 
data he could bring to bear would have a persuasive effect. 
' ••• the rhetoric of persuasion is generally considerably sim-
pler than the rhetoric of scholarly or research discourse. The 
suitable criteria for evaluating a persuasive document are not 
that all its its are dotted and all its tIs are crossed but that 
it selects some crucial issues and presents them in such a way 
as not to belie a fuller and more balanced intellectual dis-
cussion of them. It is our view that the Moynihan Report does 
not violate this standard although we recognize that some other 
social scientists would disagree.'" 
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This close interaction between enlightenment and power has prompted 
some interesting analyses of the differences and similarities between 
scientific method and legal process including the adversaria1 system. 
However, the identification of scientific method with verifiable or 
potentially verificab1e empirical relationships, that is, with accurate 
description of phenomena and the prediction of events under given condi-
tions, has convinced some observers that a sharp distinction should be 
drawn vis-a-vis legal process: That scientific method represents a dis-
passionate search for the "truth" whereas adversarial system reflects a 
passionate "urge-to-win"--to impose a position, to achieve a preferred 
value or resource distribution. 33 Consider, for example, the informational 
limitations of advocacy as illustrated in Professor Mason's description of 
one of Chief Justice Marshall's opinions: 
33Raymond M. Wilmotte in "Engineering Truth in Competitive En-
vironments," IEEE Spectrum, May 1970, p. 45, advances the thesis that 
"the success of decisions in both public affairs and industry depends 
today on the correct assessment of technical uncertainties" and that in 
"an atmosphere of adversary confrontation, the efforts to hide them can 
prove the source of much harm." He states further: 
"The mental attitude of the individual who sees that there is 
a gap in the truth when uncertainties are not expressed is 
altogether different from the attitude attending the process 
of finding the truth by the legal process of adversary con-
frontation, for that method in effect eliminates the voluntary 
disclosure of uncertainties. Scientists are inherently un-
sympathetic with this legal process, at least on technical 
matters." Ibid., p. 46. 
Wi1motte seems to be saying that the adversary process tends to add con-
fusion to factual determinations, particularly where the "uncertainties" 
as to facts are significant. His references are to the factual/effects 
phase rather than to the value or so~i~l preference phases of the assess-
ment-decision process. He feels that areas of uncertainty can and should 
be reduced in order to enlighten and clarify rather than to confuse. He 
asserts that "No scientific or engineering study should be considered 
complete without an 'uncertainty analysis'. No system or component is 
really understood by its designer until he has carried out such an analysis
." 
Ibid., p. 47. He finds the "adversary confrontation" designed not to "reach
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By minimizing the complexity of the question he had 
gratuitously set for himself, the Chief Justice ruled 
out the technical agglutinative approach. He chose to 
fuse the ingredients Judge Cardozo singled out as neces-
sary for a persuasive opinion--overtones of sincerity and 
fire, the mnemonic power of alliteration and anthesis, the 
terseness and tang of the proverb and the maxim. "Neglect 
the help of these allies," Cardozo warns, "and it (the 
opinion) may never win its way." Such qualities make for 
an opinion at once both 'magisterial' and 'imperative.' 
Such an opinion 'eschews ornament.' It is meager in illus-
tration and analogy. If it argues, it does so with the 
downward rush and overwhelming conviction of the syllogism, 
seldom with tentative gropings toward the inductive apprehen-
sion of a truth imperfectly discerned. 34 
Contrast the foregoing technique of persuasion with the following descrip-
tion of the scientific mode of presentation: 
The natural scientists have won an enviable reputation for 
modesty in this respect: they seldom allow their desire 
for results to carry them beyond a statement of what is 
knolvo or seriously probable. This often calls for a great 
deal of qualification, so that cautious qualification has 
become the hallmark of the scientific method. 35 
A striking if somewhat crude contrast of adversarial system and the 
scientific approach is that offered by the late Judge Jerome Frank in his 
book Courts on Trial (1949): 
Our mode of trials is connnonly known as "contentious" or 
"adversary." It is based on what I would call the "fight" 
a conclusion, but to prove one." He adds, "One can generalize from the 
example of the ABM that whenever the purpose of a technical presentation 
is to 'sell' rather than to connnunicate something, and competition exists, 
the foundation for a process of adversary confrontation is established." 
Ibid. 
34Mason, The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom (1962)., p. 86. 
35 
Weaver, supra, n. 20, p. 91. 
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theory, a theory which derives from the origin of trials 
as substitutes for private out-of-court brawls. 36 
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the 
fight, not at aiding the court to discover the facts. He 
does not want the trial court to reach a sound educated 
guess, if it is likely to be contrary to his client's 
interest. Our present trial method is thus the equivalent 
of throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is 
performing an operation. 37 
Judge Frank characterizes the "fight theory" of justice as "a sort of legal 
laissez-faire," that whereas classical economic theory postulated "economic 
man," the adversary system postulates "litiguous man.,,38 Several statements 
in the Report on Technical Information for Congress also attempt to draw a 
sharp distinction between scientific and legal-political processes, as for 
example: 
Scientific truth is established by objective demonstration 
and confirmed by replication; political truth is established 
by consensual agreement, usually after an "adversary contest.,,39 
John Dewey's specific attention to the process of problem solving as re-
flected in the adversarial system and its relationship to scientific method 
is illustrated by the following passages: 
As a matter of fact, men do not begin thinking with premises. 
They begin with some complicated and confused case, apparently 
admitting of alternative modes of treatment and solution. 
Premises only gradually emerge from analysis of the total 
36Frank, Courts on Trial (1949), p. 80. 
37 . Ibl.d., p. 85. 
38Ibid ., p. 92. 
39Technical Information for Congress (1969), supra, n. 15, p. 5. 
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situation. The problem is not to draw a conclusion from 
given premises; that can best be done by a piece of inanimate 
machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is to find 
statements, of general principle and of particular fact, 
which are worthy to serve as premises. As a matter of actual 
fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a 
conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and 
then we look around for principles and data which will sub-
stantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently 
between rival conclusions. No lawyer ever thought out the 
case of a client in terms of the syllogism. He begins with 
a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his 
client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situa-
tion to find material out of which to construct a fGvorable 
statement of facts, to form a minor premise. 40 
40Dewey, ilLogical Method and Law,1f 10 Cornell~ 17, 22-23 (1924); 
reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 
(1951), pp. 553-554. 
Making a determination and then '}~arching for the lIauthorityll to 
support the conclusion as is reflected in the story about Chief Justice 
Marshall: "Judgment for the plaintiff; Mr. Justice Story will furnish the 
authorities," would seem the antithesis of the scientific method. But the 
pronouncement of Marshall does not necessarily represent his process of 
reasoning. Chancellor Kent, in explaining how he arrived at a judicial de-
cision, noted that he first made himself "master of the facts" and then: 
"I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the 
court half the time. I then sat down to search the authorities 
••• 1 might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, 
but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the 
case." [Extracts taken from Jerome Frank, "What Courts Do In 
Fact," 26 Ill. L.R. 645 (1932), reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, 
Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951), pp. 474-
476.] 
Dewey's attitude toward the lawyer's approach to information gathering and 
organization would seem to be shared with Gordon Tullock in The Organization 
of Inquiry (1966), pp. 58-59: 
"So far, I have discussed science and inquiry as though they were 
the same thing. In one of the general uses of inquiry, this is 
true, but in other meanings of this term they are different. 
Investigations may be started which are not motivated by either 
curiosity about reality or the desire to make practical use of 
knowledge of the real world, but by some other motive. A lawyer 
building up a brief for his client, for example, may be much more 
intelligent, more learned, and more ingenious in his research methods 
than most scientists, but his investigation is not scientific be-
cause he is not searching for the truth. He looks for an argument, 
based on factual information to be sllre, which he thinks will persuade. 
In fact, in the Anglo-adversary type of legal proceedings, he is 
prohibited from expressing his personal opinion on this point to the 
court. " 
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I do not for a moment set up this pro(~edure as a model of 
scientific method; it is too preconnnit ted to the establish-
ment of a particular and partisan con~lusion to serve as such 
a modeL4l 
41Ibid • But does the focus on a predisposed, partisan conclusion 
necessarily preclude characterization of such techniques of data collection
 
and organization as utilized in the famous "Brandeis Brief" in support of 
the normative standard of "reasonable" in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1907), as scientific? 
"In the fall of 1907 the owner of the Grand Laundry in Port-
land, Oregon, Curt Muller, decided to appeal a ruling against him by 
the Oregon Supreme Court. Some months previously Muller had been 
convicted by a lower court of having forced a Mrs. Elmer Gotcher, 
one of his employees, to work longer than the ten hours a day per-
mitted by the Oregon law governing women workers in factories and 
laundries. He was fined $10 for the offense. The Portland laundry 
Incident might have had little importance, except that since the 
1905 r.uling by the United States Supre,me Court in the case of 
Lochner v. New York, which struck down a ten-hour limit for men 
working in bakeries, employers had been encouraged to challenge 
every law restricting hours of work. The Portland laundry owners, 
employers of women, wanted a clear test. 
"From his study of the Lochner decision of 1905 and others in-
volving the clash between Fourteenth Amendment liberty of the 
property-owner and state legislation designed to protect the weak t 
Brandeis recognized the kernel of his task: to convince the Supreme 
Court that the Oregon legislature had acted reasonably in passing its 
ten-hour statute. The Court had made it clear that it would tolerate 
protective laws that curbed the employer in the free enjoyment of 
his property only if such laws were reasonably ca.lculated to pro-
mote the social good. The words reasonable and reasonably ran like 
a thread through one Court decision after another. 
"Brandeis immediately put Josephine Goldmark to work pulling 
together evidence to prove the reasonableness of a law designed to 
curb the physical and social evils to women attendant upon exces-
sive hours of toil. This evidence was to be from physicians, 
health inspectors, social workers, and industrial experts rather 
than from legalists. Medical libraries were combed for documenta-
tion; when this was assembled and edited, Brandeis submitted 101 
pages of citations from experts in a dozen countries, all bearing 
on the physical requirements of women for a decent amount to (sic) 
rest if they were both to work and to fulfill their functions as 
mothers. Some of his testimony dated back fifty years, and much of 
it revealed greater official concern with working women's health 
in the Old World than in America. Brandeis' brief showed that every 
reliable nonjuridicial authority in Western Europe and North America 
knew that excessively long hours of work are harder on women than 
on men; and further, that because women bear children, the physical 
well-being of humanity requires that their working hours be limited. 
One citation after another proved that long hours of work led to 
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Despite the fact that many efforts have been made to distinguish 
scientific method and legal process, similarities can also be found. All 
decisional sub-systems within society and especially those which are 
closely related to a recogniz1d discipline or profession, are necessarily 
concerned with particular subject matter, thought processes, and institu-
tionalized or customary decisional procedures. While given professional 
groups tend to specialize in certain types of subject matter, thought 
processes, analytical frameworks, and customary modes of reaching out-
comes, such elements are not necessarily the exclusive province of such 
professions. Science is the subject matter of politicians as well as 
scientists. Inductive, deductive, trend, alternative, and goal-value 
thinking are engaged in by all professional groups to some degree. Further, 
all such groups are exposed to some extent to the various institutionalized 
or customary modes of outcome determination. One should not be surprised, 
breakdowns in women's health and morals--to illness, to alcoholism 
and to prostitution." [A. L. Todd, Justice on Trial (1964), pp. 
57-58.] 
"But Brandeis' triumph in Muller v. Oregon consisted of much 
more than success in arguing a case on the basis of actual condi-
tions of industrial life. One reason the case is considered to 
be a landmark in constitutional adjudication is that the Supreme 
Court accepted the brief filed by Brandeis as an entirely appro-
priate means for buttressing the legal argument in behalf of what 
would be called today welfare legislation. 'The Muller case is 
epoch-making,' Felix Frankfurter wrote in 1916, 'not because of 
its decision, but because of the authoritative recognition by 
the Supreme Court that the way in which Mr. Brandeis presented 
the case. • .laid down a new technique for counsel charged with 
the responsibility of arguing such constitutional questions and 
an obligation upon courts to insist upon such method of argument 
before deciding the issue." [Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and 
Brandeis (1956), pp. 88-89.] 
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therefore, that many thinkers have found a degree of correspondence between 
scienti.fic method and legal process, including the adversarial system. 42 
42The philosophical movement of lIanal ytical or logical positivism,1I 
including its jurisprudential aspects, grew out of the application of the 
methods used in the natural sciences to the study of social and legal pro-
cess. See Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (1962), p. 89. 
F. S. Cohen, in IIField Theory and Judicial Logic,1I 59 Yale L.J. 238 
(1950), reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy (1951), p. 580, quotes from Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of 
Physics (1938), p. 259: 
IIA new concept appears in physics, the most important invention 
since Newton's time: the field. It needed great scientific 
imagination to realize that it is not the charges nor the particles 
but the field in the space between the charges and the particles 
which is essential for the description of physical phenomena. 1I 
In the discussion which follows Felix Cohen states: 
IIMust we not say that the truth of any assertion is a matter of 
degree, that from certain angles the sentence may give light and 
that at other angles it may obscure more light than it gives? The 
angle or perspective and the context are, part of the meanii.1g of 
any proposition, and therefore a part of whatever it is that is 
true or false. 
liThe location of words in a c(mtext is essential to their mean-
ing and truth. The fallacy of simple location in physical space-
time has finally been supm::seded in physics. We now realize that 
the Copernican v:i.e'W that the earth moves around the sun and the 
older Ptolemaic view that the sun moves around the earth can both 
be true, and that for practical though not aesthetic or religious 
purposes the P1:olemaic and Copernican astronomics may be used inter-
changeably. We realize that Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometrics 
can both be l;rue. What is a straight line in one system may be 
an ellipse il.1 another system, just as a penny may be round in one 
perspective. oval in a second, and rectangular in a third. 
"A prosecuting attorney who assumes that policemen are accurate 
and impartial observers of traffic speeds will arrive at one 
estimate of the speed of a defendant charged with reckless driving. 
The defendant's attorney, if he assumes that his client is an honest 
man and that policemen on the witness stand generally exaggerate in 
order to build up an impressive record of convictions, will arrive 
at another estimate. If each honestly gives his views the court 
will have the benefit of synoptic vision. Appreciation of the im-
portance of such synoptic vision is a distinguishing mark of liberal 
civilization. To the anthropologist, the tolerance that is institu-
tionalized in a judicial system geared to hear two sides in every 
case represents a major step in man's liberation from the tyranny 
of word-magic. If we do not feel that we have to annihilate those 
who say things we do not believe or, what is generally more irritating, 
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Morris Cohen, for example, in his writings strongly supported the 
"hypothetico-deductive" method, asserting that, like science, law is based 
upon a relatively few primary principles from which particularized legal 
rules are derived. 43 The resemblance found by Morris Cohen would certainly 
be rejected b~' others who might select a different aspect of legal process 
to examine or who might start from assumptions or conclusions about legal 
process which differ radically from those of Cohen. Holmes at times seemed 
scornful of the application of a formal logical approach to legal process 
say tiings we do believe but say them in strange ways or in 
unfamiliar accents, we are able to conserve our energy for more 
useful purposes. Energy so conserved may produce science, art, 
baseball, and various other substitutes for indiscriminate 
individualistic slaughter. 
"The ancient wisdom of our connnon law recognized that men are 
bound to differ in their views of fact and law, not because some 
are honest and others dishonest, but because each of us operates 
in a value-charged field which gives shape and color to whatever 
we see. The proposition that no man should be a judge of his 
own cause embodies the ancient wisdom that only a many perspectived 
view of the world can relieve us of the endless anarchy of one-
eyed vision." Ibid., pp. 583-584. 
43 
See M.R. Cohen, "Law and Scientific Method," in Law and the Social 
Order (1933), pp. 192-197; reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in 
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951). Citations are to pages in Cohen 
and Cohen. Representative connnents include: 
"The method of beginning with hypoth,;ses and deducing 
conclusions, and then comparing these conclusions with the 
factual world, seems to be still the essence of sound scientific 
method." p. 563. 
"A deductive system that enables us to derive many legal 
rules from a few principles makes the law more certain, so that 
people can better know their rights." p. 564. 
"A suggestive parallel can be drawn between the functions 
of the law and of natural science. Both facilitate transactions 
by increasing our reliance on the future." p. 542. 
"(S)cientific jurisprudence endeavors to analyze all laws as 
combinations of a few recurrent simple elements." p. 549. 
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as when he stated that "The life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience.,,44 While this assertion would seem sharply at odds with 
Cohen's, Holmes might be said to have moved very close to the scientific 
spirit of inquiry by emphasizing the empirical approach and the predictive 
function: "The prophecies of what the court will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the 1aw.,,45 Clearly, "science," 
"legal process," or even "science of law" can be defined, interpreted, and 
analyzed in a multiplicity of ways, and whether similarities or differences 
are found depends largely upon the aspect of the concept or process ex-
amined. 46 
44Ho1mes, The Common Law (1881); reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings 
in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (1951), p. 530. 
45 Holmes, The Path of the Law from Collected Legal Papers (1920); 
reprinted in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 
(1951), pp. 416-417. 
46 
See the interesting introduction to the article by Barbara J. 
Shapiro, "Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England," 21 Stan. L. R. 
727 (1969): 
"It is a remarkable trick of the English language, and of 
the historical development of legal thought, that the phrase 
'law and science' stands in such sharp contradistinction to the 
phrase 'legal science.' Nineteenth and early 20th-century 
lawyers, seeking to carve out an intellectually legitimate and 
autonomous discipline of law, used the term legal science not to 
suggest that the law was part of modern scientific culture, but 
precisely the opposite. TIley meant that law was a science just 
as chemistry was a science, and was thus entitled to independent 
existence. This reasoning rested on an obsolete definition of 
a science as any systematically organized body of knowledge and 
on a failure to acknowledge that what made chemistry or physics 
a science was not its autonomously organized knowledge but the 
fact that it shared with other sciences a particular method of 
investigation and a particular mode of stating results. 
And consider the statement of Frederick K. Beutel in Experimental Juris-
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Many observers who have given careful attention to the interacting 
roles of scientific method and the adversarial system in the making of 
socio-political decisions usually attempt to assign different tasks to these 
prudence (1957), pp. 18-19, on the "Essence of Experimental Jurispru-
dence": 
"A science of l3w based on a rigorous application of the 
scientific method should be devoted to the study of the phenomenon 
of law-making, the effect of law upon society and the efficiency 
of laws in accomplishing the purposes for which they came into 
existence. It is iL~aterial whether or not all of political 
science, part of each of sociology, economics, philosophy and 
many of the other socia.l sciences are included within its ken. 
The line between the 'sciences,' like the definition of law, is 
little more than a quibble which can be left to the pundits, 
bureaucrats and administrators; to the scientist, the nature of 
its subject matter, the methods which it uses and the results 
which it achieves, rather than its definition, are fundamental." 
Suggestions that an approach to problem solving which involves 
Specification of goals, 
Description of contextual conditions and influential trends, 
Invention of alternative courses of action to achieve such goals, 
Appraisal of the outcomes and consequences of alternative 
courses of action, and 
Cost-benefit evaluations of the consequences of such outcomes 
in terms of specified goal-objectives, 
is a "scientific approach," seems to push the scientific label a bit too 
far. This is certainly a rational approach to problem analysis if we 
consider rational to be the application of relevant facts and analyses to 
specific standards of judgment or consider rational problem-solving to be 
the selection of satisfactory means to achieve specific objectives. But the 
types of thinking represented by the components of this decisional model 
certainly existed long before the Western Scientlfic Tradition got its 
momentum. There is nothing distinctively scientific in this approach. It 
represents alternative thinking which has always been reflected in legis-
lative and policy processes. See Mayo & Jones, "Legal-Policy Decision 
Process: Alternative Thinking and the Predictive Function," 33 Geo.Wash. L.R. 
318 (1964). Nevertheless, modern science has contributed to the more effec-
tive utilization of this decisional process. Its empirical, inductive pro-
cedures have provided more comprehensive data on the real world and have 
assisted in better defining the gap between what exists and our aspirations. 
It has improved our techniques of trend thinking and prediction. It has 
provided improved means of measuring impacts of gi.ven policies, projects, 
practices and applications and has therefore giv(\r" us a better grasp of how 
to move from where we are to where we want to be. The approach to problem 
analysis noted above, however, obviously involves both "factual" and 
"evaluative" components so interrelated as to provide a systematic or 
rational model for social problem solving. Such intellectual tasks as goal 
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two methods of inquiry or to suggest limits on the applicability of scien-
tific method or of legal process. Judge Lee Loevinger in "Law and Science 
as Rival Systems" comments as follows: 
The fundamental point that lawyers, as well as scien-
tists, must understand is that both the dialectic method 
of law and the empiric method of science are merely means 
of gathering and helping to organize data, and that data 
may answer some simple specific questions, but they do not 
provide answers to problems, particularly of the kind with 
which law and government deal. 47 
The dialectic method of law is essentially clinical in the 
sense that it is best adapted to investigation and determina-
tion of the "facts" of individual cases and it is not well 
adapted to the investigation of mass or social problems. 
Legal procedures tend to break down under the influx of large 
numbers of cases ••. and simply have no means of coping with 
large populations or broad social investigations. 48 
What science has to offer law in this generation, and prob-
ably in several succeeding ones, is knowledge of how to 
gather, analyze, and test data •.• 49 
Loevinger offers as a summary statement: 
The difference in the legal and scientific modes of securing 
data is, as has often been observed, at least partially a 
clarification, model construction of factor-variable interrelationships, 
and alternative invention, are involved. I.t is not surprising, therefore, 
that similar approaches have been suggested as means by which both science 
and scientists can effectively relate to the social-political process. 
See, e.g., Robert S. Morison, "Science and Social Attitudes," Science, 
July 11, 1969, pp. 150 and 165; Don K. Price, "Purists and Politicians," 
Science, January 3, 1969, pp. 25 and 31; and Gordon F. White, "Broader 
Bases for Choice: The Next Key Move," in H. Jarreted, Perspectives on 
Conservation: Essays on America's Natural Resources (1958), pp. 206, 216-225. 
47 
Lee Loevinger, "Law and Science as Rival Systems," 19 U. of Fla. L.R. 
530, 541-542 (1967). 
48Ibid • 
49 
Ibid., p. 544. 
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function of the different tasks performed by law and science. 
While science seeks to analyze and predict phenomena, law 
seeks to classify and control conduct. In the most simple 
and elementary terms it may be said that the function of 
science is descriptive and law is prescriptive. The essential 
legal function of prescribing norms is not and cannot be scien-
tific in any sense which the contemporary scientific community 
would recognizG as scientific. 50 
Ibid., p. 535. A professor of rhetoric puts the matter simply: 
"The diffe>:-ence is that science j.s a partial universe of discourse, 
which i~ concerned only with facts and the relationships among 
them. Rhetoric is concerned with a wider realm, since it must 
include both the scientific occurrence and the axiological order-
ing of these facts. For the rhetorician the tendency of the state-
ment is the primary th~ng, because it indicates his position or 
point of view in his universe of discourse. Rhetorical presenta-
tion always carries perspective. The scientific inquirer, on the 
other hand, is merely noting th"ings as they exist in empirical 
conjunction. He is not passing judgment on them because his 
presentment, as long as it remains scientific, is not supposed 
to be anything more than classificatory." Weaver, supra, n. 20, 
p. 85. 
Distinctions between "law" and "science" become somewhat less clear when 
one shifts from the physical sciences to the behavioral sciences. Con-
sider the following extract from Gordon & Temer1in, "Forensic Psychology: 
The Judge and the Jury," 52 Judicature, No.8, March 1969, p. 333: 
"Psychology and the Law often stand juxtaposed. The Law is 
basically rational and deductive; Psychology is basically ex-
perimental and inductive. The Law assumes a vo1unteeristic source 
of man's actions and couches its concepts in such absolute terms 
as guilty or innocent, defendant or plaintiff, sane or insane. 
Psychology assumes a deterministic basis for man's actions and 
shrouds its concepts in relativistic and probabilistic terms. 
The Law, for the most part, seeks answers in legal theory and 
precedent; Psychology seeks to solve its problems by future 
research. Yet, one overriding commonality emerges. Both 
Psychology and the Law are concerned with human behavior: one 
to study it a.nd aid in its actualization, the other to codify 
rules for the protection of men and to guide men's behavior toward 
one another." 
For an interesting comparative professional analysis see June L. Tapp, 
"Psychology and the Law: The Dilemma," American Bar Foundation, 1969, 
No.2, Reprinted from Psychology Toda'~, February 1969. 
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IX. Applicability of Adversarial System to Technology Assessment 
As a general proposition it can be stated that any methodology, pro-
cedure or technique which increases the adequacy of the identification of 
effects (scope, intensity, and persistence) of a technological application 
and which clarifies the social norms against which the desirability or 
undesirability of such effects can be measured has a legitimate function in 
the technology assessment process. 129 The utility of any mode of inquiry 
can therefore be measured by the degree to which it contributes to the 
execution of the operations encompassed in the concept of Adequacy. 
Scientific method is indispensable as one means of producing relevant 
data; but as a method of inquiry it clearly does not satisfy all of the 
data requirements for the technology assessment process as defin.ed herein. 
While the operations of scientific method are essential in establishing 
cause and effect or probability relationships and in projecting trends, 
even in contributing to the data required in comparing alternative projects, 
it has relatively little direct contribution to goal clarification. One 
must not dismiss, however, the contribution that scientific operations do 
129 The following statement of Dean Don K. Price i~ The Scientific 
ESLa~e (1965) p. 272f would seem of relevance in this connection: 
------IIThough science has given mankind greater certainty of 
knowledge, it has gained that certainty by renouncing the 
concern for purpose that must remain at the heart of 
politics and administration--in both practice and their 
theory. • • 
The case for the mutual independence of the several disci-
plines does not depend mainly on the objective validity of 
the ways by which they acquire and verify knowledge. It 
depends even more on the political value of maintaining free 
competition and free mutual criticism in the search for truth." 
!lR~EDING PAGE BLANK NOT rILMW 
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make in the appraisal of impacts of exist~~g applications. Such data is 
relevant to goal clarification in the sense that it forces reexamination 
of posited goals to determine if the means employed are in fact achieving 
the goals sought or if goals supposedly sought are the objectives actually 
desired after the implications of such objectives are made explicit by 
scientific investigation of effects, thus, i11 effect, contributing to the 
sel~ction, as well as clarification of goals. 130 
As scientific method reaches its limits pf utility, some variation 
of the adversarial system will usually be introduced. But the Formal 
Adjudicatory Model of adversarial system is not a wholly satisfactory 
model of the technology assessment process either, even though it com-
bines both factual determination and normative resolution. 13l Yet there 
l30Consider this statement of Emmanuel G. Mesthene, supra, n. 1, 
p. 101: 
"We used to scorn the mind of the military man as rigid, yet 
he has proved remarkably flexible. In less than twenty years, 'he 
has learned that science, which began by giving him new means 
to his old ends, has ended by giving him a new set of ends. Science 
has changed his old business from soldiering to a much broader con-
cern with national security affairs • 
• • • To turn to science as a means is to take the first step 
toward changing one's ends. The question is not whether the ends 
will change, but when and how, and the manager's principal atten-
tion--whether he is managing a bUSiness, a government, or an 
international negot.iation--must be on the first signs of change 
in the ends he th01Jght he was heading for when he began." 
131 See with reference to the general point, Harold L. Korn, "Law, 
Fact and Science in the Courts," 66 Columbia L.R. 1080 (1966): 
"CONCLUSION 
"Adjudication faces an institutional setting for 'fact-
determination' that seems on its face at war with the kind of 
aspirations that science can entertain in pursuit of the truth. 
Built into the system is an extreme tolerance for low-accuracy 
results. A mere 'preponderance' of the evidence--probability 
greater than fifty percent--normally suffices to establish a fact 
as true for the purpose of the litigation, and latitude exists to 
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are characteristics of the adversarial system such as the motivation en-
gendered in the participants to present the full data to support a position 
and to carefully scrutinize the positions of other participants which 
definitely can contribute to the satisfaction of the various operations 
set forth in the Adequacy Performance Model suggested. Hence, the ob-
jective must be to utilize scientific method, the adversarial system and 
other modes of inquiry to the greatest degree possible in order to optimize 
the criteria of adequacy. 
That adversarial system in some form will probably be introduced into 
the assessment process is evident. l32 However, the inevitability of ad-
versarial practices in certain assessment forums is not necessarily conclusive 
sustain jury verdicts that are erroneous in the eyes of the court 
even under this broadly permissive criterion. Much pertinent 
data is excluded because of policies that the law deems para-
mount to ascertainment of the truth in adjudication, or under 
rules designed to screen uneducated nineteenth century juries 
from evidence that they might overvalue. The evidence that is 
admissible is gathered and presented in an adversary setting under 
the result-oriented aegis of the parties; and the tribunal is 
supposed to base its decision (apart from matters which may be 
'judicially noticed t ) solely on the evidence so produced by the 
parties of its own." 
"It is an important question to what extent this institu-
tional setting properly imposes limits on the goals that may 
meaningfully be pursued in seeking improved technical decision-
making. To some extent the justifications for so structuring the 
traditional trial process may be unconvincing as applied to scien-
tific and technical issues." (lli!L, p. 1115.) 
"However they are viewed, it is clear that inherent limitations 
of the judicial process require that the major stresses of scien-
tific and technological advance b~ borne by legislative and ad-
ministrative innovation.1i (Ibid., p. 1116.) 
l32A strong impression of the "inevitability" of the assertion of 
partisan claims in various technology assessment forums is provided by 
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of the desirability of such practices, at least in the manner in which 
the adversarial system is sometimes employed by particular participants. 
With respect to the technology assessment process, adversarial system 
must be appraised in tenns of its ut~lity as a mode of inquiry which 
contributes to the operations of the Adequacy Performance Model. Profes-
sor Arthur S. Miller advances a cogent criticism of the adversary system 
as it operates in the judicial system: 
That deficiency of "ad hocery"--former Bureau of the Budget 
Director Charles Schultze's term--may be seen quite clearly 
in the lawyers' desire to judicialize human affairs. They not 
only view the adversary system of litigation (which deliberately 
casts witnesses in partisan roles and expects them to be par-
tial in their testimony) as a proper method of settling dis-
putes, but tend to look on it as the sine qua non of any 
situation. But litigation does not suffice when the problems, 
in Aristotle's classification, concern distributive justice 
rather than corrective justice. As government moves ever 
more into a system of plannjng, the adversary system simply 
will not cope with the needs. 
There is, furthermore, nothing in the intellectual equip-
ment of the usual judge to make him knowledgeable about 
many of the problems now brought before courts and those 
"quasi-cour~s," the administrative agencies. The :;lame may 
be said for the average lawyer. (Administrators, on the other 
hand, are supposed by definition to be endowed with technical 
expertise, a notion that has been badly oversold in this 
country.) As a consequence, judges cannot base wise decisions 
on the information brought to them by contending litigants. 
Accordingly in the past they have tended to abdicate deci-
sional responsibility to administrators--just as legislators 
have. 
The adversary system, in sum; is based on two premises: fir~::, 
that the lawyers and judges are competent in the matters dealt 
Wollan, The Process of Setting Safety Standards in the Courts, Congress, 
and Administrative Agencies, Part III-Summary and Conclusions, (Program of 
Policy Studies Staff Discussion Paper 204, 1968). Conversely, the proba-
bility of attaining "rigorous objectivity" in the assessment function is 
minimized. 
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with, and second, that the system can provide enough of the 
right type of data to make viable decisions. Neither idea is 
valid. D3 
I 
I 
It is clear that adversarial system is discouraged in certain assess-
ment forums or by particular assessment entities. In other words, ad-
versaria1 system is not viewed as a positive mode of inquiry for the 
purposes of certain assessment entities. This seems to be the case with 
the National Transportation Safety Board. This Board is an unusual type 
of assessment entity, the Department of Transportation Act specifically 
stating that in the exercise of its function the Board is charged with a 
continuing review of the safety situation with respect to all modes of 
133 Arthur S. Miller, supra, n. 31, p. 40. These criticisms focus on 
the competency of the advocates and decision-makers to resolve scientific 
and technological questions. Even in regard to traditional courts Miller, 
ibid., p. 42, acknowledges that: 
"At the very least they could study the problem of making judges 
and other legal decision-makers more competent.' One way to accom-
plish this would be for panels of experts to be made available to 
the judges. This is done in Great Britain, with respect to the 
Restrictive Practices Court (~ court that deals with Britain's 
counterpart of the antitrust laws); there economists are or. the 
staffs of the judges. Further, judges and administrators dealing 
with scientific-technological issues should have available person-
nel who could forecast the impact of projected decisions." 
Cf. the statement of Arthur Kantro\1itz, supra, n. 126. 
More difficult to cope with is the view that people, particularly 
educated people such as scientists and engineers, should be able to cooper-
ate to their mutual benefit in achieving common goals rather than competing 
for individual benefit and individual goals. 
Perhaps this is a consequence of the affluence of science OVer the 
past 30 years. But as Representative Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.) pointed 
out in I'Congress faces Space Policy." Bulletin of the ~tom.ic Scientists, 
May 1967, p. 11, at 15, in reference to DOD and NASA cooperation in 
space " ••• if the budget squeeze,became tight enough, some individuals 
normally willing to recognize complementary spheres might become more 
partisan." 
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transportation. 134 The Act further states that the Board, in the exercise 
of its functions, powers, and duties, shall be " ••• independent of the 
Secretary and other offices and officers of the Department." Section 5(b) 
of the Act prescribes that the Board shall have responsibility for de-
termining cause or probable cause and reporting the facts, conditions, and 
circumstances of accidents investigated under authority transferred to the 
Secretary of Transportation. 135 Reports and recommendations of the Board, 
as well as special studies, must be made public. The Board is concerned 
with obtaining the fullest possible information. It is not concerned with 
authoritative determinations of placing fault or assessing legal liability. 
Its findings are not admissible in court. In order to obtain the most 
candid and uninhibited evidence feasible it has discouraged adversaria1 
procedure. 136 Nevertheless, the Board does attempt to establish probable 
134pub1ic Law 89-670, 89th Cong., H.R. 15963, October 15, 1966, 80 
Stat.,931, An Act to Establish a Department of Transportation, and for 
other purposes. See Section 5: National Transportation Safety Board. 
See also Annual Report to Congress, 1967, of the National Transportation 
Safety Board. 
135 The Board is authorized, for example, to: 
"Make recommendations to the Secretary concerning rules, 
regulations, and procedures for the conduct of accident in-
vestigations. 
"Initiate on its own motion, or conduct rail, highway, or 
pipeline accident investigations as the Board deems necessary 
or appropriate. 
"Conduct special studies on matters pertaining to safety 
in transportation and the prevention of accidents. 
"Make recommendations to the Secretary which will, in its 
opinion, tend to prevent transportation accidents and promote 
transportation safety. " 
See Annual Report to Congress,1967 of the National Transportation 
Safety Board, p. 2. 
l36This is the impression gained by the writer in discussing investi-
gatory procedures with persons cognizant of the Boa'rd' s operat,ions. See 
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cause and this finding is obviously related to fault and liability. 
Here the accident has occurred. Liability for certain parties and 
remedies for others potentially exists. The Board's recommendations have 
been generally accepted; thus, its assessments effectively control official 
decisions. Various participants, therefore, have a stake in its findings 
or may think they do. This encourages a self interest, partisan approach 
which may inhibit full disclosure of facts. But in such circumstances, 
why should it be expected that the adversarial system 'Would not creep into 
the factual investigations by the Board? One might further ask: Why 
shouldn't such procedures be accommodated to some degree at least? 
Another assessment context in which an attempt has been made to de-
emphasize adversarial procedures is discussed by Professor Harold P. Green 
in his article: "Safety Deterlliinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A 
Critical View. ,,137 In the author's view the public or, affected segments of 
Charles Yarborough in the "Crash Inquiry Innovation," Wash. Evenin~ Star, 
October 28, 1969, A9, col. 6, wherein it: is stated that .~n the ~nv st~gation 
of the Indianapolis mid-air collision tragedy "the NTSB will not only sit 
as a full membership but that another procedural precedent will be de-
parted from: Witnesses, heretofore subject to questioning by batteries of 
technical experts, will be interrogated only by Board Members." 
l37Harold P. Green, "Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: 
"" Critical View," 43 Notre Dame Lawyer 633 (1968) (Reprint No.1, Program 
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Washington University.) 
Perhaps some scientists and engineers would find the following extract 
from Felix S. Cohen, op. cit. supra, n. 42, congenial to their temperament. 
In addressing the topic of The Paradoxes of Judicial Logic, he asks: Are 
Lawyers Liars? and states in part: 
"How the edifice of justice can be supported by the efforts of liars 
at the bar and ex-liars on the bench is one of the p~radoxes of 
legal logic which the man in the street.has never solved. The bitter 
sketch of 'Two Lawyers' by Daumier still expresses the accepted 
public view of the legal profession. So, too, does the oft-told 
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the public do not have an adequ~te,opportunity to review the considera-
tions that go into the licens~ng process nor to contest the determinations 
made. l38 One of his more pungent statements for our present analysis re-
lates to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards of three members, two of 
whom must be technically qualified membbrs of "recognized caliber and 
, 139 
stature in the nuclear f:1.eld": 
Clearly, therefore, the boards do not base their determina-
tions solely upon the evidence within the four corners of the 
record. The evidence is weighed and assessed in terms of the 
knowledge, experience, and biases of the expert members of the 
board. Moreover, the hearing procedures themselves have been 
significantly de-judicialized on the theory that "trial-type" 
proceedings are not appropriate for the development of scien-
tific and technical information concerning safety and also to 
accommodate the procedures to the temperaments of the scientists 
and engineers who testify and sit on the boards. 140 
A major implication of the foregoing is that concerted efforts have 
been made to limit adversarial proceedings in nuclear power licensing, 
no doubt with the best of intentions since this process is viewed by 
nuclear specialists and enthusiasts as essentially a scientific-technical 
matter. The Price-Anderson Act of 195'7 provided that a mandatory hearing 
b h ld 1 ' , f I' f 1 141 e e on every app 1cat10n or a 1cense or a nuc ear power reactor, 
story of Satan's refusal to mend the party w~ll between Heaven 
and Hell when it '.vas his turn to do so, of St. Peter's fruitless 
protests and threats to bring suit, and of Satan's crushing 
comeback: 'Wherla do you think you will find a lawyer?'" 
l38Green, supra, n. 107, pp. 652-653. l39Ibid ., p. 643. 
l40Ibid • Social scientists are apparently more will~ng to accept the 
analogy of a trial to critical reviews of their efforts. See, for example, 
Carl Stover, "Industry, Technology, and Metropolitan problems," 27 'Pub. Adm. 
Rev. 112, 114 (1967). 
141 Green, supra, n. 107, p. 639. 
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thereby. amending the 1954 Act which. required only that a hear~ng be 
granted at the request lIof any person whose' interest Iilay be affected," 
142 
no hearing being required in the absence of such request. The 1957 
Amendment was interpreted to require a mandatory hearing at the construc-
tion permit stage, the op~rating license stage, and on any significant 
amendment to the application at either stage. This approach apparently 
led to a multitude of hearings, most of which were uncontested. 143 Profes-
sor Green states: 
In view of the practice of informal discussion and collabora-
tion between the regulatory staff and the applica~t, safety 
issues were generally resolved before the hearing so that the 
role of both parties typically was to build a record supporting 
issuance of the construction permit, license, or amendment. 
The entire multi-hearing procedure not only invited interven-
tion, but also was in many respects an exercise in time-
consuming, expensiv~ futility which was particularly irritating 
to scientists and engineers, who had little patience for the 
lawyer's role and the legalistic aspects of these proceedings~144 
It would appear, therefore, that adversaria1 proceedings such as reflected 
in non-essential public hearings can get in the way of adequat~ as well as 
efficient assessments. By a 1962 Amendment to the 1954 Act the requirement 
for a mandatory hearing remained but only at the construction permit stage. 
"The AEC is, however, required to give thirty days notice of its intent 
to issue an operating license or an amendment, and it must grant a hearing 
at the request of any intervenor whose interest may be affected:;,145 
142 . Ibid., p. 637. 143 Ibid., p. 639. 
144 145 
Ibid., pp. 639-640. Ibid., p. 640. 
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The effort to restrain non-productive adversaria1 intervention can 
be appreciated. This attitude hardly resolves" the complex of issues in-
vo1ved, however, Safety or the criterion of "undue hazard" applied in 
nuclear power licensing is not merely a scientific-technical issue; 
social risks and benefits are involved in such judgments. A consensus 
position on such matters, if potentially attainable, would seem desirable, 
but an imposed consensus, whether it pertains to factual interpretations 
and predictions or to social objectives, is not only unfair to the affected 
public but is an inherently dangerous procedure--both technologically and 
po1itica11y.l46 Further, the ~roblem here is not limited simply to de-
termining the best techniques for the promotion of public enlightenment. 
It also involves the allocation of professional influence over economic and 
political decision-making. Put another way, the greater the universe of 
issues that are categorized as scientific-technical, the greater the 
decision-making power of the scientist and engineer. The consequent jost-
ling for positions of influence as between professional groups or or~anized 
societal interests would not seem destined for early demise. 
Efforts persist, however, to moderate the public's feelings of dis-
satisfaction with decisions based on highly conflicting assessments, par-
ticularly where serious threats to health are concerned. During the Calvert 
Cliffs nuclear power hearings, the Washington Post, noting that all such 
hearings have been controversial, suggested that: 
146 
The least the country can ask, in venturing into a new field 
of this kind which may vitally affect the environment,is that 
See discussion by Green, ibid., p. 652. 
/ 
r I 
i 
- 88 -
a competent and disinterested public body take a careful look 
at all the available facts before the leap is taken. The 
location of such plants ought to.be.a major issue before a 
Council on Environmental Quality.147 .. 
The obvious abuses of the adversarial system in practice such as con-
cealment of relevant information, introduction of frivolous claims, the 
distortion of factual data to suit partisan ends, the exaggeration of 
benefits or of potential dangers, the divisive efforts which prevent con-
sensus on matters where potential and legitimate consensus would serve the 
public interest, and so forth, should not blind us to the contributions 
such a system can make in support of more adequate technology assessments. 148 
The advantages may be looked at broadly in terms of the pressing need for 
public participation in major technological decisions. For example, Profes-
sor H. L. Nieberg states in his article on "The Tech-Fix and the City": 
the 
147Wash • Post Editorial, May 8, 1969. 
148 See John Platt, "How Men Can Shape Their Future" in the Bulletin of 
World Future Society, June 1970, p. 9: 
"Several features stand out as requirements for satisfactory group 
decision-making in the groups and cities and countries of the world 
ahead. The first is that all social decisions from now on must be 
participatory. Every individual or sub-group must have as large 
a share as is practically attainable in the decisions that affect 
its destiny ••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Better maps may not only bridge divergent pictures of reality but 
may even do something toward bridging divergent self-interests. 
If one route can be shown to be ·clearly more promising than another 
in terms of total social costs in reaching a generally agreed-upon 
goal, then that total social advantage can be partly used to give 
compensating personal advantages to groups whose interests are 
damaged by taking that route. Thus, we compensate landowners 
displaced by a highway, or workers displaced by automation. It 
is only when the total advantage is uncertain that the disputes 
rage on. Much wider use of this principle of preassessment and 
compensation would help many of our needed social changes to go 
faster and with less disruption." 
I 
I 
1 
J 
I , 
j 
," ~ 
:£~r 
! 
- 89 -
The problem is not how to control science and technology. The 
problem is to recognize which interest groups are exerting 
preponderant influence and for what purposes--in order that 
we may seek the time-honored correctives of pluralism--n~mely 
visible public accounting and counter-prevailing power. If 
there is, as Admiral Rickover frequently asserts, an antithesis 
between blind technology and individual liberty, it is an anti-
thesis between coalitions of narrow group interests able to 
allocate natural resources toward ends not shared by other 
large groups. Our theme, therefore, is the need to assimilate 
the gothic mysteries of science and technology to ordinary 
political analysis, common-sense political judgment, and plain 
English. Obviously~ the nation cannot deny itself the aid of 
augmented science and technology in facing the serious problems 
of the day. But neither can it blindly accept all those claims 
made in the name of science and technology as inexorable natural 
forces. Scientific and technical change are far from unstoppable 
and automatic, but are rather the result of, and responsive to, 
public policy. The interested public can gain access and predict 
consequences in this, at least as well as in any, area of policy 
choice; and all areas are complicated, highly specialized, and 
jargonized. 149 
l49H• L. Nieburg, "The Tech-Fix and the City," in the Quality of Urban 
Life, Vol. III, Urban Affairs Annual Review, (Sage Publications, 1969) 
pp. 211, 240. 
On the growing intensity of the general public interest in major tech-
nological projects, see guest editorial of Eugene B. Skolnikoff of MIT, 
"Public Challenge of Government Action," in Science, May 2, 1969. 
See "Arms and the Scientists: A Long Dialogue Continues," Science, 
March 28, 1969, p. 1436. 
"The national debate on Sentinel is the first example I know 
of a military system being a matter of public debate not confined 
to a small group of experts or advocat\~s of a special cause. --Professor 
Jack P. Ruina of MIT, a former top Pentagon weapons adviser, at recent 
Senate ABM hearings. 
"David E. Lilienthal, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
made this point in a recent CBS public affairs program when he con-
trasted the ABM debate with conditions prevailing two decades ago 
when the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb was made. Lilienthal, 
who opposed development of the H-bomb, commented on the decision and 
its effect on the arms race. 'Well, it's easy,' said Lilienthal, 
'to look back and say you were right, but now we're going through 
another cycle ••. ' 
'Now we're he.ving a public debate about another issue of this kind, 
and it's casting a lot of light on public policy. The H-bomb should 
have been discussed that way.' 
"Certainly there is a new freedom in discusion of weaponry 
in comparison with the early postwar period, when the military 
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It must be kept in mind that we are not necessarily concerned with 
des":'rable and utldesirable social impacts. but with which impacts represent 
positive social values which should prevail in specific assessment contexts. 
We desire both a pest-free agriculture and a pollution-free environment. 
How is one to determine what distribution or adjustments are to be made 
between two social values at a given point in time or during a projected 
period of time? Certain segments of the public stand to gain benefits and 
secrecy lid was kept clamped down with wartime tightness. But 
it is unclear to what extent more open discussion has actually 
affected key strategic decisions or the process by which they 
are made." 
The adversarial system would seem to be consistent with the implementation 
of the notion of "social justice" as proposed by Kenneth E. Boulding, 
"Social Justice in Social Dynamics," in Social Justice (Richard B. Brandt, 
ed., 1962): 
"I propose to approach the problem of social justice as an 
economist and social scientist in a manner somewhat different 
from that which is customary among the philosophers. The 
philosopher treats the concept of justice as essentially a 
normative concept. He is concerned with abstract notions of 
what is right, good, and just. He is concerned with what ought 
to be, not necessarily with what is. These normative discussions 
are important and I would not for a moment wish to decry their 
value. There is, however, another point. of view from which the 
problem of social justice can be examined. This might be called 
the positive or operational point of view in which social justice 
--or at least the image of social justice as it exists in the 
minds of the members of society--is an essential variable in de-
termining the dynamic processes and the evolution of that so-
ciety." (p. 73.) 
"The perception of divergence between the perceived real value 
and the ideal value of any important psychological variable--that 
is, of any variable which is strongly related to utility or gen-
eral satisfaction--may be labeled discontent. In this sense, 
discontent can be regarded as the prime mover of man to action 
provided that his image of cause and effect permits him to believe 
himself capable of such action as to reduce the divergence between 
the perceived real and the ideal. We may notice a point here, the 
importance of which will be clearer later. The divergence between 
the real and the ideal may be reduced by acting so as to manipulate 
the real. But it may also be reduced by adjusting the ideal. This 
is the way of renunciation--of wanting what you get, rather than 
getting what you want. It is traditionally associated with Eastern 
philosophies, and if adopted it is a powerful deterrent to rapid 
change." (p. 78.) 
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other segments of the public stand to be. deprived of benefits or to bear 
additional social-economic costs as a result of these decisions. The 
adversarial system offers thl~ indispensable means by which the relevant 
values are clarified and the probable benefits and costs are estimated for 
the enlightenment of the ultimate decision-maker. 
No doubt some observers and participants view the adversarial system 
as a most serious threat to the a~hievementof adequate assessment out-
comes. But if one begins with that criterion of the Ad4;!quacy Model which 
refers to the comprehensiveness and openness of assessment information, 
then the adversarial system as a method of inquiry is to be encouraged 
rather than inhibited. Even the most casual inquiry into the various 
~xisting technology assessment systems which have relevance to particular 
applications will show a tremendous fragmentation of assessment entities 
and their associated processes of assessment. Improved coordinating 
mechanisms to serve the purpose of assuring that all such assessment sub-
systems contribute their inputs to support Total Impact Assessments is 
perhaps the really crucial need at this particular time. Participation 
needs to be encouraged rather than hindered. Broadened participation will 
in turn, no doubt, contribute to additional areas of factual disagreement 
and to different judgments on the social worth of the application under 
consideration. This will encourage further resort to adversarial type 
proceedings. But why not? Advocates for potentially affected participants 
usually introduce a flow of intelligence respecting the relationship of 
the parties they represent to the assessment situation which would not 
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otherwise be available. 150 Not only do we have our long historical 
judicial tradition to support this ~roposition but the more contemporary 
practices of administrative agencies of sending proposed rules to poten-
tially affectf)d parties for comment often taps an extremely useful. source 
of data and appraisals. 
Some commentators feel that a well-structured and vigorous adversary 
system is the crucial technique for technology assessment.
15l This notion 
150Consider this statement of Gordon F. White: 
"The kind of analysis the nation needs would present estimates 
of the consequences of each of the politically practicable lines 
of public action. Thereby, the political process of choice would 
be sharpened rather than curbed, and governmental intervention 
seen in perspective with the alternatives. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . ~ . . . 
"agency consolidation, policy formulation, Congressional 
reorganization, and inter'agency co-ordination may, indeed, help 
reduce friction and reconcile operating methods. But they are 
less basic than an agency or procedure to focus attention upon 
the choices and effect of public action. Even with such a 
mechanism we could expect continued conflict, divergence, and 
pluralism of approach. as Norman Wengert has stated, we should 
welcome such indecision and friction so far as they reflect 
searching and experimenting with promising lines of action. We 
should be dissatisfied only when the choices are not made from 
the full range that could be marshalled with our potentially 
available stock of knowledge and skills. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
"Whether or not the federal government recognizes a greatly re-
fined appraisal process as an aid to deciSion-making, nonfederal 
agencies will be needed for that purpose, to double on a small scale 
for such action in its absence, or to give it competition in its 
functioning." Supra, n. 46, pp. 224-25. 
15lconsider the following extract from Dennis W. Brezina, The Role of 
Crusader-Triggered Controversy in Technolc'ev Assessment: An Analysis of 
the Mass Media Response to Silent Spring and Unsafe at Any Speed, Staff 
Discussion Paper 203, (Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, 
The Ge0~ge Washington University, April 1968): 
"The process of technology assessmer.t in the case of pesti-
cides and auto safety had previously consisted of an unemotional 
and sporadic debate which centered on highly technical issues of 
interest primarily to a small circle of experts, and which, 
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is based on the assumptio~ that new technologies have a momentum ex-
pressly and energetically promoted by the proponents of specific applica-
tions, that such proposals invariably emphasize, even exaggerate, the 
benefits to be derived from such applications and minimize the social 
costs. If this situation is assumed as the general context of technology 
assessment, then the obvious means for gaining a Total Impact Assessment 
therefure, was largely beyond the understanding of the public. 
The appearance of the two crusaders and their upsetting books 
signaled a shift in the tempo and the substance of the previously 
low-keyed and intermittent debate, for value judgments were 
injected and simplifications were made in such a way that the 
issues became meaningful to the public. This popularization 
phase evoked an emotional response which raised the debate to 
a controversial pitch. At this time the political implications 
of the issues became apparent to the public and the Congress 
and enough interest and pressure was generated to allow Congress 
to take a.ction. In this way the books served to move the issues 
from the technical plane to the political arena, where the policy 
makers could decide on future courses of action before the partial-
ly resolved issues gravitated back to the technical public. This 
movement from expert to crusading critic, to public, to policy 
maker, and then back to expert, in general describes the pesti-
cide and auto safety controversies. 
"In terms of the democratic process, one is persuaded that the 
public 1 s involvement was to a great extent due to the efforts of 
Rachael Carson and P.~lph Nader. Whether public and congressional 
interest could have developed without these crusaders is a matter 
of conjecture. That the technology assessment process did pro-
ceed in this fashion in these two cases suggests that other con-
troversies over technological programs might occur in the same 
fashion in the future. For example, crusade'r-triggered contro-
versies might enter into the process of assessing the anti-
ballistic missile or the supersonic transport, which are two 
technological programs .as yet not explained to the public in any 
systematic way that points out both their strengths and weaknesses. 
In any event it is not clear how public and congressional involve-
ment in the assessment of technology can be assured unless some 
controversy develo,~. If controversy is, therefore, necessary, 
then Silent Spring and Unsafe at. Any Speed are ~lements of an 
emerging tradition of social criticism evolving in response to the 
scientific-technological revolution. This new form of social 
criticism has tended to illustrate that public and congressional 
involvement, even though episodic., can be a viable and influential 
part of the assessment and application of technology." (Italics 
added. ) 
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of the application--a full analysis of the prospective impacts and social 
implications-~is to confront the proponents in the assessment forum with 
countervailing facts, interpretations, and evaluations of social conse-
quences. Professor Green, in the article previously referred to, has pro-
posed that a "devil's advocate,,152 arrangement be introduced into the 
nuclear reactor licensing procedure. In support of this proposal he states: 
What is required is a scheme that would require and facili-
tate the public articulation, in language which the public 
can understand, of the nature of the risks, the steps taken 
to minimize them, and the degree of risk that remains. This 
would permit a meaningful balancing of costs against benefits 
and the focusing of public attention on the policy questions. 153 
In his book on Modern Science and Modern Man, Dr •. James B. Conant 
gives special attention to adversary-type proceedings: 
There is a fairly common fal:acy that if you are dealing 
with scientific and technical matters, judgment of values 
rarely, if ever, enters in. Facts speak for themselves 
in science, we are often told. Anyone who is familiar with 
the course of scientific research and development knows 
this is nonsense. What is true is that the area of debate 
is fairly definitely circumscribed ••• (T)his does not mean 
that what is proposed is not controversial; it means simply 
that the number of people qualified to take part in the 
controversy is highly limited. 154 
(Therefore) it is necessary to explore ways and means of 
balancing the biases of experts whenever their opinions are 
of prime importance in the making of decisions. 155 
Dr. Conant suggested that "if the Department of Defense would gradually 
introduce a quasi-judicial system of review which provided forced oppo~i­
tion to new projects, the taxpayer's money would be more wisely spent.,,156 
152 See Gret'n~ sUl'ra, n. 107, p. 656. 153 Ibid.! p. 655. 
l54Conant, Modern Sciel~ce and Modern Man (Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954, 
originally published in. 1952)~ p. 113. 
l55Ib~d., 114 ]15 ... pp. -.. l56Ibid ., p. 117. 
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He further suggested a referee or judge to hear arguments and added: 
With opposing briefs, arguments and cross-questioning many 
facets of the probl.em, :QJany prejudices of the witnesses 
would be brought out into the open. The forced opposition 
is the important point. 157 
l57Ibid ., pp. 117-118. Apparently, some such procedure was adopted. 
The N.y.-rimes Editorial of July 6, 1969, 8E, col. 1, commented, in 
connection with Pentagon programs, that lithe influence of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff ••• has been rising sharply within the Administration" and added: 
"The danger in the current trend ••• is the elimination of 
checks and balances. The decisions Mr. McNamara made were 
partly right and partly wrong. But the adversary process he 
employed, which forced the Joint Chiefs to justify their pro-
posals to civilian experts, was eminently sound. Nowhere 
else--neither in the Pentagon, nor in the Budget Bureau review, 
nor in the Congressional hearings, nor in National Security 
Council and White House studies--does such a thoroughly compe-
tent cross-examination occur." 
See also Harold Demsetz, "The Technostructure, Forty-six Years Later," 
reviewing Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 77 Yale L. J. 802, 811-,812, 
for a concise description of the assessment system within the Pentagon 
between weapons systems and between bidders on a particular weapons system. 
Because of the requirement for secrecy, an open fo~~m of any real utility 
would be rather difficult to obtain. 
Congress,of course, does on occasion serve as a more or less open 
assessment forum. The B-70 controversy as weli as ABM involved searching 
'examination of the Pentagon's position--whether one agreed with the ultimate 
outcome of these controversies or not. See Michael Harrington, "The Socia1-
Industrial Complex," Harper's Magazine, November, 1967, p. 55, for a de-
scription of the adversary nature of such controversies and of new social 
programs before Congress, which points up the danger in the present relative 
lack of capacity of any group which does not stand to make a profit from a 
favorable outcome to challenge such presentations. 
"Each element in the defense sector--pa-rticular industries, branches 
of the service, 'independent' associations for the Army, Air Corps 
(sic), Navy, and Marines, and even trade unions~-has its own special 
interest (profit for the companies, prestige and power for the 
officers, jobs for labor). And each one lobbies for strategies 
which are determined, not by any objective analysis of the needs of 
the nation, but hy its own stake in the ilecision. The debate over 
the B-70 bomber during the Kennedy Administration was a classic case 
in point. A powerful section of the military-industt:ial complex, led 
by the Air Force and aiming to serve purposes of its own, mounted 
a determined campaign against the Administration in favor of proposals 
which had been rejected by three Secretaries of Defense under Eisen-
hower and by Secretary McNamara under Kennedy." 
II 
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br. James R. Killiam, Jr., Ghairman of the MIT Corporation and the 
first White House Science Adviser, proposed in testimony before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Internal Organization and Disarmament in March 1969, that 
the U.S. establish a new policy review group. He proposed a task force 
which could channel public debate on weapons issues by making an "ind.e-
pendent, comprehensive study in depth of our weapons technology and of the 
factors which bear upon the decisions the nation must make." His proposal 
would seemingly introduce a new, reputable, moderating participant into 
such controversies which could contain the vehemence and bring a more 
effective adversarial procedure into being. 
Their special value would be that they would be dependent 
conclusions reached by a group of competent citizens who were 
free of organizational loyalties. By virtue of this freedom 
such a connnission could also provide some reassurance to the 
growing number of citizens who are concerned about the 158 
"military-industrial complex" and its alleged influence. 
"Something like this pattern is beginning to emerge within 
the social-industrial complex. 'Business,' to quote the Wall 
Street Journal once more, 'is turning into an important force for 
pushing embattled domestic proposals through Congress.' An 
executive of the Department of Housing and Urban Development is 
quoted as saying, 'Each agency has gradually developed a list of 
firm~ interested in its field ••• We know how to turn them 
on .•• ' ••• (A)s the experience of the military-industrial 
complex demonstrates, such procedures lead straight to private 
alliances betweel.~ self-interested executives and a,ubitious bureau-
crats. This trend is already quite developed in ttie citi.es in--
dustry--where, for instance, real-estate men support rent subsi-
dies as a means of attacking public-housing .•• " (p. 57.) 
As Lynton Caldwell put it, supra, n. 99, at 128, "American administration 
of science and technology is not irresponsible; nevertheless it may be 
argued that it is not sufficiently responsible." 
158 Quoted in Technology Review, May 1969, p. 72 •. 
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Dr. Killiam added that "it is important for the policy-maker and the public 
to have the benefit of listening to contending points of view on complex 
technical and strategic proposals such as Sentinel. 11159 
The need for, and opportunity to employ, adversarial system exists 
to the extent that scientific method cannot supply the data to satisfy the 
operational criteria of adequacy of assessment. But the need for informa-
tion and evaluations through methods of inquiry other than scientific 
method does not necessarily mean that adversarial system can be employed or, 
if permitted, to what extent. Multiple assessment entities and their associa-
ted forums exist which differ in objectives, degree of specific official 
authority, composition of membership, character and scope of subject matter 
treated, capability to assemble and analyze data relevant to its obj ectives, 
statutory or customary decisional processes, and reputation, including 
respect status, among participants. These factors plus the general dis-
position of the assessment entity will determine the extent to which the 
adversary system may be applicable. Some assessment entities will or pur-
port to be non-partisan seekers after the "truth" and stress unbiased, 
inclusive claims. At the other extreme~ adversarial proceedings will not 
only be expected by the assessing entity but be required as in courts or in 
regulatory agency and Congression~l hearings. The assessing entity may, 
through time, indicate clearly what types of information and te~hniques of 
, , d t . 1 160 presentat~on ~t ten s -0 re y upon. 
159Ibid • 
160 f' , l' k b ' f ' Various types 0 connnun~cat~ons ~n s etween ~n ormat~on sources and 
the Congress are noted in Technical Information for Congress (1969), p. 510. 
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The following tentative hypothesis is offered fort~e purpose of pro-
viding a summary statement of the theme developed herein and for the further 
purpose of provoking continued critical appraisals of the role of adver-
sarial proceedings in the technology assessment process: 
II 
The greater the uncertainty as to relevant data 
and effects of technological applications, 
The greater the divergence of preferred social values 
among the participants, 
The greater the perceived stakes in the authoritative 
decision to be based, at least in part, on the assess-
ment outcome, 
The greater the probable influence of the assessment on 
the ultimate authoritative decision, 
The greater the acceptability to the assessment entity 
of adversarial proceedings, 
The more likely are the participants to resort to 
adversarial techr.iques of data development and outcome 
persuasion. 161 
.. 
The contribution of adversarial system to an assessment will, of course, be 
measured by the extent to which it satisfies the criteria of adequacy. 
There is a very obvious and substantial reason why adversarial techniques 
will be imposed upon assessment processes such as the National Transportation 
Safety Board hearin?s and the Atomic Energy Commission licensing procedure. Sucn 
procedures necessarily tend to become adversarial because real interests and 
values are at stake. While this wiJ.l depend upon a number of factors, 
161 While the variables noted may tend to be the more influential re-
garding the likely resort to adversarial techniques, a wide range of factors 
which may exist in numerous combinations would be relevant to the testing of 
the hypothesis. See Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, 
Chart: Process of Technology Assessment/Application, December 1969. 
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including the assessment forum and the influence that the assessment out-
come is likely to have on the authoritative decision, one may appropriately 
ask: why shouldn't participants having a stake in the ultimate allocation 
of benefits and costs employ every legitimate means of protecting and ad-
162 
vancing their interests? While "impartial assessment sub-systems" can 
us~fu1J,y provide independent (more or less) standards of judgment by which 
partisan claims can be appraised, :l.t is unlikely that our social values and 
our assessment-decision procedures can or should preclude partisan partici-
pants. Further, as set forth previously, there would seem to be a potential 
gain from the standpoint of improving the adequacy of the ass~ssment process 
by such partisan participation. In other words, an adversarial system tail.:;'red 
163 
to the assessment process not only reinforces a fundamental political principle ! 
162 
A recent National Academy of Sciences panel report, "Behavioral 
Science or Electioneering?" reprinted in part in the Saturday Review, 
November 1, 1969, p. 65, states: 
52 
"If there is to be any substantial increase in social experi-
mentation, the public must have a voice in what is permitted. 
This is a matter not simply of public acceptance of scientific 
methods of gaining information, but, more importantly, of public 
participation in decisions. that affect the utilization of scien-
tific knowledge. This is true for such classic social problems 
as poverty and crime; it could be even more important where 
the products of science and technology may stimulate fundamental 
changes in human affairs." 
163 
The late Judge Learned Hand stated in the Associated Press Case, 
F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943): 
"(N)either exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of 
the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves ,one· of 
the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination 'of news 
from as ~~ny different sources and with as many facets and colors 
as i8 possible, That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is 
not the same as, the interest protected by the Fi'rst Amendment; it 
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gachererl 
out of a multitude of tonciues than through any kind ot: authori-
tarian selection. To many this is, and a1~yays will be, folly; but 
we have staked upon it our all." 
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l.64 
but also serves as a valuable mode of inquiry. 
Yet it would seem clearly desirable to. attempt to identify those 
areas of agreement or consensus relevant to the assessment, particularly 
l64This "theme was sounded on April 14 by Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, then 
President of Stanford University, a former research director for the ABC 
and a recent chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. 
Urging a testing delay in central Nevada and Alaska until independent scien
-
tists could study the possible effects, Pitzer said: 
'The problem in this case is not that the risk is completely 
ignored; rather, that it has been examined primarily in closed 
circles with the effective judgment rendered by officials com-
mitted to the test program. This sort of problem should be con-
sidered by an impartial judge and jury. I believe the risk that 
a damaging earthquake might be triggered deserves a much more 
substantial public hearing. Then Congressmen, Governors, and 
other responsible public officials, as well as the interested 
public, can form their own judgment, balancing this and any other 
risks against the need for tests or the extra costs of moving to 
a (safer) location.'" 
Gladwyn Hill, "About 355 of 'Those Things' Have Exploded in 
Nevada," N.Y. Times Magazine, July 27, 1969, p. 36. 
Consider also the following extract from a talk by Representative 
Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.) at Washington University in St. Louis on 
February 12, 1969, quoted in.Science, March 15, 1969, p. 1183: 
"Let's take one example--the 200 BEV accelerator proposed 
for Weston, Illinois. 
"You may be, and probably are, much interested in the 'policy' 
machinations which resulted in a decision to go forward with 
this highly publicized, highly expensive bit of 'big science.' 
I am, too. But I must confess I do not know what they were. 
"What rationale is behind the priority given to the accelerator? 
(Not that given to the facility itself.) Who was most responsible? 
The National Academy of Sciences? The Congress? The Atomic 
Energy Conunission? The National Science Foundation? The Office 
of Science and Technology and the Federal Council.? The Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Conunittee? Or was it the remnants of the 
old World War II MIT-Los Alamos axis whose guiding lights are 
sometimes alleged to have been dominating U.S. science ever since? 
What logic actually governed the selection of the site? And, in 
this case, did an 'in-group' make the reconunendation~ if S~, was 
its real advice followed? 
"These are questions on which we have all read much and specu-
lated much. Certainly, they are questions of policy. Just as 
certainly, very few know the answers, and I sometimes wonder if 
anyone knows them all. 
"But the point here is to suggest that many of the important 
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the technical aspects, as early in the assessment· process as practicable. 
In other words, it would seem highly desirable that to the extent a 
potential consensus exists, it should be formulated and stipulated in order 
to restrict the areas of uncertainty and difference as much as possible. 
This will prevent those aspects of the assessment wh~ch are determinable 
and can be agreed to from being distorted by subsequent conflicting asser-
tions, interpretations, and partisan claims. Perhaps in some situations 
the most adequate assessments can be made at an early phase of the develop-
ment of a new technological application before interests in the application 
have become consolidated as by investments or by the assignment of program 
authority. But this also means that relatively little will be known at 
this stage about the impact of the operations. This is another variation 
of the eternal dilemma of whether information is to be sought from those 
who are essentially unbiased and therefore probably only superficially in-
formed or whether advice is to be sought from those who have studied the 
problem in depth and have in the course of this process in some way become 
committed or identified with a particular application or interest. l65 
There are, however, difficulties with the foregoing hypothesis that 
the potential for consensus is greatest at the earliest phases of a pro-
posed technological application. Surely, disputes are to be expected on 
every conceivable factual and normative issue in the assessment of existing 
details of federally assisted scientific endeavor in this 
country are decided without being responsible to. any policy, 
formal, or informal ••• " . 
l65Cf • the statement of Arthur Kantrowitz, supra, n. 1264 
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applications where stakes are already consolidated. But even in the 
case of developed technologies where an assessment is simply for a new 
project resembling many existing applications, the early phases of the 
assessment process may present the best opportunities for resolution of 
differences. Put another way, as the assessment process approaches the 
final assessment forum and the ultimate authoritative decision, the more 
likely that partisan claims of participants will be vigorously pressed. 
But again, reservations arise. The procedural closeness to the ultimate 
arena may not identify the most crucial forum, i.e., that assessment 
forum which will have the greatest influence on the ultimate allocation 
of costs and benefits. For example, the hearing on the initial construc-
tion permit for a nuclear reactor may be a far more critical assessment 
point than a subsequent hearing, by request, just prior to the granting of 
the final permit. Hence, one can expect, within procedural limitations, 
that the adversarial system will be employed with maximum vigor and ex-
pertise in what is perceived to be the critical assessment forum. 166 
l66Limitations on adversarial techniques, however, may severely 
cripple the public's right to participate in decisions which vitally con-
cern it. See for example "Maryland A-Plant: Boon or a Menace?" Wash. Post, 
Aug. 26, 1970, p. 1, col. 1, wherein it is stated: 
"Dr. Edward P. Radford, professor of environmental medicine 
at Johns Hopkins University, is among the scores of people who 
have criticized the events in the decision-making process. 
"He notes that in May of 1969, the AEC began hearings on 
B'altimore Gas and Electric's application for a construction 
permit. 
"Although opponents regarded this as the key hearing in block-
ing the plant, the AEC pOinted out that the law governing such pro-
ceedings prohibited presentation of testimony regarding the choice 
of plant location, thermal effects on marine life in the Bay, 
power line location and the relationship between the size of the 
plant and the actual power needs of the area to be served. 
flTestimony was therefore limited strictly to matters regarding 
actual plant construction. 1I 
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To the extent the above situation does or will pertain, it rA.ises 
a most difficult and critical question concerning the role and the efficacy 
of existing or proposed "neutral" or "unbiased" or "non-partisan" assess-
ment entities. If, as the tentatively advanced hypothesis suggests, the 
most vigorous partisan demands will be made (or attempt to be made) in 
the most critical or influential assessment forums, what is the implica-
tion of this assumption for the role of a supposedly impartial assessment 
entity? Of course, the answer might differ somewhat with the structure of 
the assessment system for different technological applications, with the 
stage of the assessment process as the assessment moves from proposal to 
recommendation to ultimate authorization, or even with particular opera-
tions of the Adequacy Performance Model. But the crux of the matter is 
that partisan claims will bt~ focused on the more influential assessment 
forums;167 and the more influ.ential the assessment outcomes of a given 
assessment entity on the final au.thoritative decision, the greater the 
167 . Cons~der Lynton Caldwell's statement, supra, n. 99, pp. 128-29: 
"The locus of responsibility for this kind of policy guidance 
is obviously .•. a function of the Congress, the President, and 
the Supreme Court. But the knowledge required for policy deci-
sions in the new age of science cannot possibly be developed 
at this level .•. (P)ub1ic policy making must be sought at those 
levels in the structure of decision where the knowledge is ••. 
(T)he technological bias of our social attitudes and administra-
tive programs make it easy for technical judgments to become 
social decisions without adequate appraisal of the implied con-
sequences." 
See also M. Harrington, supra, n. 157. 
This is partly compensated for by deliberately structuring institu-
tions around these people to protect them from their own lack of knowledge 
--althongh these institutions are by no means sufficiently knowledgable. 
"But even with a President and a Vice-President who are firmly 
on record as advocates, the program is not automatically guaran-
teed clear sailing in the executive branch. The Executive Office 
of the President is not an open door to budget suppliants in NASA and 
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effort that will be brought to bear to. impose partisan demands on the 
(f d ·) f h . 168 I h C assessment process orum procee ~ngs 0 suc .ent~ty. n t e ongres-
sional hearing (assessment forum) certain possibilities seem apparent. 
If a given Congressional committee or sub-committee should tend to rely 
primarily upon the analysis and recommendations of a particular "impartial" 
assessment entity, then interested participants would surely make every 
effort to be heard and to influence the assessment outcomes of such 
entity. At the other extreme, the "impartial" assessment entity might be 
viewed by the committee or sub-committee as "just another witness," in 
which case the entity would enter the Congressional assessment forum as a 
partisan participant, although with a different perspective from the usual 
interest-oriented witnesses. In the latter situation the adversarial pro-
ceeding would focus at the Congressional hearing level rather than in the 
forum of the "impartial" assessment entity. But it is simply a matter of at 
what level and to what extent the adversarial system ente~s the assessment 
Defense or other agencies who have space plans to push. 
Of course their requests are heard. But these requests are 
screened for the President by a variety of institutional safe-
guards whose very purpose is to protect a President from his 
own enthusiasms and from the persuasiveness of a particular 
subordinate official. The Bureau of the Budget is a profes-
sional "no" agency; otherwise the limit to federal expenditures 
would be almost impossible to fix short of disaster. 
" .•• The consequence is that it is most difficult to estab-
lish new forward commitments in the executive branch. The 
de,dre is there, perhaps, but the realities of total national 
needs are a strong constraint." Rep. Daddario, supra, n. 133, p. 16. 
Of course, Congress cannot rely on such a "no" agency since it doesn't 
have one--except itself. 
168 
The pressures that can be brought to bear upon the ultimate assess-
ment/decision entity is well illustrated in the fluoridation controversy. 
See Wollan, "Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government-Sponsored 
Technology," 36 Geo. Wash. L.R. 1105, 1125, 1130 (1968) (Reprint No.2, 
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, July 1968.) 
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process. Partisan claims tvill be.made or, at least, heavy pressure 
will be brought to bear to have them heard. Hence, the lIimpartia1
11 
assessment entity in all probability cannot escape the adversarial pro-
cedure. 169 Either its own assessment process will have to provide for 
adversarial procedures or it will have to enter the Congressional assess-
ment forum as one of mUltiple participants in an adversarial assessment 
context. It may, nevertheless, be plausibly maintained that wh:Ue the 
conventional partisan inputs to the Congressional assessment forum are 
indispensable, there is clearly further need for one or more IIdisinter-
ested, pub1ic-interest-oriented ll
 assessment entities which can provide 
the Congress with a full spectrum of prospective impacts of proposed 
te~hnological applications. Yet it would seem most unlikely that in our 
political system such an lIunbiased ll assessment entity could operate as a 
l69Without positing a particular model of an assessment arrangement 
it is not feasible to identify the specific difficulties or issues which 
would arise with respect to concept, prescribed functions, organization a
nd 
operations. Assuming the possibility of the establishment of a more high
ly 
institutionalized and centralized assessment function than now exists, 
surely past experience with official entities such as courts and the regu
la-
tory agencies would be suggestive in identifying the types of issues whic
h 
might arise. In this connection such articles as that of A. Everette 
MacIntyre, liThe Status of Regulatory Independence," 29 Fed. Bar Jou. 1 
(1969), would be useful. And on the further assumption that the new asses-
sors would have objectives similar to those of Federal Trail Examiners 
in the technologically oriented regulatory agencies and would be confronte
d 
with conceptual and operational questions with which such examiners have 
had 
to contend, careful attention to John W. Macy's article, "The APA and the
 
Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society," 27 Fed. Bar 
Jou. 351 (1967) would seem warranted. 
--- And in terms of process and the relationship of scientific or techni
cal 
IIfacts ll to decisional criteria, the article of Har,)ld 1.. Korn., "Law, Fact, 
and Science in the Courts,lI 66 CoL L.R. 1080 (1966) is highly relevant. 
This article treats in major subheadings: I. Transmitting Technical Informa-
tion; II. Applying the Scientific Knowledge to Decision of the Legal Iss
ue; 
and III. Scientific Knowledge as Law or Fact. 
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170 
decisive assessment instrumentality in isolation from partisan claims. 
In any event, the shifting interaction in the assessment process between 
the inputs of adversarial system on the one hand and the inputs of a sup-
posedly disinterested public interest-oriented assessment entity on the 
other, is deserving of continuing careful examination. 17l 
l70Hugh Folk, in a paper entitled The Role of Technology Assessment 
in Public Policy, pp. 4-5, 9, 10, delivered at the AAAS Meeting on December 
29, 1969, addresses this point in the following fashion: 
IINo matter how objective an assessment might be, it will become 
embroiled in political controversy if the matter is important. 
lilt would seem to me wise to accept as a political fact that 
any assessment of an interesting problem is likely to be embroiled 
in controversy. Those who wish to engage in such exciting activi-
ties should look to their flanks. When they prepare assessments 
they should employ 'no men,' devi1 ' s advocates, and experts on 
'the intentions of the enemy. ' 
II ... if technology policy is to be forged in the fire of 
political controv~rsy, then a responsible technological opposition 
must constitute itself. These counter assessors must separate 
themselves from the closed, coopted, scientific and technological 
elite that pretends to be above or beyond politics and ally with 
those political interests and politicians whose objectives are 
consonant ,vith survival, prosperity, and liberty as the counter-
assessors perceive these goals. They must train themselves in 
the skills, the arts, and even the wiles of the assessment process." 
171See discussion of the "notion of 'Independence' of the Assessment 
Function ll in the Statement of Professor Louis H. Mayo, IISome Legal, Juris-
dictional, and Operational Implications of a Congressional Technology 
Assessment Component" before the E.ubconnnittee on Science, Research and 
Development of the House Connnittee on Science and Astronautics, December 2, 
1969. (Staff Discussion Paper 207, Program of Policy Studies in Science 
and Technology, December 1969.) 
Experience with agencies established to protect Or promote the IIpublic 
interest" rather than a special partisan segment of the public, has been 
something less than an overwhelming success. 
An editorial concerning the resort of citizens to the courts rather 
than to the regulatory agencies, "Back to Caveat Emptor," N. Y .. Times, 
August 24, 1969, E12, Col. 2, states in part--after referring to a study 
of the Food and Drug Administration which cautioned that exaggerated faith 
in the FDA "should be dispelled to the greatest extent possible,"--
"So it should, and the candor of the study is admirable. But 
where does it leave the consumer? If he believes the findings--
and there is no slightest reason for him to doubt them--he may well 
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Perhaps those who find the adversarial system in conflict with the 
notion of "demonstrated truths," with a sensitivity toward precisiun, and 
with a dispassionate approach to assessment, look forward to a beautiful 
future wherein sophisticated techniques of automatic data processing, 
mathematical modeling, systems a~alysis, and computer simulation will 
eliminate the need for adversarial system and obliterate the advocates, 
particularly the lawyers. Hut perhaps one shQuldn't bet on it. 
As the Participant-Computer merges into an operational entity, we 
shall probably see a somewhat modified form of the adversary system composed 
feel that the nation is fast returning to the rule of caveat emptor 
that existed before the coming of the regulatory agencies. If he 
reads Louis M. Kohlmeier's newly published book, 'The Regulators,' 
he will be sure of it. For the author documents the already 
familiar thesis that these agencies, set up to protect the public 
against special interests, tend to forget the public and come to 
identify themselves with the interests they are supposed to be 
watching. 
"It is understandable, then, that ma.ny citizens are concluding 
that their best resource against damage and deception is the 
law. " 
Horton Mintz, in "A Speech Portends Change of Climate," Wash. Post, 
February 7, 1969, A22, col. 5, writes that: 
"The other day, in a talk warning about the location of large 
nuclear power plants licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
Senator Edmund Muskie CD-Maine) recognized that 'Government 
itself develops vested interests which become more concerned 
with self-perpetuation than with social values. Sometimes econ-' 
omic interests and Goverrment agency interests become so inter-
twined that the public cannot distinguish between the two.' II 
Further, in News and Connnent, Science, 29 August, 1969, p. 881, Horton 
Mintz states: 
"It will be recalled that the commissioner, Dr. Herber B. Ley, 
Jr., said the conflict over the combination anti-biotics was 
'between commercial and therapeutic goals.' If he is correct, 
the Panalba case reaches a great question of our time: In a 
struggle between public interest and special interest in which 
the stakes are needless exploitation, injury, and even death to 
helpless patients, can American institutions function reliably 
to protect the public? 11 
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172 
of computer-advocates. The monel or models employed will differ; the 
values introduced into the computer as social benefits and costs will 
differ; thus the outcomes will certainly differ as will the combinations 
of consequences flowing from such outcomes. While automatic data processing 
and simulation may lead to the establishment of a greater degree of cer-
tainty about some factual situations and relationships, the capability of 
the computer to vastly broaden the number of alternatives that can be con-
sidered with respect to both the effects phase and the normative phase of 
technology assessment may generate an increasingly greater number of dis~ 
crepancies, areas of uncertainty, and potential points for disagreement. 
Advocacy may not yet have =eached its hey-day. 
Hence, with reference back to de Jouvenel, it seems highly probable 
that adversaria1 system has a most promising future in technology assess-
172 
That new modes of decision-making, designed to reduce uncertainty 
and clarify options, will be employed is clearly indicated by Daniel Bell, 
in "The Balance of Knowledge and Power," Technology Review, June 1969, 
pp. 39-40: 
IIIn the post-industrial society, there will be new modes of 
decision-making based on 'intellectual technology.' If 
technology is defined not just as machines but as a rational-
istic attempt at problem solving, using machines, then the new 
intellectual technology--systems analysis, simulation, decision 
theory, linear programming, stochastic mode1s--based on the com-
puter will become increasingly i~portant in the analysis of 
problems and the laying down of alterna'tive solutions." 
For a less optimistic view, see Ida R. Hoos, "Automation, Systems 
Engineering, and Public Administration: Observations and Reflections on 
the California Experience," 26 Pub. Adm. Rev. 311 (1966). 
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ment and other phases of the public decision-making process, whether 
the advocacy is performed by the "ascendant technologist" or the 
"obsolescent lawyer." 173 
l73See Jones, Advocacy in Technology Assessment, Staff Discussion 
Paper 209, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, 
November 1970. 
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mustered in successful opposition to desirable technological applications. 
In some instances assessment may inhibit desirable technological innovation. 
Assessments are particularly subject to the risk that the difficulties 
of coping with unwanted side effects of technological applications will 
be magnified" while possibilities that solutions will later be discovered 
are ignored or minimized. Assessment systems may also be "captured" by 
. 1 . 70 a spec1a 1nterest group. Avoidance and minimization of risks such as 
these is clearly desirable. 
8. Criteria of Internal Operations 
Another approach to the problem of adequate criteria of assessment 
focuses upon the internal operations of assessment entities. 7l Operations 
are conceived as sufficiently discrete to be subsumed under categories 
and a flow chart is prepared of steps or sequences of categories of opera-
tions. By way of illustration a Illodified version of a flow chart of the 
technology assessment function of the Congress will be used. See Figure 
1 below. 72 While as originally conceived this flow chart made use of 
70 
Concerning risks of assessment, see Technology: Processes of 
A$sessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 84-89. 
71 
Respecting criteria of internal operations, see Vickers, The Art 
of Judgment, (1965), pp. 157-169 
72 
The flow chart is found in statement of Louis H. Mayo in Hearings 
befQre the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee 
on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, on S. Res. 78, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., March 4, 5, 6, April 24, and May 7, 1969, at p. 120. The tech-
nology assessment capability of the Congress is also discussed in Tech-
nolo~Processes of Assessment and Choice, pp. 100-110; Technical----
Information For Congress; and A Study of Technology Assessment, pp. 9-21, 
all supra, note 2. 
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eight categories (initiation, identification> .specification, selection, 
utilization, determination, evaluatiol'll, and modification), it is sufficient 
for present purposes to reduce these to six: problem perception, problem 
formulation, selection, utilization, determination, and evaluation. Pro-
ceeding seriatim criteria will be suggested for the adequacy of each opera-
tion. 
The occasion for an assessment may be triggered by a statutory or 
j 
I 
(a) Problem Perception 
customary obligation of the Congress, or of one of its committees, or by 
a social crisis or other stimuli. The important idea of the category is I 
I 
I 
, 
that somehow the Congress comes to perceive that a technology assessment 
problem exists and merits attention. If the Congressional assessment 
mechanism adopts a passive stance toward problem perception, waiting for 
stimuli to come to it (except where a legal or customary duty requires 
it to search for problems), important problems of assessment (at least 
until they have reached crisis proportions) and a representative sample 
of problems of assessment are not likely to be perceived by the Congress. 
To mi nin.ize these risks affirmc..tive scanning or search strategies are. 
required. In other words, the operation of problem perception can be 
evaluated in terms of its completeness, representativeness and timeliness. 
Presumably no .... all problems of assessment perceived by the Congres-
siollnl aSSeSSmi:::£lt mechanism would be permitted to appear on the Congres-
siana1 agenda f0r decision making. Hence some screening of perceived 
problems is required. The adequacy of the screening operation might be 
te .ted by the following criteria: the urgency of the problem; the lack 
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of assessment efforts respecting the problem by other assessment entities; 
the existence or lack of existence of another assessment forum; the 
appropriateness of the Congress as an assessment forum (for example, if 
it cannot process the problem it ought not appear on its agenda); the 
relationship of the problem to other concerns of the Congress; and the 
nature of the problem (for example, problems of assessing existing 
technology assessment systems might receive, initially at least, higher 
agenda priority than problems of asseSSing past or future technological 
73 
applications). 
(b) Problem Formulation 
Since a problem is a disparity between existing and preferred con-
ditions, problem formulation requires a statement.of existing conditions 
(including trends in such conditions), a statement of preferred conditions, 
a statement of criteria for determining preferred conditions, and an esti-
mate of the gap between existing and preferred conditions. 74 
Criteria of adequacy of statements of existing conditions are: the 
methodological soundness of fact collecting strategies; the accuracy of 
73 
For other formulations of agenda-criteria, see supra, note 2, 
Technical Information For Congress, p. 474; Technology: Processes of 
Assessment and Choice, p. 93; A Study of Technology Assessment, p. 5, 9, 
10. 
74 
Mayo urges that adequate formulation of a social problem includes 
delineation of the social subsystem encompassing the social interactions 
and effects to be assessed. Since by definition a system (or subsystem) 
has some capacity for coping with threats to its e~ui1ibrium or stability 
it is not enough merely to trace impacts of outcomes to a social system. 
The critical issue is: did the impact have sufficient "critical mass" 
to produce permanent changes in the system, or .did the system absorb and 
neutralize the impact. 
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the data; the comprehensiveness of the data; and the contextuality (in-
cluding the degree to which relationships with other institutions, programs, 
and policy goals are reflected) of the data. It may sometimes be helpful 
to include a classification of the particular technological application 
75 
to be assessed. 
Criteria for evaluating statements of preferred conditions (goals) 
may come from numerous sources, including the constitution, statutes, 
administrative regulations, case-law precedents, and conceptions of 
policy goals derived from democratic ideology. Since problem formulation 
ideally requires operational statements of preferred conditions such 
statements also can be evaluated in terms of possibility of achievement, 
degree of satisfaction of conceived needs, and, if preferred conditions 
are a~so instrumental goals, how ultimate goals will be affected. 
Criteria for evaluating criteria for determining prt:ferred conditions 
would include the criteria set forth above for evaluating statements of 
preferred conditions. In addition such criteria might also include the 
extent to which criteria for determining preferred conditions functioned 
as such (for example, are the criteria sufficiently operational to deter-
mine preferred conditions?). Criteria for evaluating estimates of the 
gap between existing and preferred conditions are the suitability of the 
methodology and the soundness of its application • 
If the problem formulated by the Congressional assessment mechanism 
refers not to existing or prospectIve technological applications but to 
75 
See the six-fold classification in statement of Louis H. Mayo, supra, 
note 72. pp. 114-115; and the ten-fold classification system suggested in 
Technica~..n}:-ormatiml For Congress, supra, note 2 I' pp. 480-482. 
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the adequacy of an existing assessment system, meta-criteria (criteria of 
criteria) are required. The notion of adequate assessment presented in 
this paper proposes a set of meta-criteria. 
(c) Selection 
Selection refers to the operation of choosing I'information sources.;1 
Perhaps a more descriptive reference is "intelligence sources," since more 
than mere data or information is required. For example, the political 
feasibility of a solution of an assessment problem might depend upon the 
Congress permitting interest groups to contribute inputs of intelligence. 
Selection involves a definition of the intelligence needed, determinations 
of where it can be found and how :i.t can be ob tained, its dependability, 
comprehensiveness, contextuality, economy, and probable contribution 
to the resolution of the problem. Criteria of adequate selection would 
therefore test the adequacy of the definition of the intelligence needed, 
of identification of its location and avilability, of methods of obtain-
ing it, and of its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness, 
contextuality, economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution. 
(d) Utilization 
This operation refers to the decisional procedure used by the assess-
ment mechanism, and, unless they are prescribed, includes choices of the 
procedures used. Choice of procedures and application of procedures chosen 
may well be governed by different albeit interdependent criteria. Since 
choice and application of procedures are instrumental steps for reaching 
, 
decisional outcomes, criteria governing them should be causally related 
1 
to the qualities (criteria) sought of decisional outcomes. In other words, 1 
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decisions choosing a decisional procedure, and decisions applying chosen 
procedures might be tested by asking whether the procedure as a whole or 
some aspect of its application helps or hinders realization of specified 
qualities of outcomes. Decisions choosing a decisional procedure and 
applying chosen procedures should also be governed by the nature of the 
problem formulated (for example, whether assessment of a technological 
application, or an assessment of a technology assessment system), and by 
the intelligence sources to be used (it may be preferable, for example, 
that statistical data from unimpeachable sources be presented in docu-
mentary form). The number of participants as intelligence sources may 
also influence choice and application of a decisional procedure. 
(e) Determination 
This operation refers to the process of arriving at decisional out-
comes and to the outcomes themselves. The process of decision can be evalu-
. 76 
ated by the cr1teria of BDM or by the following criteria proposed in 
77 
Technical Information for Congress: what alternative solutions have been 
advanced; what are the probable costs and undesirable stde effects of each 
alternative; what are the probable values and useful side effects of each 
alternative; what are the economic and technical considerations relative 
to each alternative; are the various alternatives feasible technically, 
economically, politically; are all apparent alternatives politically or 
technically unacceptable, thus requiring that additional alternatives 
76 
See text p. 38 and note 51, supra. 
77 
Supra, note 2" p. 475. See also pp. 2-4 
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should be searched for; what are the implications of each alternative 
for the short and long term; what contradictions are contained in the 
information as received; what bias and indications of unreliability 
prejudice the information; what are the relative weights of the technical 
conclusions and the information about political values pertaining to the 
various alternatives after bias and unreliability have been screened out; 
and what are the relative costs and benefits of adopting the preferred 
1 i f k ' i 78 a ternat ve or 0 not ta lng act on. 
Outcomes are the end products of a process of assessment. But these 
end products may also constitute inputs to intelligence, promotion, pre-
scription, invocation, application, appraisal, or termination functions 
of the Congress. When this -is true criteria applicable to the Congress' 
performallce of these functions would also be appropriate criteria of out-
comes of a process of assessment. 
(f) Evaluation 
Since it refers to post-assessment appraisals of the impact of 
determination-outcomes, this operation is an appraisal function and 
should be evaluated by criteria applicable to the Congress' performance 
79 
of this function. 
78 
For additonal criteria see Downs, supra, note 45, pp. 175-176. 
79 
Criteria of appraisal are presented in the text, supra, pp. 30-31. 
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IV. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ADVOCACY 
Evaluations of advocacy commonly postulate the context of an adjudi-
catory arena governed by an adversarial decisional model, assume that all 
advocates are lawyers, and focus upon the strategies of advocates. Con-
sequently, advocacy in non-adjudicatory areans, the role of non-.lawyers as 
advocates, and advocacy as a mode of inquiry supporting intelligence and 
other decisional functions remain implicit and obscure. Perhaps such 
failures of evaluation are partly attributable to the commitment of some 
disciplines (especially "PUrE-'" ones), professions and occupations (for 
example, operatjons researchers, systems analysts, and management scientists), 
and schools of thought (in the most extreme form, scientism) to inflexible 
notions of "truth," "objectivity," and "neutrality." Explicit recognition 
of advocacy as characteristic of all arenas, of advocacy by non-lawyer 
participants, and of its role as a mode of inquiry would raise questions 
about claims to scientific validity, objectivity, and neutrality. And 
the practice of labeling policy problems as "technical" or "scientific" 
or "legal" might itself be recognized as a strategy of advocacy aimed at 
enhancing the power and prestige of technicists, scientists, and legalists. 
Some failures in evaluation of advocacy may also reflect a general 
cultural bias (in particular a bias of academics) in favor of hierarchical 
and pyramidal, unilateral controls as the preferable modes of coordinating 
community life, and against bargaining-advocacy as a coordinating 
80 
mechanism. 
Finally, since bargaining-advocacy may be "illegal and much (though not all) 
is extra-legal and is commonly condemned as the product of stupidity, 
80SeeLindblom, supra, note 12, pp. 2, 6-7, 28-29. 
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partiality, and avarice. 81 " its contributions tend to go unnoticed. 
How, then, does advocacy fare, as a mode of inquiry as well as 
strategies of claimants, when evaluated by representative sets of criteria 
of adequate assessment? 
1. Participant Criteria 
Openness of participation as a criterion of adequate technology 
assessment could hardly be achieved without some design for advocacy 
as a mode of inquiry. Not only does openness look toward affording 
opportunity for advocacy, but other participant criteria require in-
stitutaiona1 arrangements that treat the strategies of claimants, co1-
lective1y, as part of the intelligence function and as a means of enhancing 
the quality of aosessments. Who is permitted to participate, the degree to 
which participants are representative of the interests at stake, the timing 
and form of participation, the contributions expected of participants - these 
criteria presuppose an assessment design which institutionalizes advocacy as 
a mode of inquiry. Moreover, quality assessments commonly require intel-
ligence which can be supplied only by advocates, as data about past and 
future circumstances of participants, the value orientations of participants, 
and the feasibility (political, economic, and technical) of recommended 
alternatives for dealing with assessment problems. 
While participant criteria presuppose a design for advocacy, other modes 
of inquiry are not ruled out. Officials and other participants may inform 
themselves by other means and may present their offerings in other styles 
81 
Lindblom, supra, note 12, p. 3 
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and forms. The essential point of a design for advocacy, however, is tnat 
however participants inform thems€:'lves and whatever form and style of 
presentation is used (inclu,lillg claims to speak as "experts" or in the name 
of scientific validity), all presentations are open to challenge and attack 
on any relevant ground. From this point of view advocacy is not comparable 
to other modes of inquiry, because it transcends other modes. It does so 
not by denying the contributions, but by providing a method for revealing 
the strength and shortcomings of other modes, including itself as a mode. 
Moreover, in practice other modes of inquiry, although aimed primarily to-
ward producing knowledge with certain qualities and employing tests such 
as colleague consensus and inter-subjectivity, are heavily dependent upon 
advocacy as an internal quality control mechanism. Advocacy thus builds 
upon other modes of inquiry by providing the conditions under which they may 
find most fruitful expression. 
2. Perspectives Criteria 
Apparently officials cannot be assumed to supply the inclusiveness 
82 
of identification required for adequate technology assessment. Nor 
is it likely that any discipline, body of experts, professional or 
82 
"The fundamental premise • . • is that bureaucratic officials • • 
are significantly -- though not solely -- motivated by their own self-
interests." Downs, supra, note 45, p. 2. See also Technology: 
Processes of Assessment and Choice, supra, note 2, pp. 24-28, 57-62. 
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occupational group,83 or governmental entity will always assert common 
.. 
rather than merely special interests in technology assessments. It also 
seems unlikely that the expectations of participants required for adequate 
assessments (expectations, that is, of significant influence upon outcomes, 
of decisional integrity, and of adherence to basic procedual rules) can 
be created and maintained without employing advocacy as a mode of inquiry. 
That claimants-advocates are partisan toward their own interests does 
not necessarily mean that public interests are inadequately represented in 
technology assessments. Assessment officials are not confined to the 
partisan ~resentation of a single advocate (including the presentation of 
their own staff) as an intelligence source, but may consider all the 
intelligence supplied, by whatever means, to their decisional system. 
And the cumulative impact of narrowly, partisan presentatioas sharply 
and precisely in opposition to one another often may spotlight the public 
" ••• professional groups, however conscientious, often have uncon-
scious commitments to the technology or technologies with which they are 
associated and tend, with few exceptions, to make little difference in the 
basic perspectives from which assessments are currently made. II Technology: 
Processes of Assessment and Choice, p. 25. liThe dilemma of intelligence vs. 
specialization is twofold: specialization is essential to the efficient 
command of knowledge but antithetical to the penetrating interpretation 
that bears on high policy; specialization and its concomitant, inter-unit 
rivalry, frequently block the sharing of accurate information, but if pro-
blems of upward communication can be solved, rivalry can result in great 
gains -- the clarification of clashing alternatives and the presentation 
of opposing cases. The primary cost of specialization in intelligence is 
paroachialism -- the production of misleading or irrelevant informaticn, 
a product of the familiar limitations of the expert. The professionally 
biased producer of intelligence remains too distant from the intelligence 
user, too ignorant of policy needs, is forced to compete with other pro-
ducers for the support and guidance of the user . . • • The gain from 
constructive rivalry is another matter; it depends on administrative styles 
and structures that expedite the free flow of rival perspectives and solutions 
to the responsible executives and their general advisors." Wilensky, supra, 
note 48, pp. 49-50. See also pages 162-164, especially note 60 on page 164 
of Wilensky. 
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interests at stake. Much depends, also, on expectations of claimants 
that assessment decisions will be reached in a mechanical and legalistic 
way, on the one hand, or will represent a conscientious effort to arrive 
at a formulation of the public interest as seen from the broadest per-
spectives, on the other hand. When the latter expectations prevail 
advocates realize that persuasive presentations must be related to and 
shown to be consistent with policy needs. 
3. Situations Criteria 
In some settings constitutional or other legal prescriptions require 
advocacy as a mode of inquiry in technology assessment. If such require-
ments do not exist, however, since assessment usually involves numerous inter-
actions among participants, provision must be made for such matters as 
timeliness and sufficiency of notice of proceedings, the scope of matters 
to be considered, the decisional standards to be applied, the kinds and 
degrees of participation to be permitted, and the degree of support of 
the basic decisional functions of the assessment system. These are matters 
which make advocacy possible and, because of its long experience in con-
fronting them, advocacy is readily adapted to decisions respecting them. 
4. Base Values Criteria 
As a strategy of claimants and as a mode of inquiry advocacy's 
contribution is conditioned by the effective means available for its 
exercise. While this is also true of other modes of inquiry, advocacy 
has a unique capacity for expanding and economizing the resources of an 
assessment system. Base values are expanded because participants bring 
values of all types into assessments. In particular, advocacy may lend the 
aid of power to asseSsment outcomes; enlist the wealth of advocates (for) 
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investigation, preparation, presentation, and other expenses); supply 
needed standards of rectitude; contribute skill and enlightenment; reduce 
alienation and increase social cohesion; and promote the health, safety, 
and comfort of all persons participating in an assessment. To the extent 
that advocacy augments it also economizes the use of the base values of 
assessment systems. 
That assessment practices and outcomes are influenced by the base 
values of advocates is not, however, an unmixed blessing. Advocates rarely 
are equally endowed with such means. In consequence some advocates may 
be so richly endowed, as compared to others, that practices and outcomes 
will be skewed against the public interest. The best possible counter-
balance for this possibility, however, may be to increase the influence 
of opposing advocacy. 
5. Strategies Criteria 
As is true of other modes of inquiry advocacy can emphasize either 
coercion or persuasion. Relative stress upon persuasion as against coercion, 
in short, does not appear to be dependent upon modes of inquiry but upon other 
variables, particularly the base values and perspectives of participa.nts. 
For example, as political power of advocates decreases greater reliance 
d b 1 d h - f h f - d - 84 d ten s to e p ace upon t e persuaSlve use 0 researc ln lngs; an 
84 
"Facts-and-figures men who command technical intelligence obviously 
are given more discretion where the problems are technical. Less obviously, 
they also carry more weight when the organization is weak in grass-roots 
political resources. Among Washington lobbyists, for instance, repre-
sentatives of small organizations with limited political resources -- hu-
manitarian organizations, specialized trade associations -- accent research 
in their lobbying strategy, in contrast to large-member organizations, such 
as farm groups, veterans groups, and labor unions, who incline toward grass--
roots compaigns and publicity." Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 19. 
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coercive strategies are reduced by creating expectations in participants 
that only strategies of persuasion are likely to be influential. 
Advocacy has a major contribution to make to minimum rationality in 
assessment. Without it inclusive, balanced outcomes adequately reflecting 
both common and minority interests appear impossible to achieve. Advocacy 
also can contribute to and often is essential for the orderly development 
of each component of policy judgments in technology assessment. Since 
formulations of problems of assessment requires comparisons of present 
conditions with criteria of the desirable and with projections of future 
conditionij defined by such criteria, and conceptualization and proposal 
of the social subsystem to be assessed, advocacy necessarily is involved. 
This is also true of the prescriptive act of specifying goals. 
While not so apparent, formulation of causal or probability links be-
tween technological applications and social impacts and between assessment 
systems and social impacts inevitably requires advocacy. Suitable scientific 
procedures for this component seldom exist. And even when a suitable science 
is at hand and requisite controls can be used, discretion (hence advocacy) 
is not necessarily eliminated. The most basic theories of scientific 
85 disciplines are sustained ~17:- uildermined) by advocacy. If a consensus 
85 
Kuhn, The Structures of Scientific Revolutions (1962). "In the popu-
lar view, science is a more disinterested and, therefore, better institu-
tion for uncovering truth. But major advances in scientific theory often 
come from men insisting on opposing models of physical or social nature. 
They are often polemical; their debate is sometimes carried on in the spirit 
of armies at war, as Priestley's holding action against Lavoisier's theory 
of chemical clements, Marx's invective about German idealism, and Weber's 
insistence on the role of religious ethics in economic life all illustrate. 
Three characterists of science, however, mark it as different from ad-
versary procedure and limit its use in everyday administrative life as well 
as in the court. First, although individual scientists may be contentious, 
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exists among scientists respecting a causal or probability relationship, 
in an assessment, it is supported by advocacy.86 Such a consensus will 
rarely exist in any event. 87 Claims of scientific validity often amo~nt 
to no more than a "dialectic of expertise,,88 Moreover, the objects of 
an assessment may be advocates with sufficient persuasiveness to co-opt 
they are oriented more toward truth than power. The judge or the official 
must give some weight to political cr.mseq\.lences of decisions; the scientist 
is ideally oblivious of such considerations. Second, differences in science 
are settled by colleagues; scientific truths rest ultimately on the con-
sensus of the competent. It is thus too technical for many administrative 
purposes; the capacity to assess scientific truth is well developed only 
among those immersed in its traditions and tE.chniques. Finally, because 
scientific propositions take a long time to establish, science is not an 
ideal procedure for urgent organizational and judicial decisions. In short, 
although adversary proceedings do not involve critical experimental tests, 
they resemble science in their systematic regulation of the clash of views, 
and they have the additional advantage of sensitivity to political interests, 
greater availability to non-expert officials and judges, and speed." 
Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 153 
86 
"The argument is that the existing machinery of scholarly inquiry and 
the process of mutual criticism tend to produce, over the course of time, 
a collective produce, known as knowledge, which is relatively free of special 
bias. No one, obviously, can say that this process even completely achieves 
its goal." Frankel, "Being in and Being Out," 17 The Public Interest 44, 58 
(Fall, 1969). 
87 
"The higher in the hierarchy one goes the less do problems correspond 
to the specialized structure of knowledge and the less a decision can be 
programmed. Only at the lower lev.els of policy deliberation can the special-
ized expert tackle a Specialized problem with a chance of solving it by the 
premise methods of science. Further, at any level, the role of the expert is 
self-changing .... Wilensky, supra, note 48, p. 46. 
88 
"Facts-and-figures men are preoccupied with rational argument and 
criteria; their technical competence compels opposing parties to be more 
careful or honest in the use of information to match each other expert for 
expert, fact for fact." Wilensky, supra,note 48, p.16. 
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the assessment itse1f. 89 Nor are assessment officials always models of 
impartial detachment. 90 
Advocacy may assist in the invention or discovery of alternatives. 
Since means-ends relations often are highly problematical, and since the 
discovery of them often is highly creative and subjective, it is desirable 
that participants advocate a variety of alternatives. Advocacy can con-
tribute to projections of outcomes. In fact all such projections if 
. 91 
made to influence policy making constitute advocacy. Forecasts of 
consequences of policy alternatives usually outrun consensus-based 
bodies of scientific knowledge. Under such circumstances con~eting 
projections by opposing advocates are to be encouraged. The evaluation 
89 
? ; 
" . . Budget Bureau examines depend for information on the agency they 
are assigned to investigate; the agency often converts the examiner into an 
advocate of particular programs by a sensible even flow of information 
(discounting the risk of disclosing weakness.)" Wilensky, supra, note 48, p.18. 
90 
" .. there is a kind of inbred tendency, in governmental reports, 
to support existing policy. we possess an adversary system of government, 
and an adversary press, and an international ideologic9l struggle is going 
on. Under these circumstances, reports tend to have a self-defensive 
function. They accentuate the positive; they give the official what he needs 
to d2fend policies that are under attack." Frank,=l, supra, note 86, p. 49. 
91 
"A forecast that a contemplated action will have this or that conse-
quence . is an argument for or against its adoption." de Jouvene1, The 
Art of Conjecture, (1967), p. 147 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
f 
I 
r 
- 67 -
of projected consequences may also be assisted by advocacy. Since the 
use of standards of evaluation advocates their suitability for that 
purpose (including the claims that consequences identified by them as 
relevant merit evaluation and that consequences not identified by them 
as relevant do not merit attention), and since competing evaluations 
expose each other's limitations, advocacy is most useful. 
It is true, of course, that when inappropriately channeled advocacy 
can distort policy judgments. Incompetency in advocates, concealment 
and exaggeration or minimization of rl~levant facts, the screening of 
information through the categories of legal propositions sloughing-off 
the "ir-relevant, incompetent, and immaterial," the presentment of fl'ivilous 
claims, creation of a "circus atmosphere",92 exaggeration or minimization 
of anticipated social costs and benefits, mutual provocations of parti-
cipants, delayed decisions, and hasty and ill-advised decisions93 -- each 
92 
liThe deficiencies of adversary procedures are obvious. A circus at-
mosphere may develop as attorneys become preoccupied with press releases 
rather than legal briefs, with courtroom histronics rather than reasoned 
argument ("when you can't win a case, jaw it.") Wilensky, supra, note 48, 
p. 152. Note that Wilensky is referring to advocacy by lawyers at trial 
court levels of judicial arenas, apparently before juries. Nevertheless, 
because he entertains a broader conception of advocacy he can recognize its 
contributions: "But these limitations, not inevitable, are offset by the 
overriding advantages of partisan advocacy, including the opportunity to 
test the credibility of witnesses through cross-examination. In or out 
of court, the adversary precess is the best way to assure that assertions 
are exposed to systematic sct'\ciny by men with countervailing interests who 
are motivated to press hard." p. 152. 
93 
" • bargaining in the wrong place at the wrong time accounts for 
some of the worse aspects of American government. (1) It explains why 
conflicting interests often result not in agreement but in the paralysis of 
public policy, as is illustrated most dramatically by the filibuster. (2) 
it also gives disproportionate power to the leaders of strategic minorities. 
(3) It sometimes leads to the substitution of irrational agreement through 
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of these may cause rationality to suffer. The need, therefore, is for 
technology assessment entities to adopt procedures that enable advocacy 
to make its optimum contribution to policy, yet safeguard the procedures 
of persuasion and decision from disruptive side-effects. The criterion 
of minimum rationality is not likely to be approximated without the use 
of advocacy as a mode of inquiry.94 
Finally, advocacy can promote the criterion that assessment outcomes 
should assist the ultimate decision maker's performan.l"~ ()f basic decisional 
functions. Thus, it can test for qualities of dependability, comprehensive-
ness, and contextuality in intelligence functions; and for the rigor with 
log-rolling for agreement 
highly organized groups." 
Technology: Processes of 
94 
upon some common goal. 
Lindblom, supra, note 
Assessment and Choice, 
(4) It favors the most 
12, p. 37. See also 
supra, note 2, pp. 25-27 
Lindblom's evaluation of advocacy (in particular, bargaining, which is 
one form of advocacy) is interesting. He argues that advocacy-bargaining is 
superior in many circumstances to any other alternative (in particular, su-
perior to hierarchial control) for ordering social affairs; that it is the 
most feasible means for accommodating to the needs of social pluralism; that 
because the bargaining power of an official depends in large part upon the 
coincidence of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest 
(defined as "the achievement of widely shared goals"), and because bargaining 
power is largely determined through alliances with common interests, the 
public interest is given operational meaning and promoted; that "the common 
values of no significant group will be neglected in the final reconciliation 
of values necessary for p6'.1.icy decisions" ("why the courtroom, the partisan 
attorney, and the pursuit of victory instead of the study, the scholar, and 
the pursuit of truth? Because, for all the miscarriages of justice in the 
courts of law, we do not believe the researcher can give every man his due 
or bring out every fact and value favorable to him." p. 28); that it aids 
rationality in organizational contexts by supplying feedback about low level 
decisions to top level policy makers; that it "motivates men to search ex-
haustively and ceaselessly for common goals" (" ••. bargainers are highly 
motivated to look and keep on looking, and to become resourceful in finding 
hidden common goals. And, of course, the search for common values, even 
where none are found, clarifies goals and reduces pointless conflict stemming 
from mistaken self-interests." p. 31); and that it reveals wants and frustra-
tions that would pass unnoticed, thereby permitting adjustments of policy in 
the light of them. See also Fuller's evaluation of advocacy in 1958 Proceed-
ings of the American Association of Law Schools, pp. 188--191. 
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which scientific method is applied, the contextua1ity of the method, 
and the impartiality of findings and recommendations in appraisal 
functions. It can encourage integrated policy and reliance upon strategies 
of.persuasion rather than coercion in promotion functions. It can promote 
the promptness with which prescriptiv~ functions are initiate4, the con-
textua1ity of its explorations, and its conformity to basic g.oa1 values. 
Respecting invocation functions advocacy can help achieve a proper balance 
between promptness and efficiency in initiation of the process and in 
maintenance of proper safeguards against irremediable losses, assure 
contextua1ity of analysis, promote rationality in provisional character-
ization, minimize coercion, and demand iIrullediate initiation-Df follow-on 
application functions. Respecting application functions advocacy may 
assist the promptness of initiation, the comprehensiveness and contex-
tua1ity of exploration, and the choice of decisions conforming to inclusive 
community policies and capable of effective and economic enforcement. 
Finally, respecting termination functions advocacy can promote the res-
ponsiveness of prescriptions to changes in social processes, help reduce 
the cost of social change, encourage needed social change, assure comprehen-
siveness and contextua1ity in exploration, encourage cancellation in 
conformity with community policies, and promote effectiveness in amelioration. 
, , 
6. Outcomes Criteria 
Assessments may be intended to produce (1) intelligence to assist 
resolution of a particular policy problem; (2) appraisals assisting 
another decisional entity's appraisal of the impact of a particular 
policy; (3) appraisals of existing assessment systems; and (4) appraisals 
of total impact assessments. 
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Since previous discussion indicated how advocacy might contribute 
. 95 
to each component of a rational policy Judgment, (1), above, will not 
be discussed. With respect to (2), above, assessments producing appraisals 
to assist an ultimate decision maker's appraisal of the impact of a 
particular policy should (2) define what is to be appraised; (b) trace 
(establish cause and effect or probability relations) and describe the 
consequences of the policy under evaluation; (c) formulate a conception 
of relevant consequences sufficiently operational to serve as a guide in 
tracing and describing effects; (d) posit a set of standards for evaluating 
the quality of effects traced and described; and (3) report its "findings". 
Advocacy may contribute to each of these standards. 
Since definitions of objects of appraisal involve allocations of 
sC,:lrce base values, influence other tasks of an appraisal, and determine 
what is not to be appraised, rival definitions of objects of appraisal 
are foreseeable and should be encouraged. We have seen that establish-
ment of cause and effect or probability relations between particular 
policies and their consequences seldom can be based on a science of 
consequences, and even when so based, because consensus is essential 
for scientific validity, advocacy contributes to the establishment 
of that consensus and thus to the use of that science. Since conceptions 
of relevant consequences are partly normative in nature and partly 
intended as instrumental for tracing and describing (and since the 
instrumental aspect usually out-runs scientific supports), advocacy 
95 
Text, supra, pp. 37-38. The role of advocacy in aiding in'telligence 
functions in general is presented in the text, supra,> pp. 21-24. 
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can, does, and should contribute to them. To posit a set of standards 
of appraisal is to advocate its appropriateness; alternative sets of 
standards should be advocated before a set is posited. Finally, reports 
of,"findings" advocate their worth as findings; and, to the extent based 
on inferences from evidence, c:.dvocacy can test the factual support of 
findings. 
Assessments producing appraisals of existing assessment systems, 
(3), above, should be governed by criteria of appraisal constituting 
reliable indicia of the quality of the internal operations and external 
relationships of the object of assessment. Advocacy's contributions 
96 
to the internal operations of an assessment system will be presented infra. 
The present analysis, characterizing external relationships and contexts 
in terms of participants, perspectives, etc. is intended to indicate 
advocacy's contribution in these respects. 
In practice total impact assessments must satisfy criteria for 
evaluating the outcomes of other assessment systems, for relating out-
comes to a conception of total assessment, for a conception of total 
assessment, and for coordinating the efforts of other assessment systems. 
Advocacy may help meet these criteria. Its contribution to evaluations 
97 
of other assessment systems were noted supra. It can aid the formulation 
of conceptions of total assessment by explicating and critically evaluating 
their most basic assumptions; and it can assist in relating outcomes of 
96 
See text, ~, pp. 74-76. 
97 
See text, supra, pp. 45-50. 
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particular assessment entities to conceptions of total assessment by 
explicating and critically evaluating the relational frameworks employed 
to achieve syntheses. Finally, advocacy can enhance the quality of 
efforts to coordinate the assessments of ether systems. For example, 
prescriptions of appropriate spheres of autonomy between assessing systems 
and systems assessed are more likely to reflect inclusive community 
perspectives if all perspectives are advocated. 
7. Effects Criteria 
The reference here is to desirable impacts upon social institutione, 
the values of the citizenry; the physical and ecological environment; 
basic decisional functions and structures of legal process; and assessment 
systems and their participants. Advocacy has contributions for each of 
these areas. 
Advocacy can help preserve and protect social institutions through 
forecasts or appraisals of adverse impacts upon them, by insisting that 
their uniqueness requires special criteria of evaluation, by insisting 
upon an interdisciplinary approach to evaluation of impacts, and by 
noting their importance for the production of the values to which they 
tend to be specialized. Moreover, advocacy is essential for the invocation 
and application of existing prescriptions applicable to social institutions, 
and it can be indispensable in critically evaluating current debates about 
roles of social institutions and the contributions of specialists in 
the study of particular institutions. 
Respecting criteria of impact upon the values of the citizenry ~dvocacy 
can be indispensable for establishing minimum and maximum shaping and 
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sharing criteria, in the invocation and application of e~dsting prescripti:ms, 
and in critically evaluating current debates about desirable levels of 
shaping and sharing particular values and the contributions of specialists 
in .. the study of particular values. 
Formulation, invocation, and application of policy respecting impacts 
of technological applications and assessment outcomes upon physical and 
ecological environments involve policy functions which outrun the con-
tributions of scientific methods. How much of the fruits of pest-free 
agriculture are we willing to forego in order to avoid cett:-lin effects 
of DDT? Such questions raise policy issues in the resolution of which 
advocacy is both inevitable and essential. 
Since impacts upon basic decisional functions and structures of 
legal process are impacts upon the policy making and implementation 
process, itself, and since it is inevitable and essential to the process, 
advocacy has a role. 
With respect to impacts upon assessment systems and their participants, 
advocacy and bargair.ing are essential strategies for creating and maintain-
ing relationships which assure a continuing flow of base values needed by 
assessment systems. It can help maintain the confidence of all partici-
pants in the competency, detachment, impartiality, and open-mindedness 
in assessing systems. It can help promote conformity by assessment 
systems being assessed with criteria proposed in this paper. It can 
promote national coordination and control over assessments. And, it 
can help systems being assessed to avoid or minimize adverse impacts 
of their assessments. 
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8 I 1 0 . C' . 98 . nterna perat10ns r1ter1a 
(a) Problem Perception 
-----------1' 
f 
Advocacy can assist the completeness, representativeness, and 
timeliness of problem perception. For example, by serving as a supple-
ment to scanning techniques permitting members of the general public to 
call assessment problems to the attention of the Congress, advocacy might 
contribute to completeness, representativeness, and timeliness of problem 
perception. It can also contribute to agenda-making by aiding the for-
mulation of criteria of inclusion and exclusion and the interpretation 
and application of sn~h criteria. 
(b) Problem Formulation 
Statements of ex:Lst.:ing conditions, statements of preferred conditions, 
criteria for determining preferred conditions, estimates of the gap between 
existing and preferred conditions - each of these components of problem 
formulation can be aid by advocacy. Respecting statements of existing 
conditions it can test the methodological soundness of data collecting 
strategies used, the accuracy of the data, and the comprehensiveness and 
contextuality of the data. In statements of preferred conditions it 
help establish the authoritativeness of criteria, contribute to estimates 
of feasibility, note discrepancies between statements of preferred and 
conceived needs, and question whether preferred conditions, if instru-
mental goals, will achieve ultimate goals. The formulation of criteria 
98 
See text, supra, pp. 50- 59. 
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for determining preferred conditions, since it is a prescriptive act, 
can be assisted by advocacy, as can be interpretation and application 
of such criteria. The suitability of the methodology and the sound-
ness of its application in estimating gaps between existing and pre-
ferred conditions can be tessted by advocacy. Finally, it can aid in 
the formulation of meta-criteria for evaluating existing assessment 
systems. 
(c) .Selection 
Advocacy can help test the adequacy of the definition of intel-
ligence needed, in some instances aid in determining the location, 
availability, or methods of obtaining that intelligence, and probe 
its characteristics of dependability, comprehensiveness, contextuality, 
economy, and probable contribution to problem resolution. 
(d) Utilization 
Decisions choosing procedures of assessment and decisions applying 
procedures chosen can be aided by advocacy. If both types of decision 
are to be evaluated in terms of their impacts upon assessment outcomes 
advocacy is a useful means for establishing such impacts. 
(e) Determination 
If the process of arriving at decisional outcomes and the outcomes 
_,f 
themselves ar r to be evaluated by the criteria of BDM or by the set pro-
posed in Technical Information For Congress,99 or by the criteria applicable 
99 
See text, supra, p. 56 
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to the performance of basic decisional functions of the Congress, advocacy 
is a most useful tool for such evaluations. 
Advocacy, then, is not only here to stay - its potential is gO vast 
and largely untapped that its future is quite speculative. We must work 
and hope that it will be used to establish a community in which the 
dignity of man is honored in deed as well as in word. 
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IV. THE INTERF'ACE BETWEEN 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE LAW 
Harold P. GREEN 
August 1972, pp. 1-11 
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When I was asked to give this talk, it was suggested that my 
topic be "The Law Confronts Expanding Technology." This, I thought, 
was an inappropriate topic. However true it may be that the law is 
a static, backwards-looking force in our society, it simply is not true 
that the law confronts or in any sense resists technological advance. 
On the contrary, our entire legal system r.eflects a tolerant. indeed a 
benevolent. attitude towards technological advance. This is reflected 
in the patent system rooted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
Constitution to "promote the progress of science and useful arts," in 
our tax laws, and in our predisposition for political and economic 
freedom. Even our common law system has evidenced a disposition to 
balance pre-existing rights in the status quo against the benefits of 
technological advance, and generally to sacrifice the former in favor 
of the latter. 
It is important to any discussion of this topic that there be a 
clear understanding of what "law" is. It is, first of all, a body of 
rules governing individual activity and relationships among the various 
actors in society. These rules are found in the vast body of judicial 
decisions applying the common law. They are also found in statutory 
enactments and the rules of administrative agencies, as well as in 
judicial and agency decisions interpreting these statutes and rules. 
, ' 
i The law is also a process of decision-making as lawyers representing 
, clients with clashing interests seek to have their clients' interests 
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enhanced, protected, or vindicated before the courts, administrative 
agencies, and legislative bodies. 
When a new technology emerges, it is brought forth into a social 
environment which includes pre-existing technology and is not necessarily 
applicable to the new technology or the peculiar social problems which 
the new technology may bring. For example, when the first automobiles 
came into existence, there was no law directly applicable to automobiles. 
There were, however, laws applicable to the use of thoroughfares, to 
the rights of pedestrians, and to the rights, duties, and liabilities 
of persons who used horses or horse-drawn vehicles. As the use of the 
automobile imping;ed on existing legally pl:otect·)d interests, it became 
necessary for the courts to consider wh~ther, and the extent to which, 
existing law was applicable to the automo'bile. What were the respec-
tive rights of users of automobiles and users of horse-drawn vehicles? 
Were automobiles vehicles within the meaning of statutes written in 
contemplation of horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles? Were the rules 
of the road applicable to these new-fangled devices? The courts 
grappled with these problems on a case-by-case basis as lawyers repre-
senting the adversary interests of their clients argued pro and con on 
these issues, and ultimately, through a process of trial and error, a 
body of law directly applicable to automobiles began to emerge. Over 
a period of time the legislatures also began to take cognizance of 
the automobile, and statutes began to emerge providing for registration 
of motor vehicles, licensing of operators, inspection, traffic control, 
liability, etc. 
Development of this new body of law directly applicable to auto-
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mobiles could have operated as either a deterrent or an incentive 
to the growth of the automobile technology. We know in retrospect 
that the incentives, including development of highways, far outweighed 
the deterrents. Only in recent years, as our legislatures have 
addressed themselves to problems of safety and pollution, have there 
been indications that law may be moving in the direction of deterrence. 
Let me now attempt a generalized description of the legal system 
as it confronts expanding technology. 
The first response of the legal system to a new techaology has 
characteristically been to deal with the problem entirely as a matter 
of private law. Legal problems are dealt with within the framework 
of disputes between private interests: The private parties who are 
using the technology versus the private parties who may be injured or 
threatened by the technology. Government, through its judicial 
procesl,es, acts as the impartial umpire for the resolution of these 
disputes. As the principles and the wisdom of the past, found in 
judicial precedent, are applied on a trial-and-error basis to the new 
problems emerging from the new technology, the process of decision-
making in specific litigations results in the emergence of new prece-
dents specifically applicable to the new problems. The emergence of 
this new body of law creates legal rights and legal duttes\'1hich 
become a part of the general legal environment in which the te,.!hnolcgy 
develops and is used. The existence of legal rights ane. duties 
operates to internalize the social costs of the technology and becomes, 
to some degree, a deterrent to the advance of the technology. The net 
result of this process is that our society permits the technology to 
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cause social disruptions and injury on the theory that the legal system 
will provide monetary compensation to persons whose legal rights have 
been violated. 
There frequently comes a time, however, when society regards the 
existence of the disruptions and injuries caused by the technology as 
unacceptable, and the focus of law-making then shifts from the courts 
to the legislatures. Whereas the process of law-making by the courts 
is piecemeal, random, and highly indirect, legislative action is 
positive, deliberate, and direct. The legislative action may be in 
the form of new rules redefining the rights and duties of private 
persons with respect to the technology, or it may be in the form of 
positive regulation of the technology. It should be recognized, 
however, that the legislative process usually operates slowly and 
uncertainly. It is always characterized by inertia and usually also 
by considerable friction which arises from strenuous efforts by the 
sponsors of the technology to resist legislative action which will 
adversely affect their economic interests. As a consequence, the 
initial legislative action is usually based on political compromise 
and the enactment, vie~oj'ed in retrospect, is rarely adequate and 
remains to be modified in later successive legislative actions as 
society reaches the conclusion that the disruptions and injuries 
remain unacceptable. 
By and large the system I have described has worked reasonably 
well over most of the history of Anglo-American law. This is not to 
say that it has not permitted immense injury, which could have been 
avoided. Obviously, for example, automobile technology has ~roduced 
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immense slaughter on our highways which could have been substantially 
lessened had our law-making institutions come to grips with the 
problem of automobile safety at an earlier date. On the other hand, 
there is little question in my mind that, had our current concern with 
automobile safety arisen in the J'i~20' s or 1930' s, our technological 
progress as measured by the present state of the automobile would have 
been substantially retarded. When I say, therefore, that the system 
has worked reasonably well, I am saying that it has provided a frame-
work for enabling technological advance on the assumption that even 
considerable disruption and injury is an acceptable pr.ice to pay for 
this advance. 
The present interest in technology assessment reflects the 
growing view in our society that such disruption and injury may no 
longer be acceptable. This view has come into being largely as a 
consequence of the recognition that the technologies of today and 
tomorrow may be producing disruptions and injuries which go to the 
question of survival itself, and that technological advance is 
occurring at so rapid a rate that intolerable and irreversible 
levels or injury may be sustained before we are even aware of the 
fact that the technology involves a capacity to produce injury. 
As a lawyer, I see the function of technology assessment as 
being twofold: first, to provide for legislative action designed to 
channel technological advance along lines which are regarded as 
optimal from the standpoint of society's interests; and, second, to 
encourage and promote legislative action which will deal decisively 
with the potential disruptions and injuries caused by technology at 
r 
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a much earlier stage of the growth of the technology than is feasible 
under the present legal system. 
Implementation of the first of these objectives would involve 
the subst:tt!Jtion of governmental decisions for the operation of the 
market as a determinant of the allocation of resources. Government 
would presumably discourage less optimum technologies through tax 
or restrictive regulatory actions and would encourage more optimum 
technologies through benevolent regulation, tax incentives, or subsidy. 
Government, as a benevolent big brother, would make a value judgment 
on what is good for society, and this decision would have the effect 
of limiting the present right of the public to vote with its dollars 
in the market place as to what products it wants and what negative 
consequences it is willing to accept in order to have the benefits 
it desires. If, for example, technology assessment should result in 
a legislative decision that cheap but dangerous lawn mowers are 
verboten, lawn movers would become unavailable to a segment of the 
public which can afford only cheap lawn mowers and is prepared to 
assume the risks in order to have the benefits. 
Implementation of the second objective would involve a rigorous 
analysiG of the potential benefits, costs, and risks of a technology 
and the striking of a balance on the basis of which the legislatures 
would make a judgment as to whether a' green light or a red light 
should be flashed for further development and use of thf'! technology, 
and if a green light, the manner in which the technology should 
proceed. Here again a value judgment would be made as to whether 
benefits outweigh risks and costs. In this connection, it should be 
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noted that the evaluation of both benefits and risks is based more on 
predictive judgments than on experience. Benefits, moreover, are 
usually much more obvious and immediate than risks, which, when con-
sidered on a predictive basis, tend to be remote, speculative, and 
subject to technological fixes (hoped for) that will minimize them. 
This concept gives me, as a lawyer, some concern. An explicit legis-
lative judgment that benefits outweigh risks could well have the 
effect of impairing 01. limiting the right of members of the public 
to seek legal redress or relief if they regarded the risks as unaccep-
table to them. For example, a legislative determination that a certain 
level of aircraft noise is acceptable in the light of the social 
benefits of aircraft might well have the effect of precluding someone 
who is in fact injured by the noise from obtaining redress or relief 
in the courts. 
In a large sense, there is really nothing unique or novel in 
consequences of this kind, Our legislatures have always made decisions 
of this nature and these consequences have in fact resulted. Still, 
technology assessment adds a new dimension which troubles me. Obviously 
no one could seriously question the desirability of our legislatures' 
having the maximum possible amount of authoritative information on 
benefits, risks and costs on the basis of which decisions may be made. 
It is institutionalization of the process of providing such information 
to the legislatures which troubles me. Most of the recent discussion 
of technology assessment seems to proceed on the assumption that there 
exist valid processes through which benefits and risks can be identified 
and quant~fied, and alternatives set forth, by specialized elite groups, 
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and that the legislatures can then make "correct" deci&ions in the 
light of value judgments. Indeed, some spokesmen for technology 
assessment go even further and talk as if the assessment exercise 
would be a waste of time if the legislatures did not reach the 
correct judgment indicated in the assessment. My own view is that 
neither benefits nor risks can be identified, let alone quantified, 
and that alternatives cannot be articulated, without some large value 
judgments on the part of the assessors as to what the public would 
regard as benefits and risks and the importance attached by the public 
to each item of benefit and risk. Thus, my concern is that the insti-
tutionalized technology assessment mechanism will serve to the legis-
latures a predigested body of information rooted in the value judgments 
of a small, narrow, elite group and that the result of the assessment 
process, if taken seriously by the legislatures, will greatly constrain 
the operation of the democratic processes in the ultimate decision-
making exercise. 
My concern in this respect is mitigated only by my confidence that 
technology assessments of this kind, no matter how authoritative the 
assessment body may be, will not in fact be accepted as conclusive by 
members of legislative bodies. The assessment will in all liklihood 
be just another informational input i.nto the legislative process, and 
legislative enactments will still be based on political compromises 
reflecting the prejudices, interests, and responses by legislators to 
the interests of their constituencies. 
In short, therefore, I believe t~chnology assessment is a highly 
useful exercise in maxitilizing the information available to legislattlres, 
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but I believe that those who regard it as a panacea, or even as an 
important form of therapy, are taking the concept much too seriously. 
A final point I would like to make relates to the role of the 
law itself in technology assessment. Since legislation resulting from 
technology assessment will be new law superseding or supplementing 
existing law, it is important that existing law be considered in the 
process of assessment. Moreover, since new law always has a disruptive 
effect on expectations and commitments arrived at under old law, it 
seems to me to be generally desirable that new legislation should make 
the least possible change in the law consistent with accomplishing 
the desired objective. This means, I think, that proposed alternative 
courses of action set forth in a technology assessment should include 
an assessment of the first order and secondary order consequences of 
any suggested changes in the law. In addition, before a technology 
assessment flashes a green light for advance of a technology, considera-
tion should be given to what legal changes may be necessary in the long 
run to regulate that technology. For example, one can visualize that 
some of the emerging biomedical technologies may require regulatory 
laws which could have a profound effect on tradLtional individual free-
doms. The necessity for such laws is obviously a kth-order consequence 
of the technology and should be considered in the assessment process. 
Thus, the technological capabiljty of predetermining the sex or the 
physical or mental attributes of a baby could well create social con-
ditions necessitating the licensing and regulation of marrLH,e, concep-
tion, or birth. Possibilities of this kind should be considered in 
technology assessments. 
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In this connection, I throw out a word of caution to those of 
you who believe that this a "lawyer-ridden world." Institutionaliza-
tion of technology assessment could well lead to the massive intrusion 
of legalistic processes into the assessment function. There already 
is an example of how this could happen. It has been suggested that 
the National Environmental Policy Act involves something closely akin 
to technology assessment. NEPA became law on January 1, 1970. There 
is no indication that anyone thought it would give rise to a spate of 
litigation. In its 30 months or so of life to date, there have been 
well over 100 court decisions involving NEPA and its procedures dealing 
with such questions as when NEPA is applicable; what elements must be 
considered in NEPA statements; who and what interests must and may 
participate in the NEPA process; etc. The same thing can ~appen to 
technology assessment. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the process of technology 
assessment discussed today is neither the beginning point nor the 
ending point in society's assessment of technology. Society has 
always had mechanisms for technology assessment. Today, the market 
place, the legal system, and th~ insurance mechanism all play an 
important role in technology assessment. If an institutionalized 
technology assessment mechanism is created, this will be superimposed 
upon and supplement the existing structure. The outputs of this 
assessment mechanism, assuming they are reflected in legislative 
action, will not be self-executing. They will merely change the rules 
of the game, and the marketplace, the legal system, and the insurance 
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mechanism will continue to perform their own assessment functions 
under the new rules. 
It is interesting, I believe, to note that the legal profession 
has shown relatively little interest in technology assessment. This 
is perhaps due to the fact that those from other disciplines who 
have been immersed in the assessment problem have not adequately 
recognized the relevance of legal institutions in technology 
assessment and therefore have not called for the lawyers' help. On 
the other hand, it may be that from the standpoint of the legal 
profession, the old maxim is relevant: "The more things seem to 
change, the more they are the same." 
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v. CASE STUDIES 
A. Early Experiences with the 
Hazards of Medical Use of 
X-Rays: 1896-1906 
Barbara S. MARX 
Fall 1968, pp. 58-68 
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OPERATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY ASSESS11ENT PROCESS 
IN EARLY F.XPF.HTRNr:r.S WTTH THE HAZARDS OF Ml~nrCAL USE OF X-RAYS 
A period of diffusion typically precedes the ass€',ssment of 
hazardous effects of a technologic.:al innovation, un.:ess tIlt' hazardous 
effects have been persuasively conjectured or extrapolated from 
the known hazards of similar situations. During the initial stage 
of the diffusion process the technological innovation is trit'd 
out in a preliminary way, and the basic questions of What is it? 
How does it work? and Wl1at can it do? are generally answered. 
The initial stage of the diffusion ~ro~eS$ is then followed 
by a process embodying some kind of technology assessment--which may 
be directed tm\7ard examining a great number of different 
effects, good and bad, resulting from the technological innovation; 
or may look mainly at socially detrimental effects; or in a still 
narrower focus, may evaluate hazardous effects. 
This paper will now consider the characteristics of the techno-
logy assessment process which were manifested in response to the 
hazardous effects of early medical uses of X-rays. In the interests 
of better organization of the analytical material, I wish to propose a model 
to describe the eat'ly stage of the technology assessment process 
with respect to medical X-rays. The model may be thought of as 
consisting of working hypotheses about the process. 
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1. Tentative MOdel Describing the Major Phases in the Early 
Stage of the Technology Assessment Process--The major phases of 
a technology assessment process directed toward the evaluation 
of hazards consist of: (1) identification, (2) assessment, and 
(3) control. These phases may proceed in a relatively orderly or 
disorderly way, may occur quite continuously or take place in a 
sporadic interrupted way, and may follow the identification-assess-
ment-control sequence in such a way that the phases are relatively 
discrete or, on the other hand, are relatively overlapping. 
Typically the phases overlap and in part cannot be clearly dis tin-
guished; nevertheless the categorizing notion of three major 
phases is helpful in characterizing the types of assessment acti-
vities predominating during each phase. 
(a) Identification Phase--l'he identification phase of 
the early stage of the technology assessment process is com-
prised of two sub-phases. The first consists of collecting 
preliminary information about the hazards. Two main types 
of activities may be thought of as occurring. A body of infor-
mation is g~adually accumulated about the immediate auJ rela-
tively immediate hazardous effects of using a particular 
technological innovation. In, addition the information about 
the hazards is winnowed and integrated to re.solve the discre~ 
pancies in a preliminary way. The outcome of the first part 
of the identification phase is to arouse information needs 
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relating to the two general questions of What are the causes 
of the hazardous effects1--an identification problem--and 
What should be done about the hazards?--which is more an 
assessment problem. 
The other sub-phase of the identification phase is represented 
by activities which collect preliminary information about the 
causes of the hazards and the cause-effect relationships. 
During this sub-phase the follOWing activities are likely to 
occur: debate about causes, collection cf new information, 
and partial resolving of dis~gr€ement about facts, terms, and 
concepts--for example, What are the severe hazards? What 
really happened in the severe cases? To how many persons, 
or with what frequency? What are the definitions of the terms 
being used? The outcome of the second sub-phase of the identi-
fication phase is to generate information needs relating to 
the general assessment question of What are the remedies for 
the generally agreed upon causes? 
(b) Assessment Phase--The assessment phase of the early 
stage of the technology assessment process consists of acquir-
ing inforn~tion about possible remedies and determining their 
effectiveness. Again, the collection of information, debate, 
and some form of resolution of the disagreements are activities 
that typically occur. The outcome of the assessment phase is 
to arouse information needs pertaining to the question of How 
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may the remedies be most effectively applied? and What control 
actions should be taken to implement them? 
(c) Control Phase--The control phase of the early stage of 
the technology assessment process is marked by activities 
which focus on means of controlling the hazards. Typically 
these activities are related to and_ concerned with the setting 
of informal standards and the establishment of some kind of 
monitoring structure. 
2. Brief Run-Through of the MOdel. Fitting in the Data. In 
order to give the reader a general impression of the fit of the model 
to the data, we will run through its major phases and show how 
these relate to the activities occurring during the early assess-
ment of hazards of medical X-rays. In categorizing the activities 
in terms of the phases, it must be remembered, as previously cau-
tioned, that the phases and activities comprising them are not neces-
sarily altogether. orderly, continuous, discrete, or in the specified 
sequence. Discrepancies and overlap exist. But on the whole the 
patterns of events fit the formulations of the model. 
(a) 'lhe Identification Phase and its Activities--'lhe medical 
X-ray pioneers began knowing only what the rays could do--i.e., 
make a "shadow" picture of certain anatomical structures beneath 
the skin; they did not know what X-rays were, or the damages 
which could result. X-rays were a mysterious form of "light" 
that was not accompanied by the sensation of heat. 'lherefore 
exposing human tissues to X-rays seemed as harmless as exposing 
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it to daylight. Nothing was known about suitable exposure 
dis tances, frequencies:1 or time-lengths, or abou t the varying 
intensities of rays discharged by various devices then utilized. 
But since X-rays were thought to be perfectly safe, these issues 
did not seem very important. For this reason also, animals 
were not used to anSWer experimental questions about the effects 
of X-rays. 
However, within the first year of use an awareness had 
already developed of some of the immediate Rdverse effects. 
In 1897, a number of medical articles had described adverse 
effects consisting mainly of "burns," but also of unhealing 
sores, depilation, and other injuries. Initially it was 
thought that just the skin was affected, and only several 
years later was it realized that underlying anatomical structures 
could be injured. Although throughout the decade, information 
was accumulated about the benefits and hazards of X-rays, 
within the first years the inunediate and many of the relatively 
inunediate hazards had been described and identified. 
The other sub-phase of the identification phase followed, 
with only a very short lag-time between it and the first sub-
phase in which t;he nature of the hazards ~'Jas ider..i:ifi.ed. 
Thus the two sub-phases overlapped for the most part. As 
can be expected, the identification of causes led to much more 
debate. In 1897 there had been some conjecture about th~ causes 
of X-ray injuries, and this swiftly increased, with active 
debate continuing until at least 1901. The burns were attributed 
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to ozone, chemicals, germs driven into the tissues, electrolytic 
actions of the current, static electricity, and particles. The 
X-rays themselves were not strongly implicated as a cause 
until Thompson made this point near the end of 1898. Even 
so, while history proved Thompson correct, his views were 
not widely accepted until several years later. 
Other subjects of debate related to facts, terms and concepts. 
It"was not clear with what frequency injuries occurred, or 
what were the accompanying circumstances that would explain 
why only some individuals suffered ill effects. 98 In 1897, 
Scott had reported the puzzling fact that the data he collected 
showed a mere 69 cases of,injury out of an estimated 20,000 ex-
posures. But reports of additional cases of injury continued 
to be made. Even so, the significance of Scott's data was 
questioned, with the contention that it was not known whether 
the injuries were actually caused by X-rays. 
One concept that persisted for a long time was that X-rays 
were not really harmful. During the debate about causes and 
frequencies of injury, the typical statements of reassurance 
and debunking of ill effects were made, predictably confusing 
the picture. For example, in 1898 Monell prophesied that 
the problem of X~ray burns would fade out of existence with the 
new improved equipment. He confidently asserted, "It is easy 
to avoid injuries during X-ray work; it is difficult to cause 
[ them,] ." Periodically during these years, statements were 
In 1900, both Scott and Kassabian had suggested the possibility of 
differing individual susceptibilities, but apparently the suggestion 
was ignored for some time. 
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made that X-ray burns were not a problem and that there was 
practically no danger. In 1901 Williams remarked with simi-
lar confidence: H'lhere is no reason for anxiety in regard to 
ill effects." And two years later he contended that the fre-
quency of injuries had been greatly exaggera~ed. 
To the reader of today, one of the more distressing debates 
was the semantic one relating to the definition of a burn. 
Up till then it was supposed that burns were caused only when 
detectable heat was generated. Thus an "X-ray burn" seemed 
a contradiction in terms. 'lhe argument over whether the common 
form of injury should be termed a burn absorbed attention and 
energy which might have been better spent. In retrospect 
the issue seems to have been a dead-end that delayed the assess-
ment process and contributed to the sources of disagreememt 
and confusion. 
(b) 'lhe Assessment Phase and its Activities--The assess-
ment phase consisted of acquiring information about possible 
remedies and examining their effectiveness. As early as 1898 
some safety precautions were recommended, and in the next years 
the question of how to prevent injuries received more consider-
ation. It may therefore be seen that the early part of the 
assessment phase overlapped a great deal with the identification 
phase. However, it was very rudimentary assessment, and the 
amount of space relegated to precautions in the medical articles 
was very small compared with space devoted to the identification 
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of causes.of injury. The remedies suggested show how little 
was really known then about the causes. The importance of 
distance between the patient and X-ray tube was emphasized early, 
and it was thought that excessive exposures lasting an hour or 
so could lead to adverse effects. The other remedies suggested--
such as using an aluminum screen or silk sheet to protect the 
patient--were later on realized to have little relevance. In 
1897 Thompson had ohserved that heavy lead glass had a shield-
ing effect, but the implications were not recognized until 
much later. Discussion about causes of injuries and their 
prevention still focused mostly on the patient, whereas the 
effects upon the practitioner were little considered. 
By 1903 Williams suggested coating the,X-ray tube with 
white lead paint and using leaded glass to protect the operator's 
eyes. We see that with medical X-rays, during the early 
stage of the technological assessment process, relatively few 
activities can be classified as fitting into the assessment 
phase, for during the first 'decade of use very little infor-
mation about possible remedies had been developed. 
(c) The Control Phase and its Activities--Even fewer activities 
may be viewed as pertinent to the control phase. There were 
some efforts near uhe end of the decade to apply some fairly 
generally agreed upon precautions, but not in any systematic 
way. The control phase, in the initial stage of technology 
assessment of medical X-rayR" falls mainly outside the time period 
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studied in this paper. It was soon after to be marked by 
the realization that ways of measuring the intensity of 
X-ray exposures would have to be developed, so that some in-
formal standards could be described and applied. 
3. Possible Characteristics of Subsequent Stages of the Tech-
no10gy Assessment Process--The formulations about the phases of the 
early stage of the technology assessment process have been based 
for the most part on analysis of the data presented in Part I of 
the paper. If these formulations are somewhat speculative, those 
referring to the possible characteristics of subsequent stages in 
the process must be deemed even more speculative. It is, however, 
conjectured that the technology assessment process during its later 
stages recycles through the phases of identification, assessment, 
and control but very probably with a number of notable differences. 
One apparent difference is that the early stage's phases are 
characterized by relatively informal and rudimentary efforts to 
establish: (1) the nature and causes of the hazards, (2) the most 
effective remedies, and (3) the type of control actions which 
should be taken so the remedies will be adequately applied. By 
contrast, in the later stages of the technology assessment process 
the activities seem to become more formal or codified, more intensive, 
and more sophisticated. More subtle concepts of the hazards and 
their causative factors emerge. At the same time the phases of iden-
tification, assessment, and control interpenetrate much more, 
with the result that they are less sequential. 
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Related to this is very likely nnother important difference 
between the early and subsequent stages in the technology assess-
ment process. There appears to be a trend for the stages to move 
from a simple form of the assessment process to a complex form, 
with each stage becoming increasingly more complex. Rarely does 
a subsequent stage seem to be simpler than the one preceding it, 
in terms of the number of participant structures and information 
dissemination structures. Consequently perhaps the dilemma of the 
early stage of technology assessment is that, although the partici-
pant structures and information dissemination structures are quite 
simple and easy to deal with, little tends to be known about the 
hazards and little exists in the way of formal regulatory structures. 
Correspondingly, perhaps the dilemma in the later stages of assess-
ment is that while more is known about the hazards and more regula-
tory structures have evolved, the increasingly greater number of 
participant and information dissemination structures, and the frag-
mentation of the assessment process they cause, verges on the chaotic. 
The result is to overtax the capabilities of whatever overall 
decision-making and administrative bodies exist. 
This paper has presented data depicting representative early 
experiences with the hazards of medical X-rays duripg the first 
decade of their use. The reasons for the rapidity of the initial 
diffusion of X-ray applications have been discussed in considerable 
detail, and a simple model of the diffusion process suggested. 
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Some comparisons between X-ray diffusion "then" and "now" were out-
lined, with emphasis on changes which have occurred in the amount 
of information available and in the medical communication network. 
Then, based on analysis of the kinds and sequences of activities 
found in the data, a tentative model was proposed describing the 
major phases in the early stage of the technology assessment process. 
In the concluding section, conjectures were made about what differences 
might distinguish the early stage of technology assessment from its 
later stages. 
Although in this preliminary study no effort has been made / 
to demonstrate the detailed fit of the model of the technology 
assessment process to the events set forth in the data~ if the reader 
runs through the phases and sub-phases of the model and systematically 
plugs in the data, he will find that the evidence here strongly 
substantiates the model. But the proof of the model is what it 
can do. If the present formulation looks promising~ then to be of 
value the model will require further development. Further work 
with the model should be useful in testing and refining it, and I 
appraising to what extent it can be used as a tool for investiga- 1 
"--;.-'0.,.-
:f.i'/ 
ting and analyzing the process underlying other technology assess-
ment situations. I 
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Controlling the Potential Hazards of 
Government-Sponsored Technology 
MICHAEL WOLLAN· 
Introduction 
Side effects of science and technology today threaten to overrun our means of 
controlling them. Air and water pollution, power blackouts, radiation dam-
age and many other technologically-created hazards have had the sobering 
effect of impressing many public officials with the need for wise management 
of scientific and technological change. In Congre:zs this concern is being fo-
cused on Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario's Subcommittee on Science, Re-
search and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
which is holding hearings and seminars on methods of "identifying, assessing, . 
publicizing and dealing with the implications of applied research and tech-
nology."l In the executive branch, the Office of Science and Technology is 
discussing proposals for a Fourth Branch of Government that would antici-
pate and control the medical, social, political and economic ramifications of 
applications of science and technology. 
Moreover, numerous examples from the recent history of technological 
change demonstrate that an essential part of the planning for technology as-
sessment must be the continuation of assessment after government policy with 
respect to a scientific or technological im:ovation has been initially developed. 
For instance, fifteen years after atomic weapons tests Were performed in 
Nevada, health authorities in Washington County, Utah, felt the need to ex-
• Research Associate, Program in Law, Science and Technology, National Law Center, 
The George Washington University. B.A., University of Chicago; LL.B., Yale University. 
1. Technology Assessment, statement issued by Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Science, Research and Development of the House Comm. on Science and Astro-
nautics, 90th Cong., 1S.t Sess., at 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Daddario Statement]. 
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amine children for possible effects of fallout from the tests. Many years after 
the introduction of the internal combustion engine, we began to appreciate 
the seriousness of pollution problems caused by tetraethyl lead in automo-
bile fuels. And after the Navy systematically sprayed an island off the coast of 
New Jersey during World War II to eliminate hoards of flies it discovered that 
the spray, DDT, killed fish.2 
The need for re-assessment has been particularly apparent with respect to 
drugs and chemicals that people regularly consume, because medical knowl-
edge of the effects of chemical compounds on people is constantly changing. 
The Food and Drug Administration, for instance, requires that aU reports of 
adverse effects of drugs be submitted to its specialists for study, even after the 
drugs have been approved for sale and distribution. A recent survey of leading 
chemists and biologists in the United States indicates that many scientists 
who endorse fluoridation as a public health measure also believe that con-
tinued research on the effects of fluorides on human beings is desirable. The fact 
that fluoridation involves the regular ingestion of a chemical whose effects 
were not fully understood or examined at the time it was endorsed by the Public 
Health Service underscores the need for continuing assessment. 
Although the concept of Technology Assessment is not new,3 the present 
patterns of massive federal support of research and development were stim-
ulated by World War II and now have led almost every government agency 
into programs that involve applications of science and technology! Who 
assesses the impacts of these programs; for what purposes; through what 
means, mechanisms and procedures; and, with what results? These are ques-
tions this article analyzes by case studies that provide some insight into how 
the technology assessment function is currently being performed. 
Weather Modification 
Since the evolution of the most primitive societies, men have attempted to 
control their environment by modifying the weather.1i In the United States, 
Congress, in 1890, sponsored early scientific efforts to make rain, when the 
Department of Agriculture received $9,000 to produce rain by setting off ex-
plosives in the clouds.6 Not until 1946/ though, were controlled laboratory ex-
2. For an interesting discussion of these and similar problems, see Commoner, Science 
and Survival (1966). 
3. As early as 1830 our Federal Gpvernment began to assess technology. A series of 
boiler explosions on steamboats brought pressure on the Congress to take corrective 
action. lack of information on why boilers burst prompted Congress to direct the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to act. In turn, the executive branch, unable to make much head-
way granted research funds to the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia to conduct 
experiments to produce the body of data necessary to locate flaws in design, con-
struction, and theory of steam boilers. Regulatory legislation even tually resulted. 
Daddario Statement, supra note 1, at 10. 
4. For 11 description of federal suppOrt of science and technology, see XVI Nat'l Science 
Foundation, Federal Funds for Research, Development and Other Scientific Activities 
(1967)' 
5. See Halaey, The Weather Changers (1968). 
6. Baum, Congressional Action on Weather Modification (paper for Symposium on 
Weather Modification, Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Science. N.Y., Dec. 30, 1967). 
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Technology Assessment and the Law 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
periments used to demonstrate a method of increasing precipitation by seeding 
clouds with pellets of dry ice. In the 22 years since these experiments were 
performed at General Electric, weather research has progressed to such an ex-
tent that scientists are now able to produce significant changes in rainfall, tor-
nadoes, lightning, hail and fog. "[IJn a sense, weather modification today is a 
reality. Man can and does interfere with the atmosphere in a number of differ-
ent ways. His ability to produce deliberate beneficial changes is still very lim-
ited and uncertain, but it is no longer either economically or politically 
trivial.n7 
For many years novel legal problems raised by rainmaking have puzzled 
the courts. For example, in the late 19th century, when a severe drought struck 
northern New York, a minister named Duncan McLeod organized a commu-
nity prayer session to ask for rain. Within three hours a tremendous storm 
blew over the area, bringing two inches of rain. Lightning destroyed a barn 
owned by phineas Dodd, who had been the only person in the community who 
openly objected to the prayer session. Dodd promptly sued Reverend McLeod 
for $500, arguing that the loss of the barn was a direct result of the prayers he 
organized. Defense counsel finally persuaded the court that defendant had only 
prayed for rain, and the lightning had been a gratuitous gift of God.s 
As the range of controllable weather phenomena expands, more complex 
biological, ecological and political problems arise. For instance, suppose we 
are able to prevent hurricanes from battering the coast of Florida by redirecting 
them iltto the Atlantic or the Caribbean. How will other countries in the 
area be affected? What diplomatic approaches are necessary to work out ar-
rangements which will allow us to protect Florida from hurricane damage 
without deliberately inflicting this damage on another country? How will our 
ability to control rain and snowfall affect biological communities? Will repro-
ductive cyd~s be influenced, and if so, how? More important, will weather 
modification methods become instruments of warfare? What steps should be 
taken to assure that the benefits to society of weather control will be maxi-
mized and the hazards minimized? 
Generally, definitions of weather modification encompass both intentional 
and inadvertent changes in atmospheric processes, motions or compositions. 
Intentional changes include rainmaking and control of lightning, hail and 
severe storms, while inadvertent changes usually refer to the consequences of 
air pollution. 
Major programs of the federal government to modify the weather deliber-
ately began after World 'War ITl and have gone through three stages: 1) the 
period from World War II to 1958, 2) 1958-1965,3) 1066 to the present. 
7. I Nat'! Academy of Sciences, Weather and Climate Modification: Problems and 
Prospects 3 (T966) [hereinafter cited as Na!'l Academy of Sciencesj. 
8. Partidgc, Country Lawyer ch. 7 (:1939). 
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Stage One: Early Federal Involvement 
I 
f 
Although the Congress supported isolated weather modification experiments 
around the tum of the century, long range federal programs of weather control 
research did not begin until after World War II. In 1947 the armed services 
initiated investigations of cloud modifications through Project Cirrus, since 
the Air Force was interested in the advantages increased knowledge of cloud 
behavior would provide for fliers. Project Cirrus was followed in 1952 by a 
Department of Defense five year Artificial Cloud Nucleation Project. 
These early projects were confined primarily to research for military pur-
poses, and were conducted on a small scale compared with the multi-million 
dollar activities of commercial rainmakers in the early 1950'S. Rainmaking 
companies were responsible for most advances in non-military applications of 
weather modification in the first decade after the War as droughts in several 
sections of the country aroused considerable concern, particularly among far-
mers, and private organizations were often hired to try to increase precipita-
tion. 
After 1950 a number of Congressmen began to think more seriously about 
the possibilities of the federal govemment sponsoring research into civilian 
uses of weather modification. Fear that the Soviet Union migh't develop weath-
er control knowledge that could be used to disrupt American agriculture, cou-
pled with concern about drought in the West, led Congress to consider an eval-
uation of the current state of knowledge of the weather. In 1953, Congress 
created the Advisory Committee on Weather Control, headed by Retired 
Navy Captain Howard Orville, to "make a complete study and evaluation of 
public and private experiments in weather control for the purpose of determin-
ing the extent which the United States should experiment with, engage in, or 
regulate activities designed to control weather conditions."g 
Although the Orville Committee's primary task was to review existing ca-
pabilities for weather modification, Congress was aware of some possible ad-
verse consequences of experimentatior; with the weather. The Statement of 
Purpose and Policy which Congress adopted for the Committee noted that 
weather control "without proper safeguards, sufficient data, and accurate infor-
mation may ... adversely affect the general welfare and common defense."lo 
The bill setting "UP the Committee declared it to be the policy of Congress to 
prevent the "hannful and indiscriminate exercise" of "experiments and opera-
tions designed to modify and control weather."u 
The Committee's final report, issued in December, 1957, provided Congress 
with the first~complete review of weather modification research in this coun-
try. Given the data of the report and its recummendations for vast expansion of 
igovemment-sponsored research, Congress was ready to advance to the next 
stage in the development of national weather modification programs-selec-
tion of agencies to sponsor research, and appropriation of funds. 
9. 99 Congo Rec. :(()G60 (1953)' 
10. rd. 
u. rd. The Committee devoted relatively little attention to these problems. 
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Technology Assessment and the Law 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
Stage Two: The Growth of Federal Programs 
Public Law 85-51.0. At the urging of the OrvUle Committee, Congress in Pub-
lic Law 85-510, approved July 11., 1.958, designated the National Science Foun-
dation to "initiate and support a program of study, research, and evaluation in 
the field of weather modification .... "12 
During the hearings on 85-5.Lu, two arguments, frequently repeated, were 
most influential in persuading Congress of the need for establishment of 10ng-
range national weather modification programs. First, as Senator Francis Case 
pointed out, 
[EJconomically the possible importance of this bill to the Nation and to the 
world is tremendous .... We spend hundreds of millions of dollars to counter-
act and alleviate weather caused disasters, or, I might say, to overcome 
situations created by a lack of knowledge about the weather or what is coming. 
It is my earnest conviction that what the Congress does to authorize an orderly 
experimentation and evaluation program in cloud modification will have last-
ing significance for conditions of drought, floods, hurricanes, hail, lightning, 
fog, and smog.t3 
Second, a number of Senators and Congressmen were greatly concerned 
about the possibility that the Soviet Union would progress more rapidly 
than the United States in the field of weather control. They were troubled by 
the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller, who asked the House Commerce Commit-
tee to "Please imagine a world in which the R1,I.ssians can control weather on a 
big scale, where they can change the rainfall over Russia, and that-and here 
I am talking about a very definite situation-that might very well influ-
ence the rainfall in our country in an adverse manner."H 
Little attention was paid during the congressional hearings .md debates to 
possible adverse consequences of weather modification or the likelihood of 
detrimental results of experiments. 
Under 85-51.0 NSF promptly established a program of research, through 
grants and contracts, to study further the scientific bases of weather and 
climate modification. In the program's first year of operation, $1..1.41. million 
were spent.15 Funds for the program continued to be appropriated at the rate 
of between one and two million dollars a year, gradually increasing to $3.5 
million in 1.968.16 While NSF has allocated this money to support basic sci-
entific weather research, other agencies, malniythe Departments of Agricul-
ture, Commerce and the Interior, have slowly and independently built their 
12. 42 U.S.c. § :1B62(a)(9) (:1964). 
:13. Hearings on Weather Modification Research Before a Subcomfh. of the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, B5th Cong;/ 2d Sess./ at B (1:9S8). 
:14. Id. at 9. i 
:15. Nat'l Science Foundation, Ann. Rep.: Weathe.s Modification 3 (1:959). ... 
:16. Interview with P.'ter Wyckoff, Program Director for Weather Modification, Nat'l 
Science Foundation, in Wash., D.C. 
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own programs to investigate uses of weather control specifically iof interest 
to them. 
De'Delopment of Programs in the Other Agencies. The Bureau of Rec'iamation, 
in the Department of the Interior, has financed limited research into snow and 
rainfall for over seven years because of its interest in water resources in the 
Western states. Until :1964 these efforts only received about $:100,000 a year in 
financial support from Congress, but then Senator Alan Bible of Nevada and 
other Senators from the West began to push for huge increases in appropria-
tions for projects designed to augment water resources in the Upper Colorado 
River Basin.17 Senator Bible, who was specifically interested in experimenta-
tion with methods of rainmaking, led a fight that secured an appropriation 
of approximately $:1 million for the Bureau of Reclamation's weather modifi-
cation research in fiscal year 1.965. Since then, funds allocated to Interior's 
weather modification research and development programs have risen regular-
ly. For fiscal year :1968 Interior will spend $5.1. million to control the weather 
-almost fifty per cent more than any other agency, including the National Sci-
ence Foundation.I8 
During the same period, the Department of Agriculture has pursued its pro-
grams of lightning suppression, spending the modest amount of one to two 
hundred thousand dollars a year.19 The Federal Aviation Agency's research 
into fog dispersal has cost even less each year, while the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the Department of Defense have similarly allo-
cated money for a few small-scale weather control projects.20 
The Department of Commerce is the only other agency that has made major 
efforts to expand its weather and climate control programs since the Orville 
Committee submitted its final repor.t and Congress enacted Public Law 85-5:10. 
Until :1966, Commerce support of weather modification never rose above 
$250,000 a year due to the skept:.:al view which its Weather Bureau had to-
ward the future of weather control. In the past three years, however, the De-
partment's Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) has en-
thusiastically promoted a wide range of weather control projects, including 
efforts to modify hurricanes, increase rainfall, divert the energy of tornadoes 
and suppress hail. This year ESSA will spend $1..5 million on weather modifica-
tion, and hopes to triple that amount by 1.970.21 
To avoid duplication of weather modification projects, the agencies engaged 
in weather research have used an Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospher-
ic Sciences to exchange informati~n and coordinate programs. Annual meet-
17. Hearings on Progress in Weather Modification Before the Subcomm. on Water 
and Power Resources of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Conlh 
1St Sess., at 1:1 (1967). 
18. Hearings on Wellther Modification Before the Subcomm. on Comtnunications and 
Power of the House Comm. on Interstale and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1St Sess., 
at42 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Weather Modification]. 
19. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, supra note 7, at 15. 
20. ld. Exact amounts being spent by the Department of Defense are not public since 
many of the projects are classified. 
21. Hearings on Weather Modification, supra note 18. 
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ings of all officials involved in weather control are arranged by leAS to en-
courage exchanges of ideas and reports on successes and failures rnet by each 
agency. ICAS does not attempt to plan or regulate the Government's weather 
modification I!.ctivities. Occasionally, the Committee may recommend that one 
agency eliminate a proposed experiment because similar work is being under-
taken by another agency, but in general, ICAS serves only as a clearinghouse 
for information on federal weather modification research. 
As Interior, Agriculture, the FAA, ESSA and NASA have joined the Nation-
al Science Foundation in support of weather modification efforts in the past ten 
years, their programs have focused primarily on establishing the feasibility 
of scientific methods for controlling the weather. Interior, because of its mis-
sion-oriented projects in the area of water resources, has sought to find ways 
of augmenting precipitation. Agriculture, because of its responsiblities for the 
farm economy, has been interested in how weather control can reduce crop 
dam~ge. The FAA, because of its concern for air safety, has tried to find meth-
ods of removing heavy fogs trat hang over airports. In general, all of these 
government programs have endeavored to overcome skepticism among many 
scientists about man's ability to subject the weather to his control. But almost 
no studies or" funds were devoted to investigation of the legal, biological, eco-
logical or social consequences of weather modification throughout the late 
1950'S and early 1960'S. 
Appointment of NSF and NAS Study Groups. By 1963, a number of Adminis-
tration people and some Congressmen felt that a general reevaluation of the 
results of weather modification, similar to the study of the Orville Commit-
tee, was due. On October 17 NSF's National Science Board authorized appoint-" 
ment of a Special Commission on Weather Modification to review the "state 
of knowledge on weather and climate modification, make recommendations 
concenting future policies and programs and examine the adequacy of the 
Foundation's program."22 In November, the National Academy of Sciences also 
appointed a Panel on Weather and Climate Modification "to undertake a de-
liberate and thoughtful review" of the status of weather modification and its 
potential. 23 . 
The NSF and NAS study groups were closely conn~cted from their concep-
tion, since NSF provided fifty per cent of the money for the NAS study.24 To 
avoid duplication of their efforts, and to assure that the many complex prob-
lems of weather modification received adequate treatment, the two organiza-
tions agreed that NSF would concentrate on the non-scieIltific aspects while 
the Academy would focus on scientific and technical matters. Together the two 
22. Special Comm'n on Weather Modification, Nael Science Foundation, Report on 
Weather and Climate Modification 6 (1965). 
2,3. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, supra note 7, at vii. 
24. Id. at ix. 
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hoped to provide a comprehensive analysis of what had happened in weather 
modification programs since the Orville Committee report. As the NAS Panel 
explained later in the preface to its final report: "The complexion of the field 
had changed subtly since the appearance in 1957 of the final report of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Advisory Committee of Weather Control. It was time for a 
new and broader evaluation."25 The Panel and the Special Commission com"' 
pleted their work within a month of each other. The published results ushered 
in the next stage in the development of federal weather modification policies. 
Stage Three: Emergence of New Dimensions in Federal Policy 
The].lAS and NSF Reports. In November, 1965, the National Academy's Panel 
submitted its final report,2ft followed a month later by the conclusions and rec-
ommendations of the NSF Special Commission.27 In a careful, detailed review 
0'£ progress with respect to modification uf clouds, cloud systems, climates in 
large areas and climates in local and regional areas, the Panel concluded that 
scientific means for bringing about limited forms of weather control were 
already available, and investment of large sums of federal money promised 
even more progress in the immediate future. Given this persuasive evidence 
that "weather and climate modification is becoming a reality,,,28 the NSF 
Special Commission sought to make the public, the scientific community, the 
Congress and other government agencies aware of five. crucial questions: 
1) What may be the biological consequences of we·ather and climate modifi-
cation activities? 
2) What might be the sociat human and economic benefits to man? 
3) Are there legal, politicaL and legislative issues to be resolved? 
4) How should the plans of the United States in weather and climate modifi-
cation be communicated to and coordinated with other nations? 
5) What are the organizational and funding needs for a national program 
in weather and clinlate modification? 
None of these questions were thoroughly answered in the report, but the 
need to explore them in depth was spelled out explicitly. For Instance, com-
menting on biologkal implications, the report noted that 
Anything that has a general and significant effect upon plants and animals, 
making some more abundant, others less so, is of primary concern to mankind, 
for it strikes at the very basis of human existence. Changes in weather and cli-
mate may be expected to have such effects. It follows that any program of 
weather and climate modification must give serious attention to adverse as 
well as beneficial biological aspects.29 
Regarding social effects, the report mentioned that 
25. Ill. at vii. 
26. I &: II Nat'l Academy of Sciences, Weather and Climate Modification: Problems 
and Pro.peets (X966). 
27. Report on Weather and Climate Modification, supra note 22. 
2B. Id. at B. 
2S1' Ill. at :iB. 
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As indicated by the lack of social research about weather modification since 
the 1957 report of the Advisory Committee on Weather Contro!, when uncer-
tainty concerning the feasibility of extensive weather modification is large the 
social implications tend to remain unexplored until a major problem erupts. 
The Commission feels strongly that this should not be the course of events 
in the future. All agencies engaged in weather modification attempts should 
give systematic attention to the social implications.so 
And with respect to international problems, the report concluded that 
Looking into the future to the time when field experiments with weather or 
climate modification are expanded in scope and number and involve actual at-
tempts to introduce changes in the atmosphere, some form of international 
collaboration will be essential in the planning and execution of projects .... 
Thought must be given to the types of international organizations that will be 
needed, and the functions they should perform . . . .31 
Both the NSF and NAS reports urged expansion of federal programs of research 
and recommended that the level of funding be raised from $9 million a year 
in 1967 to $30 million by 1970. They also suggested that program direction 
be assigned to a single agency, although both qualified this point by stating 
that "a degree of delegated responsibility should be maintained that will allow 
other agencies to meet their mission requirements for work in this field."s2 
Impact of the Reports. The NAS and NSF reports acted as catalysts, immedi-
ately prompting wider debate on the non-scientific problems of weather modi-
fication and on the question of how federal weather research should be struc-
tured. To follow up on its own recommendations for research into the social 
aspects of weather control, NSF established a Task Group on the Human Di-
mensions of the Atmosphere, to determine ways in which research on the 
human dim.ensions of weather modification might be encouraged, and to 
outline types of research requiring most urgent attention. The Task Group's 
final report is expected this summer. NSF also arranged for Southern Methodist 
University to sponsor a conference in December, 19'7, on the Legal Impli-
cations of Weather. Modification Activity. 
In addition, other agencies connected with weather modification programs 
have in the last two years undertaken independent studi~s of various so-
cial, legal a.nd ecological effects of weather modification. The Interior, Com-
merce and Agriculture Departments have contracted with several universities 
to study such issues as federal liability for damages due to weather modifica-
tion' experiments, the effects of experiments on crops, and the effects of in-
creased precipitation on plants ami animals in localized areas. These studies 
are now in progress. 
30. Id. at 23. 
31. Id. at 26-27. 
32. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, supra note 7r at 2:1.. 
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Moreover, the agencies have begun to think more about how to structure 
federal weather modification programs so that the non-scientific consequences 
would be regularly taken into account in the planning and execution of proj-
ects. On March 29, 1.966, Dr. Donald F. Hornig asked ICAS to prepare a report 
on the organization of federal weather control programs.3S Dr. Homer E. New-
ell of NASA agreed to write the report, and in November he submitted a 
''Recommended National Program in Weather Modification." Newell strongly 
expressed his feelings that "there must be regulation and control of weather 
modification activities ... to provide a m.echanism for protection against 
harmful consequences of weather modification but also to permit valid ex-
perimentation."u He added that lithe regulatory body must not be one of the 
operating agencies participating in the National Weather Modification Pro-
gram. To assign this responsibility to one of these agencies would immedi-
ately generate conflicts of interest, sow the seeds of dissension, and doom the 
efforts at regulation and control to endless frustration. liS II 
Finally, the reports have led Congress to assume a more active role in assess-
ing the economic and social impact of weather modification activities. Senator 
Warren Magnuson's interest in weather modification was aroused enough by 
the reports that he asked the Legislative Reference Service to prepare an exten-
sive rcpnrt on "Weather Modification and Control" for the Senate Commerce 
Committee.ss 
Thus, the NAS and NSF reports in effect added new dimensions to the 
development of weather modification policies by stimulating greater interest 
in non-scientific issues and in regulatory structures that would attempt to 
further scientific progress in weather control while minimizing the hazards 
such progress might create for the public and the environment. 
The Current Status of Weather Modificat"IUn. The surge of interest during the 
past two years in assessment of the social consequences of weather modification 
has not meant that programs of research or experimentation on methods of 
weather c(,ntrol have been curtailed. On the contrary, the programs of NSF, In-
terior, Commerce and Agriculture continue to expand, as the NSF and NAS re-
ports recommended. for example, Project Stormfury, conducted jointly by 
ESSA and the Navy, will attempt this fall to disperse or change the direction 
of hurricanes in the Caribbean. ESSA this year will also be trying to reduce the 
huge levels of snow which plague the area around Buffalo, New York, and In-
terior has an extensive program for combatting the water shortage problems 
in the Southwest by modifying rainfall in the Rocky Mountains. In general, 
)). Newell, NASA, Report on a Recommended National Program in Weather Modi-
fication to the Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences (1966) (Federal 
Council for Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, Nov. 1966, preface). 
)4. ld. at 7· 
)5. ld. at )6. 
)6. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Report on Weather Modifica" 
tion and Control (1966). 
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$10.55 million will be spent on federal weather modification programs in 
1968, comp-ued with only $7 million in 1966.87 
Congress has been prodded by the NSF, NAS and Newell reports (just as it 
was prodded ten years ago by the Orville report) to review the structure of fed-
eral programs and to consider the need for new legislation that would broaden 
the regulatory authority of the Government and assign direction of federal 
programs to a single agency. The bill receiving most attention, H.R. 9212/ 
would give primary authority for weather modification research to the De-
partment of Commerce, while allowing other departments to carry out pro-
grams in specified areas. Non-federal weather modification activities would be 
regulated by the Secretary of Commerce under authority granted by the bill. 
And responsibility for "thorough study and investigation" of social, econom-
ic, biological and ecological effects of weather modification would be dele-
gated to the Secretary of Commerce. 
Hearings on H.R. 9212 were held in October and November, 19671 by the 
House Commerce Committee, but at the moment the bill is still in committee. 
Committee staff members indicate there is little hope for passage this year. 
Until new legislation is enacted, weather modification programs will continue 
in the various agencies at levels depending on the appropriations each agency 
can obtain from Congress. Some of the wacial consequences will be studied, as 
they are now, under grants and contracts issued from each agency. Although 
there will be no systematic planning or centralized regulation of federal weath-
er modification projects, ICAS will continue to compile information on them 
and advise the departments or agencies of possible duplications in their efforts. 
Technology Assessment in the Field of Weather Modification-
An Evaluation 
Frequently important social implications of a scientific method or invention 
are discovered long after extensive use has been made of the particular device. 
For instance, when oil from the freighter Torrey Canyon polluted the English 
coast, thousands of gallons of detergents were used to restore beaches to their 
pre-disaster condition. Now scientists have discovered that the detergents were 
more harmful to birds, plants and marine life than was the oil. 
In the field of weather modification, however, many scientists, Congress-
men, and government officials are already aware of possible adverse conse-
quences. No fonnal assessment institutions or mechanisms, and no major dis-
asters, were necessary to inform those government officials or scientists who 
were responsible for initiating federal weather modification experiments of the 
37. Hearings on Weather Modification, supra note 18; Nat'l Science Foundation, Ann. 
Rep.: Weather Modification 91 (1966). 
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existence of non-scientific ramifications of weather control. But the level of 
concern about the consequences of weather modification has changed since 
1953, and two groups, the NSF Special Commission and the NAS Panel, were 
primarily responsible for shifting interest in these questions from general dis-
cussions to specific, analytical programs of study and research. Prior to 1965, 
despite the work of the Orville Committee, many people still doubted whether 
the future of weather modification was bright enough to justify expediture of 
large amounts of government funds in research programs or experiments. 
The National Academy's report eliminated almost all of these doubts. The NSF 
report, in turn, directed attention to the kinds of legal, ecological and biologi-
cal problems which will occur more and more frequently as the number and 
range of weather control experiments expand. 
For the purposes of understanding what institutions or mechanisms are the 
most effective instruments of technology assessment, it is important to note 
that the current level of interest in social consequences of weather modifica-
tion was induced by groups which did not operate mission-oriented weather 
control programs. Government agencies responded to the reports of the NAS 
and NSF, but did little to investigate the non-scientific ramifications of weath-
er control prior to publication of the reports at the end of 1965. A possible 
explanation for the failure of these other agencies to initiate such studies is 
that to Interior, or Agriculture, or the FAA, weather modification devices are 
merely tools to be used to accomplish its mission of conserving water resources, 
protecting farm crops or promoting air safety. The agency thus is likely to 
allocate its limited resources to programs that demonstrate the feasibility and 
applicability of weather modification. NSF, however, has broader responsi-
bilities for financing scientific research and development in general. 
As technology ~,ssessment institutions, NSF and the Academy Panel not 
only stimulat.ed greater interest in some of the implications of weather mod-
ification, but they performed this function prior to the launching of weather 
control experiments affecting mass populations. Therefore, many questions 
about weather modification are now being studied by government agencies in 
anticipation of situations in which large numbers of people, plants or animals 
might be injured by reckless experiments. 
Nevertheless, NSF, the NAS Panel and other existing agencies have limita~ 
tions as, assessment institutions that are dramatized by noting some of the 
issues in weather modification not being thoroughly treated: 
1. Who should decide what region of the country will be the subject of a 
weather modification experiment, and how should that decision be made 1 These 
ql:cstions are important as long as there is uncertainty about the possible con-
sequences of the experiment, and such uncertainty is present with most weather 
experiments today. For instance, some scientists believe it is possible to re-
duce the severity of some hail storms by seeding clouds. However, the seeding 
must take place at a critical time and altitude, or the severity of the storm 
might be increased instead of diminished. Thus, the question of how the deci-
sion is made to conduct the experiment in state X instead of state Y becomes 
significant. Should the people in the area be consulted? How much should 
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they be told about the risks involved in the experiment? The NSF and NAS 
reports dealt with questions of a more general nature, and the agencies cur-
rently engaged in weather modification programs have been reluctant to at-
tempt to lay down guidelines for deciding these questions. Most officials 
connected with the programs feel that since they are aware of the possible 
serious consequences of experimentation, the public can trust them to conduct 
the experiments with a minimum of risk. Probably general regulations gov-
erning choice of sites, timing of experiments and notice to persons likely to 
be affected should be drawn up by an agency which would not have a mission-
oriented interest in weather modification programs. 
2. The National Academy's Panel, the NSF Special Commission and the 
Newell report to ICAS all urged that a federal regulatory structure for weather 
modification be established.The NAS recommendation was particularly strong: 
We recommend that attention be given immediately to careful monitoring and 
regulation of operational programs for weather modification. New legisla-
tion will be required, and this legislation should reflect the economic, political, 
social, and scientific implications of the programs. To ensUre maximum over-
all benefit and public welfare, legislation should include means of assigning to 
a single federal agency, possibly created for this and related purposes, the 
responsibility for monitoring and regulating operations and ensuring the pub-
lication of full reports. Such an agency should have powers and resources to 
conduct independent evaluations, and may need the authority to adjudicate 
among conflicting projects.ss 
No regulatory system has been set up, although legislation authorizing f~g­
ulation of non-federal operations has received some attention. H.R. 921.2, 
pending before the House Commerce Committee, would allow the Secretary of 
Commerce 
after notice and opportunity for a hearing, to issue regulations governing the 
weather modification activities of any person or persons not engaging in ~;uch 
activities pursuant to contract, lease, cooperative agreement, grant, or other 
transaction with agencies of the Federal Government, which conflict with or 
impede any activities conducted under this Act and to encourage compliance 
with such regulations by such business concerns.3D 
There is little likelihood, however, of committee action on the bill this year. 
Some limited rules governing weather modification projects have been is-
sued by sponsoring agencies. For instance, in Project Stormfury's experi-
- ments with hurricanes, ESSA has informally ruled that "a hurricane in the 
southwestern North Atlantic will be considered eligible for seeding as long as 
there is a small probability (10% or less) of the hurricane center coming within 
38. Nat'! Academy of Sciences, supra note 7, at 23. 
39. H.R. 9212, 90th Cong., :J:st Sess. § 205(a) (1967)' 
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50 miles of a populated land area within the ensuing 2411ours."40 This regula-
tion reflects ESSA's understanding that its experiments may not produce the 
hurricane behavior predicted, and therefore steps must be taken to protect 
people and property in the Caribbean or North Atlantic that might be adversely 
alected by experiments. 
In; general though, there has been much reluctance to create a regulatory 
-sency ot to issue broad regulations that would limit weather modification 
experiments conducted by the federal government.41 H.R. 9212 would apply 
only to non-federal activities, and the agencies involved in federal activities 
have not attempted to develop detailed regulations for weather control 
projects. 
There are two basic reasons why, despite the conclusions of the NAS Panel, 
the NSF Special Commission and the Newell report, a federal regulatory struc-
ture for weather modification has not emerged. First, the operating agencies are 
hesitant to allow a new agency such as a National Weather Modification Com-
mission to have the power to regulate the manner in which their experi-
ments are selected or conducted, fearing that a Commission might, through 
unn~cessarily conservative regulation, restrict current rates of progress in the 
atmospheric sciences. The agencies are also unwilling to allow an existing de-
partment to be given general regulatory authority because of the possibility 
that programs in one agency will then be given priority over those in another. 
For example, Interior opposes the provisions in H.R. 9212 that would give 
primary responsibility fOi weather modification research to the Department of 
Commerce. Second, because of the pressing problems of the Vietnam War and 
of the cities here, no pressure has developed in Congress to act on H.R. 9212 
or other legislation dealing with regulation of weather modification. 
The longer Congress waits to enact legislation which would create regulatory 
mechanisms' in the field of weather modification, however, the more difficult it 
becomes to overcome the resistance of established programs to a central regula-
tory authority. Thus, while the NSF, NAS and Newell reports, as assessment 
reports, have succeeded in raising issues connected with the science of weather 
modification and in prompting further studies of the issues raised, their impact 
on the organization and regulatkln of government weather modification pro-
grams has been minor. 
Engine Noise from the Supersonic Transport 
The federal government's decision to construct a supersonic commercial air-
liner (SST) in conjunction with private industry has been subjected to a con-
40. Environmental Sciences Services Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Project 
Stormfury Fact Sheet) (Aug. :1967). 
41. £.g., S. )73, 90th Cong., :1st Sess. § )0) (:1967), introduced by Senator Magnuson in 
January, 1967, would require that an agency obtain prior approval of Congress before 
conducting weather modification operational activities. Agencies that submitted their 
views on the bil.I to the Commerce Committee urged deletion of the section. 
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tinual evaluation or assessment by a number of writers and members of Con-
gress.42 Controversy over the SST has centered on three questions: 
1) What hazards are presented to the public and to property by the plane's 
sonic boom, and what limitations will these hazards place on air routes for 
the plane? 
2.) How much fmancial support for the projects should come from the federal 
government, and what return should the ...;overnment receive on its invest-
ment? 
.3) To what extent should issues of national prestige determine whether or 
not the government. underwrites the design and construction of the plane 7 
A fourth issue, the amount of noise created by the jet engines of the plane, 
has received little attention. Analysis of this issue, however, is of immediate 
importance and further illustrates the manner in which the technology assess-
ment function is being perfonned in the federal government today. 
Assessment Prior to the President's Announcement 
Speaking to the graduating class of the Air Force Academy on June 5, 1963, 
President Kennedy gave his seal of approval to proposals for joint govern-
ment-industry development of a commercial supersonic transport.43 These 
proposals had been evolving since the mid-1950'S, and had been reviewed for 
several years by numerous government officials, private citizens, industry rep-
resentatives and members of Congress. The potential noise level of the plane's 
huge engines Was among the issues frequently discussed. 
At the first congressional hearings on the subject of a supersonic transport, 
held by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in May, 1.960, the 
noise problem was broadly defined." Ira H. Abbott of NASA told the Com~ 
mittee that 1/ As far as engine noise is concerned, the situation is not much 
different than for existing jet transports, except that more power will be needed 
and there will be .1 corresponding tendency for more noise."4G Major General 
Victor Haugen of the Air Force testified that lIengine noise, and its effects, as 
evidenced by sonic fatigue in aircraft structure and physiological discomfort 
or community annoyance, has been recognized for some time .... The higher 
power of the engines on the supersonic transports would make the problem 
more severe."46 Two industry representatives added that the noise problem 
should not be taken lightly. The President of North American Aviation, Inc. 
42. See, e.g., Lardner, Supersonic Scandal, The New Republic, Mar. '16, '1968, at :13; 
Watkins, SST Faces Drastic Cut in Weight, Aviation Week /!3:. Space Technology, Mar. 'I'!, 
1968, at 28i 113 Congo Rec. S'14446 (daily ed. Oct. fh 1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). 
43· Kennedy, Public Papers of the President-:1963, at 439 (1.964). 
44. Hearings on Supersonic Air Transports Before the Special Itl'oestt'gating Subcomm. 
of the HOllse Comm. on Science and Astronalltics, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1.9(0). 
4.5. Id. at". 
46. ld. at 20. 
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commented that fiAt best, the sound problem is of major consequence,"47 and 
a manager from General Electric, describing the type of engine capable of 
powering the plane, concluded simply: "It will be a noisy engine."48 
Government officials at the :1960 hearing indicated that they were al-
ready thinking of the possibility of government imposition of noise stan-
dards for the plane. One NASA official involved in SST research programs 
said that an SST "must be socially acceptable in the sense that it must not 
cause undue noise at or in the vicinity of the airport or over the routes it will 
be 80wn.fl41l FAA Administrator General Elwood R. Queseda repeated this 
concern: UA major premise which must be kept in mind from the outset in de-
veloping such an aircraft is that any need for increased power should be met 
without increased noise."GO A year later, when Congress made its first appro-
priation for research on SST feasibility, the FAA discussed more specifically 
the standards it would use to regulate the SST's engine noise. FANs new ad-
ministrator, Najeeb Halaby, told Congress: flWe would try to see to it that 
the noise levels were tolerable to the community, or as tolerable as the then 
existing aircraft.flu 
To strengthen its understanding of potential problems of the proposed SST, 
the FAA solicited special reports on various aspects of an SST program. In July, 
1961,anSST Steering Group comprised of the FAA administrator, the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development and the NASA 
Director of Aeronautical Research was established.52 In December, :1962, this 
Steering Group received a report from its SST Advisory Group, consisting of 
ten members drawn from the airlines, airplane manufacturers, financial insti-
tutions and research organizations. The report included a warning that "the 
relationship between take-off performance and the noise generated at take-off 
must be such that public annoyance in airport communities is less than it is 
today. "" "Approach and landing noise," the report continued, "must be no 
greater than that generated by present subsonic jet aircraft.,,5 .. Other studies 
prepared for the FAA between :1960 and :1963 repeated this assessment.55 
Assessment After the President's Announcement 
After the President announced his support of a government-industry project 
to develop an SST, the FAA began to take further steps toward establishment 
of noise standards for the potential plane, and also explained more carefully 
the basis for its expectations regarding the plane's noise levels. 
47 Id.luo). 
48. Id. It ,31. 
49. Id. at4. 
50. Id. at 46. 
51. Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year :1.962 Before a 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong" 1St sess., at 627 (1961). 
52.. Hearings on Dcp't of Transportation Appropriations for FisClll Year :1.968 Before 
a Subcomm. of the HOj/se Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1St sess., at ,307 (:1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Dep't of Transportation Approprilltions]. 
53. SST Advisory Group, Report to SST Steering GrOUp:10 (Dec. :11, :1962.). 
54. Id. 
55. Hearings on Dep't of Transportation Appropria/ionG, supra note 52.. 
1120 
~------~I~~----__ ~--__ PN" 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
l 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I J 
, 
I 
r· 
I 
! 
r 
Technology Assessment and the Law 
TIlE GEOIlGE WASHINGTON LAW IlEVIEW 
June 5, '1.963 to January 1., 1.967. Two weeks after his speech at the Air Force 
Academy, President Kennedy submitted to Congress a program for develop-
ment of the SST,~6 listing major decision points critical for the success of the 
plane and outlining objectives for the plane's design. Objective number seven 
sought "noise resulting from landing and take-off operations not greater than 
that presently created by the current international subsonic jet transports."IIT 
On August 1.5, 1963, the FAA sent to manufacturers Requests for Proposals 
(RFP) for development of the SST that essentially incorporated this design ob-
jective as well as the FAA's previous statements to Congress on the plane's en-
gine noise levels. The RFP informed potential contractors that Itnoise resulting 
hom take-off operations shall be less than 1i2 PNDB [an arbitrary unit com-
monly used to measure noise levels from airplane engines] at a point on the 
ground one statute mile from the departure end of the runway ... 11118_a 
level that would compare favorably with commercial jets £lying at subsonic 
speeds. Landing noise, according to the RFP, would have to be Uless objection-
able than that resulting from operations of current subsonic jets used in inter-
national service," and ground noise at the airport would have to be "reduced 
to a level tolerable to the average traveler and airport employee."~9 
The bases of the FAA's design objectives were elaborated by Administrator 
Halaby and Deputy Administrator Gordon Bain before the Senate Commerce 
Committee in October, 1963. Bain explained that although the engines for the 
SST will have to be more powerful than engines for subsonic jets, and there-
fore capable of producing much more noise, it is not likely that the aircraft 
would have to use its full thrust on takeoff. In addition, because of the plane's 
ability to climb at a rapid rate, "its noise level should be equal to or substantial-
ly less than current fanjets and we believe it will be less.,,6o Halaby's opinion 
was that the combination of more powerful engines and more rapid climb 
would create Uabout the same noise" for the community as subsonic jets.61 
Both Halaby and Bain admitted there would probably be a noise problem 
"on the runway as the pilot applies the power on the takeoff run."62 "There is 
just no question," said Halaby, "but what [a subsonic jet with] four engine;; 
generating 1S,ooopounds of thrust, for a transatlantic takeoff out of runway 
56. Hearings on Independent Offices AppropriatiollS for fiscal Year 1964 Before a 
Subcomm. of the S~nate Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 198. (196,3). 
57. Id. at 1994. 
58. FAA, Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic 
Transport 20 (Aug. 15, 1963). 
59. ld. 
60. Hearings on U.S. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program Before 
the A'Diation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 35, 
at 73 (196,3) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on U.S. Commercial Sf4peTsonic Airc.raft 
Development Program]. 
61. Id. at 17,3. 
62. Id. at75. 
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1)-L at IdlewUd, will make less noise on the runway than [an SST with] four 
engines, developing 40,000 pounds of thrust. There is just no doubt about 
it."61 Therefore, the FAA, in its RFP, instead of specifying that the noise levels 
be less than or equal to those of subsonic jets, called for levels "tolerable to the 
average traveler and airport employee."" 
Dur"'Jg '1.965 and 1966 the engine designs were evaluated by the FAA and 
several other groups. One evaluation group consisted of '12.9 representatives of 
the Air Force, Navy, Civil Aeronautics Board, NASA and the FAA. Another 
was the President's Advisory Committee on the Supersonic Transport, chaired 
by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Nine United States airlines conducted 
their own investigations of the designs. 
This evaluation process did not include a direct comparison of the noise 
levels potentially produced by the two engines.8li Instead, the various com-
mittees focused on the type of engine required to power a plane with the quali-
ties and dimensions which the Government sought. Of the two frame-design 
companies competing, the Boeing Company submitted the design the Gov-
ernment felt was most suitable, and the final decision on the engine was based 
primarUy on an analysis of which engine was better adapted to the Boeing 
plane." 
January :1., :1.967 to the Present. On January 1, 1967, contracts were drawn 
between GE and the FAA for development of a prototype engine for the SST, 
and between Boeing and the FAA for development of a prototype airframe. 
Consistent with its earlier statements that it would assure engine noise levels 
for the plane that would be "socially acceptable," the FAA insisted that 
noise standards be included in the contracts. Accordingly, the approach and 
airport noise levels specified in the Boeing contract are approximately equal 
to levels produced by subsonic jets, while thf. take-off level is lower.67 
These standards are production objectives rather than inflexible require-
ments for the prototype pl~nes Boeing has contracted to construct. The FAA 
explains that while they expect Boeing to be able to "come close" to these 
numbers, neither the Agency nor Boeing guarantees that strict compliance is 
possible.1IB Publicly, Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd is confident that 
the standards will be met. In May, 1967, he told Congress that J'These engines 
have such tremendous power that at subsonic flight they will be able to 
operate with less noise than the existing subsonics that are utilizing maximum 
power."eo Privately, FAA officials are much more cautious, prefering to abide 
by their earlier statements that they expect the SST engine noise levels to be at 
least equal to those of subsonic jets.70 Some state that IIthere is a real aggreS-
6). Id. 
64. FAA, Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic 
Transport 20 (Aug. 15,196). 
65. Interviews with officials of the FAA. 
66. ld. 
67. FAA contract no. FA-SS-67-31 at A-7 (Jan. 1,1967). 
68. Interviews, supra note 65. 
69. Hearings on Dcp't of Transportation Appropriations, supra note 52, at 37· 
70. Interviews, supra note 65. 
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sive" noise reduction program at Boeing and GE which encourages them to 
believe that "we can keep the noise to today's levels, although it will be tough, 
because the engines have to be bigger."11 Others are more sceptical.12 
At this stage, the assessment pro,=ess for the engine problems is carried out 
jointly by the contracting companieEl and the FAA. GE and Boeing submit 
quarterly progress reports to the FAA's Supersonic Transport Project Office. 
In acidition, the companies and thl.! Agency exchange information informal-
ly, since close contacts between them have developed in the course of the ad-
ministration of the contracts. 
The Assessment Process Evaluated 
Since the supersonic transport prototype models probably will not be ready 
until :197:1 or :1972, a complete evaluation of the efforts of the Government 
and the contractors to predict and control the engine noise levels is not possi-
ble. But some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the assessment pro-
cess that has taken place so far. 
:1. The congressional hearings in :1960 demonstrated that Congress and the 
FAA have been aware of the potential problems of the SST engine noise levels 
from the beginning of serious discussions about the federal government's role 
in the design and construction of the plane. Other government agencies 
which participated in early deci~\ions regarding the SST, such as NASA, the 
Department of Defense, and the Office of Science and Technology, have also 
shown an understanding of the noise levels likely to be produced by the plane 
and of the need to take some steps to reduce these levels. In addition, the air-
line industry has repeatedly made known to the FAA and Congress its recog-
nition of the noise issue.13 
Thus some of the social consequences of using advanced technology to pro-
duce the new, more powerful engines required for a supersonic commercial 
airliner were anticipated several years prior to the announcement by President 
Kennedy that the Government would support de1"<:!lopment of the plane. The 
institutions and processes which led to this anticipation were both formal and 
jnformal. Congressional hearings, advisory committees and the regular re-
search of government agencies and industry produced a general recognition 
among '~ome members of Congress and presidential advisors of the engine 
71. Id. 
72. Id. On May 1, 1968, the Ne\', York Times reported that the Boeing Company was 
considering switching to a fixed-wing concept in order to overcome difficulties being 
encountered in design of the plane. If the fixed-wing design is eventually adopted, it is 
likely that the engine noise problems created by the plane will be increased. Hearings on 
U.S. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program, supra note 60, at 162 (re-
marks .0£ Gordon Bain, Deputy Administrator, Supersonic Transport Development, FAA). 
73. Hearings on U.S. Commercial Supersonic Aircraft Development Program, supra note 
60, at 449. 
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noise problem. No institutions specifically devoted to technology assessment 
were necessary to bring about this awareness. 
2. However, as was apparent in the case of weather modification, the 
assessment process has had limitations that are primarily a result of the fact 
that the major participants in the engine noise assessment process-the FAA, 
the airplane and engine manufacturers, other government agencies such as 
NASA and DOD-for over five years have had vested interests in the success-
ful design and construction of the SST. n 
While the FAA has consistently raised the question of how to build an 
SST that will not significantly increase the amount of jet noise to which com-
munities surrounding airports are now exposed, it has not seriously consiil-
ered, in connection with the SST program, a more searching question: How 
much noise from jets should the Government tolerate, and what can be done 
to reduce SST jet noise to that level? Approaching the task of setting standards 
for engine noise with the primary goal of reducing noise below the level of 
public tolerance might have produced contract "Production Airplane Objec-
tives" significantly more stringent than those in the Boeing contract now, 
because, according to the FAA, many people living near airports find jet noise 
intolerable as soon as the levels approach 85-90 Pndb.'I1i 
The major reason why the FAA and other groups involved in assessment of 
the engine noise problem have concentrated instead on constructing a plane 
which would not generate noise levels above those of subsonic jets is that 
they have assumed that certain other characteristics of the SST should not be 
altered. As one FAA official expl:..ins, "Given a plane with a range of 4,000 
miles, a speed of 2.7 mach, a payload of 60,000 pounds, operating off exist-
ing runways, the contract objectives are the lowest possible noise level expec-
tations. If you start by setting noise figures which would eliminate complaints 
about noise, you might end up with a very different kind of plane, one that 
would not fit our conception of the SST.'176 Another official describes the pro-
cess of choosing noise standards this way: "Start with the kind of plane you: 
need, then drive the numbers as low as you can possibly get them.'1T7 Thus, 
because the individuals and institutions assessing the noise problem have 
been committed to development of the SST commercial plane with the char-
acteristics described above, the assessment process has been limited. Efforts to 
reduce the noise levels have concentrated on comparing engine noise with 
noise from existing subsonic jets rather than on the noise level people li"ing 
near airports find tolerable. 
Although the FAA and the airplane industry have admitted for several 
years that the noise on the runway and at the airport from the SST will prob-
ably .be greater than from subsonic jets, no comprehensive f,tudies have been 
made of the costs of soundproofing airport buildings or (!xpanding airport 
74. See, e.g., Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations for Fiscal Year ~96:z 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1St Sess. (1961). 
75. Interviews, supra note 65· 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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boundaries. In 196) E. Thomas Burnard, Executive Director of the Airport 
Operators Council, which represents local government bodies that maintain 
and operate airports, warned the FAA that the noise levels at the airport might 
require such expenditures. Burnard told the Senate Commerce Committee: 
[W]e don't think that these economic considerations should overlook the pos-
sibility of buying thousands of acres of prime real estate in major metropoli-
tan areas, should the noise calculations be off, or millions of dollars of con-
crete should the aircraft be incapable of operating off the existing-or cur-
rently planned-runways. . . . Aircraft that require further soundproofing 
of terminal buildings, concourses, fingers, maintenance and operating areas, 
and even mobile lounges, will also add to the cost of operation.78 
The FAA says that "not a lot" of money will have to be spent on improved 
soundproofing or airport expansion, but does not know "exactly how much 
we might have to pay."N Such computations have not been made because 
compared with the total cost of the multi-billion dollar SST program, these 
sums are likely to be small. Those committed to development of the plane 
therefore tend to regard Burnard's warning as relatively insignificant, even 
though a thorough assessment of the costs and benefits of the engines for the 
SST would, require some quantitative estimates of these costs. 
In the design competition between GE and Pratt-Whitney, the FAA and the 
advisory committees evaluating the competing designs did not make a direct 
comparison of the noise levels likely to be produced by the two engines }.e-
cause their basic aim was to choose an airframe with the qualities and dimen-
sions they sought, and then to pick the engine best suited to the frame. FAA 
officials acknowledge that the design competition could have been arranged in 
a manner that would have permitted noise level comparisons to be made. But 
commitments to a particular kind of plane limited the structure :'Jt: the 
competition. 
Fluoridation 
Probably no issue of science and public policy has involved. as much emo-
tional fervor as fluoridation. Over 900 referenda on fluoridation have been 
held in the United States since 1950,80 and nearly every one has taken place 
in an atmosphere filled with irrational charges and counter-charges. Almost 
20 years after the major American dental and medical organizations accepted 
fluoridation, public health officials in such cities as New York, Detroit) and 
Los Angeles are still faced with strong, articul;l.te opposition to it. 
78. Hearings on U,S. Commercial SlIpersollic Aircraft Development 
note 60, at 392. 
79. Interviews, slIpra note 65· 
80. U.S. Public Health Service, fluoridation Census 342 (3d ed. 1966). 
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Decay:.r~sisting effects of chemical compounds of fluondes were discovered 
in the :1930'S,81 and by 1940 some scientists and public health officials were 
urging local communities to add fluorides to their drinking water supplies.82 
But not until the United States Public Health Service endorsed fluoridation 
as a safe, effective method of combating tooth decay in 1950 did many towns 
adopt it. 
wly Warnings 
In 1944, the Federal Security Agency held hearingsBl to determine what tol-
erances should be set for fhoride residues from spraying agricultural prod-
ucts. In the course of the hearings, the possibility of adding fluorides to 
public water supplies was also debated. H. Trendley Dean of the Public Health 
Service, who had been in charge of PHS studies of fluorides and dental health 
since the early 1930's, testified that he had already begun investigations of 
the effects of fluorides occurring naturally in water supplies of many towns 
in the Southwest to find out what fluOJ,'ide levels were potentially harmful. 
Dean told the hearing that water containing 8 parts per million (ppm) fluor-
ide in Bartlett, Texas, produced several minor changes in bone structure, 
nails, pelvis and the lumbar spine, but that thp,se were "a matter of small im-
portance as to public health.fls, Dean added that hundreds of thousands of 
people had been drinking naturally fluoridated water for many years in this 
country and that the PHS had no reports of fluoride poisoning. Thus the PHS 
was considering the possibility that artificially fluoridated water, containing 
about:1 ppm fluoride might be a method of combating tooth declty that would 
not result in any ill effects. 
Some other scientists testifying at the 1944 hearings were more sceptical 
about the consequences of fluoridating water. A University of Chicago physi-
ologist pointed out that physical harm would often be difficult to detect. "You 
have to do tremendous damage, because of compensatory repair," he . said, 
"before you can get evidence of injury. However, the injury process undoubt-
edly goes on."8G Others testified that statistical epidemiologkal surveys such 
as the ones the PHS conducted in the Southwest might be misleading, since 
people would react differently to fluorides, just as they would rea.ct differently 
to any drug. A third witness warned against analogizing ell-perience 'with 
natural fluoridation to artificial fluoridation. He noted that othf!r minerals in 
the naturally fluoridated water could reduce the likelihood of harm by com-
bining with the fluorides to form compounds that pass through the body in-
stead of being deposited in the bone structure. 
PHS Caution and Pressure from Wisconsin 
Despite their general belief that artificial fluoridation at the 1 ppm level prob-
ably would be completely safe, PHS officials in the early 1940'S were unwilling 
81. McNeill, The Fight for Fluoridation (1957). 
82. Id. 
8). Federal Security Agency, Docket No. FDC-41 (1944). 
84. Id. at 449-54' 
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to recommend that communities began adding fluorides to drinking water. They 
felt that within a few years more conclusive results of research would provide 
them with an even stronger case for fluoridation, and would answer any re-
maining questions about physical or dental effects. In particular, the PHS 
in 1945 began two experimental projects in conjunction with state public 
health officers in New York and Michigan. In each state two cities were 
chosen, one to be fluoridated artificially, and the other to serve as a control. 
The experiments were designed to last ten yea~; then the PHS would re-
evaluate its position on fluoridation. 
Energetic public health officers in Wisconsin, however, were not willing to 
wait for this research to be completed. They wel'e actively engaged in a cam-
paign to bring about an early PHS endorsement of fluoridation. Since 1941 
Wisconsin cities had been accepting it, primarily as a result of the persuasive 
efforts of the state dental society and two of its members, Dr. Francis A. Bull of 
the state Board of Health and Dr. John Frisch, a Madison dentist. After the 
PHS demonstration projects in New York and Michigan were under way, 
Frisch and Bull launched a remarkably intense nationwide effort to obtain a 
PHS endorsement of fluoridation before the ten year period passed.8S Th~y 
criss-crossed the country attempting to persuade dentists and community lead-
ers of the benefits of fluoridation.8T 
By 1950 Frisch and Bull were beginning to reap results. Early data from the 
Michigan demonstration project were leaking out through the University of 
Michigan Dental School, which supervised the project. Figures revealed defi-
nite reductions in the incidence of tooth decay. Frisch publicized these statis-
tics, and argued that now the benefits of artificial fluoridation had been proved. 
Any delay in introducing mass fluoridation, he contended, would no longer 
be justified. Privately, Frisch and Bull told the Public Health Service that they 
had better get on the fluoridation band wagon if they did not want their 
image as leaders in public health to be permanently tarnished. 
In addition, by 1.950 influential state dental health officers were taking posi-
tions in favor of fluoridation. On May 8, David Ast, New York's director of 
dental health, sent a memo to his regional health directors offering state aid to 
local communities wishing to start fluoridation. 88 
The Endorsement 
The climax of the mounting pressure for fluoridation came in late May, 1.950, 
at the annual meeting of state and territorial dental health officers in Washing-
86. This campaign has been recorded in the F.S. McKay and John Frisch Papers of the 
Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. 
87. Herbert Bain, an official of t:1e American Dental Association, came to dread meet-
ings "because those guys would show up and never let you off the hook." Interview 
with Donald R. McNeill, in Madison, Wise., Dec. 23, :1966. 
88. MemoranduII, from David Ast, May 8, :1950, in McKay Papers, supra note 86. 
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ton. Dr. Bull once again buttonholed every major Public Health Service offi-
cial attending the conference. In particular, he concentrated on Dr. Bruce For-
syth, assistant surgeon general and chief dental officer for the PHS. Bull drew 
Forsyth aside and told him he was "being made a sap out of,"8\1 because be-
fme long the PHS 1V0uld be the only major health organization refusing to en-
dorse fluoridation Forsyth agreed to attend a private meeting of four state 
dental directors, 111us Dr. H. Trendley Dean and Dean's assistant, Dr. Francis 
ArnQld. The fOUl' directors we~'e Bull, David Ast of New York, Edward Taylor 
of Texas and Robert Down:: of Colorado, who had briefed each other carefully 
in preparation for i'he enr."unter with Forsyth, Dean and Arnold. 
At the meeting Dean argued that since the New York and Michigan studies 
were only half completed, it was still not time for the PHS to take a position. 
When several days passed without the PHS endorsing fluoridation, Bull as-
sumed that Dean's view had prevailed. Within the PHS, however, the debate 
was still going on. Although Dean stuck to his original position, Forsyth and 
Surgeon General Leonard Scheele were becoming convinced that it was time 
for the PHS to back fluoridation. Finally, Forsyth and Scheele, as the nation's 
top-ranking public health officers, either formally overruled Dean or informed 
him that they were about to endorse fluoridaton, with or without him. On 
June 1, 1950, came the announcement from the PHS that "Communities de-
siring to fluoridate their communal water supplies should be strongly encour-
aged to do so. "110 
The Delaney Hearings 
There was a strong feeling in the Public Health Service in 1950 that because of 
the prevalence of tooth decay among children and adults in the United States, 
public health measures should be taken as quickly as possible to reduce the in-
cidence of decay. The PHS believed that the experience with naturally fluori-
dated water supplies, plus the preliminary results of the Michigan and New 
York studies, justified its conclusion that fluoridation was a safe, effective an-
swer to the problem. Eighteen months later, however, at hearings on chemi-
cals in foods and cosmetics, conducted by the House Select Committee to 
Investigate the Use of Chemicals in FO'Jd Products,lI! evidence was presented 
which indicated that a number of questions had not been thoroughly explored 
by the PHS before its endorsement of fluoridation. For instance, while physical 
examinations were performed on children in the Michigan and New York 
projects in order to detect possible adverse effects of artificial fluoridation, no 
such examinations were performed on adults in the selected communities. 
Other points overlooked by the PHS and brought out at the hearings included: 
1. Dr. John Knudson of the PHS admitted that the studies had never spe-
89. Interview with Dr. Francis Bull by Donald R. McNeill, Apr. 26, 1955, in McKay 
Papers, supra note 86. 
90. Am. Dental Ass'n Newsletter, June 1, 1950. 
91. Hearings on Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics Before tile House Select Comm. 10 
IntJestigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) [hereinafter 
cited as Hearings on Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics]. i 
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cifically gone into the question of the possible effect of the addition of artificial 
fluorides to water on children who are suffering from malnutrition.92 Yet, the 
February, 1.952, issue of the Journal of the American Dental Association had 
warned that "low levels of fluoride ingestion which are generally considered to 
be safe for the general-population may not be safe for mal-nourished infants 
and children, because of disturbances in Calcium metabolism. liDS 
2. Dr. Isador Zipkin of the PHS admitted that although they had performed 
chronic toxicity studies of the effects of fluoride on rats, a procedure recognized 
by a number of authorities as necessary before any chemicals are inserted in a 
food product, sucl, tests were not completed until at least a year after the 
PHS formally endOlscd fluoridation.D• 
3. The PHS went ahead with its endorsement although a June, 1.950, report 
on the New York demonstration project concluded that "a longer period of 
observation is required before final conclusions can be drawn. The possibility 
of demonstrating cumulative effects of fluoride in the final years of the ten 
year study cannot be eliminated at this time."D5 
4. The possibility of carcinogenic characteristics of fluorides was not in-
vestigated by the PHS.D8 
5. Congressman A. 1. ¥i1Ier asked a representative of the National Cancer 
Institutes if any experiments had been or now were "being carried on as to 
ill effects in pregnant women and in people with chronic diseases, that is the 
older people ... 7" The NCI official said he knew of none. Dr. Trendley Dean 
of the PHS added: "I don't know of any experiments being conducted along 
that line. liD? 
6. No attention was given to legal questions which might be raised by 
fluoridation. The possibility that some individuals might consider fluorida-
tion of water as a violation of their civil liberties, or that some religious groups 
might oppose fluoridation as an abridgement of their first amendment rights, 
apparently played no role in the PHS decision. 
On the basis of this evidence, the Select Committee concluded that 
a sufficient number of unanswered questions concerning the safety of this pro-
gram exists as tu warrant a conservative attitude. The committee believes that 
if communities are to make a mistake in reaching a decision on whether to 
fluoridate their public drinking water, it is preferable to err on the side of cau-
tion ... since there are reasonable alternatives to fluoridating the public 
water supply, even if these alternatives are not quite as effective. The topical 
application of fluorides to the teeth of children may be more cumbersome, and 
92.. ld. at 15l:O. 
9). J. Am. Dental Ass/Il, Feb./1952.· 
94. Hearings on Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics/supra note 91/ at1659. 
95. ld. at 1508. 
96. ld. at149). 
97. ld. at 1668. I 
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perhaps mo~e expensive, than the simple addition of fluorine to drinking 
water. Nevertheless, it is a feasible program, and one which will provide 
comparable protection for children's teeth for the period needed to acquire 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that no hazard exists to any portion of 
the population by reason of the addition of fluorides to drinking water,us 
The committee strongly urged that research be continued "to detennine the 
long-range effects upon the aged and chronically ill of the ingestion of water 
containing inorganic fluQrides."99 Thus, the committee in effect said that 
the Public Health Service had issued a premature endorsement of fluoridation 
as a completely safe public health measure. 
Why did the PHS give its unqualified support to fluoridation before several 
important medical and legal issues had been thoroughly explored? There are 
two basic reasons. First, the campaign directed by Drs. Frisch and Bull suc-
ceeded in generating significant pressure in dental and public health circles 
for fluoridation. Because of their general concern about public health issues, 
and particularly the problem of tooth decay, the officials responsible for PHS 
policy with respect to fluoridation, Surgeon General Scheele, Dr. Bruce For-
syth and Dr. Dean, were receptive to the growing demand for active support 
of fluoridation, 
Second, the Public Health Service was not as likely to be as sceptical in its 
investigation of the effects of a chemical or drug as an agency such as the Food 
and Drug Administration, whose primary mission is to test for safety of chem-
icals and drugs. Since its creation in 1798, the PHS has been entrusted with 
the responsibility for introducing new concepts in public health and for 
promoting public health measurc~. Its main emphasis, therefGre, has been on 
the prospective benefits of scientific research, and this was dearly revealed 
in its fluoridation studies of the 1940'S. The experimental projects begun in 
1945 in New York and Michigan had as their real purpose the investigation of 
whether artificial fluoridation would have the same anticariogenic effects ob-
served in naturally fluoridated areas.100 Thus, while thorough physical and 
dental examinations were performed on children in the selected communities, 
adults were ignored because the PHS knew from its previous research that the 
benefits of fluoridation would only be 'o.bserved in children. The PHS was 
aware of and concerned about possible adverse medical consequences of fluori-
dation, but its primary interest in confirming the benefits of f1uoridatio.n easily 
created a situatio.n in which the issues brought Out by the Select Committee in 
1952 were not rigorously researched, particularly when the limited studies 
undertaken in naturally fluoridated areas had not yielded cases of serious phys-
icalharm. 
The dual responsibility to produce a cure for tooth decay and to. test its safety 
placed the PHS in a very difficult position during the early struggles over 
98. Select Comm. to Investigate the Usc of Chemicals i~ Food Products, Report on 
Investigation of the Use of Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, H.R. Rep. No. 74, 8<!d 
Cong., 2d Ses5. (1952). 
0'"1. 1d. 
100. Hearings on Chemicals ill Foods and Cosmetics, suprr. note 91, at 1764 (remarks 
of Dr. Francis F. Heyroth, Nael Research Council's Ad Hoc Comm. on Fluoridation). 
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fluoridation in the 1940's. Suppose that the Food and Drug Administration 
were charged not only with testing the safety of drugs, but with inventing 
and developing drugs which the medical profession depends upon to perform 
its responsibilities. The FDA would often be faced with a basic conflict of roles 
that would undoubtedly limit its ability to assess the impact of drugs thor-
oughly and objectively. Likewise, the PHS in the case of fluoridation was ham-
pered in its assessment functions by the need to perfect, as quickly as possible, 
a method .of eliminating tooth decay. The result was that while some ques-
tions concerning the safety of fluoridation were answered before t.he PHS en-
dorsement, others, primarily questions of long-term effects, were not. 
The PHS and Assessment of Fluoridation Since 1950 
The assessment process for fluoridation which the Public Health Service has 
followed in the past 18 years is both symbolic and significant. The task of con-
tinuing assessment has been complicated by the irrational charges and attacks 
that have come from many opponents of fluoridation. Appeals to fear charac-
terize the speeches and pamphlets frequently used by antifluoridationists to 
persuade people to oppose fluoridatio~. These tactics have lessened the like-
lihood that more rational critiques of fluoridation will be evaluated objectively 
and have given the PHS the added burden of distinguishing between reason-
able and ridiculous criticism. 
After the PHS announced its support of fluoridation, the American Dental 
Association, the American Medical Association, and other major scientific 
and health organizations soon moved to endorse it, using PHS studies and re-
search as the bases for their conclusions. The PHS announcement also spurred. 
the introduction of fluoridation in numerous parts of the country. One year 
before the PHS endorsed fluoridation, one million .Americans were drinking 
fluoridated water. A year after the endorsement, five million were drinking it. 
Once the decision to endorse fluoridation was made, the PHS became ac-
tively involved in its promotion. The tone of PHS support was set in June, 
1951, at the Fourth Annual Conference of State Dental Directors w~th the PHS 
and the Children's Bureau in Washington. PHS spokesmen outlined a program 
designed to persuade city officials, doctors, dentists and laymen to begin fluori-
dating their water supplies. Descriptions were given about how to allay 
people's fears about fluoridation: "[NJever use the term artificial fluoridation; 
there is something about that term that means a phony. We call i~ 'controlled 
fluoridation.'" An organizational tramework tor a fluoridation campaign 
was suggested: "You come out with a resolution from your county or local 
medical organization. You do the same thing with your local bCiard of health. 
In many places the next thing to do is to go before lay groups, service dubs, 
PTA's, and always invite the public officials, watermen, aldermen, mayors, 
anybody you can get." And a strategy was recommended: "If you can, ... keep 
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fluoridation from going to a referendum.fIlol Since this conference, the PH'; 
has continued to be a major promoter of fluoridation, through preparation ar.d 
distribution of materials, storage of information and education of doctors, 
dentists and local public health officials. 
At the same time, the PHS has experimented on the medical and dental 
effects of fluoridation. lo2 The ten year projects in New York and Michigan 
were completed, and various analyses were made of people who had been drink-
ing naturally fluoridated water all their lives. No serious physical defects were 
observed. Reports of adverse physical effects of fluoridation do appear pe-
riodically, however, in the scientific literature/os and although most scientists 
as well as doctors and dentists seem to accept the PHS verdict on fluoridation, 
there is disagreement. A number of prominent scientists have argued that more 
ought to be known about the long-term consequences of drinking fluoridated 
water before people drink it daily.104 In Europe, while British public health 
officials have endorsed fluoridation enthusiastically, the Danish government 
has prohibited it, and Swedish cities have only recently begun to introduce it. 
PHS officials have expressed their willingness to evaluate studies critical of 
fluoridation carefully and objectively, but the ability of the PHS to offer a 
balanced a:;sessment is limited by the strong public commitment to fluorida-
tion it has voiced since 1950. Two particular kinds of limitations have been 
noticeable. 
1. The agency has not investigated as thoroughly as possible the results of 
research that might cast doubt on the wisdom of PHS support of fluoridation. 
For instance, an important element in the case developed by the PHS in 1950 
for the safety of fluoridation was the calculation of a normal adult's daily total 
intake of fluoride, compared with the daily intake that might possibly lead 
to harmful results. PHS scientists told the Delaney committee that their studies 
had shown that an adult living in a fluoridated community ordinarily con-
sumed about 1.) mg of fluoride each day.lO~ Since other PHS research indi-
cated that 4-5 mg'lmay be the limits of fluorine which may be ingested daily 
without an appreciable hazard,fIlo6 the agency concluded that fluoridation con-
tained an acceptable safety factor. In 1966, however, scientists at the National 
Research Council of Canada published a studylo7 indicating that the individ-
10i. Proceedings, Fourth Annual Conference of State Dental Directors with the Public 
Health Service and the Children's Bureau 11, 18,22 (1951). 
102. For reports of these experiments, see PHS, Fluoride Drinking Waters, PHS Docu-
ment No. 825 (McClure ed. :1962) [hereinafter cited as Fluoride Drinking Waters]. 
103. For a review of these reports, see Burgstahler, Dental and Medical Aspects of 
Fluoridated Drinking Water, 68 Transactions of the Kansas Academy of Science 22.3 
(1965) [hereinafter cited as BurgstahlerJ. 
10-.. E.g., Dr. Hugo Thorell, Swedish Nobel Prize-winning enzyme chemist, Dr. Simon 
A. Beisler, Chief of Urology at Roosevelt Hospital, New York City, and Dr. Ludwik Gross, 
Chief of Cancer Research, Veterans Hospital, New York City. A recent survey conducted 
by the author also indicates that many scientists who endorse fluoridation believe that 
more research shOUld be conducted on possible adverse effects. 
105. Hearings on Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, supra note 91, at :1643. 
106. Fluoride Drinking Waters, supra note 102, at 383. 
107. Marier at Rose, The Fluoride Content of Some Foods and Beverages-A Brief 
Survey Using.a Modified Z.-SPADNS Method, J. oEIood Science, Nov.-Dec., 1966, at 9-,1. 
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ual's total intake of fluoride in a fluoridated community will now vary from 2 
to 5 mg. Laborers who work outdoors in hot weather "undoubtedly" will get 
more than 5 mg, the authors said, because they drink much more water. The 
increased levels were attributed to changes in recent years in the amounts of 
fluorides in foods and beverages which are part of a nonnal diet. 
I 
Instead of sponsoring further studies to confirm or deny the Canadian re-
ports, the PHS responded by dismissing them rather disdainfully. Fluorida-
tion, agency officials said, has been proved completely safe, and no additional 
studies are now necessary. One PHS scientist argued that the Canadian studies 
could not be taken seriously because one of the authors "does not have a 
Ph.D.11l0S 
2. The PHS also has adopted an aggressively defensive attitude toward 
critics of fluoridation, which tends to discourage meaningful exchanges of 
views on the subject. For instance, Public Health Service scientists have re~ 
fused to publicly discuss or debate with scientists who are critical of fluorida-
tion the scientific merits of the PHS position. The PHS argues that such dis-
cussions "would serve no useful purpose,"I09 since fluoridation has been 
proved completely safe. The scientific community does not unanimously 
agree.110 
Moreover, the PHS attitude has occasionally led it to take action fostering a 
charged atmosphere in which objective evaluation of fluoridation is difficult. 
For example, when the American Society for Fluoride Research held its first 
meeting in September, 1966, several well-known antifluoridationists were 
openly associated with the group. Although presentations were made by 
pro-fluoridationists, antifluoridationists and scientists not committed to either . 
view, the PHS feared that the conference might receive publicity which would 
influence an impending referendum in Detroit on fluoridation. PHS thenfore 
successfully urged the American Dental Association headquarters in Chicago 
and Detroit to release a statement charging that the ASFR "is only a sounding 
board for fluoride opponents."m The Detroit News picked up the release 
and ran a front page story with the headline "Research Talk Called Plot Against 
Fluoridation."112 
The PHS took similar steps in the fall of 1967 with respect to an organiza-
tion called the International Society for the Study of Nutrition and Vital Sub-
stances, a European-based group that passed a resolution opposing fluorida-
tion,u3 When several American opponents of fluoridation learned of the So-
10B. Interview with Public Health Service scieptists. 
109. ld. 
110. Burgstahler, supra note :103; note 104, supra. 
:(1:1. Detroit News, Sept. 251 :1966, at:1. 
:112. ld. 
11~~. R!!50lution 39, International Society for Research on Nutrition ami Vital Sub-
stances, Hanover, Germany, SeN., 1966. 
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ciety's resolution, they formed a committee to distribute it in this country. 
The .PHS, learning of the American committee's activities, hastily issued a 
statement claiming that American an~ifluoridationists had infiltrated an inter-
national society, pushed through a resolution condemning fluoridation and 
were now using it for their own purposes in the United States, Later the PHS 
learned that the American committee was formed long after the resolution 
had been passed, and that none of the committee members had anything to 
do with the drafting or passage of the resolution, and therefore issued a re-
vised statement. Nevertheless, this case and the case of the ASFR indicate 
that the strength of its commitment to fluoridation can prompt the PHS to 
take hasty action that compromises its ability to provide a dreached, com-
prehensive assessment of comments and research on fluoridation. 
Conclusion 
These three case studies indicate that the federal government's vested interests 
in the continuation of its technological programs limit its ability to provide 
adequate technology assessment. In the field of weather modification, agencies 
are reluctant to explore in depth the ne.ed for regulation of their own operational 
programs. In the SST project, the Federal Aviation Agency has been unable to 
ask the kinds of questions about engine noise that might challenge basic as-
sumptions about the plane the agency if> developing. In the caf>e of fluorida-
tion, the Public Health Service's advocacy has interfered with its responsibility 
for continuing assessment of its original endorsement. 
The deficiencies in technology assessment for these particular programs for-
tunately have probably not yet resulted in serious damage to the public or the 
environment. The pace of technological development through government 
~Fonsored projects, however, continues to expand. Concurrently, as Professor 
Harold P. Green of the George Washington University National Law Center 
points -out, 
Technological advances carry with them the very real threat of destruction of 
human beings and cherished human values. How much damage could a single 
de.mented or evil person have inflicted on society in a single act 25 years ago 7 
Today, such a person in a single act may have the capability of inflicting upon 
society immense damage measured in thousands, if not millions, of human 
lives.ll{ 
Two recently publicized examples reveal the appropriateness of Green's de-
scription of the potential dangers of technology. In Utah, 6,000 sheep have 
been killed in circumstances which strongly suggest that their deaths were the 
unplanned consequence of chemical warfare tests conducted by the Army.115 
In Colorado, the disposal by the Government of huge amounts of radioactive 
wastes has apparently created a possibility that an earthquake may inflict 
114. Green, The New Technological Era: A View From the Law, Monograph No. i, 
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, Geo. Wash. Univ., Jan" i968, at 2. 
:115. N.Y. T4nes, Mar. 2711.968, at 46. 
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serious damage on the city of Denver in the near future. 116 The fact that such 
situations do occur, coupled with increased government invnlvement in tech-
nological development, means that if the existing proce~:, ..... foIl technology 
assessment are allowed to continue unchanged, they may become entrenched 
patterns of decision-making which, although designed to confer the benefits 
of science and technology upon society, in fact pose grave threat:. to the health 
and safety of Qur physical and social environment. 
Congressman Daddario has suggested that creation of a Technology Assess-
ment Board would help Congress perform its technology assessment functions 
more effectively by making available more information on the range of conse-
quences o{ specific applications of science and technology.l17 The Board would 
identify issues and provide Congress with a "balanced appraisal" of the costs 
and benefits of projected programs. Undoubtedly, some such mechanism would 
enable members of Congress to anticipate potential hazards more often, and to 
debate issues of science policy more fully before vast amounts of government 
money are committed to mission-oriented programs. 
But the results of the case studies examined here imply that an institution 
designed to educate the Congress will probably not confront some of the basic 
weaknesses in technology assessment today. The studies indicate that the fed-
eral government is often aware of many of the implications of its programs 
in science and technology, but that it should not be relied upon for thorough 
evaluation and regulation of the technologies it sponsors. What is needed to 
complement the Government's own assessments is a way to counteract the natu-
ral tendency of the government to resist rigorous and comprehensive technol-
ogy assessment. But how should this function be performed, and who should 
perform it 7 Two suggestions may be helpful in answering these questions: 
1. Private groups, operating outside the framework of government, might 
be able to persuade it to place more emphasis on reduction and elimination 
of potential hazards of technology. One such organization has in the past ten 
years acquired the respect of many scientists and politicians throughout the 
country. In 1958, a number of scientists[ university professors and other citi-
zens in the St. Louis area who were concelfted about the effects of radioactive 
fallout formed the Committee for Nuclear Information (now the Committee 
for Environmental Information), which has gathered information on pollution 
and radiation hazards/ performed iicientific studies of potential hazards and 
circulated information to the Govl',lment, the public and the scientific com-
munity. Through a monthly magazine, Scientist and Citizen, and occasional 
testimony before congressional committees, CEI has generated a great deal 
116. Id. 
117. Daddario Statement, sZlpra note 1, at ,3. 
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of interest in problems of environmental pollution. It has demonstrated that 
private independent organizations can perform useful assessment functions. 
Other groups, particularly within universities, could perform similar func-
tions in the area of science and public policy. There are, however, major prob-
lems which private technology assessment institutions must overcome if they 
are to have any impact on government programs. First, they must have com-
petent, reputable staffs that are respected by government and the rest of the 
scientific community even when they take unpopular positions on issues. Sec-
ond, they must find adequate funding. Finally, they must face the fact that 
frequendy important information on the structure and operation of govern-
ment programs is inaccessible unless the staff has an open channel of com-
munication with officials in charge of the programs. 
2. Within government, steps could also be taken to tackle the problem of 
providing thorough assessment of government-sponsored programs that may 
involve technologically created hazards. Congress could, for instance, estab-
lish a Technological Hazards Board, authorized by statute to appear before 
Congress and the agencies solely as a lobbyist for reduction and control of 
potential risks to the public and the environment. A staff of energetic, knowl-
edgeable public servant:> could survey government programs, inform sponsor-
ing agencies, Congress and the public of potential hazards, and discuss with 
Congress and the agencies ways of eliminating them. Since it would lobby, 
the THB's functions would be much broader than those of Congressman Dad-
dario's Technology Assessment Board. Moreover, because sponsoring agencies 
can, as we have seen, be counted upon to publicize and emphasize the poten-
tial benefits of their programs, the Technological Hazards Board would con-
centrate on identification and control of potential risks. In short, the THB 
would perform a technological audit of government programs, without hav-
ing legislative powers or ultimate authority for regulating the conduct of 
these programs. 
The contribution to technology assessment that a Technological Hazards 
Board could make can be illustrated with respect to each of the technological 
programs we have previously examined. Since the Board would not have vested 
interests in weather modification, it would be able to press Congress and the 
relevant executi.ve departments for action on the recommendations made by 
the Newell Report, the NAS Panel and the NSF Special Commission for a 
regulatory structure. The Board could have asked the kind" of questions 
about engine noise of the SST that the FAA did not ask. And because it has 
not been promoting fluoridation for the past 1.8 years, the Board would be in a 
position to provide an objective ass(:ssment of continuing research on fluorida-
tion or to ask the Food and Drug Administration tL' undertake a thorough in-
vestigation. 
Because ultimate authority for direction of government programs would 
remain with the Congress and the agencies, the THB would not be in a position 
to stifle necessary scientific and technological progress through its single-
minded concern for potential hazards. Its efforts would, instead, operate as 
checks against the tendencies of sponsoring agencies not to engage in com pre-
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hensive technology assessment. The existence of the Technological Hazards 
Board would, in effect, institutionalize a system of checks and balances on is-
sues of science policy formulation, thereby assuring a more rational, more 
thorough assessment of individual government programs. 
Many questions about a Technological Hazards Board would have to be an-
swered before it could be accepted by Congress. How to assure its indepen-
dence, or to define the scope of its activities--these and other issues would re-
quire careful analysis. But the idea of creating an institution, like the 
THB, that would persuasively and persistently inject the need for eliminating 
hazards into every government decision regarding applications of science and 
technology should be seriously discussed. Perhaps the basic lesson to be 
learned from the cases we have observed is that such an insti,tution is urge .Jy 
required. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
C. Consideration of Environmental 
Noise Effects in Transportation 
Planning by Governmental Entities 
Louis H. MAYO 
December 1972, pp. 1-53 
1 
! 
I - Advancinq Technology and Social Values 
In the evolving context of governmental planning or 
efforts to initiate governmental planning of transportatjon 
systems, considerations of environmental noise have made very 
recent entry into the process. We have generally been concerned 
with the primary, direct, and immediate objectives of providing 
more or new transportation services than with adverse side-
effects such as congestion, air pollution, noise intrusion, 
and aesthetic debasement. 
Planning of a "compleb~" national transportation network 
was carried out in our early history. This scheme, though never 
enacted, was put forward in 1824 by the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers under the War Department. Professor A. Hunter Dupree 
states in Science in the Federal Government .(1957): 
Despite constitutional scruples, the Congress 
increasingly appropriated money for roads and 
harbor improvements. One offshoot of Monroe's 
straddling position on the constitutionality 
of internal improvements was the Survey Act of 
1824, under which the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers made a comprehensive plan for canals 
between the Chesapeake and the Ohio, along the 
Atlantic seaboard, and for a road from Washing-
ton to New Orleans. This plan, the only one the 
government ever attempted to nnke for the country 
as a whole, required considerable technical com-
petence, and had it been executed would have 
required even more. (p.36) 
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In his first annual message to Congress of December 6, 
1825, President John Quincy Adams referred to the "internal 
improvement of the country" in the very first sentence and 
then continued: 
The great object of the institution of civil 
government is the improvement of the condition 
of those who are parties to the social compact, 
and no government, in whatever form constituted, 
can accomplish the lawful ends of its institution 
but in proportion as it improves the condition of 
those over whom it is established. Roads and can-
als, by multiplying and facilitating the communi-
cations and intercourse between distant regions 
and multitudes of men, are among the most import-
ant means of improvement. l 
Professor Richard B. Morris in Great Presidential Decisions (1960) 
states in reference to President Adams' proposal that: 
(T)he measures of his administration were "just 
and wise and every honest man should have sup-
ported them," but many did not because they simply 
could not abide their author, and still others 
because they were frightened by his centralizing 
philosophy of government. (p.10?) 
Apart from President Adams' personality difficulties there 
were substantial political, economic, demographic, and techno-
logical reasons why a national road system was not considered 
an urgent matter. As Samuel Eliot Morison states: 
Watchers from afar can discern the shadow of things 
to come in 1826, midway in President Adams' term 
of office. The Erie Canal, completed the previous 
year, made New York the Empire State and New York 
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City the world's most populous urban center. 
Yet the doom of the canal as a principal mea.ns 
of heavy transportation was sounded in 1826 
by a little horse-drawn line, first railroad 
in the united states, built near the home of 
the Adamses in Quincy; and shortly the Balti-
more & Ohio steam Failway would be chartered. 2 
And to move further along in the last century: 
Canals still carried most of the freight in 
1850, but the completion of the Hudson River 
Railroad from New York to Albany, where it 
connected with the New York Central for Buf-
falo, and of the Pennsylvania Railroad from 
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, caused such an 
astounding transfer of freight frolll canals to 
railroads, particularly in the winter season, 
as to prove the superiority of rail for long-
distance hauls, and to suggest that the loco-
motive was the pro~er instrument for penetrat-
ing the continent. 
Surely 1800 to 1900 was the century of coal and steam. 
The railroad was the means of transportation in that it fitted 
both the conditions and needs of this rapidly expanding nation 
even though canals continued in operation and steamboats found 
their use on the Mississippi and its tributaries. A new trans-
portation era began to emerge about 1900, however. Professor 
Morison's lively tract on "The Auto and the Ad Man" provides 
the flavor as well as some interesting facts on this transitional 
period.4 
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During the last century the Federal government not only 
tended to encourage technological development, including trans-
portation, as by means of land grants to the railroads. In some 
cases, the Federal government became directly involved. Sup-
port was lent to the "demonstration'phase Ji of the development 
5 
of the telegraph. Support was also lent to certain research 
efforts. For example, between 1816 and 1848 "a total of 233 
steamboat explosions had occurred in which 2,563 persons had 
been killed and 2,097 injured, with property losses in excess 
of $3 million." While it was not until 1852 that stringent and 
effective laws were enacted regulating boiler construction, oper-
ation and inspection, the Franklin Institute had researched the 
problem in 1836 and made recommendations at that time which 
embodied most of the recommendations finally adopted in Federal 
6 
legislation of 1852. 
In general, we have followed the presumption of most Western 
notions, namely, that the impact of scientific inquiry and tech-
nological advance is socially beneficial. From Francis Bacon on 
we seem to have accepted the "science is good in itself" notion. 
Certainly the scientific approach, however superficial, pervaded 
the outlook of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, that high 
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point of belief in human rationality and the potential of man 
to perfect himself and society on earth. The Royal Society 
(chartered 1662) and similar organizations promoted the idea 
that "investment in science was an investment in prosperity. 117 
Such organizations as the Lunar Society (1775-1791) were more 
"practical minded" and socially sensitive to the impact of 
. d hI h h .. l' 8 sc~enc~ an tec no ogy t an t e more prest~g~ous Roya Soc1ety. 
Even the human wastage and misery inflicted by the early 19th 
century Industrial Revolution did not greatly diminish our 
infatuation with science and technology. 
However, protests were made over the abuses of expanding 
industrialism supported by technological development. Consider 
the following quote from Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and 
Modern Times (1966) in reference to Thomas H.txley: 
He came to Baltimore toward the end of the last 
century to say that he remained unimpressed by 
all the power, natural resources, knowledge and 
machinery that had so greatly extended man's 
competence over his physical environment. liThe 
great issue, II he went on, "about which hangs a 
true sublimity and the terror of overhanging 
fate is, what are you going to do with all these 
things? II (p.208) 
Yet the prevailing attitude continued to encourage t:.echnolo9'i-
cal development. This was particularly true in America during 
the 19th century where resources were abundant, the population 
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was dispersed, transportation needs were critical and individual 
initiative was given the widest scope. 
The industrialism supported by coal, stearn and a burst of 
inventiveness, motivated by the excitement of "progress" and 
personal gain, reflected a social attitude raised to a Constitu-
tional right through the doctrine of IIfreedom of contract. II 9 Fur-
therrnore, numerous dedicated efforts to protect a broader and 
longer term concept of the "public interest!! ""ere blunted or 
defeated by the reluctance of the Federal government to encroach 
upon the traditional bounds of State "police power" over health, 
safety and general well-being. lO 
We have relied primarily on the "market" system for guiding 
and shaping the nature of new technological applications. There 
have been notable exceptions, however, as with the long agitation 
for improved public protection from adulterated foods and drugs 
which eventually resulted in the first Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906. But governmental regulation has, in general, been gradual and 
piecemeal and - as in the case of transportation - has usually 
evolved as a reaction to public demand for correction of specific and 
severe adverse effects of particular applications. The establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is an example. 
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As is well known, many of our more prominent technology-
based regulatory agencies and statutory measures to control 
technological applications were not established until well into 
the 20th century. For the mos~ part, these agencies represent 
reactive measures rather than prospective efforts to assure 
development of a new technology in the public interest. Even 
broadcasting was not brought under regulatory control until 1927 
after frequency interference became intolerable. The development 
of nuclear energy represents perhaps the most outstanding example 
of new technology whose development began under government super-
vision and for which a reasonable well-ordered assessment struc-
h b .. d 11 ture as een ma~nta~ne . 
Increasingly, since World War II, technological developments 
have been initiated and supported by the government or through 
combined government and industry efforts or government-university 
arrangements. 
The strong emphasis on promotion of the direct and immediate 
benefits of advancing technology through the 19th and the first 
half of the 20th century does not mean, of course, that all seg-
ments of the affected public were in sympathy with this 
underlying social philosophy and most certainly not with some 
of its effects. In the mid-1800's many English 
1 
I 
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citizens protested vigorously over the noisy, smoky locomotives. 
Some landowners arranged for the intermittent firing of guns 
across their grounds to keep out railroad surveyors."Parlia-
ment, exercising the right of eminent domain, eventually overcame 
these difficulties for the railroad companies, but only at a price: 
as a concession to objectors, a change was included in railway 
charters requiring that locomotives must not emit smoke. 1112 Public 
reaction to large steam carriages "brought forth in 1865 the famous 
Red Flag Act which required a flagman on foot to precede each 
13 
steam vehicle." On the other hand, new technologies were sometimes 
applauded as the means by which more agreeable qualities might be 
introduced into the social environmen.t. A quotation from Scientific 
American for July 1899 states: 
The improvement in city conditions by the general 
adoption of the motor car can hardly be overesti-
mated. Streets clean, dustless, and odorless, with 
light rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly and 
noiselessly over their smooth expanse, would elim-
inate a greater part of the nervousness, distraction, 
and strain of modern metropolitan life. 14 
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II - The Constitutional Framework for the Allocation of 
Governmental Power with Respect to 
Transportation Systems planning 
Only in recent years has environmental noise gained 
sufficient attention as a social problem to generate assess-
ments of the situation, proposals for comprehensive public 
programs of noise abatement, and enactment of a few innovative 
regulatory schemes. Various factors have forced the problem 
to the focus of public attention, as for example, the intro-
duction of commercial jet-powered aircraft over the past 15 
.. 
years:and increasing vehicular traffic resulting from urbaniza-
tion and further stimulated by the Interstate Highway System. 
The decibel level in various noise environments is definitely 
increasing. But there is more involved than this simple-
explanation of the growing concern with noise. This can be 
described as a rather drastic shift in social value priorities. 
This general concern, of which noise intrusion is but one element, 
is reflected in various statutory schemes enacted over the pa~t 
several years of which the most prominent is the National 
, 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which requires pursuant to 
§l02(2) (C~ the submission of environmental impact statements 
on "major Federal actions" and which established the Council on 
Environmental Quality. 
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The NEPA of 1969 and various other legislative schemes 
promoting environmental quality are indicat~ve of the need for 
anticipatory project assessments, and hence, for more thoughtful 
plann5.ng of public and public/private programs in such fields as 
energy generation, law enforcement, health care services, and 
transportation. It i:s with respect to the initiation of various 
new transportation systems that public concern with the full 
scope of environmental values and ame!lities has, perhaps, been 
most manifest. Public protests have sta~led the implementation 
of new airports or the modification of existing airport facili-
ties. Numerous lawsuits have been instigated over the past few 
years which have had the effect of blocking new highway (!onstruc-
tion. 
There is little qu~stion but that governmental entities at 
all levels have been somewhat tardy, if not delinquent, in giving 
adequate emphasis to the transportation systems planning process. 
The "planning function" for present purposes will be discussed 
in terms of the provision for and implementation of anticipatory 
assessments designed to take into account the effects of proposed 
transportation innovations on all participants and social value-
institutional processes affected by given proposals. Particular 
attention will be focused on the extent to which en,vironmental 
noise is given consideration as an adverse consequence in such 
assessments. 
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The abatement of environmental noise presents a severe 
challenge to legal-political improvisatjon as well as to 
technological ingenuity. The problem context of environmental 
noise is a complex one in that noise is not associated with 
one - or a few - social functions but is emitted from a vast 
variety of completely unrelated sources. Many of the most 
.. 
obnoxious noises come from moving sources or from mUltiple an d 
div~rse activities acting in concert. Hence, various 'techniques 
(abatement at the source, reduction of effects, or compensation 
for noise harm) have been devised in an attempt to cope with 
the multiplicity of sources and affected persons or activities. 
The noise abatement task is further complicated by the necessity 
to determine at what level of government these various techniques 
can best be prescribed and implemented. 
It is sometimes said that noise is a "local problem, II 
but this characterization can be a bit misleading. No doubt, 
noise is a "local problem" with respect to the Effects of noise. 
It is not necessarily a local problem with respect to the Control 
over the abatement of noise at the source or over the reduction 
of the magnitude of noise effects. The "noise context" selected 
for control purposes will ordinarily be defined in terms of the 
r 
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noise effects emitted from particular discrete noise sources 
or identifiable noise emvironments. 
What then is the "asic legal-political framework within 
which the environmentaJ. noise problem must be analyzed? Environ-
mental noise is primarily the result of a highly industrialized 
society. In a most thqughtful book of a few years back entitled 
Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960), the authors state: 
Pluralistic +ndustrialism will never reach 
a final equi~ibrium. The 'contest between 
the forces oj~ uniformity and for diversity 
will give it life and movement and change. 
The themes of uniformity and diversity, and 
manager and managed which mark the world 
today will characterize it in the future as 
well. There will be constant adjustments 
between these eternally conflicting themes, 
but no permanent settlement. They will con-
stitute the everlasting threads of history: 
the uniformity that draws on technology and 
the diversity that draws on individuality~ 
the authority that stems from the managers 
and the rebellions, however muted, that 
stem from the managed. (p. 296) 
Our Constititutional development seems consistent with this form-
ulation. For example, Art.I,§8(3) provides tpat the Congress shall 
have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 
,., 
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'rhe 1824 Supreme Court case of 
Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton ,1; 6 L.Ed. 23) gave impetus to the 
promotion of the "Commerce Clause" and interstate commerce 
by holding a New York lawprpviding for a State "steamboat 
monopoly" invalid. The subsl~quent 1851 case of Cooley v. The 
Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (53 U.S. [12 HOW.] 
299) has had great significapce in terms of mediating between 
the themes of uniformity and diversity noted above. In that 
, . 
case the Supreme Court undertook to determine whether the power 
of the Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce 
'was exclusive of whether it ~ight be in part shared by the 
states. The Court adopted a rule which placed a segment of 
control in the states, the t,est being whether a particular sub-
ject or activity of commerce requires uniform national control 
or whether it is sufficientlr local (and unique) in character 
to permit State regulation. For example, a strong national 
interest has been asserted i;n railway regulation. In Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona (3'25 jU.S. 761 [1945] ) the Supreme Court, 
,.' i. 
~"i ~-, relying on the Coo.;_ :""v Doctrine held that the Arizona Train 
Limit Law (limiting train le,ngth) contravened the Commerce 
~ Clause, the majority opinion stating that "Here examination of 
\ 
all the relevant factors ma~es it plain that the state interest 
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is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, 
economical, efficient railway transportation service, which 
must prevail." But a strong State/local interest has been 
recognized in the regulation of the use of interstate as well 
as State highways. In South Carolina State Highway Department 
v. Barnwell Bros. 
r ., (303 U.S. 177 L1938J ), a State statute limit-
ing the width and weight of motor trucks which was more restrict-
ive than those of most other states was 'held not to be an undue 
.. 
burden on interstate commerce even though "interstate carriage 
by motor trucks has become a national industry," the Court 
stating: "Few subjects 6f state regulation are so peculiarly 
of local concern as is the use of state highways." But compare 
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (359 U. S. 520 [1959] ), wherein 
the Supreme Court found an Illinois contour mudguard requirement 
for motor freight carriers to be in conflict with the Commerce 
Clause even though such "local safety measures" are normally 
not found to place an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce. 
The "states and their instrumentalities may act, in many 
areas of interstate commerce, ••• concurrently with the Federal 
government" and "Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by 
l5 
Federal action, ••• or unduly burdensome on ••• interstate commerce •••• " 
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In general, preemption by Federal legislation is not to be 
inferred lIunless the act of Congress, fair ly interpreted, is 
in actual conflict with the law of the state. 1I16 
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III - Consideration by Governmental Entities of 
the Noise Factor in the Assessment of 
Highway Projects and 
Vehicular Operations 
Consideration of the noise factor by governmental entities 
in the planning of highway transportation systems is notorious 
for its absence. Planning in terms of anticipatory total social 
impact assessments has not arrived even yet, although there are 
now strong tendencies in this direction. 
Such planning is to be clearly distinguished from the reactive 
type of ad hoc regulations which have been in existence for some time 
17 
relating to various types of traffic noise control. Many munici-
palities have for years required mufflers on motor vehicles and 
some have restricted horn noise. Most states have long provided 
statutory requirements for mufflers and several have restrictions 
on horn noise. Traditionally, local ordinances have provided for 
subjective standards such as. restricting the making of "loud," 
"unusual," or "unnecessary" noise rather than by establishing quanti-
tative (decibel limit) standards. To some extent, zoning ordinances 
providing for "quiet zones" have reflected slightly more concern for 
the long-term welfare of the community. 
This situation is beginning to change. Relatively new 
environmental noise codes in Chicago and Minneapolis clearly repre-
sent a dramatic step forward in comprehensive planning for envir6n-
mental noise control in metropolitan areas. Ironically, the proposed 
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and seemingly well planned New York City Noise Control Code which 
sets specific decibel limits for most sound-producing devices 
(though it retains the City's common law nuisance ordinances for 
judicial precedent authority) does not undertake to regulate 
motor vehicle noise, it being assumed that the State has preempted 
such regulations by forbidding the passage of local ordinances incon-
sistent with existing State 1imits.18 AS previously suggested, and 
hereinafter discussed, the "preemption question" is one which poses 
serious difficulties for governmental legislative/administrative 
planning in connection with the abatement of noise attendant to the 
operation of transportation systems. 
At the State level, California has developed a statutory 
scheme to assure the reduction of highway traffic noise over a per-
iod of time. The California Vehicle Code by §23130 prescribe~ 
"operational" Vehicle Noise Limits for speed limit of 35 mph or 
less and for speed limit of more than 35 mph. Section 23130(C) 
provides that "This section applies to the total noise from a vehicle 
or combination of vehicles and shall not be construed as limiting 
or precluding the enforcement of any other provisions of this code 
relating to motor vehicle exhaust noise." (emphasis supplied) 
Section 27160 of the Vehicle Code provides that "(a) No person shall 
sell or offer for sale a new motor vehicle 'Y-.rhich produces a maximum 
n 
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noiHe exceeding the following noise limit •.• " (with dates and 
decibel limits prescribed). Colorado and Minnesota have recently 
enacted legislation which is patterned closely after the California 
19 
scheme. 
The history of the Federal-aid to Highway programs perhaps 
offers the most useful insights into the environmental noise prob-
lem with respect to highway motor vehicle transportation. This 
program has been primarily concerned with the basic objective of 
moving masses of people and goods rather than .with secondary or 
derivative environmental amenities. 
The Federal-aid Highway legislation of 1916 laid the foundation 
for a cooperative Federal-State relationship and resulted in the 
strengthening' of State highway departments. The Federal Highway Act 
of 1921 "led to the rapid development of an integrated network of 
improved highways throughout the entire country." Also, "In 1921 
the War Department made a comprehensive study of the highway routes 
important to the national defense," a study which was brought up to 
date in 1935 through the cooperative efforts of the War Department, 
the Bureau of Public Roads, and the American Association of State 
Highway Officials. In 1941 the President appointed a National Inter-
regional Highway Committee to investigate the need for a limited sys-
tern of national highways and to advise the Federal Works Administrator 
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as to the prospects for utilizing same of the manpower and 
industrial capacity expected to be available at the end of World 
War II. The Federal-aid Highway Act of 1944 directed the designa-
tion of a National System of Interstate Highways limited in extent 
to 40,000 miles "so located as to connect by routes as direct as 
practicable the principa_ metroplitan areas, cities and industrial 
centers, to serve the national defense and to connect at suitable 
border points with routes of continental importance in the Domin-
ion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico." 
The long distances of the transcontinental 
routes are a by-product of the selection of 
the most important local and regional highways 
which articulate into continuous routes. This 
concept of the system is based upon continuing 
traffic surveys and flow analyses which show a 
heavy predominance of motor vehicles making rel-
atively short trips and a small proportio~8f 
actually transcontinental high\<Tay traffic. 
One of the more interesting episodes in the National highway 
system development concerns the persistent efforts of the late 
Congressman J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania. Commencing with a bill 
in 1936 directing the Bureau of Public Roads to survey and locate a 
system of transcontinental and north-south highways, Representative 
Snyder moved in 1937 to a proposal for a system of "superhighways" 
200 feet wide with six traffic lanes, brightly lighted, with no 
obstructions, so that they could be used as emergency landing strips 
TI 
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for airplanes and further suggested that airports be built at or 
. 21 
near the intersections of such h1ghways. 
Perhaps most relevant to our present purpose of evaluating 
the Federal level highway planning process in terms of a total 
social impact asse,ssment is a review of the Report of the Presiden-
tial Advisory Committee on "A Ten Year National Highway Program," 
attacl:~ed to the Message of the President, National Highway Program, 
of February 22, 1955, which was referred to the Committee on Public 
Works, 84th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document 93. In 1956 the 
Congress enacted major Federal highway aid legislation which was 
responsive to the request of President Eisenhower for: 
(A) grand plan for a properly articulated (highway) 
system that solves the problems of speedy, safe, 
transcontinental travel--inter-city transportation--
access highways--and farm-to-market movernent--metro-
politan area congestion--bottlenecks--and parking. 
While the President's Message directed attention to the "Nation's 
22 
highway system, other modes of transportation being excluded," the 
social sUb-system posited for this anticipatory assessment by both 
the Advisory Committee study and the House Committee on Public Works 
clearly disclosed an intention to include significant social inter-
actions and implications of the proposed "National highway system." 
Further, 
The Congressional Committee Report shows that an 
extremely wide range of engineering, financial, 
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and social factors was considered. From our 
present perspective, however, we would note that 
some factors were given no attention whatever. 
The Advisory committee and the Congress seemed to 
be much more concerned. with the efficient imple-
mentation of the highway program rather than with 
cumulative and qualitative social impacts, partic-
ularly those which might be detrimental. No con-
sideration was given to increasing environmental 
pollution which would result from the growing traf-
fic volume: air pollution from exhausts, engine 
noise, resulting aesthetic debasement, or the deriv-
ative health hazards from the foregoing sources. 
Nor was a great deal of attention given to the 
relationship between the increased number and size 
of motor freight carriers and the possible incri~sed 
hazards to private auto drivers and passengers. 
I 
I 
Taking the Executive-Legislative anticipatory assessment of 
the Interstate Highway System as the planning reference base for 
this discussion, let's move ahead 12 years to 1968 when Senate 
bill S. 2658 was introduced during the 90th Congress which proposed 
increased maximum size and weight limits for motor freight carriers. 
It might have been expected that a relatively comprehensive assess-
ment would have been made of the anticipated effects of this legis-
lation. Senate Report No. 1026, Committee on Public Works, U.S. 
Senate of March 27, 1968, Vehicular Weights and Dimensions; to 
accompany S. 2658, stated that: 
Among the major issues presented to the committee 
were those dealing with highway safety, economic 
impact, effects of increases on road systems and 
structures and the contributions of the various 
user beneficiaries. 
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Actually the Report gave very little attention to these factors 
other than to the impact of increased weights and widths on the 
existing road systems and structures. Some attention was given 
to highway safety and to increased maintenance and construction 
costs, but. the Senate Report, by no stretch of the imagination, 
could be considered an adequate anticipatory total social impact 
24 
assessment. 
This conclusion waG to some extent recognized apparently and 
even rationally justified as being consistent with the policy 
enunciated in a letter from the Secretary of Commerce of August 18, 
1964, to the Speaker of the House which made the point that such a 
proposal as that represented in S. 2658 should be considered as only 
a phase of a continuing process of IIproqressive implementation II of the 
Nation's highway system. Therefore, it would seem not only fair but 
prudent to appraise the S. 2658 assessment in the time-dimensional 
context of the evolving interstate highway system. If one views the 
1968 assessment in the context of the sequence of assessments made 
by the Congress between 1956 and 1968, a somewhat different perspective 
can be adopted. Numerous assessments leading to legislation or new 
regulations relating to air pollution, highway safety, highway 
beautification, citizen participation in freeway location, and reorgan-
ization of the entire Federal transportation regula.tory structure were 
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conducted during the 1956-1958 interim period. Also, pursuant 
to the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1956, the Secretary of Commerce 
had undertaken to determine future maximum desirable dimensions 
and weights for vehicles operating on the Federal-aid highway sys-
tems and a report was made to the Congress on August 18, 1964. 26 
The pertinent question remains, however, namely, whether 
consideration by the Congress of the various highway-related legis-
lation during the 1956-1968 time period was "programmed" in such 
manner as to schieve a close approximation to a total social impact 
assessment through time. S. 2658 breezed through the Senate but 
met strong opposition in the House and was defeated, in large meas-
ure, it ~uld appear, because many affected participants brought 
to the attention of the House members that many of significant "social 
27 
costs" had not been given appropriate consideration by the Senate. 
The author has concluded in a previous paper that: 
It is clear that, the interim 1956-1968 legislat:io n 
had the effect of filling in some of the gaps or 
completing lightly treated segments of the 1956 
assessment. It is an interesting question, however, 
as to the extent to which this was accomplished by 
deliberate design, by simple response to insistent 
public or special interest demands, through serendip-
ity from other programs such as air pollution control, 
or from sheer accident. Only to the extent such leg-
islative proposals were advanced as deliberately 
designed components of an overall integrated program 
of Highway/Motor Freight Carrier technology would it 
satisfy the Total Impact Assessment Model. While the 
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aggregative assessments through time did tend 
to expand the scope of the social sUb-system 
treated, they do not appear to have be~n, in 
any real sense, programmed to secure a Total 
Impact Assessment within a socially permissible 
time span. The DOT/Bureau of Public Roads policy 
of "progressive implementation" does not seem to 
be at all the equivalent of the Total Impact 
~sessment approach. 28 
It may be contended, of course, that in view of the Congressional 
committee structure and the customary legislative approach of sUbmit-
ting specific bills to take care of particular problems, it is 
unrealistic to expect the Congress to conduct total social impact 
assessments of transportation systems or other public programs either 
at a specific time or on an aggregative basis through time. The fact 
remains, however, that the Congress has tended to approach transport-
ation system development for the most part on an ad hoc, piecemeal, 
and non-integrative basis. 
Daniel P. Moynihan has asserted that we are moving from a focus 
on independent programs which "relate to a single part of the system"-
29 
to policy which "seeks to repond to the system in its entirety." He 
expects this movement to be a definitive trend in the 1970's. In 
short, we are giving increasing attention to total social problem 
contexts or social systems as contrasted with programs directed toward 
farticular parts of such systems which are not coordinated by an over-
all policy. .. (A) policy approach to government • (seeks) to 
30 
encompass the largest possible range of phenomena and concerns." 
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Moynihan cites the 1956 Interstate and Defense Highway System as 
the "largest public works program in history" and states that the 
eventual judgment will be that it has IIhad more influence on the 
shape and d~velopment of American cities, the distribution of pop-
ulation within metropolitan areas, and across the nation as a whole, 
the location of industry and various kinds of employment opportuni-
ties (and in all of these, immense influence on race relations and 
the welfare of black Americans) than any ini.tiative of the middle 
31 
third of the 20th Centu:t"Y." But he also concludes that "the politics 
of getting the Interstate Highway Program enacted, decreed, or at 
least indicated, the narrowest possible definition of its purposes 
and impact. 11 32 
Moynihan comments with reference to the planning and implementation 
of the Interstate Highway System by the Bureau of Public Roads: 
As bureaucrats, their instinct was faultless. Had 
anyone realized what they were in fact doing, the 
sheer magnitude of the interests they were affect-
ing, it is nigh impossible to imagine that they 
would have won acceptance. Indeed, a bare fifteen 
years after the Interstate program commenced, it is 
near impossible to get a major highway program approved 
in most large American cities. But it is too late: 
most systems have been built. In the process--such 
at least would be my views--quite appalling mistakes 
were made, but they were mistakes having to do with 
issues nominally altogether unrelated to the high-
way program ~!self, and so no one was responsible for 
them •••• 
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Surely it is possible to hope for something more. 
Government must seek out its hidden policies, 
raising them to a level of consciousness and accept-
ance--or rejection--and acknowledgement of the extra-
ordinary range of contradictions that are typically 
encountered • • •• Surely also it is possible to 
hope for a career civil service that is not only 
encouraged, but required to see their activities 
in the largest possible scope. 34 
Whatever the anticipatory assessment deficiencies of the 
Congress, it has, in recent years, enacted a number .of regulatory 
schemes which obligate the Department of Transp.ortation to take 
int.o account a br.oader range of social impacts than has be~n custOm-
ary in the past. For example, §138 of the Federal-aid t.o Highways 
Act .of 1968, 49 U.S.C.A. §1653 (f) (Supp. 1971) provides in part that 
lilt is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort 
should be made t.o preserve the natural beauty .of the c.ountryside and 
public park and recreati.on lands, wildlife and waterf.owl refuges, 
and historic sites" and implements this policy with specified require-
ments placed on the Secretary of Transportati.on. And the National 
Environmental Policy Act .of 1969 - slO2(2) (C) requires environmental 
impact statements be submitted on all "major Federal actions. II Num-
erous court cases are now being initiated which attempt to secure 
. ., f h 35 strict compliance by the Secretary w1th the prov1s1ons .0 t ese acts. 
There will 'L'.ndoubte.dly be increasing reaction, however, to the vigoro\ls 
campaign of the "environmentalists." Even now there is some evidence 
that many citizens are becoming resentful over the delays in public 
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project completjon resulting from court actions and with the 
inevitable additional costs incurred by such delays. 
Furthermore. certain leg~slation of recent years makes specific 
reference to the abatement of high\,lay noise. Starting in 1956, the 
Secretary of Commerce (duties transferred to the Secretary of Trans-
portation since 1966) was required to "cooperate with the States ••• 
in the development of long-range highway plans . • • which are formu-
lated with due consideration to their proba~le effect on the future 
development of urban areas of more than fifty thousand population." 
The first active consideration of highway noise at the Federal level 
was Policy and Procedures Memorandum 20-8 of the Bureau of Public 
Roads, issued January 14, 1969. Environmental effects, which must 
be considered by the State or local sponsor seeking Federal aid, are 
defined to include "noise, air, and water pollution." Pursuant t~ 
a 1970 amendment to the Federal-aid Highway Act (PL. 91-605) the 
Secretary of Transportation is directed "te, assure that possible 
adverse economic, social, and environmental effects have been con-
sidered in developing • • • (any Federally aided highway) project . 
Further, he is to "devedop and promulgate standards for highway noise 
levels compatible with different land uses after July 1, 1972.,,36 
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IV - Governmental Assessment of the Aircraft Noise Proble~ 
Despite certain disclaimers by the Congress that Federal 
governmental action has not completely preempted State and local 
regulation of aircraft noise, it is generally acknowledged that 
the unique characteristics of air traffic require Federal action 
for effectiv\~ control. Hence, this discussion will =ocus on Fed-
eral control of aircraft noise with comments, as appropriate, on 
State and local noise abatement regulatory efforts. While tr.ere 
have been several successful private suits brought on the theory 
of a "partial taking" (or inverse condemnation), commencing with 
37 
united States v. Causby in 1946, it is evident as noted by the 
court in the 1969 New Jersey case of Township of Hanover v. The 
Town of Morristown (wherein plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Town 
of Morristown from enlarging its airport for reason of anticipnted 
increased noise from an expanded airport operation) that "private 
compensatory damage suits do not accomplish the end objective of 
. . ,,38 
no~se suppress~on. 
The Department of Commerc( Report on ~he Noise Around Us (1970) 
asserts that pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act oi 1~5R req':~ring 
each particular model or make of aircraft to obtain a~ "airworthiness 
certificate" and an "air operating certific-i'lt.~11 that: 
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It is clear that the FAA has, • . . full power to 
prescribe air traffic rules for the "protection of 
persons and property on the ground," including pre-
scription of air traffic rules in the interest of 
noise abatement. (p. 146) 
While there may have been some doubts about this authority as of 
1958, Michael Wollan, in his article on "Controlling the Potential 
Hazards of Government-Sponsored Technology" indicates that even 
though noise per se was not mentioned in the Fede:r.'al Aviation Act 
of 1958, it was generally assumed as of 1961 i= not earlier, tha~ 
the FAA had the authority to prescribe aircraft noise standards. 
Wo1lan comments: 
A year later (1961) when Congress made its first 
appropriation for research on SST feasibility, the 
FAA discussed more specifically the standards it 
would use to regulate the SST's engine noise. FAA's 
new administrator, Najeeb Halaby, told Congress: 
"We would try to see to it that the noise levels were 
tolerable to the communit~ or as tolerable as the 
then existing aircraft. 113 
It was with the passage of the Department of Transportat~on Act of 
1966 that statutory authQrity was first specifically qran~ed relevant 
to aircraft noise, but no explicit provision was made for regulation. 
Section 4(a) of the Act directs the Secretary of DOT to "promote ana. 
undertake research and development relating to transportation, includ-
ing noise abatement, with particular attention to aircraft noise." 
All major par~icipants in the national air traffic system have 
recognized the existing and evolving dimensions c:: the aircraft noise 
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problem since shortly aft~r World War II, although the more serious 
implications might not have become clear until the introduction of 
jet-powered fleets in ·the late 1950' s. Report No. 1463 of May 23, 
1968, of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
states: 
The right to use the airspace over the united 
States in the operation of aircraft has long been 
established. Aviation has become an essential 
and widely approved part of our national trans-
portation system. However, aircraft noise and 
sonic boom are unwanted and unpleasant. At this 
stage of engine and aircraft development there 
are no easy nor ready solutions tc the continu-
ing and increasing problems. 
A subcommittee of this committee first held 
hearings on aircraft noise in September 1959 at 
the New York International Airport. The House 
of Representatives adopted House Resolution 420 
in August of 1961 which specifically authorized 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
to investigate the problem, and in February of 
1963 the committee published the "Investigation 
and Study of Aircraft Noise Problems II (88th Cong., 
1st Sess., H. Rept. No. 36). 
Over the last ten years we have had numerous 
panels of experts, with representatives from vir-
tually all segments of the aviation industry, as 
well as from local governments and the Federal 
Government. Airport operators, manufacturers, air 
carriers and their associations, local port author-
ities, municipal groups, NASA, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, and the Department of Transportation 
have all made contributions looking toward solutions, 
particularly of the noise problem, but also many of 
them have been giving increasing attention to· the 
sonic boom problem. 
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The noise problem is basically a conflict 
between two groups or i;'1b:'),7ests. On the one 
hand, there is a group who },rovides various 
air transportation services. On the other 
hand there is a group who live, work, and go 
to schools and churches in communities near air-
ports. The latter group is frequently burdened 
to the point where they can neither enjoy nor 
reasonably use their land because of noise result-
ing from aircraft operations. Many of them 
derive no direct benefit from the aircraft oper-
ations which create the unwanted noise. There-
fore, it is easy to understand why they complain, 
and complain most vehemently. The possible solu-
tions to this demanding and vexing problem which 
appear to offer the most promise are (1) new or 
modified engine and airframe designs, (2) special 
flight operating techniques and procedures, and 
(3) planning' for land use in areas adj acent to 
airports so that such land use will be most compat-
ible with aircraft operations. (pp. 3-4) 
Congressional hearings in 1962 "confirmed a 1960 House 
Committee recommendation that 'noise criteria be mandatory require-
ments in drafting specifications for future . . aircraft," since 
the lack of "maximum noise" criteria established by the F'ederal 
government appeared to have been a "deterrent to manufacturers t.O 
achieve greater noise suppression." It is obvious that competitive 
considerations restrained the aircraft engine manufacturers from 
allocating substantial research resources to aircraft noise abate-
mente Rather the objective was to "build engines and aircraft (with) 
40 
maximum performance characteristics without regard to noise." How-
ever, there were R&D efforts at the Federal level during the 1960's 
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to cope with the aircraft noise abatement problem, as for exampl
e, 
41 
the NASA "Quiet Engine" project. Nevertheless, despite the pre-
emption by the Federal government over aircraft flight operations
 
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and what might plaus
-
ibly appear to be a corresponding responsibility for the full con
-
sequences of such operations, including noise suppression, the 
Federal government, overall, moved slowly. This would seem to h
ave 
been an inevitable consequence of the 1962 Supreme Court case of 
GriggS v. Allegheny county42which held the airport operator liabl
e 
for damages, including noise caused to a homeowner by aircraft o
per-
ations and, therefore, completely absolved the airline operators 
and 
the Federal government from any responsibility whatsoever. 
The authority of the Griggs decision had the effect of 
obstructing the coordinated efforts required of all involved par
tic-
ipants called for by the OST Jet Aircraft Noise Panel in 1966 to 
43 
abatr: aircraft noise. Further, Congress gave some thought to the
 
possibility of the Federal government's indemnifying all airport 
operators throughout the U.S. against judgments obtained against 
them for noise damage alleged under the Griggs doctrine but found
 
this to be "impracticable •• :44 Hence, it was not until the passage 
of 
45 
~611 in 1968 relating to the abatement of aircraft noise and sonic 
boom and the subsequent promulgation by the FAA of noise standar
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regulations on December 1, 1969, pursuant thereto, that the 
aircraft engine manufacturers and the airlines had a compelling 
incentive to introduce noise reduction criteria into their p1an-
ning and operations. 
FAA Type certification of commercial aircraft delivered after 
December 1, 1969, under Part 36 of the FAA Aircraft Regulations, is 
perhaps the most significant Federal action to date for control of 
aircraft noise. The DC-10 and Cessna Citation 500 have been certif-
icated, and the L-1011 and all subsequent subsonic aircraft will have 
to comply with Part 36; the Boeing 747 was allowed until December 1, 
1971, for compliance. These planes are significantly quieter than 
older planes" but effectiveness of Type certification at a given 
point in time will depend on the make-lIp of the fleet at that time. 
Projections by the Air Transport Association estimate that by 1975 
only 18.6% of the fleet will have been certificated under Part 36. 
Thus, to the extent that it depends upon type certification as presently 
structured, the noise problem will have been only slightly relieved 
46 
by 1975 and could remain significant until 1990. 
Regulations with respect to retrofit, sonic boom, SST type 
certification, and STOL/VOTL typ= certification are still in the 
47 
developmental stages. Of all potential regulations, retrofitting 
would most likely bring about the most effective noise reduction 
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in the shlJrt-term, while type certification regulations '\0\611 prob-
ably be most effective in the long run. Of course, effectiveness 
will depend upon the maximum permissi~le noise levels set. The abate-
ment effects of modest noise reduction requirements with respect to 
type certification could be more than offset by an increase in air 
traffic in certain situations. 
As a result of the pervasive Federal regulation of air 
transportation pursuant to 'the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, state 
and local jurisdictions have been effectively precluded from control 
over aircraft noise. Local ordinances undertaking to control noise, 
as, for example, by prohibiting flights over the city at less than 
1,000 feet, have been struck down for being in conflict with FAA reg-
ulations or for imposing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, 
48 
or both. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the Federal govern-
ment has not accepted a level of responsibility for aircraft noise 
abatement (in terms of timely R&D and regulatory measures to reduce 
noise at the source) which corresponds to the ma9nitude of control it 
exercises over air transportation. yet, the Griggs doctrine places 
liability for aircraft noise on the airport owner-operator which is, 
in most situations, a State or local governmental entity. Furthe.r-
more, the threat of massive damage awards is definitely increasing 
49 
since the aircraft noise situation is worsening in many areas. While 
it may be generally agreed that air transportation must be regulated 
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at the national level, the lack of a corresponding national effort 
to abate one of its most distressing side-effects encourages resort 
to the courts as the only means of prodding, indirectly, a sluggish 
1 . . 50 Federa system ~nto actJDn. 
Since the states and municipalities as airport owners-
operators must bear the direct and immediate burden of complaints 
from the noise-abused public, they have seized upon whatever inter-
stitial measures are available (governmental, technical, economic, 
etc.) to lessen the impact of community complaints and noise damage 
judgments. Notable in this connection is the doctrine of proprietary 
control over airport operations which has its source in the concept 
of private ownership and operational status as distinguished from oper-
ation of the airport by a State or local governmental entity in its 
1 . 51 . f . governmenta capac~ty. Wh~le the Port 0 New York Author~ty has been 
able to maintain noise standards set by itself (less stringent, how-
ever, than FAA standards for new aircraft) and the new California 
regulations on noise standards for airports are essentially grounded 
on the "power of airport proprietors," this regulatory technique has 
severe limitations. This is particularly true for short-term relief 
since most major "airports are now situated in densely populated a:::-eas 
and proprietor cont.rol over noise reduction at the source is essentially 
non-existent. The FAA has clearly preempted aircraft operations as to 
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safety. As to noise, the airport operntor is left with whatever 
marginal control he can exercise through such a measure as "planning 
runway utilization schedules to take into account adjacent residential 
areas, noise characeristics of aircraft and noise sensitive time per-
iods" which is provided, among other methods, in the California noise 
52 
regulations for airports. While the proprietary doctrine may provide 
the airport operator some small but useful bargaining leverage vis-a-vis 
the Federal government in the present evolutionary phase of aircraft 
noise regulation, it is based on a questionable legal assumption, the 
future efficacy of which is in doubt; namely, that an instrumentality 
of the state, acting in a private, non-governmental capacity, has a 
degree of control over the activities prescribed in its State-originated 
charter which the state itself is precluded from exercising. 
Federal legislation since the enactment of §611 in 1968 provides 
some support for aircraft noise abatement. Noise is an environmental 
impact and should be considered in sl02(2) (C) environmental impact 
statemen.ts for airport development and modification. There are no 
Federal noise standards for airports. The Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970 declares it to be "national policy that airport develop-
ment projects authorized pursuant to this part shall provide for the 
protection and enhancement of the natural resources and the quality of 
the environment of the nation." This Act also provides for public 
hearings on airport projects, if requested. 
An evaluation of the Federal role in aircraft noise abatement 
planning must be approached with some caution and many qualifications. 
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Approximate total social impact assessments have been initiated at the 
Federal level as studies; for example, Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise 
Panel of the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the 
President, on Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports of March, 
1966, and the Joint DOT/NASA Civil Aviation Research and Development Pol-
icy Study of March, 1971. However, these studies were not intended for 
and have not led to the development of a national plan for aircraft noise 
abatement. Perhaps more illustrative of the comprehensive planning 
approach are the Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Studies 
(MANAPS) of HUD/DOT initiated in 1969 which are now being developed into 
a Planning Guidelines Manual for use by metropolitan communities in the 
modification of existing airports or the location of new airports. The 
central thrust of this effort is to provide alternative strategies for 
achieving land use development compatible with airports. 
There are, of course, plausible reasons which can be advanced to 
rebut the implied suggestion above that the Federal governmen~, in view 
of its preemption of control over aircraft operations, might reasonably 
be expected to assume a commensurate responsibility for aircra=t noise 
abatement. For example, the problem might be handled in several ways, 
including: abatement at the source (reducing engine noise); reduction 
of the effects of noise as hy buffers, insulation, or compat...ble land 
use management; and provision for compensation for those harmed by air-
craft noise. The Federal government has restricted its efforts primarily 
to noise reduction at the source as reflected in the enactment of §611. 
It has rejected the assumption of liability for aircraft noise as it was 
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privileged to do pursuant to the Griggs case. It has not intervened 
in the land use management function, this being a traditional prerog-
ative of state and local jurisdictions under the "police power. II 
The upshot of the situation described is that municipalities, 
whose citizens are directly and adversely affected by the noise, must 
suffer the social costs withou.t benefit of regulatory authority. 
This being the existing condition, states and cities have grasped what-
ever legal and non-legal devices are available to protect themselves 
from liability as well as to reduce the complaints of noise-abused cit-
izens. Tnis is why the proprietary doctrine has been asserted and to 
some extent applied by the Port of New York Authority. And the Pre-
amble of the Noise Regulations for California Airports states, somewhat 
unconvincingly it might be added, that: 
These standards are based upon two separate l<::!gal 
grounds: (1) the power of airport proprietors to 
impose noise ceilings and other limitations on the 
use of the airport, and (2) the power of the state 
to act to an extent not prohibited by federal law. 
The fact of the matter is that this control is marginal at best. 
Further, noise abatement programs involving comprehensive land use 
schemes are either so costly or so long-term or so politically-charged 
that such alternatives offer little short-term surcease. States or 
localities would seem to have some appreciable degree of control over 
aircraf-t noise effects only with respect to new airport developments. 
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The Minnesota Airport Zoning Act (Chapter 1111, 1969 Session Laws) 
is a notable illustration of this type of State/local initiative, 
providing for appropriate regional governmental entities, eminent 
domain powers, land use and development controls, and intergovernmental 
tax sharing arrangements which may assure minimum noise intrusion if 
a major new airport is constructed in the Minneapolis-St.Paul metro-
politan area. 
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v - The critical Assessment-Planning Task: 
Evaluating the Social Benefit 
of Noise Abatement 
The two preceding sections have touched briefly on the extent 
to which the noise factor has been considered in th!1 planning of 
transportation systems as reflected by actions of various legislative 
and regulatory entities at the Federal, regional, state and local 
levels. Such·.lctions represent the prescribing phase of the public 
decision process rather than the preceding assessment/planning phase. 
Surely, if the program planning phase, supported by an anticipatory 
project assessment component, has any vital relevance to the effec-
tive public decision process, it should influence the prescribing 
phase either at the legislative or regulatory level or both. Hence, 
; 
one of the critical questions relates to the extent to which the 
available hard, demo1strable data (concerning such factors as techno-
logical feasibility, economic costs, degree of safety provided, social 
behavioral patterns, etc.) associated with and offered in support of 
recommended noise emission standards actually support such standards 
to the satisfaction of the responsible legislative or regulatory body. 
Noise standards reflect, in part, a normative or social value judg-
ment by the prescribing entity, presumably determined to be in the 
public interest. Therefore, the task of evaluating the social impact 
of identified noise effects in particular contexts or in similar 
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patterns of noise intrustion contexts cannot be escaped. Put 
otherwise, how much is it worth to reduce the noise level by so many 
decibels within a given period of time? This question has many var-
iations depending upon the particular decisional context, including 
the decisional arena, i.e., judicial, regulatory, municipal council, 
the Congress, etc. 
It is submitted that this is a, if not the, crucial question 
for the adjudicating or prescribing entity; it is also the crucial 
question. for transportation systems planners if the latter expect 
. . . 53 
to influence the standards prescrlblng entlty. A few examples should 
suffice to demonstrate the diversity of decisional contexts in which 
some evalua.tion is made, explicitly or implicitly, of the social 
detrimen.t of noise intrusion or, conversely, the social ben=fit of 
noise reduction or elimination. 
Consider the judicial arena. While court cases are customarily 
concerned with remedying adverse consequences of inadequate past 
planning rather than with assessments of proposed projects, judicial 
deci&ons do provide some simplified and approximate evaluations of 
the social significance of "unwanted sound." Legal recognition of 
noise intrusion can best be illustra'ced by cases in the eminent domain 
(highway right-of-way) context, including inverse condemnation suits. 
Where there has been no "taking, II the vast majority of jurisdictions, 
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if not all, refuse any legal remedy for highway construction/traffic 
noise per see This can be interpreted as placing zero (or de minimis) 
value on noise. Where there has been a IIpartial taking, II about 
half the states recognize noise as an element of consequential damages. 
Put otherwise, in these jurisdictions noise can be considered in determ-
ining the difference in the fair market value of the property before 
and after the taking, such difference in the fair market value represent-
ing the compensation due the landowner. 
In 1971, a Superior Court Judge in Elizabeth, New Jersey, made 
an award of $164,119 to the local Board of Education which had alleged 
damages caused by noise interference with the conduct of classes in a 
local school after Interstate Highway 278 was constructed next to the 
54 
school. In 1965 tn.\ Highway Department had condemned 2,034 square feet 
of the school's pro1erty for the highway for which the School Board 
was awarded $3,700. After the highway came into use, the nois e level 
increased from about 60 decibels to approximately 80 decibels. Inter·-
ference with normal spf.~ech commences at the 65-70 dB level. The court IS 
judgment included $94,3S0 as the cost of air-conditioning the school 
and $51,000 as the cost (~f sealing all the windows. 
This judgment promptl:' a number of observations and questions. 
On the basis of legal prec!~dent, half the states might~ have gone along 
with the $3,700 eminent don~in award, ignoring the noise intrusion 
l 
1 
i 
i 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
----~----------~- -----------~I~'-~l 
- 43 -
altogether. In short, no social value would be placed on noise 
intrusion or noise abatement. Possibly, the courts of half the 
states would have attempted to increase the award by an amount 
representing harm caused by the noise int.rusion In the subject 
case, did the cost of air-conditioning the school building accurately 
reflect the harm incurred to the educational process by the noise 
intrusion? Was this the only concrete/operational means of giving a 
measurable magnitude to the noise intrusion? If not, then taking 
into account the probability of the noise, its magnitude and duration, 
and the resultant interference with the educational process, how is 
the latter effect to be given some measurable social value dimension? 
If the Highway Department had undertaken to work out an initial com-
promise settlement with the School Board, would it have been based 
on the same considerations as the court's judgment or measured in some 
other way? Could not the Highway Department have c('Illsidered a two-
mile, 35 mph rather than a 60 mph speed zone in the vicinity of the 
school? This would have greatly reduced the noise interference. Was 
the judgment at least implicitly made that this reduction in speed of 
interstate vehicles would be a greater social detriment than the noise 
intrusion on the school's educational function? 
What were the options available to the court in this instance? 
We can assume that this court had no authority to abate the noise at 
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the source, i.e., relocate the highway or control the noise emission 
levels of vehicles moving in interstate commerce or other aspects of 
interstate traffic. Apparently, the court considered it impracticable, 
if not impossible, to determine directly compensation for harm which 
would be done the educational process as well as possible physical and 
psychological injury to individuals. Hence, the remaining option was 
to in some manner reduce the effects of the noise. Presumably, effec-
tive buffering (as by sound barriers) was considered impractical. 
Relocating the school would have, no doubt, posed far greater difficult-
ies and expense than sealing and air-conditioning the building. Hence, 
did the court select the least costly, practical option available? 
It must have appeared to the court that the award represented a reason-
.able evaluation of the social impact of the noise intrusion. But what 
if the cost of sealing and air-conditioning had come to $500,OOO? Do 
the data and appropriate analytical techniques exist by which the pros-
pective harm to the educational process and to individuals might have 
been calculated so that an award based on noise effects rather than 
on the cost or reducing the effects could have been made? If so, would 
this have been a more satisfactory mode of evaluating the social impact 
of the noise intrusion than the means adopted by the court? 
Parenthetically, it might be observed that some analysts, in 
the example given, would employ the notion of social impact onlv with 
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reference to the evaluation of the actual social impact of the highway 
noise on the educational process and in terms of physical and psycho-
logical harm to individuals. This definitional approach would make a 
distinction between compensation for the harmful effects of the noise 
on the one hand and the cost of abating the noise at the source or 
reducing the effects of the noise on the other. The latter two alter-
natives would not be considered "surrogate" alternatives of the social 
impact of the noise. It might be contended that the cost of noise 
reduction (as by air conditioning) would be small compared with the 
long-term harm done the educational process and to individuals. Even 
assuming so in this instance, however, in other contexts the cost of 
abatement at the source or reduction of effects could far exceed the 
..... 
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r 
actual harm to individuals or to community value-institutional processes. 
While the analytical approach ma-:-/ best be left to the needs of a par-
ticular assessment/decisional context, it would appear that the cost 
of abatement at the source or the cost of reducing t:he effects of noise, 
as in the New Jersey case, could be considered, consistent with custom-
ary usage, as means of "internalizing" the social costs of environmental 
noise. 
If the task of evaluating the social impacts of noise effects in 
the judicial arena seem to pose certain difficulties, the task takes 
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on even greater complexity in many assessment/planning functions in 
legislative/regulatory arenas. Only a few illustrations can be 
touched on here which necessarily involve the evaluation of social 
benefit of reducing noise levels by certain amounts over given periods 
of time or of avoiding the exposure of particular social activities 
to specified noise levels. 
Retrofit Regulations: Federal Aviation Administration 
Should the FAA undertake to establish Rules and Regula-
tions pertaining to the retrofit of jet aircraft certi-
fied prior to the Boeing 747, the Administrator, pursuant 
to ~% 11, is required to take into account whether any pro-
posed standard would be "consistent" with the highest 
degree of safety in air ~ummerce or air transportation 
in the public interest" and to "consider \vhether any pro-
posed standard, ... is economically reasonable, technolog-
ically practicable, and appropriate for the particular 
type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance or certifi-
cate to which it will apply. II Obviously, the soc1.al obj ec-
tive of reducing aircraft noise is circumscribed by con-
siderations of safety, cost, and technological feasibility. 
Not only will these factors place maximum limits on the 
noise reduction which can be realistically expected, but 
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within these limits, the noise reduction standard 
will probably be arrived at by a process of "bal-
ancing" increments of noise reduction with the other 
factors in order to arrive at an 1' optimum" standard -
or optimum set of regulations pertaining to all types 
of jets considered for the retrofit program. This 
balancing process inevita~ly involves an evaluation 
of the social significance of aircraft noise reduc-
tion by given amounts within specified periods of 
time. However, the intensity of public demand for 
aircraft noise reduction may result in the establish-
ment of inflexible standards which must be met within 
a given period of time. In such event, the other 
factors would simply have to be adjusted so as to 
assure achievement of the regulatory norm. 
center' city STOLport Configuratior.: 
City Councilor 
Metropolitan Governmental Unit 
Should a given city or metropolitan area government 
undertake to assess and plan for a new center city 
STOLport to satisfy urgent demands for increased 
inter-city air traffic capacity it would be compelled 
to consider, in many instances, thf"! clearance of several 
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city blocks by condemnation and the relocation 
of the displaced residences, businesses and pub-
lic facilities. This would be an enormously 
costly undertaking. Assuming knowledge of an 
appropriately designed STOL plane, the character-
istics of the required STOLport and the probable 
air traffic patterns, the question will arise as 
to the perimeter of the land area to be condemned 
(with exceptions for activitLes which can accommo-
date to the higher noise levels which would be intro-
duced). The responsible decision-making e~ltity 
will be directly confronted with the problem of 
deciding the compatibility of various community land 
uses and activities with particular noise levels. 
Should all residences be condemned within the 40 
NEF contour, the 35 NEF contour, or the 30 NEF con-
tour? T.i'he cost will increase drastically as the per-
imeter is pushed out. So how does the decision-maker 
evaluate the social benefit of expanding the perimeter 
from the 35 to the 30 NEF contour? The problem is, of 
course, far more complex than stated here. If land 
is condemned only out to the 40 NEF perimeter, then 
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the City Council may be faced with multiple suits 
in inverse condemnation for partial takings or would 
be obliged to purchase avigational easements, possi-
bly out to the 30 NEF contour. 
Selection of Noise Abatement Strategy for 
An Existing Airport: city Councilor 
Metropoli'tan Govermnent unit 
A problem far more complex than the new STOLport 
example would probably confront a local governmental 
entity attempting to select an appropriate noise 
abatement program for an existing airport in a built-
up area. Primary types of abatement alternatives 
include: 
• Use of preferential runways 
Traffic allocation among metropoli-
tan airports if more than one exists 
· Airport redesign: runway length and 
direction 
· Insulation of structures in adjacent 
areas 
· Encouragement of compatible land use 
through short and long-term legal 
and economic incentives 
Selective relocation of schools and 
other noise-sensitive activities 
· compensation for noise intrusion 
It is readily apparent from the HUD Metropolitan 
Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Study (MANAPS) that 
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literally dozens of alternative strategies might 
plausibly be considered, based on varjous combin-
ations of the above noted primary means of noise 
abatement. These will involve different. economic 
costs, different degrees of disruption and incon-
venience, different time frames for implementation, 
varying degrees of legal, institutional, and social 
obstruction, and different levels of noise reduction. 
So again, the question arises: just what social value 
is to be placed on noise reduction in the particular 
noise abatement context? 
Legislation to Establish Federal Noise 
Emission Standards for Non-Aircraft 
Noise Sources: 'rhe Congress with 
Implementing Regulations by EPA/ONAC 
Development of a statutory scheme and implementing 
regulations for applying Federal noise emission 
standards to non-aircraft noise sources may be the 
most complex, certainly the most far-reaching in its 
consequences for noise reduction, of all the noise 
abatement strategies. Most environmental noise 
abatement control has been initiated at the 
local level through specific ordinances or truncated 
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codes. State regulation has been limited, 
primarily to internal combust1on engine sources. 
It now is rather obvious that a coordinated pro-
gram for environmental noise abatement must be 
shaped at the national level. A start in this 
direction was made with the enactment of the Noise 
Pollution and Abatement Act of 1970. s40l(c) pro-
vides for consolidation of the reviewing function 
of noise-producing activities by the Federal agen-
cies in EPA/ONAC. This approach necessarily 
involves uniformity of standards and inevitably 
will come into conflict with the diversity of reg-
ulatory measures required for effective control of 
particular noise environments at the State and local 
levels. Further, new Federal standards will surely 
wipe out some existing State and local noise regu-
latory schemes on which the responsible governmental 
entities have expended great effort, time, and expense. 
Hence, highly intricate questions will arise with 
respect to the social value of environmental noise 
r.eduction, not merely with reference to specific 
noise contexts but also in terms of optimum noise 
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reduction in the aggregate of noise environments 
across the nation. An elaboration of the complex-
i ties involved in this task are revie'vr80 In various 
55 
recent reports and papers. 
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Another way of posing- the task of evaluating the social impact 
of noise effects is to ask: how can available scientific, techno.log-
ical, economic, and social behavioral data and analyses be applied by 
the assessment/planning entities so as confidently to establish the 
parameters within which realistic noise reduction goals, regulations, 
and standards can be prescribed? Acknowledging that heated disputes 
often arise over the validity of even so-called "scientific" data, 
there would seem to be, nevertheless, a considerable reservoir of 
consensus data and analyses concerning what is practicable with ~espect 
to noise abatement within given periods of time, the economic costs 
of alternative abatement strategies, and what the socio-political 
effects will be. Therefore, the ~lestion may be asked: how far have 
we moved toward the application of available data and analyses in the 
setting of noise standards, thereby eliminating a corresponding degree 
of needless and obfuscating partisan contentiousness? Hopefully, we 
are making some progress. This is not said to denigrate adversarial 
system. Judgments pertaining to the social significance of various 
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noise effects and the manner in which the costs and benefits of 
noise abatement programs are to be shared are matters which prop-
56 
erly fall within the ambit of adversarial process. Judgments on 
such matters as these involve alternative concepts of social justice, 
and the application of such concepts in particular decision co.ntexts 
constitute appropriate subjects for competing views in the public 
decision process. 
One further point of considerable importance needs to be made. 
While at some point in time the responsible prescribing entity 
must accept an anticipatory assessment outcome and a planning strategy 
for implementativn based thereon, this should not be the end of the 
matter. After all, the objective is to achieve prescribed environ-
mental noise reduction. But in order to determine if the actual noise 
levels of target sources or environments are in fact being reduced, 
all Federal, State and local noise abatement programs must be monitored 
and evaluated on a continuing basis so that modifications, as necessary, 
can be introduced into these programs periodically. Effective noise 
abatement involves a continuing evaluative function - not simply a 
"one shot" decision. 
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v. CASE STUDIES 
D. Genetic Technology: 
Promises and Problems 
Mark S. FRANKEL 
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by a special hospital committee, that have caused delays for women seeking 
official approval. As ~ result of the ruling, therefore, restrictive state 
. b . 1 h b 1 .. 71 antl-a ortlon aws ave een dec ared unconstltutlonal. 
APPLYING GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 
The techniques reviewed in the previous section have improved considerably 
man's capability for controlling genetic disease. At the same time, however, 
their application raises new and complex issues. Ouestions concerninq IIwhen ll 
and IIhow ll genetic technology will be employed and who will be its lIemployer,1I 
are fraught with legal, social, ethical and political ramificatlons. And 
whether the answers to these questions will be framed within the context of 
long-range societal goals or the immediate amelioration of individual or 
family problems will have important consequences for developing policy. The 
remainder of this paper will explore some of these issues, emphasizinQ the 
variables which contribute to their complexity. 
I. Treating Genetic Disease 
Two modes of therapy should be considered: current medical treatment 
and gene therapy. In the case of, the former, most would agree that if an 
appropriate treatment is available it would be morally reprehensible not to 
provide it to all those in need. Modern medicine, guided by man's compassion 
for man and its commitment to the individual, makes no distinction between the 
sources and types of diseases or the individual "worth" of its patients. 
71 Even the four states -- Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington -- that 
have permitted unrestricted abortions will probably have to alter their laws. 
These states have residency requirements which the Court struck down. 
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Prevai1inq professional and social mores IIdemand that all persons have 
11 bl d . 1 . II 72 P . d . recourse to a reasona e me lca expertlse. . rOVl lng proper care 
to all those in need, however, is not without its consequences. 
A. Cost of treatment: One problem 1S the cost involved in providin~ the 
treatment. In the case of cystic fibrosis, the most common autosomal 
recessive defect in the white population, a recent study found that the costs 
were so high that "families who have been able to attain a moderate income 
. may be reduced to the poverty level by chronic health problems .. 
The study also revealed the inadequacy of private health insurance, with the 
finding that 31 per cent of the children II were unprotected by medical insurance 
and only one-fourth had sufficiently comprehensive covera~e to include 
outpatient expenses and medication.,,74 Another example is hemoohilia, for 
which the cost of treatment can be $12,000 per year for each hemophiliac or 
approximately $480 million for all Americans suffering from the disease. 75 
Most American families would be unable to afford such treatment. Should the 
72Stevenson and Howell, QP... cit., supra, n. 55 at 31. 
73Audrey T. McCollum, "Cystic Fibrosis: Economic Impact Upon the Family,1I 
The American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 61, July 1971, P. 1340. 
74 Ibid . When insurance was available to families on an independent 
basis, ~study found the cost of premiums to be as hiah as ~40-50 per month. 
Blue Cross has established a system under which families havino a child with 
Cooley's Anemia can be reimbursed for transfusion costs even when their child 
is treated as an outpatient. The plan is being set up on a one-year trial 
basis and judgment reqarding its effectiveness must be reserved until the end 
of that time. See B.J. Culliton, Q£. cit., supra, n. 49 at 591. 
75K.M. Rrinkhous, IIChanqing Prospects for Children I-lith Hemophi1ia,1I 
Children; Vol. 17, November-December 1970, p. 222. 
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cost be absorbed by society? Can society then require that to receive such 
treatment a patient must fulfill certain conditions? 
A recent case in Pennsylvania emphasizes the implications of the latter 
Question. 76 A mother was initially informed by state officials that in order 
to receive treatment for her 12-year-old hemophiliac son she would have to ~o 
on welfare. The requirement was subsequently rescinded by the governor, who 
then told the family that they would have to recruit 36 donors a month and 
drive 100 miles to Philadelphia to donate blood in exchange for their son's 
treatment. The family, understandably perturbed, is now involved in 
negotiating a compromise with the State. 77 One must seriously question the 
intent of imposing such conditions on a family. Are there acceptable limits 
to such conditions? Hhat criteria should be used for determining those limits? 
And with whom does that responsibility rest? A recent court suit demonstrates 
the challenge that lies ahead. Four young hemophiliacs have filed suit in 
federal court demanding that the government ~rov1de them and all other 
hemophiliacs in the country with the treatment necessary to allow them to 
bleed nonna11y. The suit contends that the youths were denied the "equal 
protection" guaranteed by the "4~h Amendment, citing the ~overnment maintenance 
programs for drug addicts. 78 Thus, the familiar problem of allocating resources 
becomes even more acute with the emergence of new genetic technology. 
76The following account is taken from articles appearing in the 
WashinQton Post, November 2, 1972, p. K3 and November 6, 1972, p. A20. 
77As a result of this incident, it was recently announced that 
Pennsylvania had established a program to give free treatment ot hemophiliacs. 
See the Hashington Post, December 5, 1972, p. A4. 
78Hashington Post, October 11, 1972, p. AlB. 
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B. Health Consequences of Treatment: Another unanticipated consequence 
associated with treating genetic disease can be illustrated by examin~ the 
treatment for PKU. As already noted (supra, p. 17), the fetus of a 
phenylketonuric woman is exposed to high concentrations of phenylalanine 
metabolites and, as a result, it may experience severe retardation and heart 
defects. 79 Thus, the medical science which enabled those. mothers to lead 
relatively normal lives now threatens to deny their children the same benefits. 
Theoretically, correction of the metabolic disorder should prevent damage to 
the fetus. From a medical standpoint, however, reinstatement of the low 
phenylalanine diet poses two problems. First, lithe health status of the 
phenylketonuric woman may not justify the difficulties involved in attempts 
80 
to control diet." And second, there is the possibility that reinstatement 
of the diet may 'i resu1t in nutritional deficiency which may be as detrimental 
to the fetus as maternal phenylketonuria itse1f. 1I81 Under these circumstances, 
should the mother be encouraged not to conceive at all? If she insists on 
having a child, what is the physician's responsibility with reqard to 
reinstating the special diet? Since the btrth of such irreparably damaged 
children will result in life-long institutional care, does society have a right 
. 79According to R.R. Howell and R.B. Stevenson, "virtual1y every infant 
born to a woman who meets the criteria for classic phenylketonuria will 
have major defects, with growth retardation and microcephaly as well as other 
structural abnormalities." liThe Offspring of Phenylketonuric Women," Social 
Biology, Vol. 18 (Supplement, 1971), p. 527. 
80V. E1ving Anderson, "Discussion: Maternal Effects in Genetic Disease," 
Ibid., p. S32. 
81 R.0. Fisch, D. Doeden, L.L. Lansky and J.A. Anderson, "Materna1 
Phenylketonuria: Detrimental Effects on Embryogenesis and Fetal Deve10pment," 
American Journal of Diseases of Children, Vol. 118, December 1969, p. 855. 
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to intervene in preventin~ such births? The consequences noted for PKU have 
82 been linked to other maternal disorders as well, Thus increasing the 
proportions of the problem. 
C. Treatment by Gene Therapy: Althou~h the development and application 
of techniques for gene therapy are a number of years into the future, their 
potential impact warrants serious consideration at this time. The high degree 
of uncertainty and potential risks involved in usinq qene therapy clearly 
distinguish it from more conventional modes of therapy. Perhaps even more 
important, however, is that both the uncertainty and the risks will affect 
future offsprinq as well as the present generation. Friedmann and Roblin 
write that IIFor an acceptable genetic treatment of a human genetic defect, we 
would require that the gene therapy replace the functions of the defective 
gene segment without causing deleterious side effects in the treated individual 
83 
or in his future offspring. II They conclude that lIalthough the ethical 
problems posed by gene therapy are similar in principle to those posed by 
other experimental medical treatments, we feel that the irreversible and 
heritable nature of gene therapy means that the tolerable margin of risk and 
uncertainty in such therapy is r~duced.,,84 They support the need for continued 
research into the technology of gene therapy and propose eithico-scientific 
criteria for applying these techniques. However, they oppose usinq gene 
therapy in human patients at this time because of man's limited understanding 
of genetic processes and of how they might be affected by technological 
82Stevenson and Howe 11, 2£.. cit., ~, n. 55 at 35. 
83F . d ne mann and Rob 1 in, PR. cit., supra, n. 53 at 952. 
84Ibid. , p. 953. 
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85 intervention. The tone of their presentation, however, suggests that gene 
therapy should and will become a useful method for medical treatment. 
Theologian Paul Ram~ey, however, is less certain about the use of such therapy. 
He writes that lithe unknown and unforeclosed risks to future generations may 
outweigh any benefit that might be secured for the individual patient. In a 
matter of such grave importance, 'no discernible risk' is not adequate 
protection. We need to know that there are no risks - a requirement which 
86 inheritable gene therapy is not apt to meet. II Ramsey is undoubtedly correct 
when he contends that complete knowledge regarding the possible risks of qene 
therapy is unlikely ever to be realized. Under such circumstances, then, gene 
therapy affecting future generations would be prohibited if Ramsey's criterion 
was observed. Ramsey believes that the choice is not simply between doing 
nothing about an inherited disease and correcting it by gene therapy. 
Alternative choices would include IIhaving no children or fewer children. The 
treatment would be continence or not getting married or using three 
contraceptives at the same time or voluntary steril ization. 11 87 In 1 ight of 
the uncertainty and high risks involved in gene therapy, Ramsey finds more 
acceptable these other alternatives for IItreatingli genetic disease. 
The two points of view outlined above converge at the crucial policy 
questions: Are there any co"Jftions under which certain types of gene therapy 
85 Ibid., p. 954. 
86pau1 Ramsey, IIGenetic Therapy: A Theologian's Response,1I in Michael 
Hamilton (ed.), The New Genetics and the Future of Man, (\11m. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co.: Michigan, 1972), P. 169. 
87paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1970), 
p. 118. 
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should be prohibited or encouraqed? What criteria or guidelines should be 
used for determining those conditions? And with whom do these responsibilities 
rest? These questions challenge both the scientific and ethical dimensions 
of the policy-making process. 
D. Treatment and the Gene Pool: Perhaps the most frequently cited 
consequence of treating genetic disease is its impact on the human gene pool, 
i.e. the total genetic information possessed by the reproductive members of 
the population. The present gene pool is the result of 3 billion years of 
evolution and natural selection. Nature is successful in protecting the human 
species from detrimental genes because potential carriers either die prior to 
reproducing or reproduce less frequently than other heriditary types. The 
problem, as viewed by a growing number of people, is that medical advances 
have altered this situation by reducing the impact of natural selection. New 
treatment permits the survival and reproduction of persons with inheritable 
disorders who in earlier times would not have reproduced. As a result, the 
human gene pool experiences a higher frequency of many defective genes. For 
example, approximately 90 per cent of the children who formerly died from 
retinoblastoma - a malignant tumor of the eye - are now surviving because 
, . 
of advances in surgery and chemotherapy. Many of these children will be blind, 
but certainly able to reproduce and, consequently, :0 transmit the deleterious 
gene to their progeny.88 Gene therapy which did not affect reproductive cells 
would produce similar results. Treated individuals would still pass the 
88Reisman and Matheny, QQ. cit., supra, n. 15 at 205. 
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defect on to their offsprinq, thus requiring more and more gene therapy. 
What are the likely consequences if the genetic load is permitted to 
increase? According to some, the quality of the gene pool wi! I continup to 
deteriorate and greater demands will be placed upon the community's medical 
services, since more people will be dependent on medical care and treatment. 
Ramsey foresees "some future !=Ieneration (which] will beqin to expe,-ience 
20 percent genetic deaths. n89 And Bentley Glass draws the following scenerio: 
to contemplate the man of tomorrow who must begin his day 
by adjusting his spectacles and his hearing aid, inserting 
his false teeth, taking an allergy injection in one arm and 
an insulin injection in another, and topping off his 
preparations for l~he by taking a tranquil1izing pill, is 
none too p1easant.-
What is good for today's individual and his qeneration may be detrimental 
to future populations, and unless some action is taken lithe whole genetic 
capacity of man will be much weakened. 11 91 
This bleak picture has prompted the suggestion of measures designed to 
cope with the deteriorating gene pool. Such measures rest on the belief 
that the present pattern of ge~etic selection is much less desirable than 
that which could be achieved by a deliberate and controlled effort. Two 
types of proposals are frequently suggested. The first is a program designed 
89pau1 Ramsey, "Mora1-Rel igious Impl ications of Genetic Control, II in 
John D. Ros1ansky (ed.), Genetics and the Future of Man, (App1eton-Century-
Crofts: New York, 1966), p. ",. 
90 Bentley Glass, "Human Heredity and Ethical Problems," Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine, Vol. 15, Winter 1972, p. 243. 
91 Ju 1 ian HuX1 ey. quoted in Sol Tax and Cha r1 es Ca 11 ender (eds.), 
Evolution After Dat~ljin, Vol. III, (The University of Chicago Press.: Chicago, 
mO). 
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to alter genetic composition by encoura~ing desirable traits, i.e. "positive" 
92 
eugenics. The second is desi~ned to alter genetic composition by reducing 
the incidence of undesirable traits, i.e. "negative" eugenics. The latter 
alternative might be accomplished by persuading those who have a high 
likelihood of transmittinq a genetic defect not to reproduce, by sterilization, 
or by abortion of fetuses diagnosed as genetically abnormal. 
The "deterioratinq gene pool" argument is not without its critics. They 
contend that the predicted danger of a genetic apocalypse is erroneously 
calculated. They see no "imminent danger of being overwhelmed by the bad 
genes .. we would seem to have no rlason to fear that the normal population 
will soon be replaced by that of individuals with abnormal genetic factors. lI93 
One force working to reduce the genetic burden is current demographic trends. 
"In the short run, demographic trends (in and of themselves) are reducinq the 
incidence of serious congenital anomalies. 1I94 Trends indicating smaller 
family size and a lowered average age of childbearing will work to ameliorate 
the quality of the human gene pool. 
Another criticism concerns the nature and severity of genetic disease. 
"Manya Ibad l gene whose effects are overcome euphenical1y [i.e. by medical 
treatment] may be said to have lost its Ibadness,1 wholly or to a large degree 
so that its accumulation no lonqer represents a serious biological load even 
92see supra, n. 66, for a discussion of the implications of such 
programs. 
93Reisman and Matheny, Q£. cit., supra, n. 15 at 204. 
94DUdley Kirk, "Patterns of Surv:va"j and Reproduction in the United 
States," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of,the U.S.A., 
Vol. 59, March 1968, p. 669. 
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95 
though it may represent a considerable economic load." For example, if a 
disease such as diabetes can be controlled by artificially altering the 
environment, ; .e. providing easy acquisition to insulin, then any real harm 
to individuals is negated. Thus, "environmental changes have made some 
96 hereditary defects irrelevant"; it seems reasonable to expect similar 
medical advances in the future. 
There are those who also question an underlying assumption of proposals 
designed to "protect" the gene pool - that such protection is an obligation 
of this generation to future generations. Professor Martin P. Golding contends 
that "We are thus raising a question about our moral relations to the community 
of the remote future. I submit that this relationship is far from clear, 
certainly less clear than our moral obligations to communities of the present ... 97 
It seems highly unlikely that today's generation can accurately predict the 
needs and wants of succeeding generations. 
One might go so far as to say that if we have an obligation 
to distant future generations it is an obligation not to 
plan for them. r~ot only do we not know their conditions 
of 1 ife, ~/e also do n,ot know whether they wi 1 1 rna i nta in the 
~:m~o~~a a similar) conception of the good life for man as 
Even if it could be agreed that there are real and identifiable obligations 
95philip Handler (ed.), Biology and the Future of Man, (Oxford 
University Press: New York, 1970), pp. 910-911. 
96K• k't 94 1 r , .Q£. • .9-" supra, n. . 
97Martin P. Golding, "Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering,1i UCLA 
Law Review, Vol. 15, February 1968, p. 453. 
98Martin P. Golding, "Obligations toPuture Generations," The Monist. 
Vol. 56, January 1972, pp. 97-98. 
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to future generations, there is still the problem of deciding how to balance 
those obligations against the obligations to the present generation. 
Any attempt to manipulate the existing gene pool might not only foreclose 
possible options of future generations, but might also adversely affect their 
biological adaptability. The genetic diversity of the human gene pool has 
long been recognized as necessary for ensuring adaptability to future 
environments, so essential to survival in the face of constant evolutionary 
change. "Genetic diversity is in one sense capital for investment in future 
adaptations. Since genetic variability represents evolutionary capability, 
it- is a load we should be ready and willing to bear.,,99 It would appear 
morally and biologically unwise, then, to tamper with the gene pool signifi-
cantly without prior know1edqe of the demands and needs of future environments. 
Finally, many seriously doubt the efficacy of negative eUgenic programs. 
Most deleterious genes are maintained in the population by normal heterozygous 
persons. It is estimated that lIevery individual is a carrier of three or 
more of such genes, and that vi~tually every human being carries at least 
100 
one." Since one cannot always be certain that such genes will manifest 
themselves clinically in present ,or future generations, lIonly by eliminating 
virtually everyone could our load of past mutations be eliminated, and this 
101 
only temporarily, as new mutations are occurring all the time." 
99Marc Lappe, "Moral Obligations and the Fallacies of 'Genetic Control,'" 
Tbeological Studies, Vol. 33, September 1972, p. 423. 
100Arno G. Motulsky, George R. Fraser and Joseph Felsenstein, "Public 
Health and Long-Term Genetic Implications of Intrauterine Diagnosis and 
Selective Abortion,1I in Daniel Bergsma (ed.), Intrauterine Diagnosis (Birth 
Defects: Original Article Series, Vol. 7: The National Foundation - March 
of Dimes, April 1971), p. 26. 
10l0r1ando J. Miller, "Discussion of Symposium Papers," Ibid., p. 34. 
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An alternative suggestion for improvin9 the gene pool, without acting 
directly upon biological man, is to minimize or eliminate environmental 
hazards. It is becoming clear that "we are exposed to a wide range of chemical 
and physical agents which may damage the genetic material of our cells",102 
Thus, to the extent that man contaminates his environment and introduces factors 
that render it harmful, "his best interests are served by the adoption and 
enforcement of regulatory measures to prevent, minimize, or remove undesirable 
103 
contamination." 
In view of the sometimes vehement stands taken by those on both sides of 
the argument, it would seem to be useful to be~;n to assess the status of the 
human gene pool. A six-year report of the American Eu~enics Society speaks 
directly to this point: 
In view of the relative stability of the gene pool, 
the problem is not generally viewed as one requiring 
dramatic or 'crash' solutions. But in the long run, 
changes in the distribution and frequenctes of genes may 
be of greatest significance. At this stage the need is 
for better identification of the present and potential 
direction of changes rather than action to alter these 
trends in any major way.104 
It is also not too soon to begin to evaluate some of the suggested approaches 
for improving man's capability to control genetic disease. 
102B100m,..£2' cit., supra, n. 31 at 1. See also V.E. Headings, QE.. cit., 
supra, n. 50. 
103National Commission on 'Community Health Services, changing Environmental 
Hazards, Report of the Task Force on Environmental Health (Pu lic Affairs 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 20. 
104Theodosius Dobzhansky, Dudley Kirk, Otis Duncan and Carl Bajema. The 
American Eugenics Society. Inc. Six-Year Report, 1965-1970 (Published by-rhe 
Society: New York), p. 6. 
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II. Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion 
When prenatal diagnosis is combined with abortion, it becomes poisible 
to alter directly the course of genetic disease. The introduction of new 
automated procedures will facilitate diagnosis as well as lessen its cost. 
It is likely, therefore, that as methods for intrauterine diagnosis improve, 
that pressures to use them in the management of the pregnant patient will 
increase. lOS Undoubtedly, this new technical capability will also add another 
dimension to the debate concerning abortion. It would be useful, therefore, 
to examine some of the criteria for developing policy for this alternative. 
A. Risks/Benefits of Prenatal Diagnosis: One important consideration 
is the risks involved in using various prenatal diagnostic tests. All of the 
techniques described herein carry some degree of risk. While most of the 
evidence appears to indicate that the risk is minimal, much more data remains 
to be collected and evaluated. In the case of amniocentesis, for example, it 
has been suggested that lithe current status of knowledge of the biology of 
amniotic fluid and its contents - including the fetus - is so rudimentary that 
. . 106 this field must be regarded pnmarl1y as i:t1 area for research. II As noted 
earlier (supra, p. 7), very lit~le information is available regarding the 
long-term risks of applying amniocentesis. Since the use of any diagnostic 
technique is justified only if the frequency of the disease or its severity 
105 11As couples feel social pressure to limit population growth and to 
be content with only two children, most will very much want to ensure that 
the two they do have are healthy. I expect the demand for amniocentesis to 
develop strong1y." C.O. Carter, "Practica1 Aspects of Early Diagnosis," in 
Maureen Harris (ed.), Early Diagnosis of Human Genetic Defects: Scientific 
and Ethical Considerations, Fogarty International Center Proceeding, No.6, 
1972. (Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Publication No. (NIH) 
72-75L p; 20. 
1060r1ando J. Miller, Q£. cit., supra, n. 101 at 33. 
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are greater than the risks posed by the diagnostic procedure, a careful 
assessment of those risks and the reliability of the diagnosis should be 
made. 
Because of the danger of applying these techniques to the general 
population before their costs - in terms of morbidity and mortality to mother 
and fetus - have been reliably assessed, it has been suggested that they be 
used only when a couple carries a moderate or high risk of g7ving birth to 
107 
a child with a genetic defect. Various criteria for making such determi-
108 
nations have been proposed. For example, statistics indicate that 
increasing age at pregnancy is correlated with an increased incidence of 
chromosomal abnormalities. 109 Thus, prospective prenatal diagnosis might be 
110 
warranted of mothers above a certain age. 
As familiarity with these techniques increases, the risks will surely 
diminish. Automation will ma.ke the required tests simple and inexpensive and 
more couples will undoubtedly request them. Thus, by emphasizing the 
criterion of risks/benefits, there might well come a time when prenatal 
diagnosis will be an integral part of monitoring all pregnancies. There are, 
however, other considerations. 
B. Parent-Child Relationship: Since treatment or cure is not available 
for most genetic deseases, the only therapeutic alternative following the 
107Michael M. Kaback, quoted in Maureen Harris (ed.), Q[. cit., supra, 
n. 105 at 85. 
l08C.O. Carter, Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
109Luks and Ruddle, Q[. cit., supra, n. 9 at 495-497. 
110In the case of Down1s syndrome, for example, a substantial proportion -
as high as 33 per cent - of children are born to mothers above the age of 40 
years. Motulsky, et. ~., QQ.. cit., supra, n. 100 at 30. 
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diagnosis of a defective child is an abortion. Important to consider here 
is the effect that the wide-scale application of prenatal diagnosis combined 
with abortion will have on the parent-child relationship. Ethicist John 
Fletcher contends that 
the experience of parents in prenatal diagnosis and genetic 
counseling does not lessen the affection they bear for their 
children, already born or to be born, even thouqh that 
relationship is permanently altered by the characterlDf the 
experience of aenetic counseling and amniocentesis. 1 I I 
(emphasis adde ) 
In his efforts to identify and describe this "altered relationship,,,1l2 
Fletcher suggests that a new stage of life is created, in which parents will 
be as intimate with their children before they are born as they are after 
they are born. One result of this was "that active roles as parents began 
earlier in the course of pregnancy. . Assurance of the health of the child 
releases parental care, planning and symbolic activity usually reserved for 
birth. 1l3 Fletcher quotes a number of couples responding that IIthey loved 
114 
them [their children] more because they had known them longer." Ironically, 
Fletcher also found that this pre-natal intimacy "increases the sense of 
compulsion towards perfection that middle-class people have; they want their 
lll John Fletcher, "The Brink: The Parent-Child Bond in the Genetic 
Revolution,JI Theological Studies, Vol. 33, September 1972, p. 428. 
l12 Ibid ., pp. 457-485. His sample consisted of 25 couples who had 
undergone amniocentesis and had given birth to a healthy child or had an 
abortion performed. 
113Ibid ., p. 477. 
114Interview with Dr. John Fletcher, Director of Interfaith Metropolitan 
Theological Education, Inc., Washington, D.C., August 11,1972. 
i 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r 1 1 
I 
L· ' ..... :L~~~_. __ 
---.--- .... ~~-.,-~-~~"".~- ... ------.. ~ .. , ~.~, -r 
37 
115 
babies to be healthy, beautiful and perfect." He sees a danqer in this, 
contending that i1the drive towards perfection is one of the worst qualities 
116 
that human beings have since it causes them to become very into1erant." 
Fletcher also asks if prenatal diagnosis, 
because it inclines the parents to contemplate the abortion 
of the fetus before they are fully informed as to the 
results of the test, erode[s] that IIbas;c trust" which 
is so fundamental as to lead Erik Erikson to assert that 
lithe firm establishment of enduring trust over basic 
mistrust is the first task of the budding personality 
and therefore first of all a task for maternal care"?117 
F1etcher conterd~ that even if the diagnostic results are negative, the test 
and its results are going to change the lives of the parents. "They will 
never be the same parents they were before because this test is changing the 
118 
way they learn the roles of parenthood. II People have been brought up to 
love their child, at least prior to its birth, without preconditions. But, 
says Fletcher, "when you start contemplating the tests with the added feature 
that abortion is an alternative, you have introduced an element of doubt into 
that relationship that has never been there before. So you are a different 
119 parent than you were taught to be." Thus, genetic technology has altered 
parenthood in a way that had not been anticipated. 
What will be the effect of this new dimension of parenthood on the "basic 
115Idem . 
l16 Idem . 
117Fletcher, Q£. cit., supra, n. 111 at 473. 
l18Interview with John Fletcher, supra, n. 114 
119Idem. 
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trust" between child(ren) and parents? Fletcher states that "nobody can 
live with the thought that his parents would have killed him if he had been 
sick. There is no way to accept that, yet you are going to have a whole 
120 
generation of parents who have had this opportunity." In the context of 
its present usage, Fletcher believes that prenatal diagnosis "does not 
introduce a permanently insoluble moral conflict in the ethics of parental 
121 
caring." But what will be its effect if applied on a wide-scale and 
supported by socially and legally sanctioned abortion? Fletcher believes 
that 
Nothing could weaken or dissolve the parent-child bond 
more effectively than children becoming afraid that the 
parents made such decisions for trivial reasons of pet'sonal 
convenience or because they were forced into it for 
external societal reasons. 122 
The parent-child relationship, then, constitutes another important variable 
to consider when developing genetic technology policy (see ..f!:tfra, pD. 63-64 , 
for additional discussion of intrafamily relationships). 
C. Economic Variables: Economic factors must also be considered. The 
economic impact can be evaluated on two levels: (1) the burden which falls on 
the individual family, and (2) the costs to society. The birth of a genetically 
defective child creates new problems of resource allocation for a family. The 
cost of caring for such a child can make deep inroads into a family's financial 
l20Idem . Fletcher also inquires into the feelings of living children, 
e.g. wiTIthey worry about their own security?, where amniocentesis was used 
on a fetal sibling. ~. cit., supra, n. 111 at 478. 
121 Fl etcher, 2£. cit., supra, n. 111 at 479. 
122Ibid ., p. 480. 
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resources (witness the case of cystic fibrosis, supra, p. 23) and private 
health insurance has been unable to absorb this impact. This drain on 
resources might also have disruptive consequences for the family unit in 
123 
more subtle ways. 
The costs to society are both direct and indirect. Society not only 
assists in providing care for defective individuals, but also assumes the 
losses resulting from their inability to become economically and socially 
productive members of society. Institutionalization and care for persons 
with genetic disorders, many of which are chronic in nature, can be very 
expensive. For example, the cost to society of caring for those suffering 
from Down's syndrome, which has an estimated frequency of one in 600 births, 
124 is approximately $1.7 billion annually. The economic impact of ~enetic 
disease, then, must be weighed along with other factors. 
D. Abortion and the Gene Pool: While a program of selective abortion 
might help to relieve the emotional and financial strain experienced by 
individuals and their families, how effective would such a program be in 
reducing the total frequency of deleterious genes? Arno Motulsky and his 
colleagues-have found that the use of selective abortion to reduce the cases 
of autosomal recessive diseases IIwil1 be relatively small (between 12.5% and 
34%) if the procedurE> is only initiated following birth of an affected 
child. 1I125 In fact, selection against recessive genes under any conditions 
123See McCollum, ~. cit., su~, n. 73 at 1335-40, for a discussion of 
some of the educational, social and psycho1agical needs of othet- family 
members that might be compromised by the strain on family resources, 
124G1 . t 90 t 241 ass,~. ~ , supra, n. a . 
l25Motu1sky, et. ~.,~. cit., supra, n. 100 at 30. 
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will be ineffective unless there is also selection aqainst heterozY90tes. 
For example, lIa 50% reduction in reproduction of heterozygotes would reduce 
the incidence of the recessive homozygote under random mating to one fourth 
. fl' t' 11 126 F . ff' . ,ts ormer va ue ,n one genera lon. or maXlmum e ectlveness ln 
eliminating autosomal recessive diseases, premarital carrier detection 
. 127 
would be required to detect those matings at rlsk. 
! 
! 
Sex-linked diseases can be prevented by prenatal diaqnosis ofl 
heterozygote mothers and selective abortion of all male fetuses. The impact 
of such a program, however, would be somewhat softened since many harmful 
sex-linked diseases are a result of fresh mutations. Thus, "even with 
prospective diagnosis, the maximum case reduction would not exceed two-thirds 
of existing affected males for diseases with zero fertility.1I 128 A potential 
dysgenic effect of such a program is that aborion of all male fetuses of 
heterozygote mothers would result in an increase (as much as 50 per cent 
with each generation in the case of hemophilia)129 in female carriers in 
future generations, thus requiring more abortions. 
The possibility that selection against autosomal Y'ecessive diseases 
would lead to an increase in their gene frequency could be the result of 
IIreproductive compensation, II since couples would be inclined to replace the 
affected child lost by abortion. A proportion of these compensating children 
126James F. Crow, IIRates of Genetic Change Under Selection," Proceedings 
of the National Acadelny of Sciences of the U.S.A., Vol. 59 March 1968, p.660. 
127 Motulsky, et. EJ..., QQ.. cit., supra, n. 100 at 30. 
1 28]E i d., p. 3l. 
129Friedmann, gQ. cit., supra, n. 11 at 40. ~t 
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will be abnormal gene carriers, thus increasing the frequency of abnormal 
gEnes over that which would have resulted had no such program been implemented. 
There is evidence, however, that IIdespite compensation t the total effects 
. . 1 d 11 130 on gene frequency are mlnna an are not a cause for concern. 
A program of selective abortion aimed at reducing the frequency of 
harmful genes raises a number of sensitive issues. For example, if a 
distinction between affected fetuses and clinically normal carriers cannot 
be made, as in the case of hemophilia, half of the male fetuses aborted 
would be normal. The moral implications of such a procedure must be weighed 
along with other considerations. A concomitant problem resulting from the 
inability to distinguish between affected and normal male fetuses in utero 
is that the result would be a 75 per cent probability of abortion with each 
pregnancy. This would mean a 1124% risk that five consecutive pregnancies 
131 
would be aborted." In this instance, then, the deleterious effect on the 
couple involved might be greater than if no such program were introduced. 
As noted earlier, abortion of all male fetuses where sex-linked diseases 
are indicated would result in an increase in female carriers, thus increasing 
the frequency of the harmful gene and the need for abortion. Is there also 
justification for aborting female carriers? The abortion of such fetuses is 
morally questionable since they exhibit no clinical manifestation of the 
disease. From a population and public health point of view. a recent study 
132 
found little evidence to support such a program. Perhaps such carriers 
130 Motulsky, et. ~., !2. cit., supra, n. 100 at 31. 
131Michael M. Kaback, IIDiscussion of Symposium Papers,1I Ibid., p. 35. 
132 -
Motulsky, et. ~., QQ.. cit., supra, n. 103 at 27. 
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could be counseled not to reproduce= in this event, the moral and political 
overtones of such a policy need to be carefully assessed. Finally, there 
are those who believe that the development of new medical techniques for 
133 
treating such diseases will make the abortion of such fetuses Ullilecessary. 
E. Attitudes and Policies on Abortion: Another factor which will 
influence the introduction and development of this approach involves existing 
attitudes and policies concerning abortion. In a study of 25 couples, 
Fletcher found that while "abortion is the major moral problem of parents in 
genetic counseling, [they] are inclined to favor abortion in case of a positive 
134 diagnosis, and they have reached this position prior to counseling." On 
a much broader scale, a recent national survey found that majority support 
for legal abortion has increased sharply. The survey revealed that 64 per cent 
of all Americans support full liberalization of abortion laws, believing that 
"abortion should be a matter for decision solely between a woman and her 
phys i ci an. 11135 ReCFJnt statements by both pub 1 i c and pri vate groups also 
reflect a more liberal attitude toward abortion. For example, the Commission 
on Population Growth has recommended that "present state laws restricting 
abortion be liberalized along the lines of the New York statute [which, prior 
l33Fritz Fuchs, quoted in Maureen Harris (ed.), oP. cit., suPha, n. 108 
at 124-125. For example, ten years ago the chances were~mote t at a baby 
with Down's syndrome would live beyond its 15th birthday. Since that time, 
however, the development of new antibiotics has given such children a projected 
life expectancy of 50 years or more. See Joseph D. Whitaker, "Science Lends 
Hand to Mongoloid Baby," Washington Post, December 18, 1972, p. Al 
134John Fletcher, "Moral Problems in Genetic Counseling," Pastoral 
Psychology, April 1972, p. 60. 
l35George Ga 11 up, "Aborti on Seen Up to l~oman, Doctor, II Washi ngton Post, 
August 25, 1972, p. A2. 
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to the recent Supreme Court ruling, was the most liberal of the state a0ortion 
136 laws]. II And the I~orld Council of Churches has called for its members 
to be prepared to endorse the personal right of parents to 
choose an induced abortion to prevent the birth of a gravely 
defective child. Wherever the laws of the state make this 
illegal, the churches should press for a modification of the 
law to permit such options to take place. 137 
The possibility of using therapeutic abortions for genetic purposes 
raises concern among many who fear that in a social climate in which unwanted 
preganancy is sufficient indication for abortion, there will be a tendency 
for couples to seek abortions for arbitrary and casual reasons. 
With increasing acceptance of abortion and limitations on 
family size, it is probable that some families will seek 
termination of pregnancies that involve less severely affected 
fetuses, or those with disorders that are treatable to some 
extent. . .. It is also likely that abortion may be chosen 
for disorders of uncertain severity. It can in fact be 
anticipated that families will not want to risk any departure 
from the normal karyotype in their offspring. 138 
Perhaps it is appropriate to recall Fletcher's fears regarding the possible 
growth in intolerance on the part of future parents (supra, po. 36-37). Those 
who fear the emergence of an "abortion mentality," characterized by an 
increasing intolerance for "weakness" or differentiation from a given "norm ," 
136The Report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American 
Future, Population and the American Future, (U.S. Government Printing 
Office: Washington, D.C., March 1972), p. 142. 
137Working Committee on Church and Society,2£.. cit., supra, n. 4 at 6. 
138AUbrey Milunsky, John W. Littlefield, Julian N. Kanfer, Edwin H. 
Kolodny, Vivian E. Shih and Leonard Atkins, "Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis 
(Third of Three Parts)'11 The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 283, 
December 31, 1970, '). 1502. The authors ci te the XYV chromosome anomaly 
as a disorder of "unce~tain se·:~;'it~'.': ihe ·'ur';p.': r~:e,"':ific opinion 
regarding this genetic ~..;i~e.:t and "its consequ~nt p(1.t";~· "r:':~li~at~ons ':Jill 
be riscussed 1~~er. 
41 
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point to an almost casual acceptance of abortion. This attitude, they maintain, 
is reflected in statistics from those states which had liberal abortion laws 
and in the growing acceptance of "early-stage abortion," which allows a woman 
with a suspected and unwanted pregnancy simply to have her monthly menstrual 
139 period extracted. This concern over the effect of a program combining 
prenatal diagnosis with selective abortion may be expressed as important 
questions for policy: Do acceptable standards for deciding when to abort 
need to be established? Whose responsibility is it to develop and apply those 
standards? What will be the effect of such a program on attitudes toward 
already existing IIgenetically defective" children? 
F. Policy Alternatives: Debate has already begun regarding the types of 
policy adjustments th't might be made. For example, should a woman be 
required to agree to an abortion prior to prenatal diagnosis? Some contend 
that "For parents unwilling to take that step, diagnosis of a disease in a 
fetus would serve no useful purpose and would only create anxiety and grief 
140 for the parents.)! Thus, they firmly believe that "the decision to interrupt 
the preganacy, if the suspected disorder is verified in the fetus, should be 
made before the amniocentesis. 1I14l Should there be special provisions, however, 
for those patients or physicians whose religious convictions preclude an 
139For details of the procedure and some of its problems, see Time, 
September 11, 1972! p. 47; also the Washington Post,January 26, 19~ 
p. CS. 
140Arno G. Motulsky, "Genetic Therapy: A Clinical Geneticist's Response," 
in Michael Hamilton (ed.), QE.. cit., ~ra, n. 86 at 13l. 
141Fritz Fuchs, IIAmniocentesis and Abortion: Methods and Risks," 
.2£.. cit., supra, n. 100 at 19. 
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142 
abortion under any circumstances? There are others who find unacceptable 
such restrictions on individual decision-making. The use of prenatal 
diagnosis does not mean that lithe geneticist may abrogate the couple's 
decision by assuming that if the fetus is ~jrmal she will carry itt or if 
abnormal, she will abort. The genetic component is one of many, and the 
143 
client must be helped to put it in perspective for a positive choice. 1I 
With respect to the difficult problem of deciding how lI abnorma1" a fetus 
must be to justify abortion, one geneticist has suggested that society must 
take advantage of "all morally acceptable developments that promise to minimize 
the number of unfortunate individuals incapable of full participation in this 
144 
complex society." While this position might attract sympathy, it would 
probably draw an equal amount of skeptical criticism. How is one to determine 
if a fetus will be lIincapab1e of full participation ll ? This is a very real 
problem, amply illustrated by the case of Down IS syndrome 
Some Down's children have rather gross retardation, 
major heart anomalies, and many fail to survive infancy; 
on the other hnn~, some have a rather mild retardation. 
no major heart defects, and have lived to at least middle 
age. An individual carrying a gene or genes which cause 
1420f relevance here is a resolution (S.J. Res. 64) recently introduced 
by Senator Frank Church, which would make it national policy, in the 
administration of all Federal programs, to protect physicians and health 
care personnel in their exercise of religious or philosophical beliefs 
which proscribe the performance of abortions or sterilization orocedures. 
Congressional Record, February 15, 1973, pp. S2567-68. 
143 E. James Lieberman, "Psychologica1 Aspects of Selective Abortion/' 
Ibid., p. 20. 
144 James V. Neel, "Lessons from a 'Primitive People,"' Science, Vol. 170 
November 20,1970, pp. 820-21. 
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retardation may be more or less retarded depending on other 
genett~ factors and the external environment which is at 
work. 45 
" I 
Furthermore, many Down's children have been found not to suffer and to have 
d . 1 d . 146 h b . goo emotlona a Justment. T us, it would e difficult to determine an 
absolute measure of biological fitness, since such fitness is to some extent 
dependent on a particular environment. 
A policy question which pervades all others concerns the basis upon 
which society will allocate decisions to either personal conscience or public 
choice. At what point is society's intervention into individual decision-
making justified? As prenatal diagnosis becomes more widespread, the tensions 
resulting from its application will become more acute. There is a need to 
relieve those tensions, balancing individual and societal needs with the 
proper respect for human life. 
III. Screening for Genetic Disease 
If prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion were combined with 
screening programs designed to detect heterozygous carriers, it might be 
possible to realize significant reductions in the incidence of some recessive 
diseases. If at-risk parents were identified prior to reproduction, they 
could eliminate.-the risk by remaining childless, by adopt1ng their family, 
or, when available, by artificial insemination or prenatal diagnosis. Another 
advantage of such programs is that the detection of the homozygous child 
after birth might be followed by immediate treatment, thus reducing and perhaps 
eliminating the deleterious effects of the disease. 
l45Robert C. Baumi11 er, "XYY Chromosome Genetics 1" Journal of Forens i c 
Sciences, Vol. 14, October 1969, p. 417. . 
l46Karen Lebacqz. Letter to-the Editor, The Hastings Center Report, 
Vol. 2, February 1972, pp. 12-13. 
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A. Cost/Benefits of Screening; Cost/benefit analysis has shown that 
screening programs would result in larqe savinqs for both the family and 
society. For example, 
The cost foi successful medical treatment of phenylketonuria 
is estimated to be no more than one tenth the cost of care 
for a retarded patient in an institution. Early diagnosis 
and treatment thus saves the community about $9,000 annually 
per patient. Moreover, the patient who escapes the immediate 
consequences of this mutant allele will eventually earn 
income and p'ay taxes, representing a further benefit to the 
cOlTlT1unity. Pl7 . 
In the case of detection prior to birth, a recent study demonstrated that 
in the case of cystic fibrosis, a substantially favorable economic ratio 
would result. 148 As new screening techniques become available an important 
part of planning large-scale screening proqrams should be the assessment of 
the costs involved in treating the genetic diseases. Present evidence seems 
to indicate a substantial economic saving. 
B. Screening and the Gene Pool: Another important criteria for assessing 
the value of screening is its potential for reducing the frequency of 
deleterious genes. The underlying assumption of such a proqram is that ... 
heterozygous couples will not mate, or in instances where they do, they will 
not have their own children. It has been suggested that this latter alternative 
is best realized through a program of voluntary sterilization. It should be 
useful, therefore, to review the potential impact of these two approaches on . 
the gene pool. 
If the fertility of heterozygotes and normal individuals were identical, 
l47charles R. Scriver, "Screening for Inherited Traits: Perspectives," 
in Maureen Harri s (ed.), .Q£.. ci t., supra, n. 105 at 95-96. 
148 Motulsky, et. !l.,.Q£.. cit., supra, n. 100 at 30. 
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the frequency of the abnormal gene would remain constant. However, many 
genes which result in autosomal recessive diseases owe their high frequency 
to the t'terozygote I s advantage in ferti 1 ity or mortal i ty . If heterozygotes 
were to cease mating with one another and this advantage persisted, there 
would be an increase in the genes since heterozygotes would have a greater 
average number of children. Consequently. the 
gene loss previously incurred by infertility or early death 
in homozygotes would cease. In the case of cystic fibrosis 
persistence of the assumed heterozygote advantage for about 
100 generatior.s would increase the frequency of carriers in 
white populations from 5% (its present level) to 50%.149 
If there were little or no difference in fertility between heterozygotes and 
normal persons, as might be the case if family size became more standardized, 
a system in which heterozygotes avoided marriage would prevent a decrease 
in abnormal gene frequency. There might even be a slow increase due to 
fresh mutations, though several thousand generations would pass before the 
150 
frequency of carriers would be doubled. 
Sterilization of heterozygous carriers appears unlikely to have any 
substantial impact on reducing deleterious genes. If the program were 
compulsory, it would require 1,500 years to reduce the frequency of a particular 
recessive gene by ha1f.'51 If sterilization is undertaken on a voluntary basis, 
the rate of decrease would be much less. Thus, the elimination of a recessive 
defect by sterilization is a very s10w process and probably of no immediate 
149Ibid ., p. 28. 
150 b'd I 1 • 
151Ching Chun Li, Population Genetics, (The University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago, 1955), p. 253. 
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value in eugenic programs. 
C. Voluntary versus Compulsory Screening: Genetic screening raises 
other essential policy issues. One crucial and heavily debated issue concerns 
the nature of such programs: Should pclrticipation in screening programs be 
voluntary or be made compulsory? The controversy over this question has 
turned into a full-fledged debate. At least ten states152 and the District 
of Columbia have enacted screeninq programs which will either require, or 
at the discretion of a doctor or health officer may require, black persons 
to undergo tests for sickle-cell anemia. There is little disagreement about 
the desirability of such tests if they are voluntary, but when the tests are 
made mandatory, the debate becomes vi~orous. 
The City Councilman who introduced the compulsory sickle-cell anemia 
legislation in the District of Columbia defends his position, contending that 
"this is a trait and a disease that has been ignored. There is no cure~ but 
a family knowing the facts would know what counseling or steps to take. 
I don1t think we can get at the problem on a voluntary basis. There is too 
153 
much apathy." On the other side of the debate, there are many persons who 
find mandatory programs both unnecessary and counter-productive. A recent 
genetics task force of the Institute of Soci~ty, Ethics, and the Life Sciences 
strongly urged that 
152The ten states are: Geotgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and Virginia. At least four 
of these states - Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia - and the 
District of Columbia will consider legislation in 1973 to repeal the 
compulsory features of their programs. 
153Henry S. Robinson, quoted in Victor Cohn, "Disease Publicity Raises 
Problems." t4ashi nqton Post, November 12,1972, p. A 12. 
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genetic screening proqrams should be conducted on a voluntary 
basis. . . . There is currently no public-health justification 
for mandatory screening for the orevention of genetic disease. 
The conditions being tested for in screening programs are 
neither "contagious" nor, for the most part, susceptible to 
treatment at present. 154 , 
It is also feared that state enforced screeninq programs will be the beginning 
of greater government intervention into what many consider to be an area for 
private decision-making. 
~Ihen you start talking about compulsory testing, you also 
start talking about compulsory genetic counseling. I~hen 
you start talking about compulsory genetic counseling, you 
start talking about putting the state behind it. Then you 
get into all sorts of implications. . .. lim for voluntary 
sickle trait testing, but I believe compulsory genetic 
testing sets a bad precedent in our kind of society.155 
The possible implications of compulsory counseling might include state-
supported marriage and sterilization laws for qenetic purposes, the precedents 
for which already exist. In fact, 25 states still retain eugenic sterilization 
156 
statutes, 22 of which are compulsory. There are also state laws prohibiting 
154A report from the Research Group on Ethical, Social and Legal Issues 
in Genetic Counseling and Genetic Engineering of the Institute of Society, 
Ethics and the Life Sciences, "Ethical and Social Issues in Screening for 
Geneti c Di sease," The New Engl and Journal of Medi ci ne, Vol. 286, May 25, 1972, 
pp. 1130-31. In the case of sickle-cell anemia there is no acceptable and 
effective treatment at this time. See R.B. Scott, "Urea Therapy in Sickle-
Cell Anemia," The New Enqland Journal of Medicine, 285: 1025-26, nctober 28, 
1971. 
155 Paul McCurdy, Georgetown University, quoted in Victor Cohn,.QQ. cit., 
supra, n. 153. 
156William R. Matoush, "Eugenic Sterilization - A Scientific Analysis," 
Denver Law Journal, Vol. 46, 1969, p. 633. In recent years, however, these 
laws have not been enforced. 
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consanguinous marriages, most prohibiting marriage between first cousins or 
157 persons more closely related. Might not the same legal rationale which 
led to these laws also be used to justify their applicdtion to carriers of 
deleterious genes?158 While a definitive answer is not possible at this time, 
there is some speculation that all such laws might be declared unconstitutional. 
159 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that the state has no 
power to interfere with the use of contraceptives by married couples, such 
use being considered one of the rights reserved to the people under the Ninth 
Amendment. If one interprets the caSf~ broadly, it may be read lito affirm 
that the decision by a husband and wife to have children, or not to have 
children, or how many children to have, is one in which the state may not 
interfere, whether the purpose be to limit the population or to improve it 
160 
eugenically." Underlying this reasoning are certain assumptions regarding 
the "rights" of couples to reproduce. 
D. Procreation and Genetic Disease: If procreation is viewed as a 
couple's "right," then it should be useful for planning genetic counseling 
activities and services to have some feeling for the kinds of reproductive 
decisions that couples will make and the reasons for their decisions. Ramsey 
157Michae1 Farrow and Richard Juberg, "Genetics and Laws 'Prohibiting' 
Marriage in the United States," Journal of the American Medical Association, 
209: 535-538, July 28, 1969. 
1581n this regard it ;s interesting to note that Virginia's 
requires sickle-cell screening for marriage license applicants. 
Code~ section 32-112.14 
159 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
law also 
Virginia 
160Frank P. Grad, "Legis1ative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and 
Possibilities," UCLA Law Review, Vol. 15, February 1968, p. 488. 
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finds it "shocking to learn ... how many parents will accept grave risk of 
having defective children rather than remain childless.,,161 Unfortunately, 
there are only a few empirical studies concerning the tendency toward risk-
taking among couples and the results are somewhat mixed. In his study of 25 
couples, Fletcher found that "Given the choice of accepting a genetically 
162 defective child or resorting to abortion, ... they would choose the latter." 
Another study involving 455 couples found that "on the whole, they took 
responsible decisions on the basis of the information. Where the recurrence 
risk was high - that is, equal to or greater than 1 in 10 - two-thirds (109 
out of 170) were deterred from planning further children.,,163 In his study 
at Yale, Hsia reports that only 25 per cent of the couples in a high risk 
164 group were deterred by counseling. And in their study of 76 fami,lies, 
Leonard and his colleagues report that 34 (45 per cent) stated thatj"TheY 
165 
reqarded the disease as a reason for curtailing reproduction." "inally, 
161Ramsey, QR. cit., supra, n. 89 at 166. 
162 Fletcher, QR. cit., supra, n. 134 at 53-54. 
163c .O. Carter, K.A. Evans, J.A. Fraser-Roberts and A.R. Buck, "Genetic 
Clinic: A Follow-Up," Lancet, Vol. 1, February 6, 1971, p. 281. Both this 
and the Fletcher studies may be somewhat biased due to the character of the 
sample populations. The majority of the Fletcher sample was middle-class 
and has a graduate degree, whi 1 e the Ca.rter, E . .!!..., samp1 e over-represented 
the upper social classes and was probably above average in education. 
164 .. Y.E. Hsia, "Chooslng My Chlldren's Genes," Paper presented at the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science annual meeting, 
Washington, D.C., December 29, 1972. 
165claire O. Leonard, Gary A. Chase and Barton Childs, "Genetic Counseling: 
A Consumer's View,n The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 287, August 31, 
1972, p. 435. This study focused on parents of children with three types of 
genetic diseases: cystic fibrosis, phenylketonu~ia, and Down's syndrome. 
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166 
the results of a follow-up study in England of 53 women referred for ~enetic 
counseling in families with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (a sex-linked disease 
for which there is no treatment) can be summarized as follows: Of the 41 
women at high risk (defined as gt',eater than 1 in 10), 36 decided to have no 
further children and two decided ~pon selective abortion. Only two disregarded 
the risks and intentionally became pregnant. Of the five women at medium 
risk (1 in 10 to 1 in 20), only one planned to have further children. The 
others considered the risks too great. Of the seven women at low risk (less 
than 1 in 20) only one was not reassured by the low risks and has avoided 
167 pregnancy. 
It should be pointed out that in most cases these studies refer to the 
impact of genetic counseling on couples' reproductive intentions, not their 
observed reproductive behavior. Generally speaking, these data suggest that 
counseling can have a significant impact on reproductive attitudes. The 
findings regarding actual reproductive behavior are not so encouraginq. In 
the largest of the aforementioned studies, Carter and his colleagues report 
that of those high-risk couples who stated that they were attitudinally 
deterred from having further children, 24 per cent (26 out of 109) had at 
least one additional pregnancy. Among the low-risk couples, who also claimed 
to be attitudinally deterred, 15 per cent (9 out of 60) had at least one 
166A.E.H. Emery, M.S. Watt and E.R. Clack, liThe Effects of Genetic 
Counselling in Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy," Clinical Genetics, 3:147-150, 
1972. The investigators report that all social classes were represented and 
that their distribution was similar to that of the general population. 
167 Ibid ., pp. 148 and 149. 
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168 
additional pregnancy. At least in this particular study, there appears 
to he a conside'rable degree of difference between the imoact of genetic 
counseling on reproductive attitudes and its impact on actual reproductive 
behavior. The.re is an obvious need for more systematic investigation into 
the question of risk-taking as well as for determining those factors which 
influence such reproductive decisions. James R. Sorenson has identified some 
,. 
of these factors: "(l) the size of the risk, (2) the severity of the potential 
abnormality, (3) the social and private attitudes of the parents toward 
abnormality, (4) the economic capacity of the family to endure the burden of 
a genetic disease, (5) the genetic health of existing children, and (6) the 
169 
type of counseling parents receive." But as he points out, there is little 
data concerning the specific role that each of these factors (and perhaps 
other factors as well) plays in parental decision-making. 
There is no consensus, however, that there is, or should be, a "right 
to procreation. II Ramsey believes that 
If the fact situation disclosed by the science of genetics 
can prove that a given person cannot be the progenitor of 
healthy individuah (or at least not unduly defective 
individuals) in the ~ext generations, then such a person's 
"right to have children" becomes his duty not to do so, or 
to have fewer children than he might want (since he never 
had any right to have children simply for his own sake).170 
Thus, Ramsey calls for the development and adoption of an "ethics of genetic 
168 Carter, et. ,!L., PR. cit., supra, n. 163 at 283. 
169James R. Sorenson, "Social Aspects of Applied Human Genetics," Social 
Sci ence Fronti ers, 1971, No.3, Copyri ght (c) 1971 by Russell Sage Foundati on, 
New York, p. 13. 
170 Ramsey, QQ. cit., supra, n. 87 at 35. 
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duty," whereby couples act responsibly and morally in order to prevent the 
birth of a defective child. Joseph Fletcher suqgests that a more appropriate 
guideline for developinq policy is "needs." He explains that 
Needs are the moral stabil izers, not riqhts . . .. If human 
rights conflict with human needs, let needs prevail. If 
medical care can use genetic controls preventively to 
protect people from disease or deformity, or to ameliorate 
such things, then let so-called "riqhts" to be born step 
aside. 
Rights are nothing but a formal recognition by society of 
certain human ne~d5, and as needs change with chanqing 
conditions so rights should change too. The right to 
conceive and bear children has to stop short of knowingly 
making crippled17~ildren - and genetics gives us that 
knowledge ... 
To what extent the state should be the agent for balancing the genetic 
"rights" and "needs" of its people is a question that society may soon have 
to face. There may be a fine line between a particular genetic defect being 
reason for a couple to refrain from procreation and its being reason for 
compulsory restrictions on the part of the state. 
E. TarRet Populations: The nature of the proqram also raises questions 
concerning the populations toward which such programs should be targeted. 
The programs aimed at sickle-cell anemia clearly demonstrate the problems 
involved. These programs, and their enacting legislation, reoresent the 
nation's first genetic effort directed at a particular race. 172 While many 
other groups experience a high incidence of genetic disease, e.q. the Ashknazi 
171Joseph Fletcher, "Ethical Aspects of Genetic Conrols: Designed 
Genetic Changes in Man," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 285, 
September 30, 1972, p. 782. 
l72Sickle-cell anemia, with a frequency of 1 in 400, is the most common 
genetic disease in the black population. The incidence among the white 
population is much smaller. See Victor' Cohn, "Disease's Effects Often 
Exaggerated," Washington Post, November 13, 1972, p. A8. 
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Jews and Tay-Sachs disease, and those of Mediterranian ancestry and Cooleyls 
Anemia, none has been singled out for compulsory testing. Tlie problem with 
isolating a specific ethnic group is that it might be interpreted as a 
racist gesture. Such has been the case with sickle-cell anemia, with some 
comparing it to the "racist eugenics legislation that led to the final 
173 
solution in Nazi Germany," and others viewing it, when combined with some 
174 forms of genetic counseling, as "white genocide." Whether or not these 
criticisms are valid, they are one reason for the growing opposition among 
blacks to sickle-cell programs. And yet, without their involvement and 
cooperation it is unlikely that such programs can accomplish their aims. 
There is also criticism of laws such as those in Virginia, which 
require the screening of persons in correctional institutions and state 
mental hospitals. Some question the intent of such laws, maintaining that 
there is 
no valid reason why prisoners and mental patients should 
be tested ... the potential for mischief is great ... 
scientific knowledge has in the past been perverted to 
fulfill social ends, and there is, unfortunately, nothing 
••. whic~ would lead one to believe there is no basis 
for alarm. 75 
l73James E. Bowman, Director of Laboratories, University of Chicago, 
quoted in Victor Cohn, Q£. cit., supra, n. 153. 
'74 Victor Cohn, "Sickle-Cell Project Outlined," Washin~ton Post, July 21 ~ 
1972, p. A15. A recent study reports a direct "relationshlp between fears 
of racial genocide and the use of family planning methods. II The investigators 
note the depth and source of this fear, writing that Negroes are Ilresponding 
to along hi s tory of every poss i b le type of oppress i on which has been 
perpetrated against blacks. The resistance to family planning and to family 
planning agencies run by whites is merely a symptom of the deep sense of 
historical and life-long estrangement." William Darity and Castellano Turner, 
~tFamily Planning, Race Consciousness and the Fear of Race Genocide," The 
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 62, November 1972, pp. 1458-59. 
175 Bowman, quoted in Victor Cohn, Q£. cit., supra, n. 153. 
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Another concern for screening legislation is the age at which persons snou1d 
be screened. For example, the District of Columbia requires that IIEach child 
admitted to a public school, either kindergarten or the first grade as the 
case may be, shall have been tested for sickle-cell anemia. 1I176 There are 
many, however, who believe that testing at such an early age is of dubious 
value and probably undesirable. They argue that these children "are too young 
to fully understand the implications of being a trait carrier, could suffer 
from the stigma, and may forqet all about it by the time they are likely to 
be considering marriage and child-bearing. 11177 Much more data needs to be 
collected regarding the "best time" at which to initiate such testing. 
F. Program Design and Management: Another broad policy concern is the 
implementation and administration of screening programs. It is essential 
that screening programs be designed for the purpose Of attaining one or more 
predetermined goals. Establishing clearly defined goals will help to avoid 
circumstances which might be costly in both scientific and hUman terms. A 
recent report suggests that the most important goals of a screening program 
are those that 
either contribute to improving the health of persons who 
suffer from genetic disorders, or allow carriers for a given 
variant gene to make informed choices regarding reproduction, 
or move toward alleviating the anxieties of families and 
communities faced with the prospect of serious genetic disease. 178 
176Regulat;on No. 72-9, section 2 (May 5, 1972). 
177B.J . Culliton, "Sickle-Cell Anemia: National Program Raises Problems 
As Well As Hopes s " Science, Vol. 178, October 20,1972, p. 284. Also, 
E. Beutler, D.R. Boggs, P. Heller, A. Maurer, A.G. Motulsky, and T.W. Sheehy, 
"Hazards of Indiscriminate Screening for Sickling," The New England Journal of 
Medicine, 285: 1485-86, December 23,1971. 
178Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, £e. cit., supra, 
n. 154 at 1129. I 
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Another reason for establishing goals is to assist in program ~valuation. If 
screening programs are to compete successfully with other programs forresollrce 
allocation, it will be necessary to provide "proof" of their effectiveness in 
order to justify public support. Identifiable goals are clearly needed for 
such evaluation. "Evaluation cannot exist in a vacuum. One must always ask 
evaluation 'of what. I Every action, every program has some value for some 
179 purpose. II Thus, an important task for program planners and (l.dministrators 
will be to develop appropriate measures and techniques for evaluating their 
180 
efforts. 
The design and operation of screening programs raises other important 
considerations for policy-makers. One Reneral observation concerns the 
relationship between public programs such as genetic screening and the commu-
nittes to be served. Citizen pressure is becoming more influential in 
determining what services the community will receive. Suchman writes that 
179 
Once sufficient evidence has accumulated to indicate the 
potential benefits of a program, the public is likely to 
demand the program without waiting for conclusive proof. 
The greater the need, the stronger the pressure to put the 
program into operation as soon as it begins to look 
success fu 1 . 
Thus, "popular causes" spring up which bring pressure upon 
the program administrator to satisfy public demand reqardless 
of professional judgment or evaluation findings. 181 
Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in 
Public Service and Social Action Proqrams, (Russell Sage Foundation: New York, 
1967), pp. 37-38. 
l80For a relevant discussion of the needs and problems of program 
evaluation, see SUchman, Ibid., especially chapters 6-8; Aaron Wildavsky, 
liThe Self.-Evaluating Orqanization," Public Administration Review, 32:509-520, 
September/October 1972; Cl.rld Thomas A. Morehouse, itprogram Evaluation: Social 
Research Versuc; Public Policy," Ibid., 32:868-874, November/December 1972. 
181 Suchman, .2,2.. cit., supr~, n. 179 at 153 and 152. 
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The difficulties involved are illustrated by the history of PKU legislation, 
in which "a small group of determined and highly motivated parents of mentally 
retarded children, together with a few equally dedicated physicians, needed 
less than three years to persuade forty-one states to pass laws requiring the 
testing of newborn children for phenylketonuria ...• "182 This effort has 
been characterized as "a simplified and incomplete understandinq of the 
objective situation, a singleminded campaiqn whkh trumpeted success and ignored 
failures, and most of all a failure to consider the harm that miqht be done 
183 by seeking to do good. II The result has been a "poor piece of legislation, 
one with noble aims, but based upon unwarranted medical assumptions. 1I184 If 
the circumstances surrounding the evolution of PKU le~islation are studied 
carefully, it may be possible to avoid similar Ditfalls in planning future 
. 185 
screenlng programs. 
G. Screening Tests: Extra care must be taken to develop testing procedures 
that will be accurate and subject to a minimum latitude of interpretation. A 
problem which might develop as a result of unreliable testing methods is that 
a "high proportion of false negatives or false positives not only wil' cast 
suspicion and discredit on the method, ... but may result in professional 
182 Bessman and Swazey, QQ. cit., ~ra, n. 47 at 49. 
183 Ibid ., p. 50. 
184American Academy of Pediatrics, "New Child Health Legislative Bills 
Proposed .. Academy Subcommittee Issues Guidelines," quoted in Bessman and 
Swazey, Ibid., P. 72. 
185History may alreadY be repeating itself. There are cries that a new 
kind of "sickle-cell crisis,1I one due to hastely drawn and poorly-planned 
sickle-cell legislation, is occurring. See Cohn~ QQ. cit., supra, n. 153 
at Al. 
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186 
malpractice charges ... II The case of PKU illustrates this problem as 
well as more seri ous consequences. 
Laboratory tests do not detect PKU but rather high blood 
phenylalanine levels, which can have causes other than PKU. 
Furthermore~ the tests suitable for the mass screening 
required by law are subject to misinterpretaHonand error. 
The tests are not accurate; they miss a number of cases of PKU 
and yield false positive reactions in an even greater number. 
Given a positive test, the physician will very probably put 
the child on a low phenylalanine diet ... But a child who 
does not have PKU is actively endangered by the diet and-can 
suffer physical deterioration at the least; a number of 
children have died from being treated for PKU, and it is 
likely that they did not have the disease. 187 
While it may be claimed that the physician is still able to decide the 
appropriate course of treatment for an infant, the fact that such legislation 
is a matter of public policy exerts a IIpowerful stimulus to prescribe in 
accordance with the cultural mores 11 188 and, in the case of PKU, has resulted 
in the use of an unproven treatment. Reliable testing procedures, therefore, 
are necessary both to assure proper treatment and to 9ain the confidence and 
cooperation Df the community. 
H. Screening Services and Delivery: There is also the question of what 
services should be included in the designing of screening programs. At a 
minimum, such services should include follow-up diagnosis, treatment and 
186rrving Ladimer, ilLegal Consideration in Screening, Treatment, 
Counseling and Research in Sickle Cell Disease,1I Paper presented at a 
Symposium on Sickle Cell Disease, New York, November 19 9 1971, pp. 7-8. 
187 Bessman and Swazey, QQ.. c; t., supra, n. 47 at 50-51. 
188Joseph D. Cooper, liThe Role of Government Legislation in Management 
of Problems in Medicine," in Anderson and Swa;man (eds.), .Q£.. cit., supra, 
n. 46 at 170. Bessman and Swazey report that there have been at least 
IIhalf a dozen malpractice suits involvinq PKU. II .QQ.. cit., supra, n. 47 at 72. 
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genetic counseling. Some geneticists contend that 
It is probably unjustified on ethical grounds to mount 
large-scale screening programs for disease or carrier 
detection in conditions where the patient and carriers 
cannot be offered specific effective medical therapeutic 
alternatives, including intrauterine diagnosis and 
abortion. 189 
This reference to abortion raises sensitive policy questions, including 
whether or not public funds should be used to provide abortion services. If 
society's resources are expended in order to provide families with infonnation 
that ;s required for intelligent reproductive decision-making, can it then 
deny them the option to implement their decision, an abortion being one option 
they might choose? 
Genetic counseling also has an important role to play in screening 
programs. First, it can provide couples with the basic genetic infonnation 
required to make informed and intelligent decisions about subsequent 
pregnancies. And second, it provides the follow-up support needed to help 
those couples implement their decisions. 
In providing infonnation to couples, the genetic counselor will be able 
to explain the source and meaning of a particular defect and, after appropriate 
testing and analysis, inform them of the risk of its occurrence or recurrence. 
The lack of such infonnation mi~ht lead to poor decision-making in either of 
two directions. Some couples might have additional children when the 
probability is high that their future offspring will be adversely affected. 
Or, conversely, couples with conditions in which the risk is very low may 
l89Robert F. Murray, Jr., "Problems Behind the Promise: Ethical Issues 
in 'Mass Genetic Screening," The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 2, April 1972, 
p. '3. 
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have no further children as a tonsequence of unreasonable fear. A recent 
study of families with genetically-ill children found that 
regardless of socia-economic class, birth order of .the . 
chronically ill child, religion, burden of care, qnd the 
heriditarv nature of the condition, families continue to 
have children, whether purposefully or unplanned as do the 
parents of normal children. There is a strong indication, 
however, that this would not be the case if parents were 
aware of the risk involved in the transmission of genetic 
defects and if this information were coupled ~ith knowledge 
of effective techniques to prevent pregnancy.190 
Thus, the proper transmission of genetic information to couples might help 
them in planning their future families. 
On a second level, counselinq is needed to help couples adjust to and 
implement their reproductive decisions. A few examples drawn from case 
studies provide some insight into the various demands that would call for 
follow-up counseling. Fletcher studied the period of time following 
amniocentesis and found 
the parents in considerable anxiety, and whatever problems 
existed in their marriage or family relationships were 
exace'l'bated < • • • If a marriaqe is troubled, the strains 
will most likely break forth in ttis period, testing to the 
limits the capacity of the couple to face their problem and 
make plans .... Counselors should be particu]ar1y attentive 
to the deeper personal problems which emerqe in this period. 191 
Fletcher describes existing counseling centers as poorly set-up to deal with 
these problems, noting that perhaps "one in twenty-five centers would be 
sensitive to marital problems and f~wer than that would have the means to 
192 help peop1e." He also found couples in "need for support and counseling 
190Harry Sultz, Edward Schlesinger and Joseph Feldman, IlAn Epidemiologic 
Justification for Genetic Counseling in Family Planninq,1I The American Journal 
of Public Health, Vol. 62, November 1972, p. 1492. 
191 Fletcher, op. cit., ~upra, n. 134 at 56. 
192 It' . h h F1 t h 114 n erYlew Wlt Jo n e c er, supra, n. . 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
r 
l .~~ i,. 
,.. 
, ~;i 
! 
L, 
.-----~-- ---._----- -~-- -~-~ ~--
63 
at the time of therapeutic abortion and the deep depression suffered at the 
time. H193 Unfortunately, he notes that abortion counseling facilities are 
less than adeq~ate for the task. 
Counseling ~ight also be required to follow up on the initial diagnostic 
tests. It is important to consider the total health needs of the patient and, 
to use the case of PKU, neglect of such needs regardinq the dietary problems 
might result in more serious physical and emotional problems. 
When treatment of a child involves restrictions in diet, 
it has broad implications for the entire family. How 
the parents feel about food, how much they use food as a 
weapon in the parent-child relationship, and how the other 
children in the home react, can mean the success or failure 
of the dietary regime. Consideration of the child as a 
member of a family that has many other responsibilities 
requires that medicinal and dietary care be obtainable 
without undue drain on family resources. 194 
There is need to assure, then, that any intervention into the qenetic 
decision-making process will not be more injurious to the individual and/or 
his family than if such intervention had not occurred. 
Coul1seiing support might also help couples overcome the severe guilt 
feelings which often accompany the birth of an affected child. In the case 
of hemophilia, for example 
193 
there is a need to deal with the emotional upset that 
occurs - the shock at the discovery, the guilt and the 
self-blame which comes from the inevitable feeling that 
parents are somehow responsible for causing the disorder 
and the fears as to what hemophilia entails. 
Fletcher, Q£. cit., supra, n. 134 at 51. 
194Recommended Guidelines for PKU Programs for th'2 Newbol'n, (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Helfare, Health Services and Mental 
Health Administration, 1971), Public Health Service Publication No. 2160, 
p. 9. 
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Helping the family through the upset is, of course, 
important in its own right, but it is also necessary for 
treatment purposes. Until the emotional problems are 
handled, it is very likely that the therapeutic efforts 
which require education of the parents about the reality 
of hemophilia will be hampered. 195 
family follow-ups and counseling, therefore, might provide both the parents 
and the affected child with more effective genetic ~uidance. 
A cOl'mlitment to create such counselinq services also entails the 
responsibility to ensure that the services reach prospective consumers. In 
his study of 250 counseling units, Sorenson found 25 per cent located in a 
hospital setting. He contends that 
Hospital based medical qenetics will probably increase 
significantly as the impact of the various intrauterine 
diagnostic procedures become more accepted . . . . Today, 
with various forms of heterozygosity detection possible, 
as well as amniocentesis, there is an increasin~ need for 
the delivery of medical genetics to be associated with the 
facilities of a hospital and laboratory.196 
This setting, according to Sorenson, will not only permit the maintenance of 
adequate facilities, but wili most likely increase lithe proportion of lower 
19\ee Salk, M. Hilgartner and B. Granick, liThe Psycho-Social Impact of 
Hemophilia on the Patient and His Family," Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 6, 
August 1972, p. 503. In the same article (p. 496), the investigators report 
that in "14 of the 25 cases, there appears to be a clear-cut deleterious 
impact, e.g. contributing to the breakup of the marriage or most leading to 
a psychological withdrawal by the husband from family relationships." For 
further evidence highlighting the presence and impact of parental guilt, see 
David G. Langsley, "Psychology of a Doomed Family,1I American Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 15:531-538,1961; and Simon Olshansky, "Chronic Sorrow: A 
Response to Having a Mentally Defective Child," Social Casework, 43:190-193, 
April 1962. 
196 James A. Sorenson, "Sociological and Psychological Factors in Appl ied 
Human Genetics ," Department of Sociology, Princeton University, October 1971, 
pp. 14 and 15. 
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Because "biochemical assays necessitate facilities that often are well 
beyond the means of the average clinical laboratory, [it] simply is not 
feasible for one laboratory to perform all of the tests now possible ... 11
201 
Thus, 
A screening program should be carried out in conjunction 
with a facility large enough to handle a volume of samples 
sufficient to detect several positive cases per year to 
assure experience in laboratory diagnosis. Efficiency is 
materially increased when a single central laboratory is 
utilized. The development of a system of quality control 
on a statewide or regional basis should be corsidered to 
insure a high degree of reliability of results. 202 
Similar consequences to those which resulted from the impact of public 
I 
pressure on the evolution of PKU legislation (supra, pp. 59-60) might also 
occur during management of diagnostic facilities and the provision of fo110w-
up services. Past experience with establishing abortion facilities to meet 
expanding demands
203 
and the difficulties which appear to be emerging in the 
201 , .. P f . 1 . . II b 
'Genetlclsts ress or Regl0na lzatlon, La oratory Management, 
Vol. 10, October 1972, p. 25. 
202Recommended Guidelines for PKU Programs for the Newborn, 2£. cit., 
supra, n. 194 at 4. Such a network has been established by the National 
Genetics Foundation, Inc. Each of their 45 centers in the United States and 
Canada is staffed and equipped to perform the biochemical and chromosomal 
analyses necessary to diagnose the most common genetic diseases. In addition, 
some of the centers have the specialized personnel and facilities required 
for diagnosis of one or more rare genetic defects. All of the centers are 
staffed to provide genetic counseling and follow-up to any diagnosis. See 
their brochure "Genetic Counseling and Treatment Network," (National Genetics 
Foundation, Inc., 250 West 57th Street, New York 10019). 
203Neubardt and Schulman discuss the problems which resulted in New York 
following the changes in its abortion law and conclude that "Abortion has 
exposed in rather vivid fashion the weaknesses of our medical institutions." 
,9.£. cit,., supra, n. 68 at 105-106. 
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development of hospital cardiac programs,204 demonstrate the problems 
confronting program planners caught up in a cross-current of public pressure. 
The problems may already be emerging in the newly-enacted sickle-cell screening 
programs. Virginia, like a number of other states, hurried to join the 
bandwagon of states with sickle-cell testing programs. However, Virginia's 
Department of Health reports that "Sufficient funds have not been appropriated 
for recruiting or hiring the appropriate number of genetic counselors .... 
Until additional funds are appropriated, we are simply unable to meet all of 
the responsibilities placed upon us by the new legislation. 11 205 The consequences 
which result, and which merit emphasis, are not only that the necessary 
facilities and services will not be provided, but that a "confidence gap" is 
created between those designated to provide and perform the services and those 
who are to receive them. Such a situation obviously benefits no one and, in 
the final analysis, is probably counterproductive. 
J. Screening Costs: There is also a need to consider the cost of 
screening and counseling services. The use of various diaqnostic tests and 
extensive laboratory work can be quite expensive (for example, a typical 
examination with ultrasound of a potentially abnormal pregnancy can cost as 
204The Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources reported 
that hospitals are under new public pressure to enlarge their cardiac 
programs. The Commission warned that "With the introduction of new techniques 
for coronary-artery surgery hospitals are again being stimulated to expand 
their surgical programs and there is evidence we may again see a proliferation 
of poorly planned units with costly duplications of facilities and suboptimal 
care. II See "Hospitals Warned on Heart Surgery," Washington Post, October 16, 
1972, p. A 1 5 • 
205patricia Hunt, Director, Bureau of Child Health, in a letter to this 
author, October 6, 1972. 
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high as fifty dollars). Systematic study is needed of the costs involved 
in providing genetic services to the population and the extent to which 
such services are not used because of a family's financial circumstances. 
Also important is the role of private health insurance in helping families 
absorb the costs of genetic services. At this time, 
No insurance company . . . recognizes the concept of 
preventive medicine. The fetus is not recognized as 
a patient. Cytogenetics is not, for the most part, 
recognized. The insurance situation seems particularly 
outrageous when one stops to consider that preventive 
medicine will be the mainstay of health care in the 
next century. 206 
As the availability and demand for qenetic services increase, the question 
of costs will become an increasingly important matter. 
K. Screening and Genetic Information: The collection and dispersion 
of genetic information acquired through screeninq proqrams also raises 
important policy questions. As more and more genetic information about 
individuals and their families is accumulated, how should it be used? What 
protection should be quaranteed to the individual to whom such information 
refers? Those who establish data-qathering systems need to be aware of the 
possible abuse of the information which they possess. 
The management of screening programs carries with it two inherent 
potential sources of abuse. First, in a large-scale screening program 
206Car10 Valenti, quoted in Laboratory Management, Vol. 10, October 
1972, p. 23. Geneticist Valenti reported that Blue Cross/Blue Shield has 
"agreed to partially cover the cost of diagnosis depending upon the type 
of policy held by the patient. However, the reimbursement schedule which 
they have offered is still less than adequate: $25-40 for a chromosome 
analysis and $15-25 for a buccal smear. These figures compare with hospital 
charges of $100 for a diagnosis based upon leukocyte cultures, $250 for 
a diagnosis based upon amniotic fibroblast cells, and $40 for a buccal 
smear. II 
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the responsibility for the quality and quantity of care that a patient 
receives rests with a team of medical experts rather than in the context of 
of the traditional doctor-patient relationship. Thus, both the medical and 
ethical responsibilities to the p~tient are more diffused and consequently 
more difficult to fix. Experience with PKU screening illustrates this point. 
Not only are records of tests filed in several different 
places in the state health department, but the entire 
preventive medicine apparatus of the state, including 
psychology, nursing, statistics, social services, nutrition, 
and education, is alerted to the condition. In this 
process, information which could seriously affect an 
individual for life is passed about among nonprofessional, 
nonmedical personnel who have no legal or moral responsibility 
to the individual. 207 
The second potential source of abuse arises from the use of computerized 
data-gathering techniques. A vast network of screening programs not only 
calls for the collection of larqe amounts of data, but also requires that 
such data be rapidly and efficiently stored, retrieved and transmitted 
between diagnostic centers. The ability of the computer to meet these demands 
makes it an ideal tool for such data management. The problems posed by the 
use of computers are not new. They simply change the economics and nature of 
processing information in ways that could result in the abuse of civil 
liberties. Questions regarding what data is to be collected, for what 
purposes, to whom it will be made available, and what mechanisms wil' exist 
for individuals to obtain and contest such data are all matters for public 
policy. A recent report of the National Research Council's Computer Science 
and Engineering Board describes the challenge to policy-makers. 
207Bessman and Swazey, ~. cit., supra, n. 47 at 73. 
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Our task is to see what appropriate safequards for. the 
individual '5 riqhts to privacy, confidentiality, and 
due process are embedded in every major record system 
in the nation, particularly the computerizing systems 
that promise to be the settinq for most important 
organizational uses of information affectin9 individuals 
in the coming decade. 20B 
ThE; risks involved in the collection of confidential information from 
any part of the population are accepted by society because of the presumed 
benefits of using this information. In the case of genetics, for example, 
the identification of heterozygous carriers would be of great value in 
estimating the gene frequency among different population. FY'om this 
information one could calculate the number of individuals who are likely to 
be affected within the particular population. Thus, better p)anning for 
and control of genetic disease are potential benefits to be derived from 
screening programs. There is a need, therefore, to strike a balance between 
the community's r~quirement for information and its subsequent use and the 
individual's rights of privacy. 
L. The Misuse of Information: In developing an appropriate information 
policy, one should bear in mind the kinds of abuses that might affect a 
"defective" individual. One such abuse is the possibility of encumbering 
him with a lifelong public stigma. A diagnostic medical label can destroy 
or distort relationships within a family and can close access to many of the 
normal channels and outlets usually open to people. Such influence can 
result in two ways: first, through affecting an individual's attitudes, his 
208quoted in Gerald S. Schatz, "Computers and Privacy: Continuing 
Questions of Civil Liberties," News Report, Vol. 22, December 1972, p. 5. 
(News Report is a monthly publication of the National Academy of Sciences). 
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image of himself, his self-confidence and, therefore, his involvement in 
an activity; or second, by identifying a person in such a way so that he 
is systematically discriminated against. Past experience with genetic disease= 
illustrates this point clearly. Persons with Huntington's chorea, a disease 
characterized by progressive mental deterioration, will probably manifest 
signs of the disease by age 35, but may not have symptoms until a much later 
age. Until that time they are quite capable of functioninq normally. 
However, the stigma which is often associated with a family with a history 
of the di sease has resulted in "great secrecy within the family because of 
the fear of social, economic, or legal penalties should the knowledge be 
made PUb1ic ... 209 
The case of sickle-cell anemia illustrates the problems incurred by the 
innocent carrier of the disease. The major problem is confusing the person 
who has the disease with the person carrying the trait, but not the disease 
symptoms. A recent report expressed concern about the 
dangers of societal misinterpretation of similar conditions 
and the possibility of widespread and undesirable labeling 
of individuals on a genetic basis. For instance, the lay 
public may incorrectly conclude that persons with sickle 
trait are seriously handicapped in their ability to 
function effectively in society ... Extreme caution 
should therefore be exercised before st~io that lend 
themselves to stigmatization are taken. 
A consequence of such stigmatization is that "much unnecessary anxiety on 
the part of parents and trait carriers and psychologic harm occurs when some 
209John Whittier, Audrey Heim1er and Charles Korenyi, liThe Psychiatrist 
and Huntington's Disease (Chorea) ," American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 128, 
June 19i2, p. 1550. 
210rnstitute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, QR. cit., supra, 
n. 154 at 1132. 
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persons are identified as carriers of sickle-cell trait without an 
understanding of the harmlessness of their trait.,,2ll Individuals mi~ht 
come to be regarded as physically weaker or less fit. An example drawn from 
experience with another disease may help to illustrate the possible harm. 
Dr. Nicholas Hobbs, director of the staff for a five-agency federal study of 
labeling, has reported "growing evidence that for a child to be labeled 
anything - whether the label is 'mentally retarded' or 'gifted' - influences 
212 
what social system he gets into and shapes his whole future." Hobbs 
cites the example of a young child who was found to have a heart murmur. He 
was treated differently by his parents, "sheltered and not allowed to play 
with other children." Five yea~s later doctors found the child's heart 
perfectly good, but by then "he had already developed a picture of himself 
as having heart disease and had taken on a restricted life-style that may 
never fully reverse." Great care must be taken, therefore, to avoid 
"overprotecting" carriers when it might later result in their adopting 
unnecessary and restrictive life-styles. 
Another problem has been the denial to some sickle-trait carriers of 
employment opportunities or life and health insurance. For example there 
are reports that an airline stewardess was grounded after the airline 
213 discovered she carried the trait. Also, insurance companies "have been 
211 Beutler, et. ~., QE.. cit., supra, n. 177 at 1486. 
212Quoted in Suzanne Dean, "Study Probes Labeling of Children as Retarded," 
Washington Post, September 6, 1972, p. A8. 
213Rudolph Jackson, Coordinator, National Institutes of Health sick1e-
cell disease program, quoted in B.J. Culliton, "Sickle Cell Anemia: The 
Route from Obscurity to Prominence," Science, Vol. 178, October 13,1972, 
p. 141. 
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changing or raising the premiums or dropping insurance on persons with the 
214 
trait •.. 11 Thus, IIsickle-cell testing has shown up in employment 
records, in insurance company records, and is becoming more and more abused 
215 
by peopl e who do not understand the nature of the di sease. II Whil e certa in 
carriers of the sickle trait can experience some problems where the oxyqen 
supply ;s diminished, most carriers will never have any problems and there 
is "no evidence that trait carriers have a hiqher risk of disease or a shorter 
216 
than normal life-span. lI This stigmatization of sickle-cell carriers has 
"created emotional resistance among many persons to sickle cell screening and 
217 
genetic counseling " and consequently, the effectiveness of such 
programs has been greatly impaired. 
The XYY chromosome abnormality presents yet another p~oblem associated 
with stigmatization. This sex anomaly occurs in males with two Y chromosomes 
and one X chromosome (the normal chromosome complement for males is one of 
both X and Y chromosomes). The controversy which surrounds this aberration 
concerns the extent to which its presence predisposes an individual to engage 
in antisocial and violent behavior. A review of the literature indicates that 
the controversy )s far from resolved. On the one hand, there are studies 
214Rudolph Jackson, quoted in "Bias Against Sickle Trait Victims Probed," 
Washington Post, November 14, 1972. p. A6. Some insurance firms have been 
reported to charge trait carriers as much as 11150 per cent of the usual 
premium ... " Joseph Christian, quoted in Culliton. QQ.. cit .• supra. n. 213 
at 142. 
215Mona Blake, School Board, Fairfax County, Vir!linia, quoted in "Sickle 
Cell Examination is Opposed," Washington Post, November 1, 1972. p. B9. 
216Chri sti an, QQ.. ci t., supra, n. 213. 
217C h't 153 t Al o n. QQ.. ~., supra, n. a . 
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which suggest a correlation between the XYY abnormality and certain types 
of aberrant behavior, with one concluding that "the additional V-chromosome 
genetically predisposes the 47, XYV male to the development of a psychopathic 
218 
personality and to consequent aberrant behaviors and antisocial conduct." 
There is equally persuasive evidence, however, which suggests that there is 
no strong correlation between the presence of the XYY chromosome complement 
and a particular type of behavior. Two researchers recently claimed that the 
suggestion that "XYY males are uncontrollably agqressive psychopaths appears 
. 219 
to be nothing more than a myth promoted by the mass medla." In addition 
to the mixed findings suggested by these stu~ies, there are also questions 
regarding the methodological and conceptual approaches employed in the 
220 
investigations. In liqht of this continuing debate, therefore, any attempt 
to develop policy which seeks to respond to the needs of individuals with the 
221 XYY anomaly would be premature. The present state of knowledge does not 
2l8W.M. Court Brown, "Males with an XYV Sex Chromosome Compleme~t," 
Journal of Medical Genetics, Vol. 5,1968, pp. 348-49. Also see 
Lytt Gardner and Richard Neu, "Evidence Linking an Extra V Chromosome 
to Sociopathic Behavior," Archives of General Psychiatry, 26: 220-222, 
March 1972. 
219 Seymour Kessler and Rudolf H. Moos, "XVY Chromosome: Premature 
Conclusions,"Science, Vol. 165, August 1,1969, p. 442. Also see S. Wiener 
and G. Sutherland, "A Normal XVV Man," Lancet, 2:1352, December 21, 1968. 
220saleem A. Shah (ed.), Report on the XVY Chromosome Abnormalit~, 
(National Institute of Mental Health: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 
Public Health Service Publication No. 2103, pp. 23-27. 
221 The questions for policy consideration might include how much effort 
should be directed toward rehabilitating criminals if the underlying basis 
for their abnormal behavior is genetically determined. Or, how should the 
XYY individual be dealt with both prior to and following the commission of 
a crime? Since the XYV chromosomal abnormality can be detected in utero by 
amniocentesis, does society have a right to intervene into the reproductive 
decision of couples found to have conceived an XYY child? 
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permit any definit'jve statement regarding the possible link between the XYY 
compl,ement and certain types of behavioral pathology. This lack of consensus 
highlights the danger IIthat incomplete or inadequate understanding of the 
phenomena might possibly become embedded into public policy or legislative 
222 
enactments. II Thus t there is a need for more systematic data collect'jon and 
research into this problem, and others like it, in order to provide the necessary 
information from which policy decisions can be made. While such research 
itself creates problems regarding the confidentiality of data and individual 
privacy, the problem of stigmatization is apparently an immediate one. A 
223 
recent invest1,!tation concluded that XYY men had been falsely stigmatized 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that such information, when improperly 
understood, might affect a man's opportunities for gaining employment or 
2"'l 
obtaining parole, or prejudice his judicial proceedings. ~ Furthermore, 
presumptions that a person's chromosome pattern clearly 
disposes him toward aggressive and antisocial behavior 
could lead to further stigmatization of that individual. 
Responses from others interacting with. him might be of 
222Saleem A. Shah, "Recent Developments in Human Genetics and Their 
Implications for Problems of Social Deviance," in Daniel Bergsma (ed.), 
Advances in Human Genetics and Their Impact on Society, (Birth Defects: 
Original Article Series, Vol. 8: The National Poundation - March of Dimes, 
July 1972), p. 79. 
223 
G,R. Clark, M.A. Telfer, D. Bajer and M. Rosen, "Sex Chromosomes, 
Crime and Psychosis,'1 American Journal of Psychiatry, 126: 1659-63,1970. 
224Recently, a public-interest group threatened a law suit regarding 
a study inquiring into the frequency of XYY males in a population of children . 
The group felt it an invasion of privacy to get information about an individual 
that might guide his future treatment. They took the view that the law 
might use this information in some way that would adversely affect the 
individualu For example, if it was known that an individual was an XYV, 
there might be a greater tendency to judge him guilty if arrested by pol ice. 
See Robert Cooke, quoted in Mau reen Ha rri s (ed.), .Q£.. cit., supra, n. 105 
at 82. 
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a form that would tend to promote aggressive behavior, 
thereby mak~ng.a possible u9~~rranted assumption become 
a self-fulfl111ng prophecy. ~O 
Care must be taken, therefore, to guard against such abuses. 
M. Safeguarding Research Data: As suggested earlier, research into 
the XVV problem will create its own difficulties. It is important, then, that 
the requirements of rigorous scientific research be balanced with the proper 
respect for and protection of the rights and welfare of the subjects under 
study. The proper protection of the rights of research subjects requires 
policy that will safeguard confidential records and protect access to such 
information. Unfortunately, only eleven states have statutes that recognize 
226 
the confidentiality of general research information of a public ~ea1th nature. 
Investigators thus face serious difficulties in protecting such information 
from court subpoenas. Even when such statutes are in operation, however, they 
are often "overly broad in regard to the possible ranqe of material considered 
confidential within the statutes, and thus the researchers and even more 
importantly the subject may be misled in relying on a statute that might be 
227 
given a narrow judicial construction." It would seem to be an appropriate 
role of the legislature to formulate more discriminatory models for safe-
guarding the confidential, nature of research data. The XVY anomaly, as well 
as experience with other genetic abnormalities, illustrates the potential 
problems of data management in large-scale screening programs. 
225 Srah (ed.), ~. cit., supra, n. 220 at 9. 
226Ra1ph K. Schwitzgebel, "Confidentiality of Research Information in 
Public Health Studies," Harvard Legal Commentary, Vol. 6,1969, p. 192. 
227 Ibid., p. 196. 
r \ ] 
i 
-.. : ~\. 
fi,;:~ 
II ' .. j 
--- .--.- -------------r--·- -.-------~ 
t 
77 
N. Public Education: Much of the stigmatization cited above can be 
lessened, and perhaps to a great extent avoided, if the public can be educated 
about the nature and consequences of qenetic disease. In the case of sickle-
cell disease, the issue is not merely identifying trait carriers, but giving 
those i.ndividuals and society better information about what being a trait 
carrier means. An educated public can thus be a means of "reducing the 
potential risk that those identified as genetically variant will be stigmatized 
. 228 
or ostracized socla1ly." So far, efforts in this direction have not been 
very successful. The excessive pessimism and hostility among blacks toward 
genetic screening pt'o~rams has been attributed to the "large amounts of 
'unfortunate sensationalism' and badly informed 'scare/campaiqns' in TV and 
229 
newspapers. " C1 early, a more carefully constr-ucted and broad-based 
educational campaign shou'ld accompany genetic screening. 
Education, however, has other important functions to perform. Studies 
indicate that most people are unaware of the opportunities for genetic services, 
with persons Df the lower socio-economic classes relying "primarily on family 
and friends for information, [which] means not only that they are not likely 
to be as informed as others, but that there is an increased chance that they 
230 
will in fact receive incomplete and often erroneous health information." 
Thus, an important task will be to make people aware of available medical 
opportunities. Education is also necessary if persons are to be able to make 
------.'--
228Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, ~. cit., supra, 
n. 154 at 1130. 
229 Cohn,.QQ. cit., supra, n. 153. 
230Sorenson, .QQ. cit., supra, n. 196 at 7-8. 
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intelligent decisions regarding their future medical and genetic status. 
A survey of PKU parents demonstrates the educational challenge ahead. The 
survey was designed to find out how much such parents knew about their 
circumstances; the results were not very encouraging. 
1. 61% did not know the disorder was inherited; 
2. 58% did not understand the importance of early diagnosis; 
3. 56% said that they had never discussed the condition with 
a professional source; 
4. 56% did not know that the condition can be treated with a 
special diet. 231 
If genetic screening programs are to be effective in ameliorating the effects 
of genetic disease, an educated public is essential. 
IV. Genetic Counseling 
Genetic counseling is one of the most important means for transforming 
the results of medical and genetic's research into measures designed to provide 
immediate and practical aid to individuals. The emphasis of the following 
discussion will be on the training requirements for genetic counseling, the 
possible roles that genetic counselors might assume in performing their 
counseling services, doctor-patient communication, and the responsibilities 
of the genetic counselor to his patients and society, particularly with respect 
to the information to which he has access. 
A. Training Requirements: Today there are about 200 genetic counseling 
units in the United States. With the increasing awareness of the need for 
counseling, the number of these units should proliferate. The services offered 
by the units, however, will only be as good as the counseling personnel which 
231 Lloyd Kramer and Benjamin White, "A Survey of Families and Relatives 
of Proven Phenylketonuria (PKU) Patients in Maryland," Paper presented at 
92nd Annual Meeting, American Public Health Association, 1964. 
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provide them. 
What appears to be developing ... is a rapidly expanding 
knowledge base permitting increasingly refined prediction 
and contr-ol of genetic and chromosomal problems, but no 
concomitant professional or organizational locus of training, 
socialization and control. What this means is that genetic 
counseling as currently practiced exhibits considerable 
diversity. With no singular professional training experience, 
counselors rely largely on their individual medical 
backgrounds, local institutional constraints, as well as 
the specific demands placed on them in the counseling-
session to shape their counsel. 232 
As a result of this diverse and often narrow educational and training 
experience, two problems emerge. First, 
because most physicians lack adequate training in diagnosing 
genetic defects, misdiagnosis and inappropriate advice can 
be serious problems. For example, if a couple are told 
that a given problem is genetic and accordingly opt for 
sterilization, they have taken an irreversible step. If 
the doctor was wrong, not only has he caused the couple 
much grief, but he is legally liable. The current structure 
of genetic counsel in~ faci1 ities combined vdth the lack of 
diagnostic capacity make such problems likely. In addition, 
given the current lack of training in medical genetics, 
practicing physicians probably i9nore the genetic aspects 
of many diseases. 233 
The second problem which stems from this diversity in backgrounds is that 
Professional counselors ..• tend to erect fences 
around their area of counseling interest and, by fiat, 
allow other professionals to give genetic facts but not 
counseling. 
Counseling preserves established by vested areas of interest 
also increase the likelihood that families will miss 
vital pieces of information. When no one person carries 
232James R. Sorenson, "Factors Shaping DeCision Makinq in Applied Human 
Genetics: Professional and Client Perspectives," Department of Sociology, 
Princeton University, August 1972, p. 4. 
233 Sorenson, QE.. cit., supr_~, n. 169 at 27. i 
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the primary responsibility for organizing the genetic 
information and counseling the family, important aspects 
of information may be overlooked. 234 
There is a need, therefore, to define qualifications and to provide 
proper training for genetic counselors and to consider appropriate guidelines 
for the conduct of counseling services. Ladimer suggests that appropriate 
standards should cover the 
(1) definition of the field or process of genetic counseling; 
(2) scope of services; (3) practitioners qualified to serve~ 
(4) institutional and other settings suitable for counseling; 
(5) protection of interests; (6) relation to other fields, 
professions and services; (7) methods for evaluation; and 
(8) professional and community obligations. 235 
Certainly, an important goal of training counselors should be to sensitize 
them to the wide variety of needs and expectations that may be expressed by 
their patients. 
B. Role Orientation: Sensitizing the genetic counselor to patient needs 
and expectations naturally raises the question of how he should relate to his 
patients. The role orientation of counselors has been a subject of considerable 
discussion. Two basic positions can be distinguished. On the one hand, there 
are those who view the counselor as an informer, whose task is simply to 
inform the couples of the risks involved. They see any attempt on the 
counselor1s part to influence the decisions of those whom he counsels as beyond 
his professional responsibility as a counselor. On the other hand, there are 
those who view the counselor as a wise advisor, one whose concern for the 
patient exceeds a mere presentation of the facts and calls for a closer 
234 
Reisman and Matheny, QQ. cit., supra, n. 15 at 27. 
235Q£.. cit., supra, n. 186 at 13. 
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involvement with his counse1ees. No matter which of the two views one 
adopts, it is important to recognize the influential role which a counselor 
can assume. Sorenson has observed that 
counselees are often informationa1ly dependent on the 
counselor for not only a technical dia~nosis and assessment 
of their situation! but they seek in addition some assistance 
in giving meaning to the condition they find themselves in! 
a condition of calculated risk! but a condition for which 
there are few behavioral precedents as to how to interpret 
these risks or how to make sense out of them. 236 
Thus! lacking adequate and meaningful information, a couple seeking help is 
confused and worried. They are searching for someone with authority to 
answer their questions and thislldependency ro1e ll may make them more 
susceptible to the counselor's own views. And it is difficult, if not 
impossible! for the feelings of the counselor not to be conveyed to his 
237 patients. The opportunities which exist for counselors to influence the 
decision of a couple are illustrated by the following example. 
If the couple is facing the risk for an autosomal recessive 
disorder the counselor can tell the couple that they have 
a three in four chance of having a normal child. He might 
do this if he thinks that the couple ought to have more 
children. On the other hand, if he is pessimistic and 
believes that the couple ought not to chance reproducinq 
he might say that they face a risk of one in four that the 
child will be abnormal. In both cases the same factual 
236Q£. cit.! suyra! n. 232 at 15. Sorenson presents an excellent 
description and ana ysis of the context in which genetic counseling occurs, 
emphasizing the evolution of a new doctor-patient relationship and its 
implications for applied genetic decision-making. 
237F1etcher's study tends to support this point, with the finding that 
liThe counselor's wi shes for outcomes in a case wi 11 be conveyed di rectly or 
indirectly to the patient. II (emphasis added) QQ.. cit., supra, n. 134 at 60. 
The importance of recognizing and analyzing the nature of this influence ;s 
stressed by Sorenson, who writes that lithe ultimate role of who makes final 
decisions regarding the use of genetic knowledge is usually less ethically 
and morally neutral than is the situation in the delivery of more standard 
medical services. 1I .9£. cit., supra, n. 196 at 19. 
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information is conveyed to the clients. In the first 
situation the counselor stresses normality, while in 
the second he stresses the potential abnormality. This 
variation is certain to have an impact on the decision 
of the clients. 238 
Thus, the genetic counselor's own biases may well become important factors 
influencing a family's decision. 
C. Doctor-Patient Communication: The ultimate quality of qenetic 
counseling will, to a large extent, depend on the interaction between the 
patient and the counselor. Of the various factors which contribute to this 
interaction, certainly one of the most crucial is the communicative process 
between the counselor and his counselees. How well do oatients receive, 
comprehend, and apply the information qiven to them by their physicians? 
To what extent are instances of misunderstandinq and distortion due to the 
patient's or physician's inability to "communicate"? Answers to these 
questions are crucial, for it may well be that shortcomings in the treatment 
239 
of a chronic illness can be related to such misunderstanding or distortion. 
There appear to be at least three pertinent clearly-defi~ed variables 
in the doctor-patient communicative process. First, there is the ability of 
the physician-col'nselor to communicate information to his counselees. Of 
what value is it to have pertinent information unless the counselor is able 
238sorenson,..QE. cit., supra, n. 196 at 22. 
239Undoubted1y, many individuals distort, forqet, or r~ject the ~~~qt4~ 
information conveyed to them by the genetic counse'~~. A ~tudy o~ p?rental 
understanding of phenylketonuria concludes: "If exposing parents to mer.~:al 
information aims at improving their understanding of the illness ~~ at 
favorably influencing the course of the child's illness, the ~resent study 
provides no support for either contention." Maarten S. Sibinpa and ~- Jack 
Friedman, "Complexities of Parental Understanding of Phenylketonuria," 
Pediatrics, Vol. 46, August 1971, p. 222. The study's sample populatior 
included 42 families of children with PKU. 
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to deliver it effectively? But while it is the counselorls role to promote 
effective conmunication, it is a role, according t;) some, "for which most 
240 physicians have unfortunately had little training. II The problem resulting 
from poor communication is described by a recent study of doctor-patient 
communication in a pediatric clinic of a large hospital. The study found 
that physicians tend to be overly technical in the language they use with 
their patients. "In more thi'ln half of the cases we recorded the physicians 
resorted to medical jargon. This did not necessarily leave the patient 
dissatisfied; . .. It did, however, leave most of the mothers unenlightened 
241 
about the nature of the childls illness." This problem is also applicable 
to genetics. Unless the information is properly explained and understood, it 
may evoke unreasonable fear on the part of families. For example, in a 
follow-up study at a genetic counseling clinic, it was found that in some 
instances odds had no meaning to couples. liThe mother of a child with a 
myelocele remembered that she had been given a 1 in 25 risk, but said that 
if she had another child leither it would or would not be affected and so the 
242 
risk is 50/50 1 ." On the basis of her reasoning, this woman had adopted 
three children. Unquestionably, then, "attention to effective communication, 
a skill that should not be too difficult for any trained person to master, 
could make a valuable contribution to the quality of health care and its 
243 
availability to the general population. 11 Genetic counseling would appear 
240Reisman and Matheny, QR. cit., supra, n. 15 at 30. 
241 
Barbara Korsch and Vida Megrete, "Doctor-Patient Communication," 
Scientific American, Vol. 227, August 1972, Pp. 71-72. 
242Carter, et. ~., Q£. cit., supra, n. 163 at 282. 
243 Korsch and Megrete, ~. cit., supra, n. 241 at 74 . 
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to have much to gain from a concerted effort in this d~~ection. 
In a recent study in a congenital heart clinic with a well trained 
genetic counseling unit, it was found that after receivir,q genetic information 
only about 25 per cent of the families retained and understood the attendant 
244 
recurrence risks. Thus, even with highly-skilled genetic counselors, the 
reception and understanding of genetic information was significantly impaired. 
This leads to a second variable in the doctor-patient communicative process: 
the basic knowledge of biology and genetics that patients bring to the 
counseling session. Leonard and his colleaCjues found that "the substratum 
of biologic knowledge possessed by many parents is inadequate to support 
245 the infonnation imposed upon it by the counselor." In the 10nq run, 
therefore, there is a need for a better-educated public. Of more immediate 
concern, however; is the need for systematic and empirical investigation into 
how counseling information is received and applied. Perhaps such infonnation 
should be repeated. If so, how often and at what intervals? It might also be 
helpful to modify counseling services to the specific educational and socio-
economic backClrounds of the consumers. How this might be most effectively 
and efficiently accomplished will require additional study. 
Hhile greater education is a necessary prerequisite for more effective 
doctor-patient communication, it is apparently not always suff1ent for 
producing the desired effect, e.g. the family's understandi~g of the counseling 
information. In a study of PKU families, "Parents with greater education were 
244J .A. Reiss and V.D. Menashe, "Genetic Counseling ~I"d Cr. ... IJp.n;tal Heart 
Di sease, II Journal of Pedi atri cs, 80 :.655-656, Apri 1 1972. 
245 Leonard, et. ~., 2£.. cit., supra, n. 165 at 438. 
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246 
no less inaccurate or distortion prone than those with less education .. II 
The investigators suggest that lithe capability to understand illness miqht be 
247 
considered an emotional phenomenon." Thus, a third important variable is 
the context in which genetic counseling is provided. A recent study of qenetic 
counseling cited "emotional conflict" as an inhibiting ~nfluence on a family's 
understanding of counseling information. 248 To what extent, then, do parents 
remember information given to them when the context is so emotionally charged? 
Is reinforcement required? If so, what forms should it take? Clearly, the 
emotional context of genetic counseling requires careful assessment when 
considering ways to improve the counseling process. 
Doctor-patient communication, then, is an essential element of the 
counseling process and thus becomes an important criteria for designing and 
evaluating genetic screening proqrams. The three variables discussed above 
must be viewed as essential elements of doctor-patient communication, which, 
if carefully studied, evaluated and improved upon, could contribute to more 
effective control of genetic disease. 
D. "Responsible" Genetic Counselinq: How one defines the responsibility 
of the genetic counselor to his patients will depend, to a larqe extent, on the 
way one characterizes the practice of genetic medicine. There are those who 
contend that genetic screening and counselinq are altering the paradigm of the 
246s.b. 1 1 nga and Friedman,~. cit., supra, n. 239. 
247 Ibid . 
248Leonard, et. ~., QP.. cit., supra, n. 165. The investigators noted 
(p. 435) that five of the families interviewed "observed that the genetic 
information given at the time of diaqnosis or shortly thereafter was not 
retained because of emotional shock." Also, see supra, pp. 63-64. 
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traditional doctor~patient relationship and thus changing the nature of the 
physician's responsibilities within that context. Traditionally, the practice 
of medicine was primarily devoted to individual therapy, with the patient 
the responsibility of a single physician. Large~scale screening programs, 
however, have shifted the focus of attention from the individual to a larger 
population and from a single physician to team care. While medical codes 
regarding the professional responsibilities of the physician to his patient 
have been adequate for those problems arising from the traditional practice 
of medicine, new genetic technology and the kinds of medicine it makes 
possible may require a reevaluation of the ethical norms governing medicine, 
Perhaps the best illustration of the problems which can arise concerns the 
kinds of information that should be given to the patient. 
Under the traditional doctor-patient relationship, the physician 
examines his patient and, on the basis of his diagnosis, then acts to prescribe 
the most effective alternative for alleviating the illness. In this 
arrangement, the patient assumes that the physician possesses superior 
knowledge concerning questions of medicine and health. This is not the case 
in genetic counseling. "There is no assurance that a counselor has any more 
expertise than the counselee in evaluating risks for recurrence of a problem 
or in estimating the ability of the family to adequately handle a problem, 
249 
should it occur." Under these circumstances, then, the counselor gives a 
couple information so that they can act, rather than as a prerequisite to his 
acting on them. Questions arise, however, concerning th~ status of a 
249 Sorenson,~. cit., supra, n. 232 at 9. 
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physician's therapeutic privilege in the counseling context. What information 
should he give to his patients? Unfortunately, traditional ethical precepts 
offer little guidance. Consequently, 
Since there are few normative guidelines outlining the 
information that should be given in the counseling sessions, 
other than the provision of minimal information about the 
disease and its recurrence risk, the actual information 
that is exchanged, and the degree to which this constitutes 
counsel, advice, or behavioral sugqestion, varies dependin~ 
on the particular conditions. 250 
The problems which may emerge from this unsettled situation can be 
demonstrated by the following "cases." 
Earlier discussion of the XYY chromosome abnormality emphasized the 
inconclusive nature of research concerning its consequences on human behavior 
(supra, pp. 73~74). Assume for the moment that amniocentesis is performed on 
an expectant mother concerned that her child miqht be a Tay~Sachs baby. 
While no evidence of Tay-Sachs disease is found, the abnormal XYY chromosome 
abnormality is discovered. What should the counselor tell the mother? One 
question which this example raises is whether a counselor can simply act as 
an "informer," responsible only for providing his patients with the facts? 
In the case of the XYY anomaly, what are the "facts"? Hhat consideration. 
should the counselor give to the effect on the parents and their family 
situation if given this information? Might parental concern about t~e possible 
presence of an abnormality adversely influence their care of the child? A 
recent report on the XYY anomaly suggested that "parental expectations and 
apprehensions about possible - but as yet unknown or even non-existant -
250Ib,·d., 1617 PP· - . 
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problems, may well create certain difficulties and lead unwittin~ly to 
251 
self-fulfilling prophecies." Perhaps more importantly, should individual 
counselors, each with their own built-in biases and operating within the 
context of varied family situations, be given the responsibility to make 
• 
such decisions? By whom and by what criteria should sllch responsibility be 
allocated? And if a child or young adult, while participating in a screening 
program to detect other sex anomalies is found to be an "XYY" should he be 
informed of this condition? Ramsey raises the question of "whether the 
individual might be endangered by the acquisition, in any society, of complete 
knowledge [or in the XYY case, of partial and as yet unconfirmed knowledge] 
of his behavioral ~enetics? Such knowledqe may be too heavy for many to bear 
252 
and still remain spontaneous and free in their personal lives." Without 
any common ethical perspective, answers to these questions would undoubtedly 
vary from counselor to counselor and accordin~ to the situational context in 
which they occur. 
In cases in which early detection of a disease. cannot be accompanied by 
appropriate treatment for the patient or his family, the question arises 
whether the uncovering of the disease does more harm than good. The urqency 
of this question is demonstrated by the possible development of a safe and 
253 
accurate test for presymptomatic detection of Huntington's chorea. A 
251 () Shah ed. , 2£. cit., supra, n. 220 at 26. 
2520 1 ... .!lE.. cit., supra, n. 86 at 7,t. 
253H.C. Klawans, G.W. Paulson and A. Barbeau, "Predictive Test for 
Hunt; ngton' s Chorea," Lancet, 2: 1185-86, December 5, 1970. The authors 
report using "levodopa" as their testing agent. They stress the need, however, 
for additional experimental testing and caution a~ainst hasty interpretations 
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reliable and accurate test will mean that persons who lack the deleterious 
gene will be reassured that the diseas8 will not develop, and, thus, they 
t 
I 
I 
will also be reassured that any children that they might have will be 
unaffected. But for those whose tests are positive, they will be confronted 
v~ith the fact that their future will include qradua1 physical and mental 
degeneration. This possibility has led some to arque that "it is not 
unreasonable to withhold the use of a test of this sort until we have something 
tangible to offer to those who ~ive a positive result," suggest'inq that 
IIdepression and the risk of suicide would be more or less inev;tab1e. 1I254 
There are those who would object to this alternative, findinq "no reason to 
deprive the patients involved of the right of decision to learn, early or late, 
255 
their inevitable fate. 11 (emphasis added) It is important to remember that 
if the test is to be of value, persons with predictive signs of Huntingtonls 
chorea must refrain from having their own children. If such persons are to 
be informed, then it is imperative that the counselor carefully evaluate the 
emotional state of the patient prior to tell inq him. IIShould the diagnosis 
be confirmed without proper preparation, serious behavioral or mood disorders 
. 1 d' "d 11 256 Th h t ' b t 1d d h ' . may ensue, 1nc u 1ng SU1C1 e. us, w a 1S to e 0 an ow lt 1S to 
of test results, noting that "A positive result does not prove Huntingtonls 
chorea, it only increases the prediction coefficient ... A negative result 
is still meaningless and requires new evaluation in years to come. 1I 
254David L. Stevens, "Test for Huntingtonls Chorea (cont.)," The New 
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 285, August 12,1971, p. 414. 
255Willard Gay1in, IIGenetic Screeninq: The Ethics of Knowing," The New 
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 286, June 22, 1972, p. 1362. ---
256whitt ;er,et. ~., .QQ.. cit., supra, n. 209 at 1550. 
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be told assume new proportions in the information equation established 
between the counselor and his patient. 
While the above examples are single, isolated cases, they help to 
demonstrate some of the issues which may emerge concerning the counselor's 
responsibility in providinq information to his counselees. A qeneral overview 
of this responsibility highlights four additional policy questions. First.lis 
the question of whether persons are deprived of their freedom of choice when 
pertinent information is withheld. Without the knowledge necessar~' for 
making intelligent decisions, is the power to decide still meaningful? When 
arbitrating the question of what to communicate to the patient, it should be 
remembered that "For parents, genetic counseling can constitute a fundamental 
crisis. or emerQency. in their reproductive careers. At 1ssue is the decision 
257 
as to whether to keep open or to close the social family biologically." 
To what extent, then, should a "third party" be permitted to take that decision 
(in any meaningful sense of the term) away from a couple? 
A second issue concerns the validity of the assumption that the withholding 
of information would be in the best interests of the patient. Some geneticists 
express the opinion that, in the case where there is no effective therapy for 
an illness, informing the patient and his family of his condition will do more 
harm than good. Knowledge of the condition 
257 
258 
prior to its clinical manifestation may merely provoke 
increased patient or parental anxiety without offering 
them any positive reassurance. There will be little 
benefit to the patient and, for a time, at least, some 
possible degree of harm to the parents and patient, 
depending upon their emotional stability.258 
Sorenson,..QQ. cit., supra, n. 232 at 10. 
Murray, Q£. cit., supra, n. 189 at 10. 
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It is certainly questionable, however, whether the counselor will be able 
to determine what the "best interests" of his counselee are. Genetic 
counselors, unlike the family physician, are not well-acquainted with their 
patients and their families. Thus, some believe that "When counseling 
becomes much more routine, part of the accepted practice should not be the 
routine of withholding information from the counselees on the spurious 
grounds that the counselors know what is best for patients they hardly know 
259 
at all. II There is also the problem of a physician's own values, which may 
differ from those of his patients, and the effect that they might have on his 
judgment to discern his patient's best interests. ~The potential for conflict 
is especially great in genetic counseling in which the options elected depend 
on one's opinions about such controversial matters as the importance of the 
traditional concept of family, the morality of divorce and of abortion, .. II 
The cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship is the patient's trust 
in the integrity and ability of his physician. This poses a third question: 
If information that is withheld today is discovered later, what will be the 
effect on the relationship between the medical profession, and particularly 
genetic counseling, and its patients? Miqht there be a general loss of 
confidence in the medical profession brought about by the routine withholding 
of information? When could a patient be sure that he was being told all? 
The possible damage to the practice of medicine and its consequent impact on 
259 Alexander M. Capron, IIEthical and Legal Aspects of Genetic Counseling,1I 
Paper presented at the First Advanced Symposium: Genetic Counseling, Th~ 
New England Institute, Ridgefield, Connecticut, July 6, 1972, p. 4. 
260Ibid ., p. 5. 
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the health of the population must be added to the growing list of policy 
considerations. 
The fourth and final broad policy question concerns the nature of the 
counselor's responsibility beyond his individual patient. Specifically, 
what is the responsibility of the counselor toward a patient's family and 
society? With respect to access to information, it has been suqqested that 
liAs a general rule all unambiCjuous diagnostic results should be made available 
261 
to the pet'son, his legal representative, or a physician authorized by him.1I 
A question arises as to whether a patient's family should also be told, since 
thi'5 might give them the opportunity to evaluate intelliqently their own 
health status. It has been suggested that the traditional, confidential 
doctor-patient relationship might be less important than people's "right to 
262 
know about the risks that they run, whether infectious, toxic, or genetic." 
And if such information is withheld, could the physician or screening program 
administrators be found legally neqligent? 
There may be instances in genetic medicine where the needs of the 
individual and those of society conflict. Considering the possible dangers 
of the presence of the XYY chromosome abnormality, does the counselor have the 
responsibility to forewarn the community and perhaps expose the XYY individual 
and his family to an undercurrent of social and leqal pressures? And upon 
making a diagnosis of Down's syndrome and advising his counselees, to what 
extent should the counselor consider the costs to society of providing 
261 Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, .9£.. cit., supra, 
n. 154 at 1131. 
262John Littlefield, quote in Time, June 26, 1972, p. 51. 
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institutional care for that child? This issue requires considerable thJught 
and leads one to ask if the individual physician is in a position to measure 
and evaluate the cumulative, and sometimes remote, effects of his individual 
acts? Should such considerations influence the case of his patient? It 
might well be that "The individual physician is unfaithful to the trust the 
patient places in him if he withholds a specific therapeutic aqent in 
anticipation of some eventual perturbation of human ecology. Society, 
263 
therefore, cannot possibly delegate such decisions to ~ach physician." 
But how society and its institutions is to make these dec)sions is far from 
clear. 
Genetic technology is becoming an increasingly important part of 
societyt s vast medical arsenal. Applying such knowledge, however, may create 
a myriad of problems. In the hope of stimulating discussion and focusing 
attention on the most pressing policy issues related to genetic technology, 
this paper has sought to identify and analyze some of the major problem 
areas. It is apparent that society must begin to make some conscious 
decislons regarding the use of this technology. How these decisions are 
made will affect not only the health of this generation, but that of many 
generations to come. These, then, are the promises and problems of genetic 
technology. 
263 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, "Physician, Patients, and Society: Some New 
Tensions in Medical Ethics," 'in E. Mendelsohn, et. ~., .QQ.. cit., supra, 
n. 47 at 80. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
E. Community Level Impacts of 
Expanded Underground Coal 
Mining 
Vary T. COATES, P.I. 
May 1975, pp. 1-35 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under a research contract from the Electric Power Research Institute, 
Hittman Associates, Inc., undertook to perform "A Technology Assessment of 
Extraction of Coal by Underground Mining Methods." Project Independence an-
ticipates increasing coal production from 599 million tons per year to between 
1.2 and 1.5 billion tons within ten years, much of the increase to go for the 
generation of electricity. It is further anticipated that accomplishing this 
objective will require the opening of one new underground mine (as well as one 
new surface mine) per month during the ten year period. Hittman Associates 
was therefore asked to evaluate the requirements for deep mined coal in terms 
of alternative future production strategies, to analyze the interrelationships 
umong technological components of the deep mining process, to describe opera-
tional constraints on the expansion of deep mining, to analyze the impact of 
present and projected developments upon the physical, social, and community de-
velopment environments, to identify present, potential, direct, and indirect 
participants and affected parties and their role in this development, and to 
specify and assess a range of public and private policy alternatives which are 
practically available to increase the production of deep mine coal for electric 
generation. 
As a subcontractor to Hittman Associates, The Program of Policy Studies 
in Science and Technology (The George Washington University) was asked to (1) 
identify and evaluate the various roles and interests of the groups directly or 
indirectly connected with (potentially affected by) underground coal mining; 
and through consultation to assist Hittman Associates in their performance of 
two further tasks: (2) analysis of impacts of expanded coal production in a 
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geographical area or community selected by them for a "site study" or Ilcase 
study," and (3) specification of a range of public and private policy alterna-
tives (including strategies for related R&D and monitoring requirements) which 
appear to be practically available to increase the production of deep mine coal 
and delineation of the consequences of adopting each alternative. 
In carrying out these tasks, the Technology Assessment Group (TAG) of 
the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology: 
(a) reviewed recent and current literature concerning underground 
coal mining, in order to develop a tentative list of poten-
tially affected parties and participants in the process (see 
Appendix A, Bibliography); 
(b) conducted lengthy but informal interviews with representatives 
of such participants and parties who could be identified in 
Washington, D.C. area (see Appendix B for a list of interviews); 
(c) analyzed available census materials and other data related to 
the counties selected by Hittman Associates for their case study 
or site investigation (Marion and Monongalia Counties in West 
Vi rg i n i d.) ; 
(d) conducted interviews with community representatives, leaders, 
and decision makers in the selected West Virginia Counties, in 
order to identify other potentially affected parties who may 
not be represented by recognized or organized interest groups 
(see Appendix C); 
(e) sought for case studies of similar communities where rapid 
expansion of similar extraction industries (or the decline of 
such industries) has occurred, and utilized one such case his-
tory for comparison with the West Virginia counties, in order 
to project and generalize potential impacts on the country as 
a whole. 
The following report deals only with community level impacts and describes 
the situation in one western county where rapid expansion of an extraction in-
dustry, closely simil~r. to underground coal mining, has recently occurred. It 
then attempts to project the impact which similar development might have on 
II 
1 .l 
! 
1 
I 
j 
1 
l 
I 
I 
i 
I 
j 
I 
! 
-3-
Marion and Monongalia Counties, West Virginia, in order to forecast the im-
pacts at tlile local level which may be anticipated from a national expansion 
of deep coa'i production such as envisioned by Project Independence. In this 
report, we have relied heavily on recent studies by the Technology Assessment 
Group (TAG) of six communities in other sections of the country to provide a 
baseline of information about problems and trends affecting rural small com-
munities. 
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COMMUNITY LEVEL IMPACTS OF EXPANDED UND[RGROUND 
COAL MINING 
I. The Case of Sweetwater. Wyoming. 
In order to forf~cast the potential local impacts of underground coal 
mining expansion. and to generalize these to national and regional impacts. 
it is instructive to look at a case history of a county in which rapid expan-
sion has already occurred in a very similar irdustry.* 
Sweetwater County. Wyoming, historically depended on railroading and 
coal mining as the mainstays of its economy. Both declined rapidly after 
World War II, railroad employment dropping from 1,700 in 1950 to under 300 
in 1974. and coal mining employment from 2.000 in 1960 to almost nothing in 
1974 (some increase in coal mining is now expected). 
Other industries took up the slack, chiefly construction of Flaming 
Gorge Dam. oil and gas production. and a steady growth in trona mining. By 
1970 m'ining and processing -- including trona, oil, and coal -- employed 
1500 people. 
In 1970 a boom began in Sweetwater County, as a "cumulative result of 
separate (corporate) decisions to invest large amounts of capital II in trona 
plant and mining operations and in construction at the Jim Bridger Power Plant. 
Trona. used as an industrial chemical, is natural soda ash, and is mined 
with processes and technology very similar to those used in underground coal 
mining. Miners from West Virginia have in fact been recruited to work in 
*John S. Gilmore and Mary K. Duff, University of Denver Research Institute. 
Denver, Colorado 80210: A Growth Management Case Study: Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming. Final draft. December 1974. Prepared for Rocky Mountain Energy Company. 
We are greatly indebted to John Gilmore for permission to draw heavily on 
DRI's excellent study. We have endeavored to report the findings of this study 
as accurately and faithfully as possible. and apologize in advance for any in-
advertent misinterpretation. 
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western trona mines since they need little or no further training. Thus we 
can relate the experiences of Sweetwater County to the potential local impacts 
of rapid expansion of underground coal mining. 
From 1971 to 1974, mining employment increased 73 percent, from 1,530 
to 2,650 men, better than 17 percent growth per year. Construction employment 
[associated both with trona mining and the power plant] shot up from 400 to 
4,800. Local and state government employees, including school teachers, cor-
respondingly rose from 880 to 1,300. 
Total employment in the county from 1970-74 more than doubled. from 
7,230 to 15,225. County population also doubled, from 18,391 to 36,900. Ac-
cording to Gilmore* a growth rate of five percent per year would have been 
manageable, but Sweetwater's growth from 1970 to 1974 was 19 percent per year. 
The infrastructure was inadequate. The market mechanism was unable to furnish 
the factors of production. Housing was in short supply and prices rose rapidly, 
retail sales facilities were overloaded, and the financial viability of munici-
palities and school systems deteriorated t:1rough a lack of both capital and 
operating funds. 
The housing industry was unable to respond rapidly to the sudden demand. 
Construction labor had to be imported and pirating was common. Local sewage 
treatment was inadequate and housing developers had to build treatment facili-
ties. Much of the land in the county was owned by the government (as is the 
case in many western counties) and a few large owners -- some of them corpora-
tions -- held the rest, so that a seller's market prevailed. The tesult was 
that new housing was priced too high for workers; the largest homebuilder in 
*Q£.. cit. 
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the region, for example, decided against a 200 unit project for this reason.* 
Mortgage money was in very short supply. 
New workers therefore had to rely on mobile homes, of which there were 
soon 4,000 to 5,000 in the county. The average mining family in Sweetwater 
County has 2.2 children, .9 dogs, and .3 cats -- so mobile home living was 
often cramped and unsatisfactory.** 
Overcrowding, the case study team concluded, contributed to increases in 
alcoholism and mental problems, petty crime, violence, behavioral and educa-
tional problems with the children, family fights, and high divorce rates. It 
al so increased fi re hazards, caused breakdovms in sanitary and trash collec-
tion systems, overloaded public service facilities, and caused excessive burden-
ing of medical care facilities. 
Educational and recreational facilities also fell behind. Both local 
school districts bonded themselves up to the local limit but the accumulated 
deficit in building facilities rose to $3 million. 
Prices rose even faster than the national rates of increase. This put a 
heavy burden on both newcomers and long-time residents, but especially those 
residents with fixed incomes and those in service and government employment 
whose salaries did not go up as fast as industrial wages. Available employment 
for women did not increase proportionately to total employment. Wives and 
daughters of the newcomers sought jobs and could not find them. 
Crime rates, traffic congestion, and parking problems were increased 
dramatically. One police agency reported that complaints rose 60 percent in 
a year. 
*Gilmore and Duff, 2£. cit., p. 14. The average annual income for Sweetwater 
miners was (1974) $11,40~ Using the home mortgage borrowing power rule used 
by most mortgage companies (twice annual income) this w?uld indic~te mining. 
families with one wage earner could afford a house costlng approxlmately $n,OOO 
or renting for $190-240; typical new housing in the county is said to cost a~out 
$34,000 to $43,000 or rent for about $235 monthly. 
**According to an unpublished mining company survey~ cited in Gilmore and Duff, 
p. 15. 
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As the quality of life in the community deteriorated, the impacts on the 
mining companies were also dramatic. Productivity declined by 25 to 40 percent 
from 1972 to 1973, and tonnage per shift in the trona mines dropped 60 to 75 
percent. Employee turnover rose sharply 35 percent in some companies and 
up to 100 percent in others. In spite of attractive competitive wages, labor 
supply could not catch up to demand and workers had to be actively recruited 
from areas as far away as Canada and West Virginia.* 
Employment turnover in municipal government also rose sharply since 
government salaries were not competitive with those of industry. When gov-
ernment pay was increased, municipal budgets were strained but people were 
still not available. Demands for increased municipal services could not be 
met. The additional assessed valuation from new homes even at inflated prices 
did not cover the related demands made on municipal revenues -- this was true 
even for conventional homes and especially true for mobile homes. 
If the growth rate subsides in the near future, these problems will not 
all be sol ved; in some cases they will worsen. New publi c faci 1 ities cost 
more than the community can afford when they must be added quickly. There was 
about $2,100 increase in bonding capacity in Sweetwater (1973) for each new 
school child,** but that child also requires school plant expansion costing 
$5,100 ($40-50 per square foot). If mining operations go into a decline, in 
the future, the community will be left with heavy investment in facilities it 
can nQ longer use, and'a debt burden that will be insurmountable. 
* Gilmore and Duff, Q£. cit., p. 20. Employee turnover is attributed to 
higher wages in the construction trades plus "quality of life problems be-
setting the community," based on both observation and survey data. 
**Ten percent of assessed valuation (State Constitution). 
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Several points are worth stressing in considering this case study of a 
modern boom town: 
the lack of anticipation of and preparation for the 
Y'api d growth; 
the secondary effect of expansion in some sectors of 
employment on other employment sectors, and the ef-
fect on total population; 
the short-term failure of the market place to accommo-
date, and the rapid deterioration of the quality of 
1 i fe in the commlln i ty ; 
the differential burden placed on some segments of the 
population; and 
-- the impacts on the stimulating industry itself, and 
the implied constraints on further expansion. 
S\\'eetwater County had not foreseen or prepared for rapi dgrowth despite 
the fact that domestic and foreign demand for natural soda ash was steadily 
increasing, and trona mining is concentrated in Wyoming and especially in 
Sweetwater. The decisions that brought about the sudden growth in employment 
were made separately in a number of corporations without any communication 
between the companies themselves or between the companies and the communities 
which were to be impacted. 
An important point to remember in assessing local impacts is that every 
miner who moves into a community from outside is likely to mean 3.1 new in-
habitants. If a new mine opened employing, ultimately, 500 miners, this could 
mean 1,563 new inhabitants (and of those 510 approximate1y will be s~hool 
children). But the new mine is also likely to mean construction workers, addi-
tional government employees, school teachers, services and trades people --
possibly 2,363 additional new inhabitants.* 
*See Methodological Note, p. 36. 
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The twelve-fold increase in construction employment resulted both from 
the opening of new mines and the construction at the power plant (and result-
ing secondary construction in the community). State and local employees, 
which include school teachers, increased in four years by 48 percent. We do 
not know how many construction workers moved into the county with their fami-
lies as permanent or temporary residents, but if all of the new mining jobs 
had been filled by newcomers, 85% with families, this alone would account 
for 19 percent out of the total 101 percent growth in population. The 952 
(estimated) mining families would account for 1,142 children immediately added 
to school rolls, the population of two to three new elementary schools. 
Eight-six percent of the people in Sweetwater County live in two towns, 
Rock Springs (pop. in 1970, 11,657) and Green River (pop. 4,196). The towns 
had been gaining in population over the past decade (20 percent and 12.4 
percent respectively) although the county itself had lost 8.5 percent of 
its population -- an example of the continuing centralization in rural areas 
as larger town~ grow at the expense of smaller towns and rural population. 
Towns of this size cannot generally accommodate rapid growth in population 
because of the small housing stock and the lack of mortgage money from 
country banks, which are often reluctant to tie up limited resources in 
long term loans. Since Rock Springs and Green River had been growing slowly 
over the decade, there is also likely to have been little underuti1ized 
infrastructure. In such cases, quality of life quickly deteriorates from 
overcrowding, inadequate public services, and congested streets and retail 
trade facilities. 
This deterioration of community environment places a heavier burden on 
some segments of the population than on others. Those with fixed incomes. par-
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ticu1ar1y the aged, suffer from rising prices for housing and consumer goods. 
Wives bear the brunt of overcrowded housing, poor shopping facilities with no 
parking space, children's behavior problems stelOOling from crowded schools and 
non-existent recreation facilities, inadequate waste collection, and too few 
repair and maintenance workers. Those who need or wish to work find that the: 
number of jobs available to women have not kept pace with the number of new~ 
comers seeking such jobs. It is difficult to establish roots in such communi-
ti~s, and family stability suffers. 
As co!,:munity life becomes less acceptable, a;Jld at the :;,ame time, 
competition for 1 abor increases, employee turnover rises and producti vity de-
cl ines. Thus the industry whose growth has stimulat~d the process is in turn 
impacted by the results of unplanned, unmanaged growth and these impacts can 
become a significant constraint on further development. 
The research team headed by Gil more and Duff (see footnote, p. 1) con-
cluded the significant lowering of productivity in trona mine~ in Sweetwater 
County resulted primarily from excessive employee turnover, which stemmed from 
two factors: higher rates being paid in the construction industry (where compe-
tition for labor resulted both from the expansion of mining employment and con-
struction of a large power plant, and the secondary impacts of these projects on 
employment growth) and from the deteriorating quality of life in the community. 
The second factor, unsatisfactory community conditions, they concluded, was of 
major importance. The pacing parameter for growth management is often the 
ability of the community to provide housing and the public services which must 
accompany it. Traditionally housing stock grows at about three percent in large 
urban areas but only about one percent in rural ar~as; in West Virginia housing 
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stock, in the 1960 's, expanded at about tvJO per'cent per year. * When a com-
munity is able to anticipate and prepare for a sudden change in its economy, 
for example a large industrial plant relocating in the c;.rea, cooperation be-
tween the community and the company can overcome this potential constraint 
by intervention in the ordinary housing market (for example, local develop-
ment corporations or company housing, bond issues for new public facilities, 
mobile classrooms s etc.). 
In the absence of such planning and policy interventions, the secondary 
impacts of sudden economic growth may be sufficiently detrimental to provide 
a brake on further economic activities, as indicated in the fo11owing 
schematic, Figure 1. 
*Interview with Dr. Stephen Fuller, formerly Regional Planner, Appalachian 
Regional Commission, now consultant to the Commission and Assistant Pro-
fessor of Urban and Regional Planning, The George Washington University. 
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II. Marion and Monongalia Counties, West Virginia. 
In population size and distribution, Marion and Monongalia Counties are 
very different from Sweetwater County, Wyoming. Large even by western stan-
dards, Sweetwater covers 10,429 square miles and had (in 1970) only 18,400 
people, for a population density of 2 per square mile. By contrast, Marion 
County is 1/33 the size (311 square mile~) and has over three times as many 
people (61,400) for a population density of 197 p~r square mile. Monongalia 
County has 365 square miles of land and 63,700 people, its density being 175 
per square mile. Eighty-six percent of Sweetwater's people live in two com-
munities, Rock Springs (11,657 population) and Green River (4,196). Marion 
County has, similarly two towns of over 2,500: Fairmont (26,093) and Manning-
ton (2,747) which together account for 47 percent of county residents. Monon-
galia also has two towns: Morgantown (29,431) and Westover (5,086) which to-
gether have 54 percent of county population.* 
Thus the West Virginia counties have each about three times as many 
people as Sweetwater, and about twice as many townspeople. In West Virginia 
more people live in small hamlets or on farms** and the distance between human 
settlements is smaller, so that more people can drive to new jobs without 
changing their place of residence. In Marion and Monongalia Counties, community 
residents rely on this tendency to discount the community impacts of new mine 
development -- their immediate response to questions concerning potential 
*Unless otherwise specified, figures in this section are taken from: U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County and City Data Book, 1972, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. In most cases, 1970 figures are used for comparison 
with Sweetwater County, Wyoming, in the last year before its rapid expansion. Later 
figures are not available in many instances where they would have been desirable. 
**In West Virginia, as in most rural areas, farm population has sharply dropped in 
recent decades; it is now 900 in Marion, and 1,200 in Monongalia, dawn 54 percent 
and 44 percent respectively since 1960. Many people continue to live on farms 
which are no longer productive while working at other jobs. In Sweetwater, only 
131 persons were classified as farm population in 1970; the average size farm in 
Sweetwater is 15,000 acres compared to 100 acres in Marion and Monongalia. 
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impacts of greater mining employment is (a) that new miners will not move into 
the community but will drive to work from their present homes in other counties 
(or the adjacent state), and (b) that "most" of the jobs wi 11 be fi 11 ed in any 
case by the counties' unemployed. 
The TAG research group discounts this factor on several grounds. Commut-
ing to work across county lines is common in many rural West Virginia counties; 
thus in Doddridge and Taylor Counties (100 percent and 90 percent rural, respec-
tively) adjacent to the study areas, from 28 to 30 percent of workers are em-
ployed in other counties, chiefly Marion and Monongalia. However, the avail-
able labor force in such counties is small, and should expansion of deep mining 
occur simultaneously in several adjacent counties or throughout the region, the 
significance of commuting as a factor will be sharply reduced. Rising prices 
of gasoline may also reduce the attractiveness of commuting in the future. 
Overall unemployment rates in the counties have not been high: about four percent 
in 1970 (compared to Sweetwater's 4.4 p'2rcent just prior to the boom) and under 
six percent in 1975. Moreover, these unemployment figures have limited rele-
vance to minirlg, since they are inflated somewhat by female unemployment rates 
(women are seldom employed in the mines although there are now a few, perhaps 
six, in the two counties), and many of the other unemployed would not be ac-
cepted for mining jobs because of health, age, or other factors. 
As will be seen ;n Table I, Marion and Monongalia Counties, although the 
size of their civilian labor forces is three times that of Sweetwater, are 
comparable to the Wyoming county in many other ways. 
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County 
.Marion 
t-lononga 1 i a 
Sweetwater 
Total Employed 
Labor Force 
21,100 
21,900 
7,000 
TABLE I 
LABOR FORCE 
1970 
% in % Con- % Manu-
Mining struction facturing 
16.1 5.5 2.6.6 
10.5 6.3 11.9 
15.7 7.3 8.1 
.. ~-~~~"""<",,",,:,,, .. ...,. 4i"'_!"<"1""!"'''''''-~~. 
"1 
female 
%White % Foremen/ Labor 
%Govt. % Trade %Service %Edu. Collar Craftsmen force 
13.1 17.7 7.2 7.0 34.6 19.0 7,771 
37.5 15.9 7.1 25.1 49.3 13.4 8,416 
14.4 20.2 9.9 6.8 40.1 17.6 1,004 
" : ',J 
.~ ] 
i: Ii 
It 
r 
t 
~' 
i 
I' I, 
~ ; 
-16-
The most striking difference is the strang base of manufacturing in 
Marion County as compared to Sweetwater (and Monongalia). The three largest 
employers in Marion (a lamp manufacturer, a glass bottle manufacturer, and a 
pow'ar plant) together employ 5,550 people.* Another twelve firms together sup-
ply 2,850 jobs. Thus the 8,400 far outweigh the fewer than 3,000 mining 
jobs in the county. However, approximately half of the industrial jobs are in 
firms directly tied to mineral industries (a mining equipment manufacturer, 
a construction firm specializing in coal preparation plants, a second engineer-
ing and construction company, the railroad, the power plant). 
Approximately 38 percent of the labor force in the West Virginia counties 
(1970) is female, as contrasted with only 14 percent in Sweetwater. The ava'il-
ability of employment in manufacturing, as well as in government, trade, services, 
and education may mean that. should mining (and construction) employment increase, 
wives of newcomers would also have an opportunity to find employment to a greater 
extent than was the case in Sweetwater. However, there have recently been a num-
ber of layoffs in manufacturing plants in the two counties, so that if a national 
recession prevails there may be little or no gain in female employment oppor-
tunities. 
Marion and Monongalia Counties had a median family income of $7,800 in 
1970 (the U.S. median was then $9,586); 12.8 percent of Marion County's families, 
and 13.2 percent of Monongalia's, fell below the poverty line in income. Twenty-
two percent of Marion County's population, and 13 percent of Mononga1ians, re-
ceived either social security payments or old age assistance in 1970; these 
people would be most hurt by rising prices should a boom in employment and 
population occur in the area. 
*According to the Industrial Director of Marion County, mme., Chamber of 
Commerce, 1975. 
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Sweetwater County was slightly better off in 1970 than the two counties 
in the study area (see Table II); thus the benefits of increased employment 
would be slightly greater, but the detrimental impact of inflated housing and 
consumer costs would also be somewhat greater, in the West Virginia area, 
should a similar boom occur. 
Median 
Count~ Fam. Inc. 
Marion $7,807 
Monongalia 7,752 
Sweetwater 9,077 
0/ 
m 
TABLE II 
INCOME CHARAC~ERISTICS 
families Social Sec. Old Age 
below ~ov. RedQients Assistance 
12.8% 11 ,817 306 
13.2% 7,973 214 
7.6% 2,331 61 
% Population 
Rec. S.S. and OAA 
22% 
13% 
13% 
Housing stocks in the two counties are shown in Table III. It should be 
noted that from one-half to two-thirds of the housing is at least thirty-five 
years old and 8-11 percent lack flush toilets, piped water, or some plumbing 
facilities. Of the housing units added since 1939, about 16 percent are mobile 
homes. The price of housing in Sweetwater County rose rapidly under increased 
demand because of a shortage of developable land, the necessity of new sewage 
and water treatment facilities, competition for const rl.lcti on labor, and a lack 
'Of mortgage money. A glance at Table III shows that the same figures would pre-
vail in West Virginia. 
~-I 
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and other topographical features} and about half of that amount is already 
developed.* This means roughly 50 square mile,s to accommodate housing, public 
*Hittman Associates. I 
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facilities, and related uses. Marion County lending institutions had $96.5 
million in assets in 1970, and Monongalia's had $86.1 million, about half of 
Sweetwater County's potential savings/population ratio ~n 1970. There is no 
branch banking in West Virginia.* At present almost no mortgage money is avail-
able except through FHA. Some means is needed for marshalling resources needed 
for economic development in a region where sudden growth would mean great demands 
on very limited development funds. There is a shortage of developed industrial 
sites, and portions of the present industrial base are obsolete.** 
About 65 percent of the housing is presently served by public sewer sys-
tems. (In Sweetwater County, the figure in 1970 was 89 percent.) Of housing 
in Irura1" areas of the two counties, where new development would presumably 
occur, only 33 percent (Marion) and 26 percent 'Monongalia) are now public 
sewer systems. Both counties are now facing the necessity of extending their 
sewer systems. Additional houses in the outlying areas would help to cover 
the costs of this addition, provided planning ;s done beforehand as to where 
development is likely tv occur. 
There are about 2.417 mobile homes in the two counties. Banks (l,re more 
willing to make the small, shorter term loans for mobile home purchase than tie 
up their limited resollrces in long term mortgages. t~obi1e homes, however, do 
not provide sufficient additional tax revenue to cover the municipal and county 
services which must be provided (according to the Sweetwater County study) and 
make relatively p00r use of limited residential land. Younger miners tend to 
purchase mobile homes at least dur-ing the first five years of employment, de-
ferring conve;t10nnl home ownership until their families expand and their jobs 
*State Code. §31A-~-i2. 
**Region VI: Regiora1 Pl p n. 
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are more secure. Community leaders reported in many interviews that there would 
be great resistance in West Virginia -- particularly high-rise apartments which 
might otherwise be attractive because of land pressures -- because of the value 
traditionally attached to owning one1s own land. 
In 1970 there were 11,874 public school children in Marion County and 
11,272 in Monongalia. Marion County in 1973 spent $694 per child (projected 
to be $741 in 1974-75)* and Monongalia spent $836 (average expenditure per child 
in the State is $910).** Bond issues for schools have several times been defeated 
in each county; most recently, in April 1975 Marion County voters defeated a bond 
issue intended for consolidation of seven high schools into three larger high 
schools to serve the entire county. Most schools in both counties are over-
crowded and teacher loads are above national averages. In Monongalia County 
about 100 high school students are now forced to attend classes in the afternoon 
or evening because of overcrowding.* 
County tax assessors report that 7 percent of county revenue in Marion and 
9 percent in Monongalia is derived from property tax on coal mines. The Business 
and Occupations Tax levied on sales ($3.50 per $100 as applied to coal mines) 
goes to the State rather than the county, as does the (consumer) sa1es tax; 
there is no severance tax applied to coal mining.*** Increased county revenue 
woul d therefo~e result from increased property tax on new mines and on homes, 
automobiles, utilities, :Hld personal property if mining employment and total 
popul ation rose si gni fi cantly. 
*Telephone interviews with E. Jordon, Marion County School System, and with 
a representative of the Morgantown School Board. 
**West Virginia Office of School Statistics, responding to teiephone inquiry. 
***In Interviews. 
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"Hard-core" unemployment in the two counties is estimated at about three 
percent* but is hi~her in the adjacent rural counties. If qeneral employment 
increases, there will be an indirect beneficial impact on this problem; while 
the "hard-core" unemployed (the people with low skills, older persons, the 
partially disabled) are not eligible for mining jobs they would benefit from 
expanding secondary employment in low-skill service occupations and from 
removal from trainable younger workers from these jobs. 
In any assessment of community impacts of coal mining, the cumulative 
impacts of fatalities, injuries, and disease (and the effect of constant 
awareness of this danger) should be considered. In 1972 and 1973, fatalities 
per million man-hours from underground coal mining averaged .57** Disabling 
injuries average 40.92 per million man-hours.*** In West Virginia, as of 
September 1972, 11.8 percent of working coal miners were found to have simple 
pneumonoconiosis and 1.3 percent to have the much more serious "complicated 
categori' of the respiratory disease (commonly called "black lung")**** Thus 
with an average of 5,760 miners employed (1970-1973), Marion and Monongalia 
might expect 6 fatalities per year from accidents in the mine, 453 men disabled, 
680 miners with simple pneumonoconiosis and 75 with a serious version of the 
disease (those workers already retired ot' disabled are not included).***** 
*Interviews. 
**Coal Age, February 1974, p.83. 
***Coal Miners and The Economy, AUMWA Research Report, Sept. 30,1974, p.13. 
****Coal Age, July 1973, p.145. 
*****At an average of 240 days per year, eight hours per day, for 5,760 miners. 
--l~ 
'-
I j 
-,--- ------------ ----- ----------,,-,,'-------------,~------- --------'--~~---~-~' -~-~~ 
r 
I 
i 
C' 
l L,J .. 
.. _-- C·~~_~·~~I_ -I" 
t . 
r 
-22-
For purposes of illustrating more quantifiable impacts of expanded coal 
mining in Marion and Monongalia County, two scenarios are presented below, the 
first based on a 60% increase in mining employment O\ierl ten year period 
(5 percent growth per year), the second based on a doubling of mining employ-
ment over ten years (7.5 percent growth per year). 
TABLE IV 
COMMUNITY IMPACTS 
A. Assuming 5% growth per year in mining employment. for 10 years. 
Impact 
Mining 
Employment 
Resulting 
Pop. Growth ( 1 ) 
Other 
Employment(3) 
Resulting 
Pop.Growth(4) 
Total Pop. 
Growth (5) 
No. of New 
School 
Children(6) 
New School s (7) 
Housing(8) 
Mobile 
Homes(9) 
Fatalities 
(1 yr) 
Disabled (1 yr) 
Pneum. , 
Complicated 
Base 
5,760 
(av.1970-73) 
125,070 
(est.1974)(2) 
26,320 
(1973 ) 
125,070 
(1974) 
125,070 
(1974) 
22,449 
( 1970) 
40,000 
2,417 
(1973 ) 
6 
453 men 
75 
1 st yr. After 5 yrs. 
288 new miners 1,590 new miners 
(+ 5%) (+27.6%) 
893 4,929 
(+0.7%) (+3.9%) 
552 3,339 
(+2%) (+12.7%j 
1,270 . 7.680 
(+1%) (+6.1%) 
2,163 12.609 (+ l. 7%) (+] 0%), 
625 3,625 
(+2.8%) (+16%) 
1+ 7 
521 3,622 
+ 172= + 1 .006= 
2,589 3,423 
7 8 
475 577 
79 96 
After 10 yrs. 
3,620 new miners 
(+62.8%) 
11 ,222 
(+9% 
7,602 
(+28.9%) 
17,485 
( +14~;Y 
28~707 
(23%) 
8,193 
(+36.5%) 
16 
6,878 
+'2~290= 
4.707 
10 
737 
122 
I 
1 
1 
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TABLE IV (Cont'd) 
B. Assuming 7.5% growth per year in mining employment, for 10 years. 
Impact 
Mining 
Employment 
Base 1st yr. After 5 yrs. After 10 yrs. 
5,760 432 new miners 2,509 new miners 6,111 new miners 
(av.1970-73) (+7.5%) (+44%) (+106%) 
Resulting 125.070 1,339 
Pop.Growth(l) (est.1974)(2) (+1%) 
Other 26,320 
Emp1oyment(3) (1973) 
Resulting 125,070 
Pop.Growth(4) (est.1974) 
Total Pop. 125,070 
Growth(5) (est.1974) 
No. of New 
School 22,449 
Chi1dren(6) (1974 est.) 
New Schools(7) 
Housing(8) 4·0,000 (1974) 
Mobile 2,417 
Homes(9) (1973) 
Fatalities(l yr)(lO) 6 
Disabled (1 yr) 453 men 
Pneum. , 
Complicated 75 
[Footnotes, page 24] 
907 
(+3.4%) 
2,086 
(+ 1. 7%) 
3,425 
(+2.7%) 
985 
(+4.4%) 
1-2 
921 
(+2%) 
+274= 
2,691 
7 
486 
82 
7,778 
(+6.2%) 
5,269 
(+20%) 
12,118 
(+9.7%) 
19,896 
(+15.9%) 
5,720 
(+25% ) 
11 
4,768 
(+11. 9%) 
+1,589= 
4,006 
9 
650 
108 
18,944 
(15.1%) 
12,833 
(+48.8%) 
29,516 
(24%) 
48.460 
(+39~~) 
13,933 (62%) . 
27-28 
11 ,611 
(+~9% ) 
+3.870= 
6.287 
13 
933 
154 
I 
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(1) Latest population figures from 1970 but used for illustrative purposes. 
(2) Assuming 85% of new miners have families, with an average of 3.5 persons 
per fami ly unit; 15% with no dependents, in temporary quarters or drawn 
from families already living in the area; hence 3.1 new inhabitants per 
miner. 
(3) Growth in other employment estimated at ratio of 2.1 additional jobs per 
miner. Service (all non-basic) employment to basic employment is actually 
3.14 and 2.88 in the two counties (Hittman Associates figures). 
(4) Non-basic industry employees estimated at 50% family heads (average 3.5 
persons per family), 50% single and living in temporary quarters or drawn 
from families already living in area; hence 2.3 additional residents per 
employee. 
(5) Addition of (2) and (3) above. 
(6) Assuming an average of 1.2 school children per family unit (following 
Gilmore and Duff, 2£. cit.); see (2) and (4) above. 
(7) Estimated at 500 children per school. 
(8) BasGd solely on families, see (2) and (4) above; baseline of 40,000 units 
represents 1974 stock minus units dilapidated or with no plumbing. 
(9) One-third of new units assumed to be mobile homes, the current trend in 
the two counties according to Hittman Associates. Second number is new 
mobile homes added to "1973 baseline. 
(10) Fatalities are estimated at .57 per million man-hours, disabling acci-
dents at 40.92 per million man-hours (see p. 21). Man-hours estimated at 240 
8-hour days per year (Bureau of Mines). Figures represent annual estimate 
for last year of period given (1st year, 5th year, 10th year) and are not 
cumulative. Pneumonoconiosis, complicated, estimated at 1.3% of employed 
miners (see p. 21). 
Marion and Monongalia Counties are relatively well supplied with the trans-
portation needed for growth, since new highways are already nearing completion. 
However, within the cities of Fairmont and ~~organto\'m, and in many parts of the 
counties which might be developed, secondary roads are narrow, mount~inous and 
poorly maintained. A large "people mover" is under construction in Morgantown 
with Federal demonstration funds (primarily to carry students from an outlying 
campus of the University of \~est Virginia to the downtown campus, a distance of 
seven miles). The justification for this project'\\s the congestion at some 
~ '~' . 
hours over the narrow, winding road linking the two campuses. Within the cities, 
streets are narrow and parking will be a serious problem "if large scalo growth 
occurs; as already noted, land for additional shopping areas will be limited 
and expensive. 
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In terms of the impact of coal expansion on local transportation systems 
the potential damage of increased coal haulage mayor may not be a serious problem 
nationwide. The West VirginiaHighway Department maintains a 60,800 lb. maximum 
load level for anything hauled by truck in the state. The department indicated 
that it was not having any problems with excessive haulage on the part of coal 
companies in the area. Approximately 5% of all state-wide road maintenance is 
a result of coal traffic.* (Highways in the state of West Virginia are all 
maintained by the state.) 
Overweight hauls must receive prior state approval and the West Virginia 
highway department maintains a force of inspectors to prevent violation of this 
regulation. However, there are many night-time violators who load up their 
trucks after the state inspectors have ended their work day and travel the state 
roads with overweight cargoes. In the state of West Virginia this has been a 
problem more serious with the oil well, natural gas, ~nd timber industries,** 
than with coal, because of the highly transient nature of their business. Coal 
mining operators are more apt to obey state haulage regulations so as to continue 
to enjoy good relations with the state regulatory agencies. The state highway 
commission has the legal authority to shut down any mine found to be hauling 
coal in excess of the legal limit, without an authorized permit to do so.*** 
Excessive haulage tends to be a greater problem in the Eastern Kentucky 
coal areas. In their desire to produce extra tons of coal at a minimum of trans-
portation cost, many Eastern Kentucky coal operators haul in excess of the legal 
1· . **** lmlt. 
*E. D. Keesing, W. Va. Highway Dep.t., Asst. Dir., Maintenance. 
**Ibid. 
***Ibid. 
**** Ibi d. 
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Expansion of underground coal may not present a problem for the state 
of West Virginia in terms of an overtaxation of its road system. Almost all 
of the long distance movement of coal is done by rail or barge, with truck 
traffic accounting mainly for the transfer of coal from the mine mouth to either 
rail head or barge landing site. The dependence upon barge systems as the major 
form of coal haulage is expected to continue, but the 1I1ocks" serving ba'rges may 
become a serious constraint. 
County Commissioners, businessmen, regional planners, coal miners, and 
other community representatives in the study area who were interviewed almost 
without exception dismiss the possibility of significant expansion of under-
ground coal mining within the two counties. They do not believe that demand 
for coal will rise sufficiently to make it economically feasible to develop the 
lower grade veins which have not already been developed. They also say that 
new mines would be too far from the river for barge transportation, and 
deve10p'ing new rail spurs adds to the cost of the coal. On the other hand, 
when asked to address the question of potential community impacts of expanded 
coal mining, community representatives generally think only of the beneficial 
effects of additional employment and income within the community. 
Whether or not such opinions as to the feasibility of expansion are valid, 
it is clear that if expansion did occur, the community would be unprepared for 
it, and hence unable to manage the resulting growth so as to minimize disruptive 
consequences to the community. If significant development is to occur steps 
should be taken to set up lines of communication between mining companies and 
community leadership, so that the State and the counties and their municipalities 
can prepare for growth. Emphasis should be placed on encouraging the maintenance 
of a balanced, diversified economic development as a buffer against the 
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possibility of a sudden downturn in mining after a period of growth, and as 
a way of spreading the benefits of growth over other segments of the community 
as well as those directly involved in mining. For this to happen, ways of 
channeling development funds and investment money into the community are 
needed. Housing and land use planning and regulation will be needed. Phased 
development of additional public service systems, schools, recreation facilities, 
medical facilities, and industrial sites should be planned in advance, and the 
mineral industry should be forced to take some responsibility for helping the 
community to meet the additional demands on it without incurring a disasterous 
debt burden. 
Table V presents a list of potentially affected parties and participants 
at the local level, based on the analysis of Marion and Monongalia Counties 
and Sw~~etwater County. In Table V, ! denotes those who will make the original 
decision to expand coal mining. r denotes those who will be forced to respond 
to such decisions by providing additional services, products, and facilities, 
or who will in the ordinary course of events respond by adjusting their actions 
(businessmen) or political stances (interest groups). I denotes those who will 
be affected involuntarHy, e.g., by rising prices, competition~ or expanded 
opportunities. The active, anticipatory participation in the decision process 
of those denoted r is particularly desirable in order to manage community growth. 
The extent to which real and potential impacts in these three counties are 
generalizable to counties across the nation where future coal development 
~iould occur, is a subject needing further study but is beyond the assignment 
gi ven to TAG. 
1 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 j 
r 
" 
-28-
TABLE V 
Potentially Affected Parties and Participants at the Local Level 
Coal Mines and Companies 
Managers 
Union Miners 
Non-Union Miners 
(x) 
(Y) 
(Y) 
(Z) 
Construction Companies (Y) 
Construction Workers (Z) 
Supporting Industry (Y) 
(Mine Equipment, etc.) 
Trade, Service, and (Y) 
Government Employers 
and Employees 
Local Businessmen (Y) 
Medical and Mental Health (Y) 
Delivery Systems 
School Systems (Y) 
x = Actors, Decisionmakers 
Y= Responders (Participants) 
Z = Non-voluntary Affected Parties 
Housing Industry (Y) 
Public Service Systems 
and Utilities (Y) 
Land Owners (Y) 
County and Municipal (Y) 
Systems: Revenue and 
Expenditures, Employment, 
etc. Elected Officials, 
Government Administratory 
Regional, State, and (Y) 
Local Planners 
Investment and Lending (Y) 
Institutions 
Citizen and Public 
Interest Groups (Y) 
Families of Miners (Z) 
Residents, Especially (Z) 
those on Fixed Incomes, 
Consumers 
Hard-core Unemployed (Z) 
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III. Policy Implications. 
Consideration df potential community-level impacts of expanding deep 
coal mining suggests an area where policy intervention may be in order to 
modify and control detrimental societal consequences from a change in the 
level of utilization of a technology. Intervention options include, at the 
first stage: 
1. Establishment of communication mechanisms between local 
governments and coal companies in localities where coal 
reserves exist. The purpose of the communication chan-
nel is to provide early warning when one or several coal 
companies plan significant expansion in the area, so that 
the community has time to plan for growth. A cooperative 
Community Development Board or committee including repre-
sentatives of mining companies; other industrial, financial, 
and commercial interests; local governments; and public 
interest groups could then prepare strategies for meeting 
anticipated community needs. 
2. A national integrated planning mechanism (either for the 
coal industry or for all energy source industries) at the 
Federal level, to identify areas where extensive develop-
ment is possible and to plan such development in orderly, 
staged phases with prior attention to materials stock-
piling and environmental protection. 
If adverse economic, social, and environmental effects of expanded 
domestic resource exploitation are to be controlled and modified, integrated 
planning methods must be developed; however, such long range planning at 
either the local, the regional, or the national level itself implies signifi-
cant societal consequences which call for prior assessment. Only one aspect 
of the policy intervention option suggested above has been considered by the 
research team in the pY'esent effort: possible conflict with existing anti-
trust legislation and policies. The conflict between anti-trust policy and 
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energy/environmental concerns has been recognized but remains as yet unre-
solved.* 
Federal anti-trust laws are based on the policy that th~ public inter-
est is best served by promotion of free and vigorous competition in the market 
pl'ace; they were enacted to prohibit restraints on that competition. The 
Shennan Act of 1890 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1-7 (1970» provides: 
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal .•.. 
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed gui'lty of a mis-
demeanor .... 
Section 1 makes illegal ~ agreement in restraint of trade regardless 
of the intent of the parties or the public benefit arising from the agreement, 
because such concerted action creates market power which acts in restraint of 
competition. Section 2 prohibits "monopolizing" and conspiracies or combina-
tions to monopolize. Monopolizing is not the mere possession of a monopoly, 
rather "it implies a positive drive apart from sheer competitive skills to 
seize and exert power in the markct."** Intent is the key to violations of 
Section 2 and such intent is seen in the use or acquisi,tion of market power 
or dominance, to enhance pri ces or excl ude competitors. 
*See Rowe,tlAntitrust Policies and Environmental Controls ," 29 Business Lawyer 
897 (April 1974); Blumberg, "Corporate Responsibility and the Environment," 
VIII The Conference Board Record 42 (1971) reprinted in Blumberg, Corporate 
Responsibility in a Changing Society (1972). 
**Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., at 92-94 (1970). 
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When viewed against the background of Federal anti-trust laws, therefore, 
several aspects of the suggested policy options raise questions of legality: 
a. The sharing of business information relating to the expansion 
of employment and/or coal production with (i) local communi-
ties and (ii) other coal companies or lithe coal industry"; 
b. The agreement between competitors over aspects of coal devel~ 
opment and production locally o.nd nationally. 
The determination of the lawfulness of such an arrangement for implementing 
methods of integrated planning in the coal industry also rests on the degree of 
economic concentrat~on and vertical integration of the coal industry and the 
effects and degree of governmental participation in such planning. 
Although free and vi gorous competi ti on is supposed to be enhanced by Ule 
avai 1 abi 1 ity of accurate information on busi ness condit; ons, modern enterprises 
depend for competitive advantage on secrecy and confidentiality rather than on 
an open exchange of information. While the anti-trust laws do not forbid the 
collection and dissemination of business data, the use of such data to control 
prices or output is i1legal.* Even where the information is not used to set 
price or production, the exchange of business 'nformation between competitors 
may yield an unfair competitive edge to the firms sharing the information and 
constitute an agreement in restraint of trade. 
However, an individual company may communicate with the local govern-
ments about its plans for expansion and may agree with the community on a plan 
for development which would promote the quality of life in the community with-
out any anti-trust problem. It is less clear whether communications between 
companies when made through participation with local governments are also free 
*See Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring 
Mfgr's Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
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of anti-trust problems. Whel'e only general information relevant to planning 
and no anti-competitive activities or practices are involved, joint industry 
and governmental consultation does not violate anti-trust prohibitions. In 
fact, as a result of environmental legislation, some cooperative planning 
involving local communities and industry has been encouraged by state and 
Federal governments. * Industry-wide sharing of plans for expanded mining 
activities is not forbidden by the anti-trust laws; indeed a great deal of 
information about company activities is already made public through press 
releases, trade publications, annual reports and other publi, documents. 
The true relevance of the sharing of business information among competitors 
to anti-trust 1av/s is the use which the companies make of the information. 
The primary anti-trust problem of the proposed intervention lies in 
the agreement between competing firms on a plan for the orderly development 
of coal deposits so as to minimize the adverse impacts on the communities 
involved, and to make a concerted response to the economic, social and 
environmental problems. If this agreement were to control the locations and 
rates of expansion of coal industry increases in employment and production, 
it would have an ultimate influence on the output of the coal industry, the 
amount of coal entering the market and the market price, and would be an 
agreement in restraint of trade and illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The problem of an agreement in restraint of trade arises also when more than 
one business enthy agrees with another or another person to control or 1 imit 
its economic activity. 
*See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) and 
Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. §1316. 
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Although the industry and the coal companies were entering into the 
agreement for integrated development with the cooperation of and for the 
benefit of the small communities which would be disrupted by disorderly ex-
pansion, these localities could not offer immunity from anti-trust laws. The 
good intentions of the parties and the social benefit to be gained by such 
agreement are no defense to the illegality of the action in restraint of 
trade. In some regulated industries, such an agreement could be upheld. 
even though it is anti-competitive in nature, if the regulatory body charged 
with the authority to weigh the broader public interests to be served against 
the effects on competition determined that orderly development of coal de-
posits was the more important public int.erest. But the coal industry is not so 
regulated and without specific statutory exemption. the agreement must fail. 
The era of cooperative integrated planning between industry and local govern-
ments must await Federal action on the implications for national anti-trust 
poli cy. 
The coal industry has a high degree of economic concentration. A small 
number of companies control a major portion of the supply and market for coal 
and coal products such as coke. In addition many of the coal companies are 
vertically integrated so that a single corporate entity controls the coal from 
mine to ultimate purchaser. With such an oligopolistic structure, any agree-
ment or course of concerted action among coal companies may also lead to viola-
tions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In determining whether such violations 
might arise out of adoption of an agreemf=(f'~ between major producers or 
industry-wide, the use of the market power created in the agreement as well as 
the intent of the parties WQuld be examined. If the participating companies 
used the information obtained through the agreement,and/or the development plan 
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in the agreement itself as the means to exert market power by controlling 
or influencing the flow of coal to the market or its price or to exclude 
competitors, the requisite intent for violations of Section 2 would probably 
be demonstrated by the course of conduct of the firms so charged. The plan-
ning agreement might also be used to set up exclusive rights of development 
between companies operating in different or the same locations. The poten-
tial for anti-competitive abuse is apparent. 
What, then, can the mining companies do to promote integrated planning 
for expansion of mining activities in cooperation with local governments? 
Without running afoul of the anti-trust laws, they can cooperate on an 
individual basis with local governments and encourage industry-wide coopera-
tion with local governments. They can communicate their plans for expanded 
activities to the localities directly or through media facilities and encourage 
others in the industry to do likewise. They can seek Federal review of de-
velopment agreements between more than one coal company and a locality in the 
appropri ate agency if Federal agency action is invol ved in the development 
or by seeking an opinion from the Department of Justice in a formal Business 
Review Procedure which would provide some limited protection. They can seek 
the establishment of a government-regulated procedure for the adoption and 
implementation for such integrated planning agreements.* 
If, as predicted in this partial techno~ogy assessment, detrimental 
impacts on local communities of rapidly expanded deep coal mining production 
*Blumberg, supra. One of the frequent concerns voiced in his article was 
that fi rms that sought to deal effecti ve ly wi th envi ronmenta 1 concerns would 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage with those firms which neglected 
such responsibilities, the result of these fears would be that firms would 
pressure the government to regulate appropriate corporate responses through 
law. I 
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are sufficiently serious to constitute an eventual constraint on further ex-
pansion because of their effects on productivity, coal mining companies and 
the electric power companies which depend on their output should consider 
the advantages to themselves of actively encouragin9 such voluntary cOlTllluni-
cation and cooperation within the restraints imposed by present anti-trust 
legislation. At a higher level and in a more long-range context, the Federal 
Energy Administration could after more extensive analysis contemplate proposal 
to the U.S. Congress of appropriate modifications of anti-trust legislation 
and establishment of an information and planning mechanism at the Federal level. 
This action could be considered in connection with the establishment of a 
National Materials Information System, now being studied under the auspices 
of the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. Policy analysis of 
the proposed interventions could also be initiated by the House or Senate 
Convni ttee on the Interior and Insul ar Affai rs, by request to the Offi ce of 
Technology Assessment. 
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v. CASE STUDIES 
F. An Integrated Strategy for 
Aircraft/Airport Noise Abate-
ment: A Legal-Institutional 
Analysis of §7 of the Noise 
Control Act of 1972 and Proposals 
Based Thereon 
Louis H. MAYO 
September 1973 (Abstract of 
Report) 
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ABm'RACI' OF REroRT 
The aircraft/airport noise problem has reached it~ present--
and socially unacceptab1e--dimensl.on as a result of several cond-
itions: the reluctance of the Federal Aviation Administration to 
give adequate attention to aircraft/airport nOise, this environ-
mental intrusion being considered to date as a mere "side-effect" 
to the FAA responsibility to promote a national system of safe and 
efficient air transportation; the tardy, piec.emea1 efforts of the 
Congress in confronting the problem prior to 1972, preferring pre-
viously to deal with the situation on a partial §611 "source" control 
basis rather than as a total social problem context involving a 
coordinated inter-Federal as well as a Federa1-State-Loca1-Private 
Sector effort; the uncertainty, both real and professed, of the 
"control structure" concerning who has the authority to do what 
with respect to aircraft/airport noise abatement; the deficiencies 
of "acoustical science" to provide convincing and reliable "demon-
strab1e data" on the magnitude of the adverse effects of noise on 
people and social activities; and the relatively recent emergence 
of a social sensitivity to noise as a serious environmental intru-
sion rather than a necessary or mere incidental "externa1i tytl of a 
progressive, industrialized society. These conditions have produced 
a situation in which noise-abused citizens have been forced. to in i-
tiate judicial remedial actions in order to generate a minimum ef-
fort on the part of responsible governmental entities. Further, 
the lack of both useful data of the effects of noise and viable 
legal theories has inhibited the effectiveness of this reactive ap-
J>ROOEDlNG PAGEBLANlt NOT Fn.lIm 
, 
! 
_~ ___ -",-'-'-,-_...o...:;-, .... ~. '-OiPlptr 7"l>' "'!"""'~"""·#I~""'_"~--~~~":~':'"~~~ -+ .;j-. ___ l-_~_'~&O~~~"_~ 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
i 
" 
""Ii 
- 2 -
proach to aircraft/airport noise abatement although the resources 
are now being marshalled which could result in substantial liability 
to some airport proprietors unless an effective strategy of noise 
abatement is promptly initiated. It is generally agreed., however, 
that the judicial approach is not a suitable means for bringing 
airport operations into compatibility with other cOlIDnunity activities 
and social interests. 
The crucial deficiency with the existing legal/institutional 
control structure is that there has been no integrated approach to 
the problem of aircraft/airport noise abatement. There has been 
no inclusive governmental effort to identify the effects of noise, 
to establish "public health and welfare 1't go,als for the elimination 
or reduction of detrimental effects, and to align noise abatement 
tasks with governmental entities at all levels having the social 
mission interest, the formal authority, the professional capabilities, 
and other existing resources to execute the required tasks in a co-
ordinated manner. Instead, the general disposition of responsible 
or potentially responsible public and private sector entities pro-
ducing, regulating, or otherwise affected by aircraft/airport noise 
has been to evade rather than confront the problem. This has led 
to a practice of each entity acting in isolation rather than in co-
ordination in order to protect itself from liability, additional 
administrative duties, or other real or imagined burdens. 
The Griggs case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1962, which 
placed liability for aircraft noise harm on the airport operator, 
thereby immunizing both the Federal government and the air carriers, 
has been a primary contributor to the inadequacy of the aircraft 
noise regulatory scheme. The Griggs "legal solution" produced 
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habits of thought and patterns of behavior among the major partic-
ipants in the aircraft/airport noise context which have effectively 
precluded a constructive goals-means, social problem approach. Not 
until passage of the Noise Control Act of 1972 was there even a stat-
utory framework which could accommodate systematic development of 
an integrated aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy. 
As of this time, the most critical existing conditions emerge 
from the interactions of the statutory mandate of the Noise Control 
Act of 1972 to bring environmental noise levels into compatil5ility 
wi th the "public health and welfare, N the 1973 Bu'rbank case ruling 
of full Federal preemption over aircraft noise, and the lingering 
liability for aircraft/airport noise imposed on the airport opera-
tor by Griggs. The EPA is obligated to establish the "public health 
and welfare" goal and the FAA is responsible for promulgating appro-
priate regulations for the control of aircraft/airport noise, but 
the airport operator is still left with current and continuing res-
ponsibility for noise harm under the Griggs doctrine. SurelYl a 
recognized principle of social justice is the acceptance of commen-
surate responsibility (whether in terms of accountability or liabi .... 
lity) with the scope of formal authority conferred on and asserted 
by a given entity or level of government. The majority opinion in 
Burbank observed that it is the' "pervasive nature of the scheme of 
federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude 
that there is preemption." 
Among the basic Findings and Conclusions of this Report are 
the following: 
A. Federal control by the EPA and FAA over aircraft/airport 
noise is pervasive as found by the Supreme Court in Burbank, based 
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largely (':u § 7'. of the Noise Control Act of 1972, which includes a 
revised §611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requiring the 
introduction by EPA of "public health and welfare" considerations 
into the FAA §611 aircraft noise regulatory process. 
B. The essentially complete Federal preemption of control 
over aircraft/airport noise necessarily implies, in terms of res-
ponsible public administration, that the Federal government initiate 
the required administrative and legislative actions to design and 
implement an integrated aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy. 
This initiative involves the alignment of authority with responsi-
bility with skill ~apabilities and with financial resources for ef-
fective implementation of the Noise Control Act of 1972/15(a)(2) 
"public health and welfare" goals. 
c. The most promising legal/institutional instrument for the 
design, implementation, and operation of an effective aircraft/air-
port noise regulatory scheme in the near time is the device of air-
port certification for noise pursuant to §6ll and §6l2 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 and §5 and §7 of the Noise Control Act 
of 1972: Major advantages in this admittedly complicated approach 
include: 1) recognition both that there exists a national air trans-
portation system which requires a high degree of uniformity in re-
gulation, and that each particular airport requires a somewhat 
unique approach to its noise abatement task; 2) opportunity for all 
of the principal participants affecting or affected by the aircraft/ 
airport noise situation to contribute to the design and implement-
ation of airport noise abatement plans pursuant to the certification 
process; and 3) provision for all noise abatement techniques (tech-
nological, operational, and land use management) to be applied in 
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a systematic, articulated manner to the noise abatement task. 
D. It is incumbent upon the FAA, in cooperation with EPA, 
1) to provide airport proprietors with reliable data on intended 
or prospective technological and operational abatement actions as 
essential inputs into airport noise abatement plans; and 2) to im-
plement proposed technological and operational abatement actions in 
timely and effectiv.'. fashion so as to enable airport proprietors 
to come into compliance with EPA §5(a)(2) "public health and welfare" 
goals at the earliest practicable date. 
E. There now exists no coordinated system of revenue sources 
and funding mechanisms directed explicitly to aircraft/airport 
noise abatement. Such a system must be a parallel action to that 
of the EPA FAA ~7 aircraft/airport noise regulatory process. Ini-
tiation and coordination must be located at the Federal level so as 
to bring the responsibility for aircraft/airport noise abatement 
into alignment with the authority for abatement which is now lodged, 
per Burbank, in the EPA and the FAA. 
F. A primary consideration in achieving the public health and 
welfare goal in airport noise environments is to effect a realloca-
tion of the "social costs" of aircraft/airport noise so as to 
place the burden of abatement costs on the user/beneficiaries of 
air transportation and thereby relieve noise-exposed non-beneficiaries 
who now suffer this social cost--harm to public health and welfare. 
This is the first level of social justice concern. 
G. The secondary objective is to allocate the costs among 
the user/beneficiaries of air transportation and, insofar as feasible, 
in proportion to the degree of benefit derived. This is the second 
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level of social justice concern. 
The primary Recommendations of this Report are based upon and 
directly related to the foregoing Conclusions. The focal point of 
the entire scheme of recommendations is the imposition of a "pub-
lic health and welfare" noise level requirement as a condition to 
airport operating certificatiop,. Most of the recommendations are 
proposed for reason that they in some manner provide the necessary 
formal authority for or contribute to the efficiency and quality of 
the process of developing airport noise abatement plans. 
The recommendations also reflect a dominant Federal role in 
the implementation of an integrated aircraft/airport noise abate-
ment strategy. This role involves not only authority but the accep-
tance of a commensurate responsibility to provide the essential re-
sources to implement the mandate of the Noise Control Act of 1972. 
However, the recommendations also make clear that States, munici-
palities, non-airport owners but affected jurisdictions, airport 
proprietors, and innumerable private sector entities have indispen-
sable functions in the implementation of an integr.ated noise abate-
ment program. 
The capability for the promulgation and implementation of air-
craft/airport noise standards requires not only a legal mandate but 
adequate administrative and financial resources. Though the Bur-
bank opinion disclaims knowledge of the "ultimate remedy for air-
craft noise which plagues many communities and tens of thousands 
of people," it obviously makes little sense to have the authority 
lodged at the Federal level with other essential resources to be 
supplied at the State/local level. This is essentially the mis-
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alignment between legal authority, political and social capability, 
and financial resources which has negated effective noise abatement 
efforts since Griggs. This misalignment of legal authority and im-
plementation resources can be corrected only by Federal level action. 
It would seem incumbent upon the Congress, commensurate with the 
authority lodged at the Federa.l level, to provide the abatement im-
plementation resources which are beyond the ability of State or mun-
icipal airport owners or of airport proprietors to assemble. 
The recommendations made with respect to the funding of an in-
tegrated aircraft/airport noise abatement strategy recognize the 
need for new or expanded versions of existing funding arrangements 
and mechanisms for the collection of revenues from appropriate 
sources and the disbursement to designated abatement action entities 
(public or private) in a systematic and equitable manner. It is 
stressed"that such funding programs should make maximum use of exis-
ting revenue sources and mechanisms in order to simplify and expe-
dite implementation of essential abatement actions. In this connec-
tion it is recommended that the Airport and Airway Development Act 
of 1970 be amended to: 1) provide explicitly for grants for noise 
abatement purposes; 2) require that approval of ADAP grants for 
whatever purpose be conditioned upon adequate consideration of noise 
effects in addition to air and water quality; and 3) that the "spon-
sor" category be enlarged to include "adjacent non-airport owner 
jurisdictionslt and relevant private sector entities. It is also 
recommended that the tax on sources of revenue now provided in the 
Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 be increased so as to bring 
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund resources to a level commensurate 
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with the Federal responsibility to contribute effectively to the 
implementation of an integrated aircraft/airport noise abatement 
strategy. 
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Dennis W. BREZINA. (April 68) 
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Evaluating the Social Impacts of the AntiCipated 
Effects of Such Alternatives. 
Louis H. MAYO. (Nov. 72) GWPS·OP 14: 
56 pp. N73·14968 
Some Comments on Technology Assessment and 
the Environment. 
Raphael G. KASPER.(Nov. 70) GWPS·Op 8; 
13 pp. PB 196-640 
Some Effects of Federal Procurement of Research 
and Development 00 Industry. 
Guy BLACK. (July 68J GWPS-SDP 302; 
70 pp. PB 182-880. 
Some Implications of the n.choology Assessment 
Function for the Effeol.ive Public Decision-Making 
Process. 
Louis H. MAYO. (May 71) 
30pp. 
GWPS,OP 12: 
PB 201-049. 
Some IS$ues In Preparing Science Administration 
Leadership for Tc:morrow. 
Dwight WALOO. (Dec. 69) 
23pp. 
GW?S-OP6; 
PB 192-551. 
Some Legal, Jurisdictional, and Operatlonallmpll-
cations of a Congressional Technology Assess-
ment Component. 
LouIs H. MAYO. (Dec. 69) 
59pp. 
GWPS·SDP 207: 
N70-26454. 
.. ~~---.--~ -- '~r--~ 
t 
Some Research Approaches to Studying the Devel-
opmeot and Fuoctioniog of Technology Assess-
meot-Control Processes. 
Richard MYRICK and Barbara S MARX (Fall 67) 
30 pp. GWPS·SDP 200; 
PB 182-872. 
Space Program and the Urban Problem: Case 
Studies of the Compooents of National Consensus. 
Johr Y MOESER. (Spring 69) GWPS-SDP 404: 
48 pp. PB 192-560. 
Systems Approach aod the Urban Dilemma. 
Robert G. SMITH. (July 68) GWPS·SDP 404: 
49 pp. PB 182-869. 
Systems Approaches to Multi-Variable Soclo-Eco-
nomic Problems: An Appraisal. 
Ernest M. JONES. (Aug. 68) GWPS·SDP 103; 
70 pp. PB 182-871. 
[l3ecame Reprint # 4] 
"Systems Approaches to Socia-Economic Prob-
lems Confronting Governments: An Appraisal." 
Ernest M. JONES. From the Journal of Public Law, 
Vol. 18, # 1 , June 1969. Reprint # 4 
(June 69) 60 pp. 
Technology As!'~ssment and Citizen Action. 
Ellis R. MOnUR. (March 71) GWPS-OP 10; 
26 pp. PB 199-161. 
Technology Assessmeot and Environmental 
Engineering. 
Ellis R. MOnUR. (Jan. 71) 
19 pp. 
GWPS-OP 10; 
PB 197-687. 
Technology Assessmeot of Space Stations. 
Vary T. COATES. (May 71) GWPS-SDP 212; 
65 pp. PB 201-073. 
Technolo(IY Assessment: What Should It Be? 
Guy BLA(iK (June 71) 54 pp. GWPS-SDP 211; 
PB201-471. 
"Techoology, the Evolu\ioo of the Transnational 
Corporation, and the Nation-State: A Speculative 
Essay. 
,\(thur S. MILLER. (Oct. 72) GWPS·MON 14; 
72 pp. N73-12988. 
Technology Tral1$,fer by People Transfer, 
Clarence H. DANHOF. (Aug. 69) _ GWPS·SDP 403; 
20 pp. PB 192-559 
"Toward the 'Techno-Corporate' State: An Essay 
io American Constitutionalism." 
Arthur S. MILLER. From the Villanova Law, Re'vlew, 
Vol. 14. # 1. Fail 1968. Reprint ;:-3 
(Dec. 68) 73 pp. 
• Toward a New Federal Policy for Technology: The 
Outline Emerges. 
John M. LOGSDON. (Aug. 72) GWPS-SDP 408: 
30pp. N73-13987. 
U.S. Techoology: Trends aod Policy Issues. 
Michael BORETSKY. (Oct. 73\ GWPS-MON 17; 
175 pp. N74-13689 
Urban Development Modeling. 
George C. HEMMENS. GWPS-MON 6: 
(April 70) 38 pp. PB 192·546 
What's Happening 10 Small Business Research 
and Development? 
Guy BLACK. (May 71) 17 pp. GWPS·SDP303: 
PB 201-074. 
r 
c. 
~ .Z,· 
l 
I 
B. BOOKS AND PROJECT REPORTS 
Reports available only from GWU. Not available through NTIS. See How to Order. 
Analysis of the Need For and Feasibility of More 
Effective Distribution 01 Government-Supported 
Non-Written Material. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Educational Policy Group. 
A report. April 1970. Prepared for the U.S. Office of 
Education, this report was used as a basis for a book 
entitled "The Dissemination of Audio-VIsual Materials: 
A Study of the Systems that Supply our Schools." The 
writing of the book is supported by a grant from the 
Ford Foundation. Publication Is expected in 1974. 
Application of Systems Analysis to Government 
Operations. 
Guy BLACK. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, 
186 pages ($15). Ubrary of Congress No. 68-18914. 
A book clarifying in a very short space a large number 
of difficult concepts and ideas surrounding the appli-
cation of systems analysis. 
Candidates and Priorities for Technology Assess-
·ments: A Survey of Federal Executive Agency 
Professionals. 
Howard C. REESE with Peter R. Bankson, George E. 
HUMPHRIES, and Ben F. Sands. Jr. A report. July 
1973, 119 pages. A survey by questionnaires and 
interviews of middle·to,upper·level Federal omcials to 
determine technological developments in need of 
technology assessment. Data from both modes re-
sulted In 457 nominees and 367 candidates for tech· 
nology assessment. Prepared for the National 
Science Foundation (RANN/ERPA). 
Case Studies on the Evaluation 01 Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare Programs. 
James G. ABERT (ed.) May 1974. A volume of 
twenty·one case studies with commentary. which the 
student and practitioner of evaluative research will 
find useful and Interesting. About 500 pages. Pre· 
pared for the Russell Sage Foundetion. 
Citizen Group Uses of Scientific and 
Technological Information in Nuclear Power 
Cases. 
Steven EBBIN and Raphael KASPER. A report. 
August 1973. 2 Volumes. 343 pages. Prepared for 
the National Science Foundation. This report was 
used as a basis for a book, "Citizen Groups and the 
Nuclear Power Controversy: Uses of Scientific and 
Technological Information" published by MIT Press in 
January 1974. 
COli1puters in the Classroom: An Interdisciplinary 
View of Trends and Alternatives. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Marion R. MISCH editors). 
New York: Spartan Books. 1970. [$14 i• Abook con· 
cerning future computer uses In elementary and sec· 
ondary education, this book is based on a report pre-
pared for the U.S. Office of Education in the Autumn 
of 1967 entitled "Education in the 70's" [see below). 
Consumer Motivation and Participation In Planning 
and Use of Transportation Services. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Marion R. MISCH. First 
Year Report. October 1974. 95 pages. Prepared for 
the Program of University Research. V.S. Department 
Of Transportation. Second Year Report in Progress. 
A Critical Review of the Marine Science Commis-
sion Report, 1969. 
Thomas CLINGAN (ed.). A report. 144 pages. Avail· 
able from Marine Technology Law Society. 1730 M 
St.. N.W .• Washington, D.C. 
Decision to Go to the Moon: Project APOLLO and 
the National Interest. 
John M. LOGSDON, Cambridge. Mass,r 'M.lT. Press, 
1970. LC 73-110230. A political ~",~ntist examines 
the Influence of men and events on (he decision·mak-
ing process. A thorough historical record of this event. 
Dlssemlnatior. of Audio-Visual Materials: A Study 
of the Systems that Supply our Schools. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN .and the Educational Policy 
Group. A book to be published In ., 976, the writing of 
which Is sUpported by a grant from the Ford Founda· 
tion. It Is based on a report prepared for the U.S. 
Office of Education Tn April 1970 entitled "Analysis ot 
the Need For and Feasibility of More Effective DIWI· 
bution of Government·Supported Non·Written 
Material." 
Education In the 70·s. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Marion R. MISCH. A 
report. Autumn 1967. Prepared for the U.S. Office of 
Education. this report was used as a basis for a book 
publ;shed by Spartan Books. New York in 1970 en· 
titled "Computers in the Classroom: An Interdisci· 
pllnary View of Trends and Alternatives." 
Effect of Changing Patterns and Levels 01 Federal 
Research and Development Funding on Industry. 
Guy BLACK. A report. July 1973. 448 pages. Pre· 
pared for the National Science Foundation. Industry 
Studies Group. 
Effects 01 Limited-Access Highways on Nearby 
Churches. 
Joel GARNER with Joseph L TROPEA. A report. 
October 1971. 25 pages. Prepared for the Federal 
Highway Administration. 
Evaluation of GIJldelines and Noise-Related Envlr-
onmentallmpact Statements. 
LOUis H. MAYO and Study Team. Final report. March 
March 1974. Two Parts, 3 vol. Part One: Vol. 1, 
"NEPA Section 102(2) (C) Environmental Impact 
St(.tements Relating to Potential Noise Impacts of 
Feoerally Funded ProJects," 116 pp. Part Two: Vols. 
2 (250 pp.). 3 (251 pp.), "A Legal/Institutional 
A'lalysis of the Public Health and Weltare Mandate of 
the Noise Control Act of 1972:' Prepared for the 'En-
vironmental Protection Agency. Office of Noise Con-
trol Programs. 
Evaluation of the Effectiveness 01 Illustrated Print 
Media (Nonverbal) on Family Planning Attitudes 
Among Colombians. 
Joseph· B. MARGOLIN and Marion R. MISCH. A re-
port. July, 1974. 112 pages. In·deplh soclal/phycho-
logical study of the motivations of poor women in less 
developed countries a.bout contracepti<;>ns and abor-
tion including their attitudes, actual practices, effect-
iveness of certain media In Improving attitudes and 
behavior in family planning. Prepared for AID. U.S. 
Department of State. 
EvalUation of the Operating EffiCiencies of the 
National Criminal Justice Reference S&rvice 
(NCJRS). 
V3fY T. COATES. Yehuda KIRCHINBOIM (Atai). and 
Judith R. RUSSELL March 1975, 84 pages. Study 
evaluates the internal operations of the NCJRS as 
they relate to its goal$ and the definition of an Informa-
tion retrelva[ system. Prepared for the Law Envorce-
menl Assistance Administration. U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
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Evaluation of Oak Ridge National Laboratory Re-
port on Technology Assessment of Modular Inte-
grated Utility System (MIUS). 
Louis H. MAYO, Report to the National Bureau of 
Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce. 230 
pages. June 1975. 
Evaluative Mechani.ms for the Public Experimen-
tal Program of the Nationai Endowment for the 
Humanitle •• 
Guy BLACK and James E. MAHONEY. A report. Sep· 
tember 1969, 3 large volumes. Prepared for the Na· 
tional Endowment for the Humanities, Washington. 
D.C. 
Federal Contributions to Management: Effects on 
the Public and Private Sectors. 
David S. BROWN (editor). New York; Praeger Publish· 
ers, 1971. 405 pages. this book wa.s based on 
papers presented before a series of iieminars on 
"Federal Contributions to Management" sponsored 
by the Program of Policy Studies In Science & Tech· 
nology during the Spring and Fall of 1968. 
FOlterlng Urban Tranilportation Activities in Uni· 
versitles: Recommendations to the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration. 
Charlton R. PRICE and Study Team. Final Report. 
February 1974. 110 pages. NTIS PB 229·613/AS 
($8.75 hard copy. $1.45 microfilm). Prepared for the 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S. De· 
partment of Transportation. 
Homeowner's Tltie Registration Corporation: A 
Program to Reduce the Land-Related Costs of 
Housing. 
James M. BROWN. A report. February 1972, 4 vol· 
umes, 900 pages. Prepared for the Office of Eco· 
nomic and Market Analysis, Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, Washington, D.C. 
Innovation Information and Analysis Project. 
Wesley L. TENNANT. First Quarterly Report. July 
1973. Prepared for the National Science Foundation, 
National Research and Development Assessment 
Program (RDA). 
An Integrated Strategy for Aircraft' Airport Noise 
Abatement. 
Louis H. MAYO. A report. September 1973, 264 
pages. A Legal/Institutional Analysis of Section 7 of 
the Noise Control Act of 1972 and proposals based 
thereon. Prepared for the Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Noise Control Programs. 
Intellectual-Historical Basis for Explicit Recogni-
tion of an "Exploration Ethic" as a Component of 
Western Culture. 
Milton Marney and Jerry Delli Prisco Ii. May 1975, 401 
pages. Study aimed at examination of an "exrloration 
ethic" as a component of Western culture with an ob-
Jective to improve understanding of the personal moti· 
Vatlons and the public rationale of risks and benefits 
which have moved men, institutions, nations, or civili· 
zations to historic efforts of physical discovery and a 
conceptual analysis of the contribution of such an 
ethic to multlvalued measures of societal adaptability, 
Prepared for Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA. 
Internll!tlonal PartiCipation In an Experimental 
El!rth Resources Survey Sa.t!lllite Program. 
John HANESSIAN. Jr. and John M LOGSDON. Are· 
port. April 1970, 114 pages. Prepared for the Office 
of International Affairs, NASA. 
Inventory and Appraisal of George Washington 
University Activities In Urban Social/Minority 
Group Problem Areas. 
Program of Policy Studies in Science & Technology. A 
report. May 1968. 70 pages. Prepared for the Presi-
dent of The Gaorge Washington University. 
Laws and Regulatory Schemes for Noise Abate-
ment. 
Louis H. MAYO. A report. December 1971, 638 
pages. Prepared for the Office of Noise Abatement 
and Control. Environmental Protection Agency, Wash·. 
ington. D.C. EPA Report #NTID 300.4; available from 
NTIS as PB 206·719. 
Legal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of liabil-
Ity and Financial Responsibility as Related to 011 
Pollution, Volume II: Study. 
Erling ROSHOLDT. A report. December 1970, 347 
pages, Prepared for the U.S. Coast Guard, 
Washington, D.C. Available from NTIS as PB 198·176. 
[Vol. I, "Oil Pollution Liability and Financial Responsl' 
bility; Repor!." December, 1970, was prepared by the 
U.S. Coast Guard. 25 pages.) 
Modeling Adaptive Systems: Rudiments 01 Two 
Normative-Theoretic Approaches. 
Milton C. MARNEY and Robert W. ANTHONY. Are· 
port to Olin Corporation Charitable Trust. 36 pages. 
Presented at Institut de la vie, World Conference, 
Vers un Plan d'Action pour Humanite," Palais de 
Congres, Paris, September, 1974. Published in Pro-
ceedings of the Conference (M. Marois, ed.) New 
York: American Elsevier, 1975. 
A National Criminal Justice Reference Service. 
James E. MAHONEY and David WEEKS. A report. 
January 1971, 36 pages. Prepared for the Law En· 
forcement Assistance Administration, Department of 
Justice. Washington. D.C. The model for an informa-
tion reference system recommended in this report 
was the basis for a system which is now national in 
scope and which is broadening into international 
application. 
Political Economy 01 the Space Program. 
Mary A. HOLMAN. Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 
1974, $24.95. 
Processes 01 Technological Innovation: A Concep-
tual. Systems Model. 
Ellis R. MOTIUR. A report. January 1968. 297 pages. 
Prepared for the National Bureau of Standards Ot(I\~e 
of Invention & Innovation and the Arms Control& Dis-
armament Agency, this report covers the first phase 
of the Technological Innovation Policy Project. Inter· 
nal Reference No. NBS 9689. [The final report, 
"Technological Innovation for Clvllian, Social pur· 
poses." \:.Ias submitted in July 1971. (553 pages)). 
Revitalization 01 Small Communities: Transporta-
tion Options. 
Vary T. COATES. First PhaSe Report. July 1973. 2 
volumes, 2.40 pages. Volume 2 Is a Bibliographic reo 
view of literature in this area. Prepared for Department 
of Transportation, Office of Urban Transportation 
Systems. 
Vary T. COATES. Second Phase Report, prepared for 
. ·the Program of University Research. U,S. Department 
of Trarisportation '1 volume, approx. 300 pages to be 
pUblished .Il,ugusl, 1975. Studies eight U.S. small 
towns and their transportation problems. 
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Rural Women's Groups as Potential Change 
Agents: A Study of Columbia, Korea, and the 
Phllllppines. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Marion R. MISCH. A report 
prepared for the Technical Assistance Bureau, 
Agency for International Development. May 1975, 
121 pages, Including 15 page Executive Summary. 
Preliminary asr.>qssment of rural women's groups as 
change agen~ .for developrnent, particularly in the 
areas of famlly planning, nutrition and public h\9alth 
and family income or capital accumulation. 
Social Impacts of Civil Aviation and Implications 
for R&D Polley. 
Louis H. MAYO and Civil Aviation Study Group. Are· 
port. April 1971, 220 pages. Prepared for the Joint 
DOT INASA Civil Aviation R&D Policy Study (TST·30), 
Washington, D.C. Published by NASA in September 
1971 asNASACR·1988. 
The Southern Regional Conferllnce on Technology 
Assessment - A Summary of e Conference. 
Vary T. COATES and John E. MOCK. A report. Oct. 
1974, 86 pages. Conference held May 6·8, 1974 on 
campus of the Georgia Institute of Technc,bgy, AtIan· 
ta, Ga. Prepared for the Office of Intergovernmental 
Science and Research Utilization, Natlonal Science 
FOUndation. 
Strategies for the Use of Mass Communications 
Media In the Technologically Developing Nations. 
Joseph B. MARGOLIN and Educational Policy Group. 
A report. November 1971 , 574 pages In five volumes. 
Prepared forthe U.S. AID/AED, Washington, D.C. 
Technology and Public Policy: The Process of 
Technology Assessment In the Federal G.lvern-
ment. 
Vary T. COATES. A report. July 1972, 650 pilges. 
Available from NTIS as follows: 
Summary Report (50 pp,) PB·211455 
Vol. 1, Final Report (350 pp.) PB·211453 
Vol 2, Appendices (250 pp.) PB·211454 
Prepared and supported in part by the National 
Science Foundation's program of Research Applied 
to National Needs (RANN). 
Technology Assessment: The Proceedings of a 
Seminar Series. 
Raphael G. KASPAR (editor). A report. July 1969, 164 
pages. Available from NTIS under no. N69·40301. [A 
book based thereon was published by Praeger Pub· 
lishers, New York in 1971 under Library of Congress 
- #LC 71·161909.(See below)]. 
Technology Assessment: Understanding the So· 
clal Consequences of Technological Applications. 
Raphael G. KASPER (editor). New York: Praeger Pub· 
lishers, 1971. ($15). Library of Congress" 1·161909. 
A book based on the July 1 969 report of the discus· 
slons and pror.:e{:ldings of a seminar series on Tech· 
nology Assessment. 
Technology Assessment Applied to Urban Solid 
Waste Management. 
Henry BRADY and Betsy AMIN·ARSALA. A report. 
December 1971, 190 pages. Prepared for the Nation· 
al Science Foundation in cooperation with EcoSys· 
tems, Inc. 
Technology Assessment 61 Extraction of Coal by 
Underground Mining Methods: Task I - Commun-
ity Level Impacts, and Task 11 - Identification of 
Mlected Parties. 
Vary T. COATES. Subcontractor report to Hlttman 
Associates. Inc., Columbia, MD, for the Electric Pov.er 
ReseOilrch Institute. 93 pages. June 1975. 
--.-------- -·---r-
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Technology Assessment Implementation Project. 
Raphael KASPER and Ellis MOnUR. A report. June 
1973, 2 volumes, 522 pages. Prepared for the Na· 
tional Science Foundation (RANN/ERPA) to develop 
detailed plans for further, in·depth, inter·disciplinary 
research projects on SOCiety's Acceptance and Im-
plementation of Technology Assessments. 
Technology Assesllment of New or Improved Ma-
terials Information Systems. 
Fred B. WOOD and Assessment Team. A report. Oc· 
tober 1975 (forthcoming). Prepared for the Office of 
Technology Assessment, United States Congress. An 
evaluation of alternative institulional, technological. 
and implementation arrangements for new or im· 
proved materials information systems, and an assess· 
ment of the primary and secondary impacts and major 
policy issues. Materials are defined here to Include 
the full range of natural resources used in the produc-
tion process. 
Technological Innovation for Civilian, Social 
Purposes. 
Ellis R. MOnUR. Final report of a two·phase study. 
July 1971, 553 pages. Prepared for the Office of In· 
vention .find Innovation, National Bureau of Standards, 
and for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. !The fil'st phase report, "The Processes of 
Technological Innovation: A Conceptual Systems 
Model" was submittetl in January 1968 (297 pages)]. 
A separate volume of 47 pages is entitled "A Bibli-
ography on Technological Innovation" which may be 
of benefit to other researchers in this area. 
Toward IncreasIng the SocIal Relevance of the 
Contemporary University. 
Richard F. ERICSON. August 1969, 36 pages. A sum· 
mary statement of the history and then current status 
of the Interdisciplinary Systems and Cybernetics 
Projects. 
The Traffic Safety Law System. 
Vary T. COATES. Subcontractor report to Human 
Sciences Research, Inc., McLean, VA for the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 85 pages. Review of 
literature on the traffic safety law system to identify 
research relating to the effectiveness of the system in 
reducing unsafe driving behavior of ordinary drivers. 
Evaluation of the state of knowledge. description of 
countermeasures in effed and proposed, and identiii· 
cation of areas of further research. 
Trends In Federal Land Use Law Relating to Inven-
tories; Monitoring, and Evaluation. 
Charles M. LAMB. A report. April 1974, 86 pages. 
NTIS N74·21623. Prepared for the Office of Univer· 
sity Alfairs, NASA. 
Trends in Western European Political and Eco-
nomic Policies, 1969-1985. 
John HANESSIAN, Jr. and International Studies 
Group. A report. September 1970, 5 volumes, 516 
pages. Prepared for Battelle Memorial Institute as part 
of a contract for the Office of Scientific Research, 
U.S.A.F. 
A Workbook on Alternative Future Life Styles Re-
lated to Energy Demand. 
Vary T. COATEi3. A report. August 1973, 192 pages. 
Prepared for the Ford Foundation Energy Policy 
Project. 
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C. SPECIAL SERIES OF THE INNOVATION INFORMATION AND 
ANALYSIS PROJECT 
Available only from G WU. Not available from NTIS. See How to Order. 
1. Book L1ltl: 
1.01 Book List (; 1: tlAP Staff, March, 1974. A listing 
of more than 300 books and 40 dissertations 
pertaining to the field of innovation. (Available 
only In Xerox copy.) 100 pp. 
1.02 Book List 112: IIAP Staff, July, 1974, A listing of 
more than 125 books and 50 dissertations per-
taining to the field of innovation. (Available only 
in Xerox copy.) 70 pp. 
1.03 Book List 113: IIAP Staff, October, 1974. An 
annotated listing of more than 175 books. 
70pp. 
1.04 Book List 114: IIAP Staff, July, 1975. An anno' 
tated listing of 187 booKs. 
2. Cumulative Accesslon!..ists: 
2.01 Cumulative Document Accession List # 1: IIC 
Staff. March, 1974. An index of articles and 
documents pertaining to innovation. Documents 
# 1-99~ listod. (Available only in Xerox copy.) 
200pp. 
2.02 Cumulative Document Accession List # 2: IIC 
Staff, October, 1974. An index of articles and 
documents pertaining to innovation. Documents 
II 1 000-1700 are listed. 150 pp. 
2.03 Cumulative Document Accession List 113: IIC 
Staff, (Winter 1974-75). An index of articles and 
documents pertaining to innovation. Documents 
II 1701-3199 are alphabetically listed. 250 pp. 
2.04 Cumulative Document Accession List 114:,IIAP 
Staff (September, 1975). An index of articles 
and documents pertaining to innovation. Docu-
ments II 3200-4699 are alphabetically listed. 
300pp . 
3. Special Bibliographic S.arche,: 
3.01 A Bibliography of Case Studies oflnnovatlon, by 
Gordon K. Gayer, 1974. II bibliography review 
with commentary. 40 pp. 
::':<)2 Size of Firm In Relation to Inventive Activity: A 
Selected Bibliography ~ Part I,~IC Staff, 1974. 
A compilation of document abstracts. 68 pp. 
'. 3 
3.03 Behavioral Aspects of Innovatlon:- A selected 
Bibliography - Patt I, IIC Staff, 1974. A compil-
ation of document abstracts. 66 pp. 
4. Special Analytical Reports 
4.01 Conferencing Via Computer, by Charlton Price, 
1974. A review of activity In computer confer-
encing. It discusses current types and tech-
niques of conferencing via computer; the costs 
and benefits of this communications medium 
compared with others, and some potential appli-
oations. 38 pp. 
4.02 Multi-Case Studies of Industrial Innovation: A 
Survey and State of the Art, Grodun K. Gayer, 
1974. A narrative survey of more than 20 multi-
case studies of Innovation. It deals with mult/-
case studies of the last 15-20 years, and re-
views the state of/he art. 96 pp. 
4.03 Post-war Japanese Technological Growth and 
Innovation: A Comparative Review of the Liter-
ature, by William Fischer, 1974. An analytioal 
review of technological innovation in relation to 
postwar Japanese economic growth. Included 
are discussions of technological innovation in 
relation to: Industrial R&D, Japanese Manage-
ment practices, technological entrepreneur-
ship, gov~rnment Intervention and technologi-
callmportalion. It ends with a discussion of the 
"Japanese Innovation Cycle." 110 pp. 
4.04 Size of Firm and Its Relationship to Inventive 
Activity. Deborah K. Saulsbury, 1975. 65 pp. 
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D. WORKING PAPERS ON TECHNOL~~Y~"rRANSFER AND 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
These papers should not be quoted or reproduced without permission of the authors, 
Available only from GWU. See How to Order. 
Catalogue of the Issues Involved with the Transfer of Technology to Lalln America, GWU University Policy Studies Re· 
search Group, August 13, 1974; 41 pp. 
Export Control System: 1945-1975, Howard Gobstein, Working Paper G-1, Spring 1975; 23 pp. 
International Codes of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, GWU University Policy Studies Team, August 13, 1974; 
64pp. 
Internal/anal Rfce Research Institute (IRRI) Small Agricultural Machinery Project, Carol Ulinski, Working Paper U-7, 
June 5, 1975; 75pp. 
Interpreting U.S. Foreign Policy 011 Food and Energy, Henry R. Nau, January 30, 1975 (prepared for AAAS annaul 
meeting, January 1975), 21 pp. 
Kamaz: Chronology and Issues - A Case Study in U.S. Participation in Soviet Industrial Expansion, Scott Finer and 
Howard Gobstein. Working Paper FG-4, June 5, 1975; 44 pp. 
Manulacturing Enterprise Relationships in East-West Technology Transfer; Theoretical Models and Practical 
Experiences, Eric W. Hayden and Henry R. Nau, July, 1975, 28 pp. 
"New Direr:tions" of U.S. Technical Assistance Programs: A Critique, Henry R. Nau, March 21, 1975; 32 pp. 
Technology Transfer and Advanced Western Countries: International Cooperallon in Energy R&D, Jim L<:lster. Working 
Paper J-5, May 23,1975; 86 pp. 
Technology Transfer in the Aluminum Bauxite Industry, Mary M. Allen, Working Paper MMA-5, June 5, 1975; 56 pp. 
Technology, U.S. Foreign Policy and the International System: Postwar Experience, Henry R. Nau, August 1975; 
40pp. 
U.S. Aid Policy and Appropriate Technologies: Model for Future Programs?, HenrY R. Nau and Carol Ulinski, Working 
Paper NU-1 ; July 15, 1975; 49 pp. 
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
GUY BLACK is Professor of Business Economics and Chairman of the 
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